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The work of Robert Henryson constitutes a sophisticated critical engagement with
Scholastic literary theory, embodying a deep commitment to the priorities dictated by
that theory while attending closely to the problems which it presents. The works of St
Augustine and other medieval thinkers provide the theoretical background to the
suspicion of poetic discourse which recurs throughout Henryson's works. The common
accusations that poets are liars and rouse the passions, which lead in the earlier Middle
Ages to a minimising of the authority which attaches to poetic discourse, are founded on
a consideration of how such writing destabilises meaning in resisting assimilation to a
referential model of linguistic signification. Comparative analysis of the exemplative
theory of Averroes and the interpretative strategies of allegoresis illustrates that the
affective literary theory of Scholasticism positively reappraises literature by making it
conformable to a referential view of language. Developments in late-medieval
philosophy which produce a tension between Scholastic theory's idealising and affective
emphases result in modifications of that theory among vernacular writers which exploit
its transformative potential, as exemplified in Dante's Commedia. Henryson's work
similarly enacts a process of critique and modification of Scholastic theory, providing a
particularly flexible and critical deployment of its resources. The patterns of disjunction
which occur in the Moral Fables are organised around the need to define a model of
signification which closely addresses particular circumstances without having the
destabilising forces of textuality undermine the ideal basis ofmeaning. Henryson's
work both posits and criticises a range of literary solutions to the problems. New
concepts of authorship which Henryson introduces, while suggesting affiliations with
Renaissance humanism, are couched in terms which show that they derive from and
modify Scholastic theory. The Testament ofCresseid employs these concepts in
developing a perspectival mode of signification which encompasses the idealising and
particularising imperatives of Scholastic theory but which is in turn problematised by
the Fables' depiction of the limitations of human vision. Henryson's treatment of
rhetoric and social injustice in the Fables displays a traditional concern over literature's
inefficacy in producing reform which is for him exacerbated by the crisis of
representation which sees actual reality and ideal moral norms divided. For Henryson,
moral and social problems are also problems of semiotics with the epistemological status
of literary signification at their core. The diverse positions adopted in his work are
structured by interpretative problems and imperatives which derive from Scholastic
theory.
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Rei per Signa: Medieval
Language Theory and the
Early-Medieval Suspicion
of Imaginative Literature
Cum subito raptus in spiritu, ad tribunal judicis pertrahore [...].
Interrogatus de conditione, Christianum me esse responsi. Et ille
qui praesidebat: Mentiris, ait, Ciceronianus es, non Christianus;
Ubi enim thesaurus tuus, ibi et cor tuum.
(St Jerome, Epistola XXII1)
1
In his introduction to Medieval Theory ofAuthorship Alistair Minnis
comments on the consistency of Scholastic literary theory while at the
same time emphasising the fact that it is a system which is constantly
developing2. In this he focuses on an issue which is central to any
discussion of the development of literary attitudes in the Middle Ages: to
what extent can one assume a continuity within medieval perspectives on
literature when it is clear (as Minnis' book illustrates) that these
perspectives contained considerable variety and underwent much
modification? This in turn invites one to ask how, given the plurality of
possible theoretical positions, medieval intellectuals could maintain that
sense of the homogeneity of thought which is so characteristic of them.
Yet that they did so to a remarkable extent is clear from, to give one
example, the criteria used to evaluate a text's auctoritas. As Alistair
Minnis points out, 'to have "intrinsic worth", a literary work had to
conform, in one way or another, with Christian truth; an auctor had to
say the right things'3. Given that the numerous auctoritates available
spanned a vast range of theoretical positions, from Augustine to pseudo-
Dionysius to Aquinas, it is hard to see how the required degree of
1. Epistola XXII, in Patriologiae Cursus Completus Latinae (henceforth PL), ed.
J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844-64), 22, 394-426, xxx (col.416). (References to PL are to volume
and column numbers, respectively.)
2. A.J. Minnis, Medieval Theory ofAuthorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in
the Later Middle Ages (London: Scolar Press, 1984), p.2.
3. Minnis, Authorship, pp.10-11. See this section also for a discussion of the
significance of the terms auctor, auctoritas. Basically an auctor was a writer judged
worthy to be given credence. An auctoritas was an excerpt from such a writer's work,
while the same term could also mean the quality of authoritativeness attached to author
and text.
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concordance could be derived. Why does this plurality not lead them to a
conscious sense of thought as heterogeneous, disrupting any sense of an
overall unity?
An explanation for this may perhaps be found in the medieval
view of the structure of thought. Jacques Derrida, in 'Structure, Sign and
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'4, describes the concept of
structure which, until recently, has characterised thought on such
matters:
Structure - or rather the structurality of structure - although it has
always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and
this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of
presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to
orient, balance, and organize the structure [...] but above all to
make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would
limit what we might call the play of the structure. [...] As center, it
is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or
terms is no longer possible. [...] Thus it has always been thought
that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very
thing within a structure which while governing the structure,
escapes structurality. That is why classical thought concerning
structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, within the
structure and outside it. The center is at the center of the totality,
and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part
of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere.
(pp.278-279)
This brings to mind that moment in the Paradiso where Dante perceives
the spiritual structure of the universe as a series of concentric rings with
God as a point of light at the centre5. This spiritual reversal of the
universe's spatial ordering can be seen as embodying the view of
structure outlined by Derrida and emphasising its importance to
medieval thought. The divine essence is outside and independent of the
plurality and mutability of the temporal world. But at the same time it
provides a centre around which the contingent world circles, and in which
its temporal contradictions and uncertainties are resolved.
In the same way, the particularities and individuating elements of
medieval thought are ultimately traced back to a unified truth in which
all thought comes together in harmony. Thus, Jesse M. Gellrich remarks
that although medieval grammatical theory touches on potentially
4. Jacques Derrida, 'Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences', in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1978), pp.278-293.
5. The Divine Comedy, trans. C.H. Sisson (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993), Paradiso, XXVII, 16-78.
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disruptive aspects of language, such as the view of the relation between
signifier and signified as conventional, these are subsumed within the
service of a wider exercise:
Signs and signification, as they were explored in grammatica [...]
and in the hermeneutics of Scripture, remain committed to a wider
intellectual preoccupation with stabilizing the sign, and tracing
utterance back to a fixed origin, such as the primal Word spoken by
God the Father.6
The varying intellectual positions which occur in the Middle Ages may in
this way be seen as pertaining to a wider exercise aimed at perpetuating
a dominant view of the structure of thought. Modifications and
differences in thought have their centrifugal influence reduced by being
part of an intellectual exercise which propagates the idea of a centre to
which they are anchored but which is itself independent of them, not
being subject to the processes of variation and transformation which
characterise the particular structures of thought which it governs. The
concept of such a centre, by virtue of the appearance of stability which it
lends, limits the scope for disruption implicit in the range of particular
theoretical positions.
Thus, in the preface to his Sic et Non, Peter Abelard (d. 1142)
expounds the view that differences and inconsistencies between auctores
could be legitimately examined in order that the auctores can be
reconciled in a common relation to ultimate truth7. In this way difference
is seen as not calling into question the unifying and validating existence
of a centre which informs the writings of all auctores, but rather any
subversive effects such difference may have are absorbed by the certainty
of such a common end, whose truths different writers express in different
ways. What is more, while this certainty in a common centre allows
Abelard to examine the particular causes and motivations which produce
differences between auctores, it also, and perhaps more typically, allows
other thinkers to underplay such differences by emphasising this shared
central focus. Thus, in citing an auctoritas, medieval writers will strive
to make the thought of their auctores accord with their own, and in doing
so will quite happily produce the most radical departures from what those
6. Jesse M. Gellrich, The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages: Language Theory,
Mythology and Fiction (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985) p.21.
7. Sic et Non, PL, 178, 1339-1610, prologue (cols 1339-49).
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auctores actually wrote, with no obvious sense of incongruity8. This is
done in the apparently secure belief that the agreement which they have
created constitutes not an abuse of the individuality of their auctor's
thought, but a resolution of merely seeming difference within a unified
store ofmeaning. Such resolutions and accommodations of difference are
made possible by a belief in the central unity of thought, and serve to
perpetuate that belief.
Derrida has suggested that such a concept of structure has
characterised Western philosophical discourse throughout its history9.
But literary (and specifically poetic) discourse problematises this concept
of structure in that its foregrounded artificiality tends to announce its
status as a construct, and hence to deny its attachment to any stable and
discernible prior reality. This undermines any attempt to assign
meaning an external origin, and instead emphasises its textual,
interpretative nature. It is, I believe, in response to the resistance of
poetic and fictional writing to the perpetuation of the centrist view of
structure that the most distinctive and characteristic features of medieval
literary theory are manifested10.
In later chapters it will be demonstrated that Robert Henryson's
work expresses an anxiety over the disruptive nature of poetic
signification which derives from concerns such as these. It is the
contention of this thesis that Henryson's anxiety, and the varied literary
strategies which he adopts in seeking to alleviate it, are shaped and
motivated by a profound engagement with the exegetical protocols and
imperatives of Scholastic literary theory. The Scholastic approach to
imaginative writing constitutes a thoroughgoing containment of its
destabilising elements. But subsequent developments in the intellectual
climate of the later Middle Ages problematise the assumptions and
strategies on which that containment depends. An awareness of this
context casts considerable light on the literary ideals towards which
Henryson strives, and on the inadequacies which leave him dissatisfied
and spur him to further creativity.
8. See the remarks later in this chapter on Aquinas' treatment of St Augustine
(below, pp.15-16).
9. See Derrida, 'Structure Sign and Play', p.278. Also OfGrammatology, trans.
G.C. Spivak (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp.10-26.
10. An interesting discussion of these issues is provided in Rita Copeland,
Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and
Vernacular Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.46-55.
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But before outlining the defining features and ramifications of
Scholastic literary theory, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of
the suspicion towards literature on which it is founded and which its
definitions and protocols seek to dispel. Accordingly, this chapter will
look in some detail at the wariness with which early-medieval thinkers
regard imaginative writing, showing this to derive from a clear
awareness of how such discourse challenges the referential assumptions
which underlie medieval thought on language. The early-medieval
context defines for the Scholastics the conditions which must be met if
poetry and fiction are to be positively approved, and thus clarifies the
ideals and the doubts which structure Henryson's work.
2
An important strand in the thought of St Augustine (d.430) is his
meditation on the relationship between human words and the divine
Word. This is exemplified in a passage from his Confessiones11 where he
states that the mind
comparavit haec verba temporaliter sonantia cum aeterno in
silentio Verbo tuo et dixit: aliud est, longe aliud est. Haec longe
infra me sunt; nec sunt, quia fugiunt et praetereunt. Verbum
autem dei mei supra me manet in aeternum.
(Bk XI, ch.vi, col.812)
The contrast here between Word and words centres on the eternal and
unchanging nature of the former, as opposed to the transience of the
latter. The implications of this are clarified in the reference to human
language in the plural form, whereas the divine Word is seen as singular.
What this points to is the totalising nature of the Word: its singularity
testifies to its intrinsic connection to and simultaneous containment of all
of reality:
Et ideo Verbo tibi coaeterno, simul et sempiterne dicis omnia quae
dicis, et fit quidquid dicus ut fiat; nec aliter, quam dicendo, facis:
nec tamen et simul et sempiterne fiunt omnia quae dicendo facis.
(Conf. Bk XI, ch.vii, col.813)
Within the framework of the creation myth the Word is the
ontological source of its referent, and so Word and being are intrinsically
11. St Augustine, Confessiones, PL, 32, 659-868. For an interesting and
sensitive discussion ofAugustine's attitudes towards language and reading, see Brian
Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of
Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
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connected. Apprehension of the divine Word, which is the source of
being, would therefore constitute a comprehensive and direct perception
of the complete order of reality as contained within the framework of the
divine ordo. The Word cannot be plural because it generates and
contains all things, and there is nothing other than itself to which it can
be added. This concept of the divine Word validates an absolutist view of
the universe, where the univocity of reality is affirmed and where all
things form part of one theocentric structure12.
Such a view is also embodied in Augustine's views on the
relationship between time and eternity13. His distinction between
perpetuity, defined as history experienced by humans as a series of
transient moments, and eternity as a single divine moment
comprehending all of history, exemplifies the typical medieval view
wherein disparate elements of reality are all contained within a unified
universal framework. The idea of the divine Word, with its
comprehension of all creation within a single atemporal impulse from the
mind ofGod, is born of the same tendency to incorporate the diverse
particulars of reality into a consistently meaningful whole.
However, as Augustine points out, human words are very different.
He is aware that human language is steeped in temporality, in fact
depending on it for its capacity to communicate:
Non enim erit totus sermo si unum verbum non decedat cum
sonuerit partes suas, ut succedat aliud. [...] Et non vis utique stare
syllabas, sed transvolare, ut aliae veniant, et totum audias.
(■Conf. Bk IV, ch.x-xi, cols 699-700)
Augustine here outlines a model of communication in which language is
envisioned as mediative in that it conveys an idea from the mind of a
sender to that of a receiver. However, he seems aware of aspects of
language which may complicate the communication process, preventing it
from being merely a simple transference of ideas. This can be seen in the
distinction between meaning as it exists complete and unified in the
sender's mind, and its linguistic formulation. Whereas the idea exists in
the mind as a totality, comprehending the objects of the mind within a
unifying vision, its expression in language disrupts that unity and
disperses meaning across temporal utterance. This much is clear from
12. For a clear outline of the dominant medieval world view, see C.S. Lewis, The
Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge:
University of Cambridge Press, 1964).
13. See Conf., XI, x-xiii (cols 814-16).
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the distinction between the singularity of the whole of what he has to say
and the plurality of the syllables which make up its linguistic expression.
The conception of language implied here is also a corollary of the
standard medieval view of linguistic signification as being a product of
convention, (a view which Augustine shared14), which necessarily
involves a sense of a breach between language and its desired referent.
Thus, in the process of mediation, language is seen as unable simply to
present a meaning in its totality, instead exerting a centrifugal influence
as it disperses unified comprehension through time across linguistic
forms.
In this respect human language deviates from and potentially
disrupts the totalising view of reality which, as I suggested above, is
validated by the concept of the divine Word. Language's organisation as
a linear structure composed of a system of parts tends to present its
signified in such a way as to undercut any neat sense of unity and
cohesion therein. Thus, the multiplicity of its structural elements seems
to announce language's independence from any prior reality which can
govern its signings and stand as an ontological basis ofmeaning. This
potentially threatens any attempt to propound a view of all meaning
being contained within and validated by a theocentric unity which
transcends contingent limitations.
And yet, it is quite clear that writers in the Middle Ages were not
overly perturbed by the threat which language posed to their conception
of the relation between meaning and reality. Indeed, the prolific writings
propounding such a homogenising view testify to this effect. The position
which perhaps comes closest to questioning the referential power of
language is the Dionysian via negativa, wherein humanity's incapacity to
know or represent the transcendental divine is emphasised, and the best
that can be done is to represent it by what it is clearly not15. The obvious
difference between the imagery used and what that imagery refers to
thus serves as a reminder that in contemplating the divine one must
ultimately raise the mind from linguistic representation and leave it
behind. But while the via negativa emphasised the gulf between the
14. See Conf., I, xiii (col.671). Also De Doctrina Christiana, in De Doctrina
Christiana; De Vera Religione, ed. Joseph Martin (Turnholt: Typographi Brepols, 1962),
II, i, 1-3.
15. See Chapter II of The Celestial Hierarchy, in The Complete Works ofPseudo-
Dionysius, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York and London: Paulist Press, 1987), pp. 147-
153.
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representations possible within human language and the realm of the
divine, in the later Middle Ages commentators on pseudo-Dionysius
tended to compromise his views and to stress the via positiva,
emphasising the appropriateness of similitudes and their ability to
convey positive information when discussing divine matters. As Alistair
Minnis comments, 'Deferring to his great auctoritas they allowed him his
view, but tended to obtrude the Pauline-Augustinian emphasis on the
positive connections between creatures and Creator.'16 Medieval thinkers
were thus inclined to minimise the disruptive force of those aspects of
language which suggested its lack of connection to any unified truth
regarding the ineffable divine. How much more, then, do they do this
when considering those truths, all aspects of one truth, which the mind
could grasp? That Augustine's thought tends in this direction is clear
from his faith in the capacity of the receiver to reconstruct and abstract
unified meaning from the linear structures of language, evinced in the
above quotation where he distinguishes the 'totum' ofwhat he has to say
from the syllables by means of which it is expressed.
Clarification of how such a reclamation of language could be
achieved can be provided by turning to Augustine's discussion of the
conventional nature of linguistic signification in his dialogue De
Magistro17, an issue which, as I observed above, potentially challenges
the efficacy of language's referentiality. It is stated with regard to
language that 'Nam quae loquimur, ea significamus; non autem quae res
significatur, sed signum quo significatur loquentis ore procedit, nisi cum
ipsa signa significantur.' (Bk VIII ch.xxiii, col. 1209) Thus, the only thing
directly presented in language is language itself18, and there is no
intrinsic connection between signs and things. For this reason, language
of itself can provide no referential meaning but must be related to a prior
knowledge of things which already exists in the minds of both sender and
receiver:
Per ea signa quae verba appellantur, nos nihil discere; potius enim,
ut dixi, vim verbi, id est significatione quae latet in sono, re ipsa
quae significatur cognita, discimus, quam illam tali significatione
percipimur.
(De Mag. Bk X, ch.xxxiv, col. 1215)
16. Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism c.llOO-c.1375: The Commentary
Tradition, ed. A.J. Minnis and A.B. Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p.171.
17. St Augustine De Magistro, PL, 32, 1193-1220.
18. See ibid., X, xxx (col. 1212).
9
For Augustine, and for the medieval world in general, this knowledge of
things was based on a direct mental apprehension of the external world,
involving a clear continuity between mind and reality19. Even the radical
nominalist, William of Ockham, accepted this when he remarked in his
Summa Logicae that mental concepts are natural signs of things20. As
Derrida comments in OfGrammatology with regard to Aristotle's
espousal of this view, 'the feelings of the mind, expressing things
naturally, constitute a sort of universal language which can then efface
itself. It is the stage of transparence. Aristotle can sometimes omit it
without risk.' (p.11) The effect of asserting such continuity between mind
and reality is to connect the conventional signifying process of language
to a direct knowledge of reality which supervises that process. Thus,
while there is no real connection between words and things, there is felt
to be a clear mental connection.
Given this, the process by which knowledge is communicated
through language can be seen as analogous to the operation of the logical
syllogism. The syllogism functions by taking two known premises and
deducing a third necessarily implied by their combination. Just so,
communication through language is seen as involving the combination of
a number of significations already known to the receiver, in order to
produce from them a new signification. However, the knowledge which
the receiver starts with is not just a knowledge of the signs, but also of
the things which they signify. This means that any final signification
established by this process of composition stems from the direct
knowledge of a prior reality, was latent in that knowledge, and is
verifiable by reference to it. What is more, the multiple significations
which facilitate communication are seen as unified within the totality of
the final signification derived from their combination: as Augustine
states, the syllables of a linguistic utterance ultimately pass away in
order to communicate the whole ofwhat is being said. Thus, this
signification becomes not merely a linguistic construct, defined by and
dependent on the conventions of a particular discourse, but a distinct
19. See Summa Theologicae, ed. Institutum Studiorum Medievalium
Ottaviensis, 5 vols (Ottawa: Studii Generalis O.Pr., 1941-45), I, lxxxv, 2, where Aquinas
argues that the intellect and senses perceive not merely the impressions which are the
phantasms and the intelligible species, but actual things through these impressions.
See also ST, I, lxxvi, 2, ad.4.
20. Summa Logicae Pars Prima, ed. Philotheus Boehner (New York: Franciscan
Institute, 1957), I, xiv, 51.
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conceptual unity, traceable to an extra-linguistic reality. This view
effectively serves to govern and stabilise those linguistic structures: the
totality of this signified, guaranteed by virtue of its source in reality, is
seen as encompassing in its unity the diverse significations through
which it is communicated, thus serving to exert a centripetal influence on
them. Hence the disruptive effects of the temporal structure of language
are contained by subordinating its multiple grammatical functions to the
direct apprehension of a unifying referent. Thomas ofErfurt, in his
fourteenth-century Grammatica Speculativa, confirms this:
Omnis modus significandi activus est ab aliqua rei proprietate.
Circa secundum notandum, quod cum huiusmodi rationes sive
modi significandi activus non sint figmenta, oportet omnem
modum significandi activum ab aliqua rei proprietate radicaliter
oriri.21
This conception of linguistic signification establishes a relationship
between the structures of language and the structure of reality, as
illustrated in the following passage from Hugh of St Victor's Didascalicon
(written c.1327):
Quod ergo sonis oris, qui simul subsistere incipet et desinit ad
rationam mentis est; hoc omne spatium temporia ad aeternitatem.
Ratio mentis intrinsecum verbum est, quod sono vocis, id est verba
extrinseco manifestatur, et divina sapienta, quam de corde suo
pater eructavit, in se invisibilis per creaturas, et in creaturis,
agnoscitur.22
Those aspects of reality which appear to be diversified and contingent are
seen as contained in a harmonised pattern within the atemporal unity of
the divine ordo, which encompasses all things. Thus the structure of
reality reaffirms the concept of a theocentric unity which serves to
underpin authority. Medieval thought on language invokes this same
concept of structure, requiring us to move via temporal language to a
direct contemplation of the signified meaning as an independent totality.
The subordination of linguistic structures to the perception of such a
transcendent signified mirrors the containment of temporal reality within
a totalising pattern, and allows the signifying process of language to be
assimilated to the structure of reality. Rather than having a subversive
effect, language is thus turned to the validation of that structure, and
21. Grammatica Speculativa of Thomas ofErfurt, ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall (London:
Longman, 1972), II, iv, pp.137-8.
22. Didascalicon, PL, 176, 739-838, V, iv (col.790).
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hence of the structure of thought, as its signing is seen to reproduce the
metaphysical assumptions on which these rely.
This is in essence typical of medieval views of language and
signification. However, in defining verbal signification as typically
subordinated to the apprehension of a prior signified one must be aware
that the Middle Ages did not have one consistent standard noetic or
epistemology. Developments and individuations in these might in turn
lead to significant alterations in language theory and these may frustrate
any attempt to define any one view as typical. That there were
considerable developments in language theory is clear, particularly from
the rigorous logical analysis developed by the modistae from the twelfth
century on23. But, as I noted above, it is important to see how such
modifications and developments are located within a wider intellectual
enterprise, and it is in relation to this that the consistency of medieval
thought on language can be perceived. Similarly, changes in medieval
noetic and epistemology can be seen as subordinated to the perpetuation
of a governing teleology, and to have a consistency in their dedication to
perpetuating the belief in a stabilising structural centre.
To illustrate this it may be worth examining briefly the thoughts of
St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas (d.1274) on human perception and
knowledge of reality. These two thinkers are deliberate choices, because
in their thoughts on these matters they are substantially different from
one another. In particular, Aquinas departs considerably from
Augustine's views on divine illumination and the perception of
intelligible truth. Yet, as I shall demonstrate, despite their considerable
differences, their conclusions equally reproduce the fundamental
assumptions which make possible the containment of the subversive
aspects of language.
3
To maintain the view of linguistic signification as being controlled by a
prior reality it is necessary, as I observed above, to maintain that that
reality be directly perceptible to the mind. Medieval thought on reality is
founded on the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible;
23. For discussion of the development and significance of modistic grammar see
Bursill-Hall's introduction to Grammatica Speculativa.
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between that which is perceptible to the senses and that which is
perceptible only to the intellect. With regard to sensible reality, Etienne
Gilson observes that 'Augustine had become acquainted with the main
arguments of the sceptics against the truth value of sensations. In his
Contra Academicos, and later on in his De Trinitate, Augustine forcefully
maintained the validity of sense knowledge against all these sceptical
arguments (sensory illusions, dreams, mental diseases).'24 Aquinas
concurs with Augustine in defending the validity of sense knowledge
against scepticism25. However, where Augustine perceives sensation as
an act of the soul26, Aquinas sees the senses as passive, being roused from
a state of potential sensibility by the stimulation of actual sensible
reality27. In this, while their views as to the operation of the senses
diverge, they agree in asserting the capacity of the senses to actually
know sensible reality directly.
Knowledge of intelligible reality, however, is more problematic.
For Augustine, sensible reality does not provide an adequate basis for the
cognition of universal principles. While he defends the connection
between mind and reality with regard to the validity of sense knowledge,
the certainties such knowledge provides are of the conditions of particular
things and thus steeped in contingency. As such, knowledge of this sort
is far beneath that of immutable universal principles, which are the
proper objects of the intellect28. Augustine, therefore, finds it necessary
to contrive an alternative mode of knowledge which pertains to the
intellect. But this presents certain problems: it is clear to him that the
mind possesses knowledge which is necessarily true, such as that of
mathematical principles, as is indicated in his remark in the Confessiones
that 'continet memoria numerorum dimensionumque rationes et leges
innumerabiles' (Bk X, ch.12, col.787). It is not, however, clear exactly
whence such knowledge is derived, for since both the human mind and
the reality which it perceives are mutable, then it is felt that neither can
24. Etienne Gilson, History ofChristian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1955), p.76.
25. See above, p.8, n.18
26. De Quantitate Anime, PL, 32, 1035-1080, xxiii-xxx, esp. xxx (col.1068): '[...]
Sensus est corporus passio per seipsam non latens animam [...].' Sensation certainly
involves the action of an external material thing on the body, but sensation is only
produced when the soul actively attends to such an action. It is this act of attention
which constitutes sensation.
27. ST, I, lxxviii, 3.
28. De Diversibus Quaestiones LXXXIII, PL, 40, 1-100, ix.
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be the source of human knowledge of universals, which are necessary
truths and therefore unchanging:
Omne quod corporeus sensus attingit, quod et sensibile dicitur,
sine ulla intermissione temporis commutatur. [...] Non est igitur
exspectanda sinceritas veritatis a sensibus corporis.29
Augustine therefore concludes that the source of knowledge must be
something external to the mind which imbues it with such knowledge.
This leads him to state the doctrine of divine illumination, whereby when
the mind forms a true judgement concerning intelligible reality it does so
through contact with the divine mind. It is this which produces such
knowledge, as the divine mind superadds the illumination of its own fixed
and immutable intellect to the inferior mind ofman30. What this means
for Augustine's model of communication is that the derivation of meaning
from direct apprehension of reality extends from statements concerning
sensible reality to those concerning the intelligible:
Cum vero de iis agitur quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu
atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur quae praesentia contuemur in
ilia interiore luce veritatis, qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior,
illustratur et fruitur: sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si et et ipse
ilia secreto ac simplici oculo videt; novit quod dico sua
contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne huncquidem doceo vera
dicens, vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis
rebus, Deo intus pandente, manifestis [...].
(De Mag., Bk XII, ch.xl, col.1217)
Thus, the human mind is conceived as having access to a perceptible
reality, at the levels of both contingency and universality. This
effectively stabilises language's signification, allowing the meaning of an
utterance to be construed as independent of its linguistic formulation.
Where Augustine resorts to the theory of illumination from an
external source as the source of human knowledge of intelligible truth,
Aquinas reinterprets this theory so as to locate the capacity to attain such
knowledge within the human mind:
Non oportet quod mens humana, quae movetur a deo ad
cognoscendum naturaliter cognita, nova luce perfundatur.31
For Aquinas divine illumination does not involve a separate intellect
implanting in the mind ideas to which it could not attain by means of its
natural operation. Rather he identifies this illumination with the divine
29. Ibid.
30. See De Trinitate, PL, 42, 867-1056, IX, xii.
31. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boethium in Trinitate, ed.
Bruno Decker (Leiden: Brill, 1955), I, i, p.62.
14
intellect's gift of the agent intellect, a pale reflection of the light of the
divine mind, as one of the soul's natural powers32. The knowledge proper
to the intellect is then seen as derived from sensible things, (contrary to
Augustine's view) by virtue of the agent intellect's natural operation in
the soul33. Human intellection of intelligible reality, therefore, proceeds
from the natural functions of the mind. The process takes place thus: it is
in the nature of external reality to be actually sensible and potentially
intelligible34. The sense, a passive power, is acted on by a sensible thing,
which rouses it from a state of potency to extract an image or phantasm.
This in turn is referred to the intellect. The intellect consists of two
powers: the potential intellect and the agent intellect. It must be
considered as potential because were it wholly active then it would be
capable of comprehending all universal being, a power which pertains
only to God35. That it does not do so indicates that it is only potentially
active in relation to that being. But equally, were it wholly passive it
could not act on the phantasms in order to extract the intelligible species
that are only potential in them, and hence it could aspire to no
understanding of universal forms36. It is in this that the agent intellect
plays its role, abstracting from the phantasms the species potential in
them, and allowing the potential intellect to receive them37. Thus, the
agent intellect is a part of the natural powers of the soul. Its function is
not to admit ideas from a separate intellect, but to abstract these from
what is presented to it by the senses. The intellect, therefore, does not
simply give the human mind access to intelligible reality per se, but first
requires the perception of sensible reality by the senses. As Etienne
Gilson puts it in his History ofChristian Philosophy, 'The origin of human
knowledge is [...] in the senses; it results from a collaboration between
material things, senses and intellect.' (p.377)
Clearly, this is significantly different from Augustine's theory of
knowledge. By placing an emphasis on the sensible basis of intellectual
knowledge Aquinas brings to the mind a weight of empiricism which
constitutes a radical departure from the Augustinian view. Similarly, his
view of the agent intellect as being wholly an operation natural to the
32. Ibid. See also ST, I, lxxix, 4.
33. ST, I, lxxxiv, 6.
34. Ibid., I, lxxix, 3.
35. Ibid., I, lxxix, 2.
36. See above, n.32.
37. Ibid.
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soul removes the direct communication with the divine mind which was
opened by Augustine's theory of illumination. As the intellect
participates in the divine intellect not by any sharing of being, but in
owing its being to it as its source, so the field of human knowledge
becomes much more rigidly separated from the divine. Gilson remarks
that 'the creation is placed infinitely below the creator, so far below him
that there is no real relation between God and things, but only between
things and God.' (History, p.373) Any knowledge which we can have of
the divine only derives from analogy, where we may know something of a
cause from the nature of its effects. The empiricism in Aquinas'
philosophy, in conjunction with the stress on the gulf between the
temporal world and the divine, can be seen as pointing forward in many
ways to the radical nominalism of the fourteenth century. It would,
therefore, clearly be wrong to consider the relationship of the thought of
Aquinas on these matters to that of Augustine as being merely a
conservative assent to and reiteration of an orthodoxy.
However, it is equally clear that both are dedicated to preserving a
sense of the homogeneity and authority of all Christian thought. For
example, in refuting Augustine's opinion that immutable truth cannot be
arrived at from sensible things, Aquinas does not state that Augustine is
wrong:
Dicendum quod per verba ilia Augustini datur intelligi quod
Veritas non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim
lumen intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in
rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et disceramus ipsas res a
similitudinibus rerum.
(ST, q.84, art.6)
Thus, Aquinas simply reconstrues Augustine's words, denying any
contradiction between their positions. Similarly, in defining divine
illumination as the implanting of the agent intellect rather than any
direct communication from an external intellect, Aquinas again states
that it was such an implanting to which Augustine referred, and in fact
cites Augustine as an authority in confirmation of his view38. Rather
than risk compromising the unity of the intellectual traditions of the
Church by open disagreement, Aquinas simply reinterprets Augustine to
accord with his own views. As I have already observed, this is typical of
the way in which medieval thinkers dealt with their auctoritates, and
38. Boethium in Trinitate, I, i, p.62.
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exemplifies the process of thought whereby diverse theoretical positions
are construed as uniting in a common end. And just as Aquinas affirms a
central core of truth which both he and Augustine serve and which
resolves any difference in their thought, so too they both provide in their
different ways an epistemology and noetic which is required to make
language capable of being turned to the service of that truth instead of
disrupting it. The views of both permit language to be traced back to a
stable prior reality, and in this they make it possible to contain the
subversive implications of its conventional and temporal signifying
structure. Thus, language acquires the function ofmere referentiality,
the particularities of its structure being reduced to a transparency
through which the human mind passes, turning to a direct consideration
of the signified res or rei. This effectively contains the difficulties implicit
in any attempt to trace linguistic utterance to unified truth.
4
At this point, in order to crystallise the general outline presented above,
it may prove valuable to provide a specific instance of how medieval
language theory assimilates these suppositions as its governing
principles. Jesse M. Gellrich discusses the way in which medieval
grammarians dealt with the problem of consignificatio: the ways in which
words alter their meanings as they take on different syntactic functions39.
He examines the discussion of the problem in John of Salisbury's
Metalogicon (completed 1159), where John addresses the question of the
relationship between the different significations of words based on the
stem 'white', when it occurs in a noun {albedo), a verb (albet), and an
adjective (album)40. The problem is that the variety of meanings specified
by the different grammatical forms sharing a common stem suggests that
their meaning is determined not through any direct reference to a
signified reality, but through their position within a syntactic order, and
hence is dependent on the chain of differences operating within that
language. Language, rather than reality would thus be shaping meaning.
John deals with this problem by determining the noun 'whiteness', as
that which 'sine omni participatione subjecti, ipsam significat
39. Gellrich, pp. 102-5.
40. Metalogicon, PL, 199, 823-946, III, ii.
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qualitatem'. As such, the noun is taken as the basic semantic unit,
signifying through a direct reference to a subsistent thing, and its
meaning seen as outside syntax and independent of the chain of
significations which make up the language. Consequently, in accounting
for the syntactic function of the verb and adjective, John recalls the
remarks of Bernard of Chartres (d.c.1130) on this question:
Aibat Bernardus Cartnotensis, quia albedo significat virginem
incorruptam; albet, eadem introentum thalamum aut cubantem in
toro; album vera, eadem, sed corruptam.41
The comparison of the effects of consignificatio to the deflowering of a
virgin reveals the mode of thought by which any subversive effects which
this aspect of language might have are effectively contained. Gellrich
comments thus:
While [...] they were touching on different "ways of signifying" in
connotative functions, it would be wrong to imagine that they were
unearthing a principle of linguistic indeterminacy. Terms differ
manifestly in their simultaneous secondary meanings - their
consignification; but they never lose possession of the primary stem
from which they derive.
(Gellrich, p. 104)
This is clear from the image of deflowering a virgin, in that the woman of
the image remains the same physical person throughout her transition,
providing a continuity between what John and Bernard see as her initial
state of purity and her later, supposedly debased, state. By analogy, a
word participating in the process of consignificatio maintains a
connection with its pristine status as a noun which signifies by direct
reference42. If its meanings vary according to syntactic context, they
nevertheless remain in contact with a primary extra-syntactic origin.
Hence, as the later conditions of the woman are defined as a corruption,
and thus determined through reference to her initial purity, so syntactic
context is seen as something which qualifies the originary 'virginal'
signification of a noun, with that qualification necessarily depending on
the originary condition as the primary determinant of meaning. The
ideal state of the word 'whiteness' as a noun, representing the quality
directly and in itself, thus provides a point of anchorage which its
consignificative derivatives can be traced back to. It is a stable centre of




subversions. This clearly illustrates the ways in which medieval thought
on language rests on the assumption of an extra-linguistic point of
reference constituting a unified meaning which stabilises linguistic
utterance and contains its disruptive potential.
In OfGrammatology, Derrida observes that 'the idea of the book is
the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; this totality of the
signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified
preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs, and is independent
of it in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural
totality, is profoundly alien to the sense ofwriting. It is the encyclopedic
protection of theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of
writing, against its aphoristic energy, and [...] against difference in
general.' (p.18) The idea of the book as specified by Derrida here
corresponds to that which medieval thought, as exemplified by Augustine
and Aquinas, seeks to preserve. Despite differences between individual
writers, and despite potentially disruptive elements existing within
particular theories, medieval thought is located within an intellectual
framework dedicated to the service of a totalising theocentric view of
reality, and this holds true for its language theory. Rather than rejecting
the disruption of language, medieval theory strives to control it and turn
language to serve that which is 'profoundly alien' to it. It is a
fundamental aim of Scholastic literary theory, as I will attempt to show,
to extend this tendency from the regions of basic discursive language into
the special linguistic realms of poetry and fiction.
5
The medieval attitude towards literary discourse is perhaps most evident
in writers' treatment of their sources and auctores. C.S. Lewis remarks
on this with regard to LaJamon's Brut and Sawles Warde, a prose text
by a writer known only as Johan:
The scholar's ideal of accuracy in translation, the historian's ideal
of fidelity to a document, and the artist's ideal of originality, are all
alike absent from the minds of LaJamon and Johan. [...] We might
equally call our medieval authors the most unoriginal or the most
original ofmen. They are so unoriginal that they hardly ever
attempt to write anything unless someone has written it down
before. They are so rebellious and insistently original that they
can hardly reproduce a page of any older work without
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transforming it [...]. They can no more leave their originals intact
than we can leave our own earlier drafts intact when we fair-copy
them. We always tinker and (as we hope) improve. But in the
Middle Ages you did that as cheerfully to other people's work as to
your own.43
Medieval writers, then, are typically self-effacing, denying any
responsibility for a work and presenting themselves as the transparent
vehicle for the work or ideas of their auctores. Yet at the same time they
will radically alter and add to their sources with no sense of any
incongruity between the passive role they claim to adopt and their actual
literary activity44.
Similar attitudes towards texts can be seen in the allegorical
interpretation of fictional or mythical tales. A striking example can be
found in the interpretations of the Orpheus myth, given in, among other
places, commentaries on Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae45. The
fourteenth-century scholar Nicholas Trevet offers a reading of Book III,
Metre 12 in which the would-be rapist Aristaeus, who brings about the
death ofEurydice, represents good virtue while Eurydice represents the
appetitive powers of the soul which flee virtue's governance46. This
interpretation reveals a lack of consideration of the literal implications of
the story to the point of countenancing clear contradiction between the
literal and allegorical meanings. Such interpretations are commonplace
in medieval literary exegesis and display a clear lack of interest in the
nuances of the particular narrative structure of a text:a lack of interest
which is similar to the freedom displayed in writers' treatment of their
sources. In both cases their attitude towards the text is wholly alien to
modern thought.
43. 'The Genesis of a Medieval Book', in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance
Literature, ed. Walter Hooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 18-40
(pp. 18-19).
44. On the self-effacing attitude of medieval writers, see also Tim William
Machan, 'Textual Authority and the Works of Hoccleve, Lydgate and Henryson', Viator,
23 (1992), 281-99.
45. See, for example, William of Aragon's commentary, excerpted and
translated in Minnis & Scott, pp.332-36. Also the relevant section ofWilliam of
Conches' commentary, printed in part in Edouard Jeauneau, 'L'Usage de la Notion
d'Integumentum a travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches', Archives d'Histoire
Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 32 (1957), 35-100 (pp.45-46).
46. The relevant passage is printed in The Poems ofRobert Henryson, ed.
Denton Fox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp.110-12. All references to Henryson's
works in this thesis are to Fox's edition.
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J.W.H. Atkins argues that medieval thought about imaginative
literature is confused and distorted by other concerns which he sees as
non-literary:
There was an absence of clear ideas concerning the nature of
poetry in particular, its aims and its standards; while further
obstacles to a free and rational discussion of literature existed in
the deep-seated reverence for the littera scripta, the distorted
views of poetry resulting from the allegorical interpretation, or
again the predominance of logical studies in the medieval
curriculum, with their tendency to divert interest from literary
matters.47
Atkins' conception of diverse non-literary influences leading to 'an
absence of clear ideas' in discussions of literature seems somewhat at
odds with the general tenor of medieval thought, which exhibits a
tendency towards encyclopaedic classification that is nothing if not
precise in its detail and exactness. Part of the problem with his account
is revealed in the casual use of the term 'literary matters', which assumes
that the nature of these matters is absolutely defined and self-evident.
But surely each age constructs its own definitions ofwhat constitutes
'literary matters', a fact indicated by changes in the literary canon which
nowadays includes types ofwriting not usually admitted in the past:
journals and diaries are one example of this. What it is important to
realise is that medieval attitudes towards literature, which seem so alien
to a modern sensibility, are not the result of any confusion or lack of clear
thought, but derive from a wholly different set of concerns and priorities.
These entail a careful consideration of the relation of such writing to the
concepts of language and meaning widely propounded in the Middle Ages.
Thus, the lack of regard for particular narrative and verbal structures
exhibited by translators and exegetes, and even the attitudes of those
who dismiss imaginative literature altogether, are founded not in any
confusion or lack of clear ideas, but in a precise and distinctive way of
thinking about such writing. I aim to demonstrate that medieval
attitudes to imaginative literature relate to its status as a problematic
type ofwriting: one which presents difficulties for the thinking which
underlies medieval language theory's containment of potentially
disruptive aspects of general discursive language.
47. J.W.H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1943), pp.2-3.
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The value of imaginative literature was debated throughout the Middle
Ages, with some thinkers dismissing the notion that it should be afforded
serious study and others attempting to assign it some value. The debate
is illustrated in a twelfth-century commentary on Juvenal's satires, cited
by Alistair Minnis, which refers to the difference between the attitudes of
William of Conches (d.1154) and Bernard of Chartres:
Having raised the issue of the part of philosophy to which
Juvenal's satires belong, the anonymous commentator claims that
Bernard thought this question irrelevant because poetry does not
treat of philosophy. But William of Conches, he continues, made a
distinction between mere writers (adores) and writers who are
authorities (auctores). The works of adores do not pertain to
philosophy, but the works of audores, although they do not teach
philosophy directly, nevertheless relate to philosophy in that they
provide moral instruction and, thereby, pertain to ethics.
(.Authorship, pp.26-26)
But while some individuals considered poetry not to be wholly
worthless, the extent to which it could be assigned a serious value was
usually very limited, especially in the early Middle Ages. The fourth-
century author Macrobius, although he may well not have been a
Christian, nevertheless admirably exemplifies the way in which doubts
about the value of imaginative writing appear to have been endemic
among religious thinkers at this time, even those who wished to defend
the use of imaginative modes ofwriting. In his commentary on Cicero's
Somnium Sdpionis, having declared that he intends to defend the use of
fiction in philosophical works, he attempts to describe the various types of
fabula. 'Fabulae', he observes, 'aut tantum conciliandae auribus
voluptatis, aut adhortationis quoque in bonam frugem gratiae repertae
sunt.'48 Dismissing the first type out of hand, he proceeds to make
further distinctions within the second type. He does not, however,
consider all of these as appropriate for philosophy:
In quibusdam enim et argumenta et ficto locatur et per mendacia
ipse relationis ordo contexitur, et sunt illae Aesopi fabulae
elegentia fictionis illustres, at in aliis argumentum quidem
fundatur veri silidate sed haec ipsa Veritas per quaedam composita
et ficta profertur, et hoc iam vocatur narratio fabulosa, non fabula
[...]. Ex hac ergo secunda divisione quam diximus, a philosophiae
48. Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1963),
p.5.
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libris prior species, quae concepta de falso per falsum narratur,
aliena est. Sequens in aliam rursum discretionem scissa dividitur:
[...] aut enim contextio narrationis per turpia et indigna numinibus
ac monstro similia componitur [...], quod genus totum philosophi
nescire malunt - aut sacrarum rerum notio sub pio figmentorum
velamine honestis et tecta rebus et vestita nominibus enuntiatur:
et hoc est solum figmenti genus quod cautio de divinus rebus
philosophantis admittit.
(Ibid. pp.5-6)
Some suspicion about the nature of literary fiction is suggested by the
fact that Macrobius does not seek to define any autonomous value for
literature, but only sees it as worthwhile insofar as it can in some way be
turned to the service of other disciplines. In themselves, such writings
are clearly considered to be of a dubious nature. This suspicion is further
indicated by the detail and careful selectivity of his approach as he seeks
to separate the wheat from the chaff. What is more, even fictional works
which Macrobius considers to be morally edifying are rejected as
inappropriate to philosophy. Thus, despite the fact that Macrobius's
integumental theory aims to defend the value of imaginative writing, his
arguments are pervaded by a strong sense of its possible pitfalls, and this
leads to a severe curtailment of the amount of authority which he assigns
to it.
A similar attitude is found in the Dialogus super Auctores of
Conrad of Hirsau (d.c.1150), in which pagan authors from Aesop to Virgil
are characterised as school authors, 'quibus imbui floribunda
tyrunculorum solent ingenia'49. The teacher describes knowledge of these
writers as something which 'licet in discente sit veniabile, nevi nota non
caret in docente' (p.73). Conrad's attitude here mirrors that implicit in
John of Salisbury's assertion that 'poetas philosophorum cunas celebre
esse'50. While this assigns some value to such writing, it also has a
negative side: as Alistair Minnis observes, 'grown men with mature
minds cannot remain in their cradle.'51 In this view, and despite an
awareness of its moral utility, poetic fiction is seen as valuable only in so
far as it provides the primary steps in education; but it is a tool which
should ultimately be left behind as wisdom increases, so that one may
progress to the infinitely more serious study of philosophy and the Bible.
49. Dialogus super Auctores, in Accessus ad Auctores: Bernard d'Utrecht:
Conrad d'Hirsau Dialogus super Auctores, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Leiden: Brill, 1970),
p.72.
50. Metalogicon, I, xxii, (col.852).
51. Minnis & Scott, p.122.
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Another point of view which provided some valid function for
imaginative literature sees it as a source of relaxation and recreation. In
this way, as Glending Olson observes, such writing could be located
within an ethical framework by allowing it a practical value in so far as it
provides rest and recuperation from the pressures of serious work, and
allows one to return to such work refreshed and invigoured by the relief
which it has provided.52 Many medieval thinkers, following Aristotle's
thoughts on recreation53, located imaginative writing in such a context,
hence avoiding total condemnation.
But this view also had its negative aspects in that it presented
literature as ultimately being a concession to human frailty.
Furthermore, excessive indulgence in literary pleasure was considered
sinful54. Being thus distinguished from serious activities, and evaluated
only in terms of its contribution to the furtherance of such activities,
imaginative writing was still not of itself afforded the kind of serious
consideration associated with theological works or with the curriculum of
the seven liberal arts. This is illustrated in the care Aquinas takes to
separate the use of imaginative language in the Bible from that found in
poetry:
Dicendum quod poeta utitur metaphoris propter
repraesentationem; repraesentatio enim naturaliter homini
delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter
necessitatem et utilitatem, ut dictum est.
(ST, I, q.l, art.9, ad.l)
Whatever the value of poetic fiction, it was not seen to be of a nature
which could justify serious study, since there was too much in it which
was felt to be merely frivolous. As Hugh of St Victor comments, the
distance between poetry and philosophy is such that 'quicunque ad
scientiam pertingere cupit, si relicta veritate artium reliquis se implicare
voluerit, materiam laboris nedum plurimam sed et infmitam sustinebit,
et fructum exiguum.'55
52. Glending Olson, Literature as Recreation in the Later Middle Ages (Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp.90-127.
53. Ibid. pp.93-115. For Aristotle's views see Nicomachean Ethics, trans.
Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), X, vi, 13.21-13.23, pp.282-83.
54. See Olson, pp.98-9, 105-8. Also Aquinas, ST, II-II, clxviii, 3.
55. Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon, III, iv (col.769).
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Why, then, should this dubiety about the value of imaginative literature
be so pervasive as to influence even those who sought to establish some
sense of its worth? An answer may be provided from an examination of
the specific accusations aimed at such writing, and the thought which
underlies them. Such accusations revolve around two basic assertions
about the negative influence of poetic and fictional writing which reflect
the concerns which were uppermost in the critics' minds. In his Republic,
Plato had criticised poets for rousing the passions of their audience and
for presenting falsehoods in their writings56, and these animadversions
were repeated time and again by medieval thinkers who saw such works
as distracting attention from the supremely important matters of
Christian truth and its promised salvation, a view which is evident in
worries over the use of such writings in education, where it was feared
that they would have a negative effect on young minds57.
These objections to poetry and fiction are founded in a sense of
their resistance to medieval thinkers' efforts to contain those elements of
language which were seen as potentially disrupting the dominant view of
language and signification. The suspicion which fuelled them was not
merely confined to imaginative literature, but also extended into the field
of rhetoric, a particularly problematic realm of discourse in the Middle
Ages. What is significant is that in all these modes of discourse emphasis
is placed on formal linguistic qualities (poetry and rhetoric by virtue of
their formal ornamentation, and fiction by constructing significations
which have a merely textual existence), bringing these to the foreground
of an audience's attention. As was suggested above (p.4), this is far from
amenable to the preoccupations of medieval intellectuals in that it
announces the detachment of a discourse from any prior reality which can
govern its significations. Questions and doubts which are raised over the
nature of rhetoric are thus related closely to the concern over the nature
and influence of imaginative literature.
56. The Republic, trans. H.D.P. Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), X, ii-iii,
pp.379-86.
57. For a brief general discussion of this concern, see James J. Murphy, Rhetoric
in the Middle Ages: A History ofRhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the
Renaissance (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1974), pp.50-4.
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Developments in the field of rhetoric during the late-Classical
period and the early Middle Ages had brought questions about language
to the fore of intellectual debate among Christian thinkers, with the
influence of the Second Sophistic leading to considerable suspicion of
ornate language. The rhetoricians of the Second Sophistic looked on
rhetorical language as a means ofmanipulating the audience for the
merely contingent purposes of political exigency, regardless of ultimate
truth. The Sophists held that an audience's assent to or rejection of a
point of view could be determined not by the merits of the argument in
relation to truth, but solely by the persuasive power of the language in
which it was couched, and, indeed, viewed such manipulation as the
proper end of rhetoric58. This view denies the attachment of rhetorical
language, and of responses to it, to any perception of truth based in
transcendent reality, and instead emphasises the ways in which
perception of reality is shaped by language59, with meaning being
established ultimately only within the context of a discourse.
Christian intellectuals, however, (along with those of other
persuasions) insisted that their beliefs were founded in absolute truth.
But since Sophistry separated rhetoric and audience response from any
basis in an extra-linguistic reality, it therefore denied any uniquely
authoritative status for Christianity. Indeed, a Christian preacher's use
of such persuasive techniques, however immediately effective they might
be, would ultimately weaken the impact and authority of his discourse:
assent to a Christian point of view which had been obtained by Sophistic
means could be superseded simply by having an opposing point of view
expressed more eloquently. Ultimately such elaborate persuasion
obtrudes itself in such a way as to deny the audience any direct grasp of
the simple truth which the Christian preacher aims to inculcate, thus
undermining the affirmation that Christian values are founded in the
very order of reality. Christian thinkers therefore reacted to Sophistry by
condemning it as an abuse of language. They reasserted the priority of
58. See Murphy, pp.35-8. Also Charles S. Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and
Poetic (New York: MacMillan, 1924), pp.2-50. A good primary source is Eunapius, Lives
of the Sophists, trans. Wilmer C. Wright (London: Heinemann; New York: G.P. Putnam's
Son's, 1922), pp.319-565.
59. See Derrida's brief observations in 'White Mythology', in Margins of
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982),
pp.209-71 (pp.248-9).
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an absolute perceptible reality, the apprehension ofwhich was seen as
being perverted by Sophistic rhetoric as it drew attention away from
reality to its own linguistic structures. This led to a suspicion of ornate
language in general, since any discourse which foregrounded its own
structural elements could be seen as interposing itself between its
audience and reality, thus obscuring their perception, and produced a
preference among many preachers for a plain style which could allow
statements to be judged by their content rather than expression, so that
the truth could shine through60.
One can see this suspicion in the comments of St Jerome (d.420),
who when writing on the subject of language, compares sensus and
verbum to bread and husks respectively61. This indicates a sense that in
the process of interpretation the priority is not attention to the particular
verbal structures of language, but to a unified meaning existing
independently of those structures. In this, Jerome's remark mirrors the
ideas about language which were so widely prevalent in the Middle Ages.
But coming when it does, it also reflects the more historically specific
concern about the possible negative effects of eloquent language on an
audience, which had arisen in reaction to Sophistry. Thus, in Jerome's
comments, attitudes inspired by the historically specific problems raised
by Sophistry coincide with those found in medieval concepts of language
in general. This illustrates the close relation of these problems and the
concerns to the general concerns of language theory in the Middle Ages,
and the pervasiveness of their influence on medieval thought on these
matters.
These concerns were shared and elaborated by St Augustine, in
whose writings the risk of eloquent language drawing the audience's
attention away from truth is a recurrent issue. But where some
Christian thinkers were led to reject rhetorical manipulation of language
altogether and insist on a plain style as the only one appropriate to
Christian truth, Augustine is rather more liberal. In his De Doctrina
Christiana he effectively reclaims rhetoric as an appropriate tool for
Christian preaching, seeing it not as a way of determining audience
response, but as a means of inclining the audience to give the Christian
message a fair hearing. However, this reclamation is still tempered wih
60. See Murphy, pp.49-63.
61. St Jerome, Epistolci XXI, PL, 22, 379-394, xlii, (col.394).
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some suspicion and a recommendation that in seeking to persuade one's
audience one should include plenty of clear rational argument and not
rely too much on eloquent language, from fear that it will distract from a
proper contemplation of the truths which such language is meant to
serve62. Similarly, in his Confessiones he comments that those who were
convinced of the wisdom of Faustus, the Manichean scholar, must have
been affected by the pleasing qualities of his speech:
Illi autem qui eum mihi promittebant, non boni rerum
existimatores erant; et ideo illis videbatur prudens et sapiens, quia
delectabat eos loquens.
(Conf., Bk V, ch.vi, col.710)
Despite the utility of rhetoric for the Christian preacher's aims, there
remains a fear that if not used carefully such language will evoke a
response which is based not on a perception of truth, but merely on an
appetitive response to the attractiveness of language. The pure love
directed at the spiritual truths contained in the word of God may be
usurped by a carnal love based on the sensual pleasure of the temporal
words of humanity63. In his emphasis on reality rather than language as
the basis of audience response, Augustine stands in pointed opposition to
the rhetorical theory of the Sophists, subordinating rhetorical language to
the perception of a subsistent referent, and giving it a value only in so far
as it can facilitate a clearer apprehension of truth.
Augustine extends his concerns about the effect of ornate language
into the realms of poetic discourse as well as rhetoric. In his discussions
of poetry he affords a certain value to versification, and locates this in the
numerological proportions on which he sees quantative metre to be based.
Writing about fictional poetry in his De Ordine, he dismisses the false
subject matter, asserting that poetic fiction is 'rationabilim mendacorium
potestas' (Bk II, ch.xiv, col. 1014). 'Rationabilim', of course, connotes the
term ratio. Augustine goes some way towards clarifying its implications
in this context by exemplifying ratio in its use with regard to
architecture, where it designates the harmony of proportions in a
building (De Ord., Bk II. ch.xi, cols 1010-11). Thus, Augustine's
statement means that the fictions ofwhich poetry is composed are
ordered via metrical rules in accordance with a proper harmony and
62. De Doctrina Christiana, IV, xxv, 55-8.
63. Augustine, in De Ordine, compares the literal meaning of scripture to the
flesh, and the inward sententia to the spirit. PL, 32, 977-1021, II, xi, (col.1011).
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proportion of structure. This harmony, however, is not based merely in
contingent aesthetic conventions. Rather, it has its source in the
unchanging numerological principles governing the structure of the
universe64. Hence, the formal metrical structure of poetry is given a
metaphysical basis: the metre of particular poems manifests in material
form the universal numerological and proportional relations which
govern it, and these relations reflect the structural harmony which
underlies the ordering of the universe65.
Such a view provides a possible justification for the ornate formal
qualities of poetry, and many religious and philosophical writers seem to
have been quite happy about composing metrical works66. However,
Augustine still has strong reservations about its effect on an audience.
He observes that although poetry can exhibit universal numerological
principles, it cannot of itself make them wholly present to the mind, but
can only represent them through the mediation of temporal language. In
order to contemplate them in their entirety the mind must move away
from particular poetic utterances to an abstract consideration of them.
For this reason the art on which poetry is based is seen as more valuable
than specific poems:
Nec ideo tamen ars ipsa, qua uersus fabricatur, sic tempori obnoxia
est, ut pulchritudo eius per mensuras morarum digeratur. Sed
simul habet omnia, quibus efficit uersum non simul habentem
omnia sed posterioribus priora tollentem, propterea tamen
pulchrum, quia extrema uestigia illius pulchritudinis ostentat,
quam constanter atque incommutabiliter ars ipsa custodit.
(De Vera Rel., Bk XXII, ch.xlii, p.213)
As with language in general, poetic language is seen as steeped in
temporality, incapable of representing any reality in the unity which it
would have when actually present to the mind. The beauty of such
64. The way in which aesthetic forms were connected to metaphysical forms in
the Middle Ages has been examined by Umberto Eco in The Aesthetics of Thomas
Aquinas, trans. Hugh Bredin (London: Radius, 1988), and in his Art and Beauty in the
Middle Ages, trans. Hugh Bredin (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1986).
65. A stimulating discussion of the relationship between temporal poetic
language and its atemporal principles in Augustine's writings is given by Eugene Vance
in Mervelous Signals: Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1986), Ch.2, 'Saint Augustine: Language as Temporality', pp.34-50.
66. Ernst Robert Curtius has remarked that religious Latin writings such as the
Stabat Mater and Dies Irae were the greatest European medieval literary works before
Dante. See his European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p.390.
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language, therefore, is only a shadow of that embodied in the principles
which underlie it since these are universal and not subject to time.
Hence, the audience should prefer the principles of the art, rather than
particular verses.
For this reason, Augustine sees a response to poetry which
concentrates on the individual features of poems as being inadequate, or
even dangerous. In a striking passage from De Vera Religione, he pours
scorn on those who do respond in this way:
Itaque ut nonnulli peruersi magis amant uersam quam ipsam
artem, qua conficitur uersus, quia plus se auribus quam
intellegentiae dediderunt, ita multi temporalia diligunt,
conditricem uero ac moderatricem temporum diuinam
prouidentiam non requirunt atque in ipsa dilectione temporalium
nolunt transire quod amant, at tarn sunt absurdi, quam si
quisquam in recitatione praeclari carminis unam aliquam syllabam
solam perpetuo uellet audire.
(Bk XXII, ch.xliii, pp.213-214)
In his contrast of the ears to the intellect, of that which perceives only
sensible reality to that which perceives intelligible reality, Augustine
underlines his identification of pleasure taken merely in the verbal and
metrical structure of a poem with the love of temporal things in
themselves, and with a failure to look to the eternal verities essential to
salvation. The ornate and attractive form of poetic language produces the
risk that the minds of the audience will never pass to a direct
consideration of the signified things as they exist in reality, but will dwell
on the imperfect constructs which are all that language can actually
make present; mere shadows of the truth, differentiated and dispersed
through temporality.
In his Confessiones, Augustine expresses concern about the use of
music in church, and his remarks on the subject provide a useful analogy
to his attitudes towards poetry67. In a section devoted to an analysis of
the temptations of earthly beauty he tells how, after much agonising, he
now tends towards an acceptance of the value of vocal music in the
singing of psalms and hymns. Suspicious of his appetitive response to the
music, he nevertheless feels that 'nunc ipso quod moveor, noncantu, sed
rebus quae cantantur, cum liquida voce et convenientissima modulatione
cantantur' (Conf., Bk X, ch.xxxiii, col.800). Thus, an appetitive response
67. This analogy is justified by Augustine's own writings: he treats both music
and poetic metre in his De Musica, PL, 32, 1081-1192.
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to the music's beauty is subordinated to an intellectual consideration of
the meaning of the sung words. In this way, a pious and edifying context
allows the accommodation within a valid devotional framework of a
response which in itself would be inappropriate and fit only to be expelled
from the mind of the devout. Such an accommodation provides equal
justification for religious and philosophical writers' use of poetry for the
praise of God or in serious philosophical works.
Music's value in a religious context hence becomes defined by its
capacity to stir the emotions in a suitable direction. Augustine makes
this clear when he draws a connection between the structure of music and
the human constitution68:
Et omnes affectus spiritus nostri pro sui diversitate habere
proprios modos in voce atque cantu, quorum nescio qua occulta
familiaritate excitentur.
(Conf., Bk X, ch.xxxiii, col.800)
This leads to the conclusion that music in church may have some value in
so far as it can help arouse religious feeling:
Magisque adducor, non quidem irretractabilem sententiam
proferens, cantandi consuetudinem approbare in Ecclesia; ut per
oblectamenta aurium infirmior animus in affectum pietatis
assurgat.
(Ibid.)
But the hesitancy expressed in the qualifying phrase suggests a
considerable doubt remaining on the subject, and this is further indicated
in the fact that he only accepts its value as a concession to 'infirmior
animus'. This doubt is overtly stated where he continues thus:
Tamen, cum mihi accidit ut me amplius cantus, quam res quae
canitur, moveat; poenaliter me peccare confiteor, et tunc mallem
non audire cantantem.
(Ibid.)
The sensual pleasure of the music presents a risk since 'sensus non ita
comitatur ut patienter sit posterior; sed tantum quia propter illam meruit
68. The connection between the human constitution and music was frequently
drawn: medieval theorists distinguished between musica murtdana, musica humana,
and musica instrumentalis. The first two referred to the harmony of the macrocosm and
of the microcosm which is the human body, and were based on the common proportional
harmonies perceived to be part of the make-up of both. The last referred to instrumental
music. The structure of all three was seen as deriving from the numerical proportions
which governed the universe. See, for instance Boethius, De Musica, in De Institutione
Arithmetica; De Institutione Musica, ed. Godofredus Freidlein (Leipzig: [n.pub.], 1867;
repr. Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1966), I, ii, pp.187-89.
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admitti, etiam praecurrere ac ducere conatur.' (Ibid.) Thus, while music
can on one hand play a valid part in church services, it may also be a
temptation to its hearers, interposing itself between them and the truths
which they should be contemplating, and leading their minds astray.
This is clearly similar to the concerns expressed about poetry, and
which are implicit in Augustine's preference of the art of poetry over
individual works. Nor is such an attitude mere idiosyncrasy on
Augustine's part: analogous remarks expressing the same underlying
concerns can be found throughout the Middle Ages. Boethius, in his De
Institutione Musica, asserts that the most valuable part ofmusic is the
mathematical relations underlying it, echoing Augustine's views on
metre. This leads him to assert that the true musician is he who is aware
of these relations, not he who can best put them into practice, a view
which was expressed in many medieval musical treatises69. Similarly,
Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae condemns the use of instrumental
music in church, since it was possible that its sensual pleasures might
distract from contemplation of truth (ST, II-II, q.91, art.2, ad.4). St
Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153) provides one further analogy in his
condemnation of excessive ornamentation in the design of churches,
which he feared would stimulate sensual pleasure, thus providing a
similar distraction70. The common factor to all of these instances is that
they express a fear that what is pleasing to the senses, instead of leading
to a contemplation of the true beauty which is the source of any earthly
pulchritude, may rather tempt the mind of the beholder to remain rooted
in the pleasures of temporality, without considering the relation of the
objects of their senses to unified truth. It seems, then, that the thought
underlying the frequent accusation that poetry rouses the passions is
related to a widespread concern among medieval intellectuals about the
possible negative effects of sensual beauty on the mind.
This testifies to the perception of a relationship between linguistic
structures and the structure of reality. The nature of sensual temptation
was seen to be such that it focuses the mind on what is merely temporal
and contingent, and draws it away from a proper awareness of the
69. De Institutione Musica, I, xxxiv, pp.223-25. See also Jacobus of Liege,
Speculum Musicale, ed. Roger Bragard, 7 vols (Rome: [n.pub], 1955-73), I, I, iii, pp. 17-
19.
70. Apologia ad Guillelmum, PL, 182, 895-919 (cols 915-16).
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atemporal unity of the divine ordo, which encompasses all things. And as
such, it disrupts the view of the structure of reality on which the Church
based its authority. The ornate language of poetry similarly disrupts the
desired relationship between language, perception and reality,
foregrounding itself and thrusting itself to the forefront of the audience's
attention. Thus, rather than being governed by a direct apprehension of
reality, language takes precedence and interposes itself between mind
and reality, shaping perception by stimulating the senses. By resisting
being reduced to transparency, poetic language deviates from the
standard medieval accounts of linguistic signification. Hence its mode of
signification tends to undermine the preoccupations which medieval
thinkers sought to inscribe in language's very structure. Given such a
state of affairs, although a suitably edifying context might go some way to
counteracting poetry's negative aspects, the pious and serious-minded
were inclined to feel that it should be regarded with suspicion, if not
outrightly condemned, and therefore tended to exclude it from serious
study as part of the Christian curriculum. Hence the recurrent criticism
that it rouses the passions.
Similar worries underlie the criticisms which were aimed at the
fictitious nature ofmuch poetry, in which the concern that such writing
may stimulate a sensual response is exacerbated by a suspicion of the
false subject matter. In the early-thirteenth century, Honorius ofAutun
attacks both the fiction and philosophy of the pagans and asks 'Porro quid
confert animae pugna Hectoris, vel disputatis Platonis, aut carmina
Maronis, vel neniae Nasonis?'71 Homer, too, was accused by many of
distorting the history of the Trojan war by idealising the Greek cause,
and ofmixing historical truth with his fictions of the gods72. To such
critics, the reader of fiction was giving his attention to matters which had
no bearing on truth, and which disrupted any proper grasp of it. Clearly
the problematic relationship of fiction to truth, be it historical, moral, or
spiritual, was an issue of some concern to thinkers on the subject, and
this concern is evident in their discussions of fictional narrative.
71. Gemma Animae, PL, 172, 541-758, preface (cols 543-44).
72. See, for example, Guido delle Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, trans.
M.E. Meek (Bloomington, IA and London: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp.1-2.
There is a general discussion of this question in Minnis & Scott, pp.113-16.
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Isidore of Seville (d.636), in his Etymologiae, follows Cicero's
distinction of two basic categories of fictional narrative, which are to be
distinguished from the narration of literally true events found in history.
The first of these is fabula, where the content is neither true nor possibly
could be true. In this category would come fables in which beasts or
inanimate objects were endowed with speech, and tales about mythical
beasts or gods. The second category is argumentum wherein the content
is untrue, but nonetheless credible, and under which would come any
type of verisimilar narrative73. Conrad of Hirsau in his Dialogus super
Auctores, makes a similar categorical distinction:
Differunt autem Hesopi fabulae ad morum finem relatae et
delectandi gratia confictae a commentis mendicabus Terentii,
Plauti et aliorum similium poetarum, quia etsi aliquod modo
veritati compendebat quod isti de negotiis humanarum rerum vel
personarum confinxerunt, quod Hesopus confinxit nec fuit
umquam nec fieri potuit.
(pp.84-85)
Conrad's language seems somewhat contradictory at first sight: if the
argumenta of these writers correspond with truth, even though only in a
certain manner, then why does Conrad feel the need to label them as lies?
What this reveals is a concern over the separateness of the fictional text
from reality: an attitude which aims to contain the implications of that
separateness by an act ofmind which subordinates the text to a direct
grasp of reality. Just as in medieval language theory the signifying
function of language is defined as referential, controlled by the
apprehension of a transcendent signified, unmediated and present to the
mind in its totality, so the same is true of fiction. This is indicated by
Conrad's definition of verisimilar fiction's relation to truth in terms of the
possibility of its fictional narrative happening in real life. In this he
locates the significance of the fictional text in a reality which is external
to it, assessing it in terms which are felt to have their basis in reality.
Such a process involves a translation of the significance of the contents of
the narrative from their specific fictional context into a general context
defined by the supposedly given characteristics of reality. Hence, the
credibility of the fictional narrative, the quality by which its relation to
73. Isidore of Seville, Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum
Libri XX, ed. W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), I, xliv, 5; Cicero, De
Inventione, in De Inventione; De Optimum Genere Oratorum; Topica, trans. H.M.
Hubbell (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp.55-6.
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truth is defined, is located outside the text in the prior view of reality
which determines just what is seen as being possible.
What this means is that elements which are seen as functioning
only in terms of the fictionality of the text are not conceived as an
integral part of its meaning. In determining the text's significance those
elements which are peculiar to the text, with no external referent, are to
be ignored. Only those elements which can be seen as holding a general
relation to reality and whose significance therefore extends beyond the
text are to be considered as pertinent. The conjunction of lies with a
certain relation to truth which Conrad identifies in these writers can be
seen as expressing this double aspect to the text: those elements of the
argumentum which are seen only as imaginary constructs peculiar to the
text lead such writings to be classified as lies, but those elements which it
is felt can be related in general terms to a conception of reality allow it to
be seen as corresponding with truth, even if only 'aliquod modi'.
The same holds true for fabula. Such narratives, with their lack of
verisimilitude, are never positively evaluated in terms of their fictional
content: this is either condemned or else seen as signifying some separate
moral or historical truth. The fables ofAesop, for instance, were
considered to be appropriate reading for a Christian, since their stories
were felt to be so preposterous, and their moral significance so clear, that
the reader would easily be able to extract what is meaningful and leave
behind the frivolous fiction74. These attitudes can also be seen to underlie
the criticisms of Homer's mixing history with fiction, wherein the
narratives about the gods in his works are seen as merely a distraction, to
be dismissed in extracting the truth which the texts presented. The idea
that Homer was not trying to write history, and that the fictions are
aesthetically speaking an integral part of his work, simply did not occur:
a reading based on such a premise is utterly out of step with the
Christian thought of the time, according to whose logic it deals with
matters which are not worth serious consideration, but merely figments
and frivolities. The fiction, therefore, is seen as irrelevant in itself and
can only be valued as a sign of something other than itself: a reality to
which the mind should turn, away from what is merely a figment or he,
74. See, for example, Augustine, Contra Mendacium, PL, 40, 517-48, XIII, xxviii,
(col.538), and Boccaccio, De Genealoge Deorum Gentilium Libri, ed. Vincenzo Romano, 2
vols (Bari: G. Laterza, 1951), XIV, xiii (Vol.11, pp.717-723).
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and hence insignificant. For since the significance of fictional meanings
is defined solely by their textuality, having no actual referent outside
language, then to pay attention to them in themselves would be to remain
trapped within language. The objects of the mind would then be those
which language had constructed, rather than those which actually exist.
This suspicion about the problematic relationship between fiction
and reality and its disruption of the approved mode of perception is
fundamental to the above attitudes towards fiction. As was observed
above, the signifying process of language is validated by seeing it as
governed by prior knowledge of reality. Thus, the communication of
meaning through language involves the quasi-syllogistic combination of
already known significations, combining them in such a way as to
produce a new unified signification derived from their conjunction. But
while this process, in order to be meaningful, involves producing new
knowledge of reality from that which one already has, in fictional writing
the process is different. For instance, a poet may combine the knowledge
ofwhat a horse is and what a man is and thus signify the concept of a
centaur. But this process perverts our knowledge of reality by turning it
to the production of figments: things which do not exist and which
therefore lead the mind away from real things. Such figments can only
be justified by seeing them as referring to something else. Thus, the
centaur is seen to signify euhemeristically the horsemen of the
Thessalians who, when riding about in battle, seemed to be of one body
with their horses75. In this way the fiction is seen as signifying a reality
which exists independently of it, to which it merely refers, and which can
be contemplated without the need to give any attention to the fiction.
To contemplate fictions for their own sake, then, constitutes a
disruption of the order of perception similar to that which ornate
language is suspected of producing, distracting the mind from a
contemplation of external truth (be it moral, spiritual, or empirical fact)
and focusing it on what is merely a textual construct, not truth, and
therefore a he. And the consequences for the authority of the Church also
remain the same: by encouraging delight in the representation of
falsehoods and hence distracting attention from reality, fiction induces a
response in its audience which usurps the dominance of a sense of a
75. See Isidore, Etymologiarum, XI, iii, 37.
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stable centre which should govern their responses. This usurpation
undermines the view of reality and thought which the Christian
curriculum sought to inculcate, and by means of which the Church
validated its authority. Hence, those writings which risk bringing it
about are regarded with suspicion and tend to be excluded from any
serious status within that curriculum.
These concerns, with their emphasis on imaginative writing's
disruption of any sense of unified truth, mirror those general concerns
about language which medieval language theory aims to contain: the
fundamental emphasis is on problems of signification, and on the
relationship between language, reality, and the mind, in the problematic
discourses of poetry and fiction. Scholastic literary theory, however, was
able to overcome the doubts about such writings to a considerable degree.
One can observe this in the way in which commentators in the later
Middle Ages almost universally defined poetry as pertaining to ethics,
and hence being relevant to philosophy. In the early Middle Ages any
relation between philosophy and imaginative writing was drawn very
tentatively and with great selectivity, as is witnessed by Macrobius's
agonising over the problem in the passage already cited. In the later
Middle Ages, however, the definition of poetry as pertaining to ethics
became virtually axiomatic, indicating its heightened esteem among the
Scholastics76. The general development of an increasingly favourable
attitude towards poetry culminates in the fourteenth century with
Boccaccio's assertion that poetry is theology and that theology is poetry, a
view which links poetry to the highest stratum of knowledge and affords
it a level of respect unheard of in the early Middle Ages77.
Yet the reclamation which the Scholastics effected is not based in
any attempt to define an autonomous value for poetry. Rather than
challenging the conviction that only writing which conformed with the
apprehension of truth was to be considered worthwhile, they accepted
these terms of evaluation and set out to prove that imaginative literature
fulfilled them. While their conclusions as to the significance of poetic and
fictional language were very different from those of its earlier critics,
76. See Judson Boyce Allen, The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages: A
Decorum of Convenient Distinction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
77. Short Treatise in Praise ofDante, in Minnis & Scott, pp.492-503 (p.498).
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their assumptions and premises as to the nature and value of language
were the same. Through an analysis of the theoretical basis of the new
modes of discussing and thinking about literature which they developed, I
intend to show that the fundamental aim of their exegetical procedures
and ideas about the function of literature is to extend the stabilising
influence which their language theory provided for general discursive
language so as to encompass potentially disruptive aspects of imaginative
writing. Such an approach should reveal that the main difference
between Scholastics and earlier thinkers in their thought on literature is
that the Scholastics aimed at containment rather than dismissal;
assimilation rather than exclusion.
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Chapter Two
Per Grosse et Figuraliter:
The Scholastic Reappraisal
of Imaginative Writing
For Seint Paul seith that al that writen is,
To our doctrine it is ywrite, ywis.
(Chaucer, Nun's Priest's Tale)1
1
Scholastic apologists for literature sought to justify the study of secular
and profane poetic texts by subordinating their meaning within a pre¬
ordained doctrinal and eschatological framework, thus countering the
earlier criticisms which had been levelled at such writings. This was
achieved in the first instance by the definition of poetry as an affective
art form, which effectively dealt with the criticism of poetry as being
inflammatory, since its operation on the affections was seen as working in
common with edifying subject matter so as to move the audience to
penitence and virtue. Secondly the subject matter of poetry was either
moralised or allegorised. Thus, while fictional content was not seen as
true in itself, it could be considered to pertain in some way to moral,
spiritual or historical truth, either through exemplification or allegoresis.
The Scholastic application of these ways of conceiving literary texts
is a novel and distinctive feature of medieval thought on such writing.
While employing techniques such as allegoresis which had long been
common exegetical practice, the Scholastics used them to unprecedented
effect in revolutionising attitudes towards the value and authority of
literature. Later in this chapter I will analyse in some detail exactly how
the Scholastic definition of the nature and function of imaginative writing
provided a powerful response to the earlier attitudes of suspicion. The
chapter will close with a discussion of the relationship between medieval
literature and its contemporary theory and a general indication of one of
the most notable ways in which Scholastic literary theory informs
medieval literature and is developed therein. This last will serve as a
1. The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson et al., 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), Canterbury Tales, VII, 3441-42 (p.261).
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preface to the discussion in later chapters of how the works of Robert
Henryson can be profitably analysed within the context of the Scholastic
approach to literature. Firstly, however, it will be useful to analyse the
underlying forces which facilitated the more positive late-medieval
attitudes towards literature.
2
Alistair Minnis has convincingly argued that the sense of value and
authority which the Scholastics were able to attach to literature was
facilitated by new features of Biblical exegesis which appeared in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries2. Fundamental to these features was
an increasing emphasis on theology as primarily appealing to the
emotions rather than to the rational faculties. Thus, while writers such
as Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent (d.1293) persisted in
emphasising the speculative and ratiocinative aspects of theology, other
thirteenth-century thinkers such as Giles of Rome (d. 1316) and Saint
Bonaventure (d.1274) stressed the affective nature of the science. The
argument behind this emphasis on the affective nature of divine science
was that theology was aimed not merely at establishing knowledge of
divine truth, but was intended to stimulate the love of the divine good
and to inculcate the three cardinal virtues of faith, hope and charity.
This could not be achieved by ratiocination alone, for this in itself does
not move the affections, and futhermore, matters of faith, which is the
foundation of these virtues, are ultimately above human reason. Rather,
what was required was the stimulation and direction of the will to desire
the good, so leading to virtuous action as the soul turned to the good on
the basis of that desire3.
Minnis suggests that once this was proposed it became possible to
analyse the Bible with a new emphasis on its stylistic features. These
features came to be seen as working in collaboration with the truths
which it conveyed, so as to move the audience to virtue4. Some earlier
2. See Authorship, esp. pp.118-45.
3. See ibid., pp.119-22.
4. Ibid., p.144, 'Once the suggestion had been made that theology might be
basically affective, no theologian could avoid considering those aspects of rhetoric and
poetics which Alexander of Hales and his successors had deemed appropriate to the
subject.' For a general account see pp. 123-45.
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writers, certainly, had argued that stylistic features and secular learning
in general were relevant to the study of Bible. Cassiodorus (d.c.580), in
his Institutiones Divinarum Litterarum, states that 'in sacris litteris
quam in expositoribus doctissimis multa per schemata, multa per
definitiones, multa per artem grammatica, multa per artem rhetorica [...]
intelligere possumus.'5 But Cassiodorus' treatment of these subjects is
cursory, and far from complete in its detail. What is more, the section of
his De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium in which he deals with the arts
of discourse found in the trivium is extremely brief, taking up very little
of the work, and receiving an even more cursory treatment in his treatise
on sacred letters6. The later Middle Ages found a much more far-
reaching and systematic extension of these branches of learning into the
study of the Bible.
This tendency can be seen in the Summa Theologiae of Alexander
of Hales (d.1245), in which he examines the question of whether or not
the scriptures utilise multiple stylistic and significative modes7. Among
other arguments Alexander proposes that truth must be conveyed in such
a way as to take into account the diverse conditions of those who make up
its audience:
The conditions (status) ofmen are manifold: in the time of the Law,
in the time after the Law, in the time of prophecy, in the time of
grace. Even within those periods the conditions ofmen are
manifold. For some are sluggish in matters relating to faith, some
are rebellious in matters relating to good morality, and [fall short]
in different ways. Some pass their lives in prosperity, some in
adversity, some in good works, some in sin. The conclusion must
be drawn that the teaching of Holy Scripture, which has been
ordained for the salvation ofmen, must employ a multiple mode,
so that the mode matches the objective.
(Minnis & Scott, p.219)
This stress on the need to take account of audience reflects ideas already
associated with rhetorical theory, where the rhetor had to consider the
nature of his hearers in choosing the discourse most appropriate to his
persuasive effect. The needs of a specific audience are thus seen to be
met by tailoring the stylistic and significative modes appropriately.
5. Flavius Cassiodorus Senator, De lnstitutione Divinarum Litterarum, PL, 70,
1105-49,1, xxi, 1, (col.1140).
6. Cassiodorus' discussion of rhetoric and grammar can be found in De Artibus
ac Disciplinis Liberalium, PL 70, 1149-1220, I-II (cols 1152-67). For a brief discussion of
his work in its connection to the study of the trivium, see Murphy, Rhetoric, pp.64-7.
7. Translated excerpts are to be found in Minnis & Scott, pp.212-23.
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Hence, rather than rejecting formal stylistic qualities as inappropriate for
the pious mind, exegetes came to see the Bible as embodying all these
features, and, indeed, to surpass secular writing in its utilisation of them.
Thus, where St Jerome contrasts the eloquence of Cicero and Plautus
with the unadorned style ('sermo [...] incultis') of the prophets8, an
anonymous late-medieval commentator on Lamentations acually cites
Cicero to help explain the stylistic form of the Biblical text9.
Despite this increasing convergence of approaches to scripture and
poetry, thirteenth-century exegetes were still inclined to draw a clear
distinction between the two. I have already observed Aquinas' separation
of poetic metaphors from those employed in the Bible, and Albertus
Magnus (d.1280) makes a similar distinction10. But, as is clear from
statements such as Boccaccio's which compare poetry and theology, later
thinkers afforded poetry a much greater respect. Once the stylistic modes
of poetry had been seen to be consonant with the doctrinal concerns of
Christian faith, and the methods of analysis associated with them found
to be of value in Biblical exegesis, then it became possible to see them as
much less out of step with Christian faith. If the very features which had
led to poetry being condemned for rousing the passions were now seen to
be employed in sacred scripture, then those features were no longer in
themselves a reason for shunning poetry. Hence, when allied to an
edifying subject matter, poetry could much more readily be afforded
serious consideration.
Given the new emphasis on the utility of poetic modes in their
perceived use in the Bible, the reservations which many Christians held
towards literary discouse seemed to dissipate. With the new authority
which the techniques of imaginative writing had acquired, those concepts
which had in earlier times been employed to lend some justification to
poetic literature came to have a much more far-reaching impact. Many
late-medieval thinkers espoused the view that secular poetic texts offered
edifying subject matter either through the exemplification of moral
values, or through their containment of valuable meanings beneath a
fictional integumentum or veil. This theory was an ancient one in the
8. Epistola XXII, PL, 22, 394-425, xxx (col.416).
9. Cited in Authorship, p.133, 262n.
10. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologia, in Opera Omnia, ed. Bernhard Geyer,
et al. (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 1951-) I, v, 2, (Vol.XXXI, pp.23-4).
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study of literary texts, being found even in the Classical period, and had
been utilised by medieval scholars in, for example, the twelfth-century
accessus ad auctores11. But in the earlier Middle Ages such approaches
had been joined to a suspicion of the superfluity of the fictional elements
which only served to distract from the truth. It was this suspicion which
led to Macrobius's careful and exacting distinctions of suitable from
unsuitable fictions, and to the stress among many early-medieval
thinkers on such writing's suitability only for beginners on the first step
of the ladder to knowledge. With the new emphasis on the value of
imaginative modes ofwriting in Biblical texts, however, the delight which
the fictional veil stirred was no longer seen as mere frivolity, but as an
enticement to study and an aid to understanding. Hence, Ulrich of
Strassburg, writing in the latter part of the thirteenth century, states
that 'philomythos, id est poeta amans fingere fabulas, philosophus est eo,
quod poeta ad hoc fingit fabulam, ut excitet ad admirandum et admiratio
ulterius excitet ad inquirendum et sic constet scientia [..]12. The fictional
veil thus became no longer a mere unnecessary appendage to the text, but
was harmonised within a model of reception wherein response was seen
to consist of an opening of the intellect to appetitive stimulation.
The application by the Scholastics of these ways of looking at
poetry constitutes a considerable departure from the attitudes found in
the earlier Middle Ages, with the emphasis on its affective nature and its
classification under ethics giving it a utility and truth value which earlier
critics had not allowed. But while the specific details of these approaches
to literature constitute a distinctive and novel development in medieval
literary theory, they also have a much wider significance. These
particular developments are located within the general concerns of
medieval scholars over the nature of language as it pertained to the
certitude which could be attached to meaning. Where earlier critics had
felt imaginative writing to fit ill with the assumptions about language
and meaning which underpinned the authority of Christian doctrine, the
Scholastic approach overcomes these objections and aligns the
11. See John MacQueen, Allegory (London and New York: Methuen, 1970), p.46.
On the classical and early-medieval traditions, see pp.1-17, 46-58.
12. Ulrich of Strassburg, De Summa Bono Liber 1, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch
(Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1989), II, ix (p.52).
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significative structure of imaginative writing with that propounded in the
dominant view of language.
3
The ramifications of this new conception of the structure of poetry are
manifold and complex, but they are notably exemplified in the
commentary on Aristotle's Poetics by Averroes of Cordova (d. 1198),
translated into Latin from Arabic by Hermann the German in 125613.
The poetic theory outlined therein differs very much from that of the
genuine Aristotle. To emphasise more clearly these differences I will
glance briefly at the Aristotelian version, before examining the
Averroistic text.
While Aristotle's Poetics defines poetry as a mimesis or imitation,
implying resemblance, it nevertheless does so in terms which emphasise
the text's aesthetic autonomy. Plot is seen as the most important part
and is defined as an ordering of incidents which form a causal sequence:
We have laid it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an action
that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude; for a whole
may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that which
has beginning, middle and end. A beginning is that which is not
itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally
something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after
something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and
with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature
after one thing and has also another after it. A well constructed
plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes:
beginning and end in it must be of the form just described.14
The fittingness of the qualities of character and thought, and of the
various incidents presented, is then defined in terms of their place within
this causal ordering:
The right thing [...] is in the characters just as in the incidents of
the play to seek after the necessary or the probable; so that
whenever such-and-such a personage says or does such-and-such a
13. Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Medium in Aristoteles Poetrium, ed.
W.F. Boggess (Ph.D thesis: University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1965).
14. Poetics, 1450b. All quotations from the Poetics are from I. Bywater's
translation, printed in vol.2 of The Complete Works ofAristotle, ed. Jonathon Barnes, 2
vols (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.2316-2341. References for all
Aristotle's works are to the page numbers of Immanuel Bekker's Berlin edition of
Aristotle. This edition is used by scholars as a general reference system, and all the
editions from which I quote employ it in their margins.
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thing, it shall be the necessary or probable outcome of his
character; and whenever this incident follows on that, it shall be
either the necessary or probable consequence of it.
(1454a)
A plot constructed along these lines, however, is seen as different
from the order of events found in history:
A history has to deal not with one action, but with one period and
all that happened in that to one or more persons, however
disconnected the several events may have been. Just as two events
may take place at the same time, eg. the sea-fight off Salamis and
the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without converging to
the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes
come after the other with no one end as their common issue.
(1459a)
A poem, therefore, is not seen simply as a verisimilar reproduction of
reality. Rather, it imitates in its teleological structure an underlying
principle of entelechy which Aristotle sees as the central structure of
reality15. As he states in his Physics16, 'where there is an end, the
successive things which go before are done for it. As things are done, so
they are by nature such as to be, and as they are by nature so as to be, so
are they done, if there is no impediment.' (199a) The changes and
developments which by nature take place in material things are seen as
orientated towards a final end, in the same way as in logical investigation
premises are orientated towards a conclusion (198b). In physical objects
and beings, change which takes place in matter contributes to the full
realisation of a form which exists potentially in the changing thing, and
which is the essence of its being. The actualisation of this form is the
logical and ontological consequence of that change, and, indeed, a
motivating force for it. Aristotle thus sees the world as composed of
innumerable diverse actions, which have in common this process of
entelechy as their motivating and organising principle. And, in fact, the
concept of entelechy pervades his whole philosophy, being fundamental to
his conception of the relationship between matter and form, between
existence and essence, and between the particular and the universal17.
15. See Jonathon Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.16-20, 33-50.
16. Physics, trans. W. Charlton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
17. See Lear, passim. Lear's whole book examines the functions of the process
of entelechy in the different parts of Aristotle's philosophy. Hence the title: man's
natural desire to understand is seen as a tendency towards a perfection of form, the act
of thought being what is highest in humanity.
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By defining the unifying principle of reality in such a manner,
however, Aristotle introduces a certain disunity and lack of order into his
world view. Each distinct process of entelechy is seen as developing
independently from the others, as Aristotle makes clear in his comments
on history. Diverse operations are seen as unconnected in their
unfolding, and what is more, should they come into contact they may
clash and conflict in their different courses. Aristotle expressly states
that any natural development may meet with an 'impediment1, and
comments that 'mistakes are possible in the operations of nature' (199a),
so that any one teleological development may go awry. Hence, while
reality may be ordered according to a common principle, the connections
and interactions between the different parts of reality are seen as fitting
with no intelligible order: Aristotle is only able to classify them as
something going wrong. Thus, although Aristotle's theory aims to define
reality as an intelligible unity, it also presents each distinct entity or
action as independent and self-contained, so involving a large degree of
heterogeneity in his world view.
The view of poetry expounded in the Poetics displays a similar
disjunction to that within the ontology on which it is based. Aristotle
bases his claims as to poetry's universality on the mimesis in its causal
structure of the principles of reality operative in natural things,
dependent on the perception of a resemblance between imitation and
imitated. But by giving precedence to the plot structure which through
its organising principle achieves this mimesis, Aristotle also focuses
attention on the text as a unique object, displaying a distinctive narrative
order proper to itself. With plot as the predominant part of tragedy, the
characters, thoughts and incidents of the plot then become seen as
meaningful primarily in their resonance within a particular action,
realised only within the fictional framework of the text. Hence,
Aristotle's theory emphasises the particularities of a poem, presenting it
as a thing in itself, rather than as part of a wider system of
interrelationships. In this way, while aiming to draw resemblances,
Aristotelian mimesis also tends to distinguish the imitation from the
imitated, and to insist that the imitation be seen in terms ofwhat is
proper to itself. The text thus appears as a distinctive verbal object,
frustrating any attempt to define it in simply referential terms. As
Judson Boyce Allen comments in The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle
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Ages, 'the genuine doctrine of Aristotle distinguishes poetry from, rather
than relates it to, defines it as itself, rather than as an organic part of a
larger system.' (p. 185)
Such a view of poetry, with its emphasis on the autonomy of poetic
meaning, and its distinctness from any external reality, would obviously
be anathema to the medieval sensibility, with its ubiquitous concern
about the relationship between poetry and the real world. It should come
as no surprise, therefore, that the Averroistic version of the Poetics
should depart considerably from Aristotle's version. Rather than simply
being a misunderstanding of Aristotle, the points of difference can be
shown to be a consistent interpretative strategy in the medieval version,
recasting those aspects of the original which foreground the importance of
the text in determining meaning, and thus rendering it amenable to the
views of Christian thinkers.
This can be demonstrated from an analysis of the passage dealing
with the six parts of tragedy18:
Et oportet ut tragedie, idest artis laudandi, sex partes sunt, scilicet
sermones fabulares representativi, et consuetudines, et metrum
seu pondus, et credulitates, et consideratio, et thonus. Et signum
huius est quoniam omnis sermo poeticus dividitur in
assimilationem et in id per quod fit assimilatio et ea per que fit
assimilatio - tria sunt: representatio et metrum et thonus. Et ea
que assimilantur in laudando etiam tria sunt: consuetudines, et
credulitates, et consideratio, idest probatio recte credulitatis. Sunt
itaque necessario partes tragedie sex, et partes majores carminis
laudativi sunt consuetudines et credulitates. Tragedia etenim non
est ars representiva ipsorummet hominem prout sunt individua
cadentia in sensum, sed est representativa consuetudinem eorum
honestarum et actionem laudabilium et credulitatum
beatificantium. Et consuetudines comprehendunt actiones et
mores: ideoque ponitur consuetudo una sex partium et per eius
positionem excusatur positio actionum et morum in ilia divisione,
Consideratio autem est declaratio recte credulitatis per quam homo
laudabilis existit. [...] Et representant hoc tria, scilicet
consuetudines, credulitates et significationes, per tres maneries
18. There are several important discussions of the Averroistic Poetics.
Particularly noteworthy are W.F. Boggess, 'Hermannus Alemannus' Rhetorical
Translations', Viator 2 (1971), 227-50; H.A. Kelly, 'Aristotle-Averroes-Allemanus on
Tragedy: The Influence of the Poetics in the Middle Ages', Viator 10 (1979) 161-209.
Judson Boyce Allen discusses the text in The Ethical Poetic, and his understanding of it
is probably closest to my own. For his comments on the discussion of the six parts of
tragedy, see pp.22-38. See also his rather more brief'Hermann the German's
Averroistic Aristotle and Medieval Poetic Theory', Mosaic 9 (1976), 67-81.
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rerum per quas fit representatio, scilicet sermonem imaginativum
et metrum et tonum.
(pp.19-20)
The first term distinguished by Averroes, 'sermones fabulares
representative, is later in the passage termed simply 'representatio1. This
is significant, since 'fabulares' denotes fictional material, while
'representative and 'representatio' imply some referential aspect to the
discourse. The fictional elements of poetry are thus being traced to an
external reality, anchoring poetic signification outside the realms of
textuality and literary convention. This same first part of tragedy is also
designated in the passage by the term 'sermonem imaginativum'. This
draws a connection between the fictional discourse of the text and the
mental faculty of the imagination. The various terms used for this first
part of tragedy thus locate the text within a system of relationships
wherein it interacts with an external reality and with the human mind.
In this it encapsulates the fundamental characteristics of the Averroistic
Poetics and of Scholastic literary attitudes in general.
This can be demonstrated through analysis of the remaining
specified parts. Of these, consuetudo, credulitas, and consideratio relate
most directly to the relationship between the poetic text and external
reality. Consuetudo and credulitas are defined, pace Aristotle, as the
most important parts of tragedy, while plot has disappeared from the list
(a fact which is itself significant), becoming absorbed, it seems, within the
more general sermones fabulares19. These two terms correspond
respectively to Aristotle's character and thought. Consuetudines,
however, translates as 'customs' rather than character, suggesting a more
general reference, as Judson Boyce Allen points out:
The Aristotelian terms 'plot' and 'character' emphasise the
particular; whatever universal quality or impression one may in
the end reach, its essence is the existence and significance of a
particular action, at a particular time, by particular persons.
Averroes is just the reverse; whatever is particular in poetry is
19. Most critics and translators tend to identify sermones fabulares with the
Aristotelian 'plot'. Judson Boyce Allen, however, states that such an identification is
incorrect, and that 'plot' has been ousted by 'consuetudines' (see Mosaic 9, p.67). My
view lies somewhere in between. Sermones fabulares can certainly not be identified with
plot, being much more general, and including any sort of fictional description, be it of a
static object or a chain of events. I do, however, think that plot is included under this
heading on account of its consisting of a merely particular causal sequence, which leads
it to be afforded the lack of significance attributed to fiction in general. My reasons for
this should become clear as my argument progresses.
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exemplary rather than essential. The real essence of poetry is
something universal. The particulars of which, empirically,
representation must be made are instrumental, not absolute; their
presence has normative overtones which they define but do not
dominate.
(jEthical Poetic, p.27)
This defines the emphasis which is central to Averroes' consideration of
poetic signification, indicated when it is stated that poetry depicts
'consuetudinem [...] honestarum et actionem laudabilim et credulitatem
beatificantium.' The appended adjectives presume a set of absolute moral
standards which provide a frame of reference within which customs,
actions and beliefs can indeed be said to be truly honest, praiseworthy
and beatifying. The replacing of plot as the dominant structural
characteristic of poetry removes that which emphasises meaning as
determined within the fictional framework of a particular text. The
definition of praiseworthy consuetudines and credulitates as being the
primary features of imaginative writing gives poetic meaning a basis in
transcendent reality.
This becomes clear in the discussion of consideratio. According to
Averroes, this is 'declaratio recte credulitatis per quam homo laudabilis
existit.1 Later he defines it as 'argumentio seu probatio rectitudinis
credulitatis aut operationis [...] per sermonem representativum.' (p.23)
Both these definitions suggest that the conviction or 'probatio1 which
consideratio provides is something to do with the effectiveness of the
language employed: the first describes it as 'declaratio recte', while the
final clause of the second could be interpreted as implying that it is the
'sermonem representativum' which establishes the conviction implied by
'probatio'. It is certainly the case that language plays an important part
in convincing an audience (a point to which I shall return later), but were
this exclusively the case then the Averroistic Poetics would be reducing
poetry to mere sophistry. In fact, consideratio is defined as
'assimilationem', rather than something 'per quod fit assimilatio'. This
clearly indicates that the quality which it denotes is seen as being more
than a mere product of language, and is felt to be an intrinsic part of the
content of poetry.
The type of proof denoted by consideratio can thus be seen as the
perception of a definitive quality of Tightness' evident in the delineated
consuetudines and credulitates'. that is to say, the particular
representations of the poetic text have a perceptible universal resonance
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in terms of an absolute moral framework. The importance of this fact
becomes clear when Averroes substitutes the term significationes for
consideratio. This identifies consideratio with a text's meaningfulness,
indicating that this universal resonance is central to the conception of
how a text is intelligible. Meaningfulness is seen to depend on the
possibility of tracing the consuetudines and credulitates of a text to an
external and universal truth. Thus, in the Averroistic text the
meaningfulness of these parts of a poem is determined not by their
relative functions and relationships formulated within the fictional
framework of the text. Rather, their significance obtains from the
absolute moral values which are seen to exist outside the text, and which
the text serves to point towards. This much is stated elsewhere in the
commentary:
Et terminis substantialis sive intellegere faciens substantiam artis
laudandi est quoniam ipsa est assimilatio et representatio
operationis voluntarie virtuose complete que habet potentiam
universalem in rebus virtuosis, non potentiam particularem in
unaquaque rerum virtuosarum.
(p. 16)
The fictional particulars of the text are thus seen not to play the central
role in constructing meaning which they do in the genuine Aristotle.
Their function is, as Allen points out, an instrumental one, serving to
point to a truth located in external reality.
Thus, the causal connections between particular characters and
events within a specific plot are denied any dominant role in establishing
a text's meaning, in much the same way as John of Salisbury and
Bernard ofChartres subordinate the significative function of syntax to a
discrete extra-linguistic signified. To emphasise connections which
belong merely to a particular action would be to lose sight of the
universal verities under which all things are organised, placing the
contingent before the absolute, the sensible before the intelligible. That
such an inclination was not commonly embraced in the literary thought of
the Middle Ages can be seen in how unimportant plot structure was felt
to be among writers of the time, evident in their willingness to interrupt
their narratives with long digressions and extensive descriptions whose
presence breaks the flow of the story. Witness in Holland's Buke of the
Howlat, written in the fifteenth century, the description of the procession
of birds, which continues for some five hundred and seven lines, with one
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hundred and sixty nine of these being devoted to a digression on the noble
deeds of Douglas, the companion of Robert the Bruce20. Similarly, in the
fourteenth-century Bruce, John Barbour frequently abandons the story to
insert his narratorial digressions21. Such practice stems from an
established habit of considering a text in a way which sets little store by
the sequential ordering of a self-contained narrative structure. Instead,
the text is always referred to an external and independent meaning.
This outlook is indicated by the truth claims made by medieval
romances, of the sort mocked by Chaucer in his Tale ofSir Thopas and in
other of his works22. There seems to be no sense of contradiction between
the claims to historical accuracy and the overtly fabulous conventions
associated with romances. Thus, the opening passage of Barbour's Bruce
asserts that the story is historical truth, yet Barbour feels free to
embellish it with all the trappings of a medieval romance, with no sense
of conflict between literary convention and truth23. What such claims
assume, and what makes it possible for them to be seriously proposed, is
that the superlative actions represented in romance constitute not simply
a literary ideal, separate from reality, but the representation of a mode of
existence in conformity with real universal values, and enacted by the
great men of the past. Such actions thus represent not the illusions of
art, meaningful within the conventions of the genre, but a way of life
which is most fully consonant with the metaphysical structure of reality,
raising a particular existence to the level of the universal. It is in terms
of this relation between the particular and the universal, rather than in
terms of its status as an imaginative construct, that a text achieves its
meaning. As Judson Boyce Allen observes:
All exemplary existences inhabit, ultimately, the same world; to
the extent that one's submission to the ethical consideratio of a
poem permitted one to achieve a normative resonance, a relation to
20. Richard Holland, The Buke of the Howlat, in Priscilla Bawcutt and Felicity
Riddy, eds, Longer Scottish Poems Volume One: 1375-1670 (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1987), 157-663. For the Douglas section, see 378-546.
21. Barbour's Bruce: A Fredome is a Noble Thing, ed. M.P. McDiarmid, 3 vols
(Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1981). See, for example, I, 41-48, 445-476, and IV,
668-769 (Vol.1).
22. See The Tale ofSir Thopas, CT, VII, 713, 749 (p.213). See also The Nun's
Priest's Tale, VII, 3211-12 (p.258).
23. Bruce, I, 12-20.
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credulitas and consuetudo, one would exist as a part of that
constitution of definition.
(.Ethical Poetic, p.34)
Thus, the theory of exemplification outlined in the Averroistic Poetics, in
establishing the order of poetic signification as involving the
subordination of the structure of a particular text to the certainties of an
external reality, serves to bring poetry into conformity with the view of
signification outlined in medieval language theory, and with the
metaphysical structure of reality which it mirrors. The concern of earlier
medieval thinkers over poetic signification's separateness from any
external truth, and over the problems this presents for the orthodox view
of reality and thought, is thus alleviated. Poetry and truth are
reconciled.
While I am of the opinion that the ways of thinking about imaginative
literature evident in the Averroistic Poetics are typical of Scholasticism in
general, it must be admitted that it is atypical in denigrating fabulous
poetry, and in ignoring allegoresis in favour of an exemplative theory of
literature24. However, it can be demonstrated that medieval allegorical
exegesis displays the same attitudes towards text and interpretation as
are found in the Averroistic theory, and that what makes exemplative
poetry acceptable to that theory is precisely what makes fabulous poetry
acceptable among the Scholastics in general.
An indication of this is that allegorical interpretations of poetic
texts display precisely the same lack of concern for the text as an arbiter
ofmeaning, in fact displaying no desire to preserve a consistency between
their interpretation and the apparent sense of a poem. Thus, in his
Reductorium Morale, written mid-fourteenth century, Pierre Bersuire
feels free to abandon any consideration of story or style, stating 'non
intendo nisi rarissime litteralum sensum fabularum tangere', instead
choosing to concentrate on moral and allegorical exposition25. In the 'De
Formis Figuris et Imaginibus Deorum' which prefaces his exposition of
24. Boccaccio, for one, seems to afford privilege to the most outrageously
fictional tales. See De Genealoge Deorum Gentilium, XIV, xiii (Vol.11, p.718).
25. Book XV of the Reductorium Morale, the Ovidus Moralizatus, is available in
a facsimile version as Metamorphosis Ovidiana Moraliter...Explanata, ed. S. Orget




the text, he says that Diana may be interpreted as the Blessed Virgin, or
as an evil woman who leads men astray using temptation and lust, or as
avarice26. Similarly, in his exposition of the Orpheus narrative, having
briefly sketched the story, his interpretation makes Orpheus represent
Christ, the good preacher, the saints and learned men of the early church,
and the sinner27. This willingness to offer contradictory interpretations
of the same character reveals that such exegesis does not proceed by
trying to draw a relation of consonance between the particulars of the
text and the adduced meaning. The interpretations offered are free to
ignore the resonances of a character within the text: it suffices that the
interpretation offered is consonant with Christian doctrine. As Judson
Boyce Allen observes, 'the relation between a fictional story and its
spiritual meanings [...] holds, not because there exists some arguable
relation between the letter and the spirit - but rather because the
meaning adduced is itself true.'28
That this tendency to ignore plot structure and narrative context
rests on a fundamental quality of medieval thought can be seen from one
of the basic procedures of medieval interpretation; the analysis of the
divisio textus. This process was crucial to medieval critics, who saw the
analysis of the divisions of a text as central to any understanding of it, as
is indicated by Hugh of St Victor's assertion that 'modus legendi in
dividendo constat' (Didascalicon, III, 9). Thus Robert Kilwardby remarks
in his discussion of Aristotle's Praedicamenta that 'since we only know a
composite from our knowledge of its parts, and of their nature, and since
that book is composed of parts, therefore we must not be ignorant of what
parts, and what sort of parts, it is composed.'29 He then proceeds to
provide a detailed and meticulous analaysis of the divisio textus, of a sort
which is very much typical of analyses of textual division. The divisions
extended from books to chapters to parts of chapters. It seems that the
more divisions one could discern in a text the more thorough one's
understanding of it was felt to be30.
26. Ibid, 'De formis Figuris et Imaginibus Deorum', vii.
27. Ibid, X, A-F.
28. The Friar as Critic: Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages (Nashville,
TE: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971).
29. Cited in Authorship, p.149.
30. Thus Dante, in his commentary to the Vita Nuova xix, states that 'to
uncover still more meaning in this canzone it would be necessary to divide it more
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Judson Boyce Allen notes that the divisions identified by medieval
exegetes are primarily sententious rather than based on aesthetic
proportioning (Ethical Poetic, p. 130). Similarly, Mary Carruthers, in The
Book ofMemory, identifies the marking of divisions by punctuation as a
mnemonic device, each segment thus divided having a discrete and
noteworthy significance31. This means that each distinct part of a text,
while it participates in the system of relationships which makes up the
whole, can also be considered in isolation from the others:
Division tends to distinguish parts which are themselves whole, in
a way which as named and distinguished, is quite static. Medieval
parts relate additively, not dynamically; therefore medieval
distinction and definition of parts tends quite naturally to identify
parts appropriate to this additive kind of relationship. A
particularly neat example of this tendency is Bersuire's way of
dividing Ovid's fables for allegorisation - the result of his analysis
is a set of discrete parts of a narrative plot, which exist as more or
less independent events, each having its own meaning.
(Ethical Poetic, pp. 138-39)
The process of division thus tends to disrupt the dynamic relationships
established within the narrative structure of the text and so undermines
the significance of the parts of a poem as they relate within the fictional
framework of the plot. Their significance hence becomes determined by
virtue of the sententious division which assigns each part one or more
referents outside the text.
The parts of a text thus divided could then form distinctiones, in
which are listed a range of possible meanings applicable to the subject of
a particular divisione. It has been observed that while distinctione
collections are not given a formal designation until the later Middle Ages,
this represents a systemisation of procedures which were already in use,
extending back to the fifth century32. And, in fact, the distinctione is
clearly central to the long-standing tradition of Biblical exegesis in bono
minutely.' See Vita Nuova, trans. B. Reynolds (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp.58-
59.
31. Mary Carruthers, The Book ofMemory: A Study ofMemory in Medieval
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
32. On the history and nature of the distinctione, see M.A. Rouse and R.H.
Rouse, 'Biblical Distinctiones in the Thirteenth Century', Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale
et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 41 (1974), 27-37 (pp.28-29). For discussion of the relation
between distinctiones and divisiones see M.B. Parkes, Pause and Effect: An Introduction
to the History ofPunctuation in the West (Aldershot: Scolar, 1992), pp.21-22, 303-4. For
discussion of the sententious basis of the divisions marked by medieval punctuation, see
Parkes, pp.65-76.
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and in malo. This can be seen in the contradictory interpretations offered
by Peter of Poitiers in his Distinctiones super Psalterum. He glosses the
word lectus (bed) in Psalm 6 with a sevenfold distinctione: it refers to
sacred scripture, contemplation, the Church, conscience, carnal pleasure,
eternal damnation, and eternal beatitude33. Pierre Bersuire provides
another example in his Reportorium Morale, in which he interprets the
ram mentioned in the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22 as Christ
the Redeemer, Christ the Defender, the just precept, and the carnal
sinner34. The alternative significations proposed here are not seen in any
way to impinge on each other: the fact that the same goat should
represent vice and virtue implies no confusion in the understanding. As
with the distinctiones already seen in Bersuire's interpretations of Ovid,
the various interpretations offered constitute discrete meanings existing
independently of the text.
By dividing the text and allocating meanings to its parts in this
manner medieval exegetes avoid any sense of a merely textual unity
being the governor of signification. Rather than being determined by
their resonances within a dynamic narrative order realised only within
the framework of the text, the various significations offered for each part
form a network of possible meanings within which each signification of
any one distinctione may be related to any of the significations offered for
the other parts. Nor do all the parts need to be taken into account. In his
interpretation of the Orpheus narrative in De Consolatione Philosophiae,
William ofAragon ignores the conclusion, vastly important for the story,
where Orpheus looks back at Eurydice and thus loses her35. As Alistair
Minnis notes, he does this 'presumably because of the difficulty of finding
anything blameworthy about eloquence looking back at good
judgement'36, but this is perfectly permissible, since from the medieval
viewpoint the conclusion merely constitutes one element among others,
rather than an essential part of the poem's meaning. The only rigid
constraint on this exegetical process is the limits set by Christian
doctrine. Whatever is conformable to it is valid.
33. Cited in Philip S. Moore, The Works ofPeter ofPoitiers: Master of Theology
and, Chancellor ofParis (1193-1205) (Notre Dame, IA: University ofNotre Dame Press,
1936), p.79.
34. Cited in Gellrich, p.133.
35. See Minnis & Scott, pp.332-336 (pp.333-34).
36. Ibid., p.320.
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From this perspective, then, the fictional details of a poem are seen
as making no essential contribution to meaning. This is confirmed by
Boccaccio's assertion that 'poetarum fictiones nulli adhereant specierum
mendacii, eo quod non sit mentis eorum quenquam fmgendo fallere; nec,
uti mendacium est, fictiones poetice, ut plurimum, non sunt nedum
simillime, sed nec similes veritati, imo valde dissone et adverse.'37 For
Boccaccio, far from determining meaning, a poem's fictional elements
serve as a bulwark against giving undue notice to such elements, being so
obviously untrue that they will mislead no-one. Fictionality is thus
viewed as a guard against that most pernicious form ofmisreading which
loses sight of the true basis of meaning, serving to direct audience
attention away from itself to a truth whose basis lies outside the text,
within the realm of truth which Christian doctrine mediates and defines
for humanity, but does not construct. For the allegorists as with
Averroes, though in a different way, imaginative writing is made
conformable to the standard view of linguistic signification, having its
significative structure firmly placed under the governance of a prior and
subsistent meaning.
This insistence on meaning's absolute exteriority to textuality also
has the effect of throwing emphasis onto the audience, since, given the
innumerable possible allegorical permutations of the text, any
interpretation exists only as one among others, all of which can be
equally valid. That which justifies the selection of one interpretation
rather than another must therefore be its moral appropriateness for
given readers, rather than any merely aesthetic or textual criteria.
Scholastic allegoresis thus stresses a view of reception wherein particular
readers can select appropriate interpretations from a homogeneous body
ofmeaning founded in the totality of a complex but unified reality, their
particular requirements as readers being determined by their position
within that totality. In this way Scholastic allegoresis further reaffirms a
sense of how the basis ofmeaning transcends the limits of the situation in
which it is uttered, locating contingent circumstance within the absolute
certainty of an encompassing and informing ordo.
37. See above, p.51, n.24.
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While poetic signification is in this way reappropriated for Christian
truth, there nevertheless remains a question of what purpose the fictional
and formal aspects of the text are actually felt to serve. If privilege is
afforded to external truth, then surely it could be simply stated without
the distractions which imaginative writing seems to involve. This brings
me to the second aspect of the Averroistic Poetics-, the connection between
the text and the human mind. It is in this respect that Averroes' theory
relates to the affective tradition in the later Middle Ages. This can be
seen from the definitions of credulitas and consideratio. Initially
Averroes implies that credulitates are the beliefs of the characters
presented in tragedy, indicating this when he states that 'consideratio [...]
est declaratio recte credulitatis per quam homo laudabilis existit.'
Clearly, the credulitates which assimilantur are here seen as belonging to
the praiseworthy protagonist. Yet later in the passage credulitas is
defined in very different terms:
Et pars tertia tragedie est credulitas, et hec est potentia
representandi rem sic esse aut non sic esse. Et hoc est simile et
quod conatur rhetorica in declaratione quod res existat aut non
existat, nisi quod rhetorica conatur ad hoc per sermonum
persuasivum et poetria per sermonum representativum.
(pp.21-22)
Here, as the comparison with rhetoric makes clear, credulitas is defined
in relation to the audience; in fact, as a belief generated in the mind of
the audience. But credulitas, as we have seen, is something which is
likened or imitated. What this suggests is that in some sense the
audience is seen as falling within the boundaries of the text's content.
This can also be seen from the term consideratio, which is
'argumentio seu probatio rectitudinis credulitatis aut operationis.'
Consideratio, while connected in some way with language, is also, as I
have already observed, one of the things which is likened. Hence, the
audience's conviction of the rectitude of a belief or deed is once again seen
as in some way intrinsic to the content of poetry. This extension of poetry
into the minds of the audience indicates the affective function which it is
felt to serve:
Differentia inter sermonem poeticum preceptivum et instigativum
ad credulitates et preceptivum et instigativum ad consuetudines
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est quoniam ille qui instigat ad consuetudines instigat ad
operandum et agendum aliquid aut recedendum et fugiendum ab
eo. Sermo vero qui instigat ad credulitatem non instigat nisi ad
credendum aliquid esse aut non esse, sed non ad inquirendum
ipsum aut respuendum.
(p.22)
The represented consuetudines and credulitates extend into the deeds and
thoughts of the audience as either praiseworthy actions and beliefs, or
the avoidance of vicious ones (the latter being instigated in comedy, or the
art of blaming, since tragedy is the art of praise). Literary representation
is thus seen as translating into virtuous behaviour.
For Averroes, the affective power of poetry seems to derive in part
from the universal resonance considered to be perceptible in the
represented qualities. The effect which this has on the audience appears
to be based on a perceived proportional analogy between these qualities
and the structure of the mind. Thus, Giles ofRome comments that 'the
thoughts and affections of the will do not deviate from that harmony and
those proportions which men follow in striving to achieve good works
grounded in virtue'38, and as Aquinas observes, the will naturally
embraces that in which it sees its own form mirrored (ST, II-II, q.10
art.2). The virtue of an act is seen to be ascertained by the audience's
natural perception of its intrinsic consonance with truth. Thus, since the
mind naturally tends to embrace what it sees to be good, when the
members of the audience perceive the relation between fact and truth
which a poem manifests they are moved to assimilate what is
represented, making it the criterion for their own actions and thoughts.
This implies a powerful faith in the relationship between sensible and
intelligible reality, between the particular and the universal, and in the
harmonious correlation between this relationship and the human mind.
But Averroes makes it clear that while having a substantial basis in
reality, the affective process is also facilitated by the use of poetic images
and ornate language.
The connection between poetic likening and the audience's
tendency to virtue is drawn quite explicitly in another passage:
Et est quidem representatio seu imitatio sustenamentum et
fundamentum in hac arte propterea quod non fit delectatio ex
rememoratione rei cuius intenditur remomeratio absque sui
38. Commentary on the Song of Songs, excerpted and translated in Minnis &
Scott, pp.243-47 (p.244).
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representatione, sed fit delectatio quidem et receptio ipsius quando
representata fuerit.
(p.21)
Later, it is stated that poetry achieves its persuasive effects 'per
sermonem representativum.' (p.22) The representations of the fictional
framework of the text clearly are felt to play an important part in the
affective power of the text. This is indicated by the assertion that they
inspire 'delectatio quidem et receptio', implying that through the pleasure
taken in the representation the effect on the mind will be deeper,
producing a greater receptiveness.
The association of pleasure with a greater receptiveness to virtue
and truth in the audience recalls the comments ofAquinas on the value of
corporeal images for mnemonic purposes. Memory, or more precisely,
artificial memory39, has been classified as a part of prudence, allowing
one to recall the paths of virtue and of vice. Dealing with the problem
that memory is a part of the imagination, and hence of the sensitive
rather than rational soul, he states that 'prudentia applicat universalem
cognitionem ad particularia, quorum est sensus; unde multa quae
pertinent ad partem sensitivam requiruntur ad prudentiam. Inter quae
est memoria.'40 In this Aquinas displays a willingness to see the senses
as working in harmony with the intellect, being used by it for a properly
virtuous end. He goes on to discuss the value of corporeal images for the
prudential use ofmemory, recommending that these should not be too
familiar:
quia ea quae sunt inconsueta magis miramur, et sic in eis animus
magis et vehementius detinetur [...]. Ideo autem necessaria est
huiusmodi similitudinum vel imaginum adinventio, quia
intentiones simplices et spirituales facilius ex anima elabuntur nisi
quibusdam similitudinibus corporalibus quasi alligentur; quia
humana cognitio potentior est circa sensibilia.
(Ibid.)
In a similar connection, Albertus Magnus states that corporeal
similitudes are important because 'metaphorica plus movent animam at
ideo plus conferunt memoria'41. Fabulous images are all the more
effective in this respect since 'mirabile plus movet quam consuetum, et
ideo cum huius modi imagines translationis sint compositae ex miris plus
39. For a clear account of the workings of artificial memory see Frances Yates,
The Art ofMemory (London: Ark, 1984).
40. ST, II-II, q.49, art.l.
41. De Bono, IV, ii, 2, sol.16 (in Opera Omnia, Vol.XXVIII, p.251).
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movent quam propria consueta'. Hence, he affirms, the first philosophers
conveyed their ideas through poetry, 'quia fabula, cum sit composita ex
miris, plus movet.'42 The sensual power of the figments of the
imagination are in this way seen as harmonising with the higher faculties
of the soul, the better to help it grasp intelligible truths.
Such an outlook paves the way for the provision of a valid role for
imaginative literature, establishing a justification for its figments. Thus,
while both Albertus and Aquinas remained inclined to denigrate the
value of poetry, distinguishing the use of poetic modes in the Bible from
those found in secular texts, many later thinkers were inclined to
compare the two, asking how one could call poets liars without impugning
the Biblical auctores43. Looked at along these lines, the fictional
framework of a poem, being denied any dominating role in the process of
signification, could be seen as useful in terms of its influence on the
audience, and it is in these terms that Averroes defines its function. By
clothing truth in the corporeal garment of fiction, that truth can be more
readily and surely fixed in the human mind. Thus, those aspects of
poetry which would seem to focus attention on the text as a verbal
construct distinct from any external referent, instead become seen as a
way ofmore effectively impressing truth on the audience. Instead of
turning the text inward and away from reality, they are now seen to
extend it out into the external world.
The verbal structure of poetry is also assimilated into this
framework, as can be seen where the Commentator distinguishes
proverbs and fables from poetry:
Compositorum vero proverbiorum et fabularum opus non est opus
poetarum, quamuis huiusmodi proverbia et fabulas adinventicias
component sermone metrico. Quamuis enim in metro
communicent, tamen alterius eorum completur operatio intenta
per fabulas et si sit absque metro.
(p.29)
From this it is clear that the metrical structure of the text, specified as
metrum in the division of six parts, plays a significant part in the poem's
effect, as indicated by the suggestion that were metre not used the poem
would not have the same potency, contrary to what is the case with
42. Ibid., sol.17.
43. For instance, see Boccaccio's comments in De Genealoge, XIV, ix (Vol.11
pp.707-78).
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proverbs and fables. Similarly, Averroes specifies thonus as 'maior
partium ad impremendum anime et operandum in ipsam.' This suggests
that the ornate verbal structure of a poem is considered to be of
considerable importance in determining the poem's effect on its audience.
With regard to thonus, Judson Boyce Allen sees it as 'the presence
of that harmony or sense of rightness which convinces one that one is in
the presence of truth', suggesting that it corresponds to the 'medieval
sense of being in the presence ofmusica mundana.' (Ethical Poetic, p.37)
The comparison with music is certainly apt, since the word thonus
translates as 'melody'. (I take it to refer in basic terms to those phonetic
qualities of language which we would designate by words such as
'assonance' or 'alliteration'.) With regard to metrum the connections
drawn between metrical and musical proportions and the ordering of
reality were noted in the previous chapter. Both these terms thus seem
to suggest that the verbal structure of a poem operates in harmony with
an ideal ratio which governs its significations.
However, it must also be emphasised that the immediate appeal of
these terms is to the senses (although this is certainly founded in their
basis in a universal order). Thus Robert Henryson, writing of poetic
fables, states that 'Thair polite termes of sweit rhetore / Richt plesand ar
vnto the eir ofman.'44 Here, the formal structure of poetry is associated
with pleasure: the same delectatio which Averroes saw in representation.
Furthermore, the term 'rhetore' connects the effects of poetic language to
those of rhetoric. Discussing rhetorical effect, Alistair Minnis has
observed that in the ancient tradition it was felt that 'the orator should
win the emotional support of his audience by arousing their feelings', and
that this notion was applied in medieval accessus ad auctores to pagan
poets. Hence, in poetry as well as in rhetoric the pleasure aroused by the
harmonious qualities of the language is seen as making the audience
tractable, opening their minds to appetitive stimulation, and thus
inclining them towards a mood of sensitive appreciation45. In this way,
the verbal structure of a text is considered to increase its affective power,
allowing its meanings to be more readily and effectively impressed on the
mind. To appropriate the words of the latin Averroes, 'est maior partium
ad impremendum anime et operandum in ipsam.'
44. Fables, 'Prologue', 3-4.
45. Authorship, pp.125-26.
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What the Averroistic Poetics achieves, along with Scholastic
literary thought in general, is a thorough reappropriation of imaginative
writing for the orthodox view of language. By defining its significative
structure as governed by a referent grounded in external truth any sense
of it as undermining the certitude ofmeaning is contained. Those
elements of the fictional and formal framework of literary discourse
which would seem to separate its meanings from any transcendent reality
are given a valid but subordinate instrumental function in their
contribution to its affective force. Poetry is thus no longer seen as a
distracting influence, removed from the control of an external referent
and disrupting a proper understanding of the structure of reality.
Instead, its margins become extended upward and outward: upward to
the realm of truth and outward to the minds of the audience to whom it
renders those truths in an affecting and digestible form. To borrow a
convenient distinction from Judson Boyce Allen, rather than being a
verbal artefact the text becomes a verbal act, mediating between an
external meaning which it signifies and an audience upon whom it
impresses that meaning46. Where earlier thinkers saw lies there is now
truth; where they saw an inflammatory power there is now an affective
force for virtue.
6
The features of the Scholastic approach to literature which emerge from
the foregoing analysis have significant implications for the understanding
of the relation between individual literary works from the Middle Ages
and the contemporaneous theory, as well as of the literary attitudes
expressed in Robert Henryson's works. These implications can be
demonstrated through a critique of D.W. Robertson's attempt in A Preface
to Chaucer to connect the literature and literary theory of the Middle
Ages47. Robertson's approach is characterised by the assumption that the
theory of the day reflects the general attitudes of educated medieval
readers and that these attitudes underlie the literary works ofwriters
46. The distinction is made in The Ethical Poetic, p.87. Allen contrasts a sense
of poems as 'verbal constructs1 to one of them as 'verbal events which include both
reference and rhetorical effect.'
47. D.W. Robertson, A Preface to Chaucer: Studies in Medieval Perspectives
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).
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such as Chaucer. Accordingly, he views the interpretative procedures of
medieval literary theory as a metalanguage, furnishing modern readers
with a system of exegetical protocols which explain the workings of
medieval literature and which should govern its interpretation.
Robertson describes medieval art as 'an enigmatical arrangement
of visible things which would call attention to an invisible truth', and
observes that in the Middle Ages 'a work of art was frequently a problem
to be solved' (p. 15). As this latter statement in particular suggests, the
interpretation of such 'enigmatic' writing involves the discovery ofwhat
Robertson later terms 'the abstract truths which its practitioners sought
to convey' (p.63). Such truths are viewed as being concealed behind the
'problem' presented by the text, whose apparent complexities may prove
misleading to readers not equipped with the correct exegetical key. The
proper interpretation of medieval literature is thus seen to consist in
moralisation or allegoresis, with the reader transcending the solas of the
text to identify a clear moral or theological sentence which lies behind it.
Robertson argues that the diverse sentences ofmedieval poetry all
work together in commonly promoting caritas and opposing cupiditas. It
is assumed that medieval readers are in agreement over what might
constitute caritas or cupiditas in a given situation, and that any matter
on which they might care to form an opinion will be morally assessed in
the light of these values. Consequently all medieval texts are seen as
ultimately harmonising in their meaning48. This aspect of Robertson's
approach is exemplified in his reading of the Arthurian romances of
Chretien de Troyes, which he interprets as presenting a moral
condemnation of the folly of sensual love (pp.87-88). Robertson dismisses
the fact that the tone of the romances is not condemnatory by invoking
the fact that Chretien 'had far more reason to entertain his audience than
had an ordinary preacher' (pp.88-89). Rejecting any suggestion that
courtly attitudes towards love might differ from those current in the
cloister, he observes that 'the standards of reasonable behaviour were,
throughout the Middle Ages, those established by the Church' (p,90).
Robertson in fact cites a condemnation ofwritings such as
Chretien's by Odo Tusculanus, which in objecting to romances being more
popular than preaching potentially compromises his own position: 'You
48. See Robertson, pp.24-44, where he aims to demonstrate the mutual
consonance of a vast diversity of literary materials.
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insult God who, neglecting his words, more readily listen to fables and
tirelessly devote yourselves to fictions about Arthur, and Erec, and about
Cliges.' (pp.89-90) Odo's stress on the fictional nature of the romances
would indicate that, far from viewing them as sententious and edifying,
he in fact considers them to be lacking in significance and unworthy of
the attention which should be devoted to the truths propounded by
preachers. But such evidence, which suggests that there is more room for
diversity and disagreement in medieval literature than Robertson is
prepared to allow, is dismissed. Robertson attributes Odo's remarks to
professional jealousy and an emerging sense of competitiveness between
preachers and poets: 'He is disturbed largely because his audience prefers
the more entertaining romances to his sermons.' (p.90) For Robertson the
moral values espoused by Chretien are no different from those of a
medieval preacher, and he considers that for both of them the inculcation
of such values is the chief end of literature. From this viewpoint all of a
text's idiosyncrasies are non-essential, and all points of disharmony
between texts are illusory.
Robertson's approach has met with much dissent on both practical
and theoretical grounds. With regard to the former, it has been observed
that Robertson's assumptions tend to produce extremely reductive
interpretations. His critical method is seriously inadequate when dealing
with texts which resist any simple closure, or which seem to adopt a
position not clearly amenable to what he considers to be the moral values
recommended by the Church. This tendency is exacerbated by
Robertson's insistence on the abstract nature of these sententiae49, which
encourages him to privilege what is general at the expense ofwhat is
distinctive, giving insufficient consideration to the particularising
features of the text. Any differentiating features which resist
subordination to a general and commonly-held truth are viewed as only
apparent difficulties: obstacles to be surmounted in order to determine
the universal meaning which they conceal. The consequence of all these
features is that the attempt to identify a clear sententia often leads to
readings which fail to account for large sections of the text and which lay
49. See Robertson, pp.34-7.
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a disproportionate emphasis on the briefest of passages. Indeed, they
may even simply replace the apparent sense with an imposed meaning50.
These inadequacies can be illustated by contrasting Robertson's
reading of a passage from the prologue to Chaucer's 'Tale of Melibee' with
the implications of the passage itself:
Therefore, lordynges alle, I yow biseche,
If that yow thynk I varie as in my speche,
As thus, though that I telle somwhat moore
Of proverbes than ye han herd bifoore
Comprehended in this litel tretys heere,
To enforce with th'effect ofmy mateere;
And though I not the same wordes seye
As ye han herd, yet to yow alle I preye
Blameth me nat; for, as in my sentence,
Shul ye nowher fynden difference
Fro the sentence of this tretys lyte
After the which this murye tale I write.
(CT, Frag.VII, 11.953-64, [pp.216-17])
Robertson's reading of this passage, in keeping with the priorities of
Scholastic literary theory as outlined above, stresses its privileging of
signifier over signified. We are assured that 'The "tretys" referred to is
not in fact the source of the "Melibee"'. Rather, 'The "tretys" is obviously
The Canterbury Tales itself (p.369). The passage is thus taken to
indicate that this tale and all the others agree in their meaning,
harmonising in the singularity of Christian truth:
Chaucer tells us that the Melibee, although it differs verbally from
the other tales the audience has heard from the 'sondry folk' who
proceed towards Canterbury, [...] does not differ from them in
sentence.
(p.369)
Consequently, in reading The Canterbury Tales one should treat any
differences or tensions as accidental, tracing the text back to the simple
closure of a doctrinally sound sentence.
If one tests Robertson's argument against the passage itself,
however, it can be seen that the situation is more complicated than he
50. On Robertson's failure, or refusal, to account for the possibility of dissent or
disagreement within medieval literature, see Sheila Delaney, Medieval Literary Politics:
Shapes of Ideology (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990),
pp.43, 169n. On the general lack of critical sensitivity which Robertson's approach
produces, see E. Talbot Donaldson, 'Patristic Exegesis in the Criticism ofMedieval
Literature: The Opposition', in Speaking ofChaucer (London: Athlone, 1970), Ch.10,
pp. 134-53. See in particular his discussion of Mortimer Donovan's analysis of 'The
Nun's Priest's Tale', pp. 147-50.
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suggests. The most immediate problem is the fact that these lines are
Chaucer the pilgrim's explanation to his fellow-travellers of why they
may have heard different versions of this particular tale. The passage
may have broader implications, but it by no means 'obviously' relates the
comments on the 'tretys' primarily to the Canterbury Tales as a whole,
and it thus should not be so readily taken as providing general
interpretative guidelines. Moreover, considered in their fictional context,
the words of the passage are addressed by Chaucer the pilgrim to an
audience composed of other pilgrims, with Chaucer the poet reporting
this initial address to the audience reading the tales. This makes the
nuances of the prologue much more subtle than Robertson suggests,
producing a complex interplay between the different narratorial and
audience perspectives which are evoked. This is far removed from the
simple interpretative prompting which Robertson perceives in the
passage. Rather than pointing to a simple and transcendent level of
meaning, the prologue to the 'Melibee' in fact foregrounds the
significative transformations which a piece of discourse necessarily
undergoes as it is articulated in different contexts.
The inadequacies of Robertson's reading of the prologue to the
'Melibee' underlines the general critical problems attached to his method,
as his a priori assumption that each text closes unproblematically on a
simple truth leads him to overlook or dismiss elements which resist such
neat resolution. But Robertson's incapacity to perceive the complexities
of this passage from Chaucer, in suggesting that there were ways of
signifying current in the Middle Ages which he fails to recognise, also
highlights a more specific problem with regard to the limitations of his
account of medieval literary theory.
The closure which Robertson imposes on texts in subordinating
them to an ideal signified seems in accordance with the procedures of
Scholastic literary exegesis which I have outlined above (although for
reasons which will become clear below, Robertson himself is dismissive of
the Scholastic achievement). While the Scholastics have a much higher
respect for the affective value of the sensual appeal of poetic discourse
than does Robertson51, both nevertheless tend to reduce the text to the
51. Robertson recognises the importance attached to the affective value of
poetry, but insists that the appeal is to the intellect rather than the senses (see
Robertson, pp.55-6). The Scholastics of course maintain a sense of the intelligible basis
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level of instrumentality and subordinate it to an external and ideal
meaning. But if the complex and nuanced nature of Chaucer's work
seems to fit ill with both Robertson's assumptions and those which
underly the critical procedures of Scholastic exegesis, closer analysis will
show that Robertson's account of medieval exegetical procedures is
oversimplistic. Robertson underestimates the diversity of the views of
signification which were current in the later Middle Ages, particularly in
Biblical scholarship. He also fails to recognise that the allegorising and
moralising approaches which he outlines, and which are certainly
dominant in academic literary exegesis, contain elements which provide
the potential for the development of alternative views of literature. If
Scholastic approaches to literature tend to anchor the text to an ideal
level ofmeaning, they nevertheless also make possible new models and
modes of signification which resist closure, and which are more sensitive
to the particularising aspects of texts. The intellectual climate of the
later Middle Ages will be seen to provide conditions particularly
favourable for such development. As I shall argue below, the
development of new ways of signifying occurs in vernacular literature
through a modification of Scholastic literary theory. This process
involves a relation between text and theory based not on an author's
passive assent to the assumptions and procedures of interpretative
precedents, but rather on an active engagement with such precedents,
attentive to the creative possiblities which they open.
7
Robertson's claim that the exegetical approach which he outlines was
almost universally predominant in the later Middle Ages has been
seriously questioned in recent criticism. Robertson's account of medieval
literary theory posits a patristic tradition of exegesis which persists for
over a millenium, and which remains the dominant system of attitudes
towards literature throughout that period. However, critics such as
Alistair Minnis and Gillian R. Evans have drawn attention to the new
possibilities opened by the impact of Scholastic thought, notably through
its stress on the literal sense in Biblical analysis, and to the positive
of affective power, but they afford an irreducible value to a sensual response which
operates in conjunction with intellection, and indeed facilitates it.
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impact of such developments in extending the scope of late-medieval
theory52.
Robertson's own observations on literalistic Biblical exegesis and
on Scholasticism are dismissive:
The possibility that Chaucer or any other prominent poet of the
fourteenth century could take a literal view of the Bible is,
historically speaking, extremely unlikely. It may be true that
allegory did not flourish in scholastic debate, but nothing of any
literary importance flourished there either.
(pp.314-15)
Robertson's view of a separate and vital patristic exegetical tradition co¬
existing with a stale and unfruitful Scholasticism has been thoroughly
controverted. Minnis' work in particular demonstrates the vast influence
of Scholasticism and its importance for renovating attitudes towards
literature. Indeed, my own analysis in the previous chapter suggests that
the Augustinian aesthetic which Robertson outlines actually tends to
foster an attitude of suspicion towards literature: it is only with the
advent of Scholasticism, with its emphasis on Aristotelian psychology and
its renovation of the ars memorativa, that a really effective justification
for the figments of poetry is provided.
But Robertson's dismissal of Scholasticism is puzzling. The
Scholastics introduce to medieval thought on literature the idea that the
conjunction of edifying truths with the concrete details of a text is not
merely a pleasing adjunct to learning, but is essential to the very process
of intellection. This emphasis on the affective and mnemonic value of
poetry is largely responsible for the revitalisation and extension of the
exegetical traditions of literary moralisation and allegoresis53. Since the
general influence of such traditions is at the very core of Robertson's
argument, the enervating effect of Scholasticism would seem to
strengthen his case for arguing such influence.
Nevertheless, Robertson's minimising of the importance of
Scholasticism is understandable in the light of its broader implications.
Recognition of the significance and influence of the Scholastic
achievement in the field of secular literature demands that one also
recognise the importance of the developments evident in Scholastic
52. See Minnis, Authorship, passim, and Gillian R. Evans, The Language and,
Logic of the Bible: The Road to Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), pp.42-50.
53. See Minnis & Scott, pp.321-34, and above, pp.58-60.
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Biblical scholarship. These developments are far less amenable to
Robertson's argument. They inaugurate analytical procedures and
interpretative assumptions which undermine his claim as to the
universality of the interpretative procedures which he propounds, and
which call into question the justification for his reductively abstractive
interpretations.
With the advent of the view of theology as an affective science and
the development of the Aristotelian four causes as an analytical schema
late-medieval exegetes began to afford much greater privilege to the
literal sense of the Bible than did their predecessors. This allowed
considerable attention to be given to the creativity of the Biblical
auctores, so that rather than viewing them as being merely the pen of the
Holy Spirit exegetes could concentrate much more closely on the
distinctive literary styles and modes which the auctores employed54. In
this respect the study of the Bible and the study of poetry come together
within a common set of analytical procedures: the attention to sententia
in Biblical study is extended to poetry while the attention to form and
style found in poetic exegesis is employed by the theologians55. This
awareness of human creativity sits uneasily with Robertson's analytical
emphasis on transcendent meaning, which in making a priori abstract
truths the main focus of critical attention, minimises the importance
which is attached to those elements of a text which are the product of
human ingenuity.
If the focus on the literary methods of the human auctores of
scripture brings the study of the Bible closer to the study of secular
literature, in other respects the transformations in Biblical scholarship
produce a view of signification which differs from that assumed in the
study of poetry. The value of allegoresis, a technique which was being
increasingly employed in the interpretation of poetry, is called into
question by many late-medieval Biblical exegetes. Figures such as St
Thomas Aquinas and St Bonaventure, for instance, stressed that it was
necessary that the allegorical meanings which one finds concealed behind
a scriptural passage should be openly expressed elsewhere in the Bible56.
54. See Minnis, Authorship, pp.75-8.
55. See Authorship, pp. 141-42.
56. See Aquinas, ST, I, i, 10, ad.l; St Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Prologue, vi
(Minnis & Scott, pp.236-8).
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This precept is also to be found in the work of St Augustine57, but the
strong emphasis which it came to receive in the later Middle Ages is
distinctive. This emphasis is underscored when one considers that in the
later Middle Ages the precept is being stated in a context where earlier
allegorical exegesis is increasingly coming to be perceived as excessive58,
a fact which gives the injunction a much more pointed and corrective
quality than it has in Augustine, symptomatic of the new accent being
placed upon it. Such a position on exegesis still leaves considerable room
for interpretative freedom in allegoresis, indicated by the fact that
Aquinas states the precept in a passage where he also reaffirms the
principle ofmultiple levels of Biblical significance (ST, I, q.l, art.10,
resp.). But the emphasis which it introduces nevertheless effectively
reduces the allegorical levels ofmeaning to an optional extra, placing
priority firmly on the literal sense as the fundamental arbiter of Biblical
truth59.
Other late-medieval exegetes adopted positions which conjoined an
emphasis on the literal sense with criticism of the interpretative freedom
in allegoresis which both Aquinas and Bonavenure retain. These
exegetes argued that the parameters of legitimate reading ought to be
more restricted and that interpretation ought to respect the obvious sense
of the letter. Nicholas of Lyre (d.1340), for instance, in attacking the
allegorical excesses of some interpreters, observes that just as a house
which becomes separated from its foundation will collapse, so allegorical
interpretations should not depart too much from the solid base of the
literal sense60. An earlier but more extreme advocate of this position is
William ofAuvergne (d.1249), who argues in his De Legibus that
meanings adduced allegorically, such as the twelfth century exegesis of
the David and Bathsheba narrative, are not significations but
similitudes: ie., they are not part of the intentional structure of the text,
but are comparisons imposed on it by the exegete.
William draws a contrast between the ways in which allegorising
exegetes correlate diverse things and the way in which this is done in, for
instance, the book of Jeremiah:
57. Epistola XCIII, PL, 33, 321-47, viii, 24 (cols 333-34).
58. See Minnis, Authorship, pp.106-7.
59. See Minnis & Scott, p.204.
60. Nicholas of Lyre, Littera Postilla, 'Second Prologue', translated and
excerpted in Minnis & Scott, pp.268-70 (p.268).
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Quomodo si mulier contemnat amatorem suum, sic contempsit me
domus Israel. [Jer.iii, 20] Non dixit, quia contemptus huius
mulieris significaret contemptum filiiorum Israel, nec dixit quod
amator huius singificaret ipsum, [...] sed expressit modum seu
similitudinem notam inter opus figuli et opus suum, et inter
factum mulieris contemnetis amatorem suum et factum populi
Israel, quo modo si loquerentur sacro expositores et doctores in
allegoriis et tropologiis suis etiam anagogicis interpretationibus, et
scripturae satisfacterunt et audientium sive legentium intellectus
non offenderunt. Sed quia dicitur: 'tale quid significat tale quid, et
est figura seu prophetia aut parabola talis rei,' cum alterum
propter alterum significandum nec factum nec dictum videatur,
offendunt graviter audientes.61
In William's view, then, while allegorical interpretation can retain a
pedagogic value, it is to be dismissed as a tool for scholarly analysis of the
real meaning of a text62. William's position is an extreme one, but it
participates in the shift in attitudes which underlies the pronouncements
of figures such as Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Nicholas of Lyre, all of
whom diminish in their differing ways the importance of the allegorical
levels of the Biblical text in favour of the literal sense.
This shift in attitudes conjoins with the emphasis on the style and
creativity of the Biblical auctores to produce a strong awareness of how
texts have been intended by their authors to convey a particular meaning,
making the discovery of this intention the main aim of exegesis63. These
facts make nonsense of Robertson's affirmation that it is 'extremely
unlikely' that a fourteenth century poet might have viewed the Bible
literally, and seriously undermine his insistence that it is an
understanding of the relation of a text's meaning to abstract truth which
is prioritised in medieval thought. Rather, they indicate that the
understanding of that meaning in relation to the specific interests and
motivations of the author might also be a legitimate exegetical goal.
Another line of development in late-medieval theory calls into
question Robertson's view that a medieval text's meaning properly
understood will take the form of an abstract truth. The new emphasis on
the affective nature of scripture introduces a conviction that the Bible,
since it does not only convey information about theological or moral
61. William of Auvergne, De Legibus, excerpted in Beryl Studies in Medieval
Literature and Learning: From Abelard to WycliflLondon: Hambledon, 1981), pp.179-81
(pp.179-80).
62. See Smalley, Studies, pp.150-51; Evans, Language and Logic, p.44.
63. See Minnis & Scott, pp.203-9.
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wisdom but also inspires its readers with a desire to embrace such
wisdom, can not merely be concerned with communicating abstract truths
but must also provide a means ofmediating between such simple truths
and the diverse circumstances in which they are received by a fallen
humanity. This conviction leads to a view of signification which is
sensitive to the ways in which texts tend to depart from such a simple
level ofmeaning, giving ample consideration to what is particular in their
significance as well as to what is universal.
This viewpoint is expressed in Alexander of Hales' argument that
scripture adopts diverse modi in order to address the different
conditiones ofhumanity (see above, p.40). Alexander's argument
suggests that attention must be given not merely to ideal truths and
values per se, but also to their necessary diffraction as they are applied in
varying circumstances64. This approach is similar to that recommended
by Abelard, whose work strikingly anticipates later developments in
medieval theory:
Diligenter et illud discutiendum est, cum de eodem diversa
dicuntur, quid ad praecepti coarctationem, quid ad indulgentiae
remissionem vel ad perfectionis exhortationem intendatur, ut
secundum intentionum diversitatem adversitatis quaeramus
remedium.
(Sic et Non, Prol., col.1341)
Consequently, understanding a passage of scripture, for both Alexander
and Abelard, consists not only in perceiving an ideal level of meaning but
also in the comprehension of how that meaning has been given a
distinctive configuration according to the circumstances which the author
is addressing. As with the developing emphasis on the importance of the
literal sense and of stylistic features, this facilitates a considerable
sensitivity to diversity and distinctiveness in discussion of the sacred
page, and involves a view of signification very different from that
assumed by Robertson.
The developments in late-medieval Biblical exegesis outlined above
by no means rule out the possibility that many late-medieval readers and
writers might hold the attitudes and priorities which Robertson ascribes
to them. If one qualifies Robertson's position by making it clear that a
sensitivity to the individuating features of Biblical texts was widespread
64. For an opposition to Alexander's view which clearly brings out these
features of it, see the discussion of Henry of Ghent's attitudes, below, pp.74-5.
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in the later Middle Ages, one can still see how that sensitivity might be
reabsorbed within a perspective which maintains his view ofmedieval art
as 'a problem to be solved', closing on a transcendent and commonly held
truth65. Thus, an awareness of the distinctive stylistic features of a work
might be accompanied by a view that such features simply serve to clothe
a prior meaning, so that while style becomes fundamental to the affective
transmission ofmeaning, it remains non-essential to that meaning's
constitution. Indeed, the analysis earlier in this chapter of Scholastic
attitudes towards literature, where an awareness of the importance of
stylistic features is not permitted to compromise the ideality of meaning,
suggests that universalising exegetical priorities almost totally retain
their dominance in that sphere of study. Equally, the desire to produce a
consonance between meaning and the literal sense can be satisfied
through exemplificatory moralisation66. Such tropological exegesis
certainly involves a much greater contiguity between a text's ideal
meaning and its concrete details. But it could still tend to privilege the
former, concentrating as in the Averroistic Poetics on the need to raise
the particular to the level of the universal, and thus tending to prioritise
the closure ofmeaning on an abstract truth.
But, judging from the developments occuring in late-medieval
exegesis, it is equally possible that medieval readers and writers might
approach a text in a way which balances a focus on universal meaning
with a close attention to individuating features, examining the distinctive
motivations which led an auctor to convey a particular meaning in a
particular manner. Alternatively, the example of Alexander of Hales
might be followed, so that instead of tracing the text to the simplicity of
an ideal sententia, attention is devoted to understanding how meaning
has been shaped in order to address a specific context. Late-medieval
Biblical exegesis in fact facilitates a broad range of possible interpretative
emphases and priorities, and certainly provides the foundations for
modes of textual analysis which devote considerable attention to all of a
text's individuating qualities. No one of the many approaches which
occur within this range can lay claim to be the definitive one. Rather,
criticism must operate with a flexible awareness of the diverse ways in
65. On the persistence of such priorities in late-medieval exegesis, see Evans,
Language and Logic, pp.46-8.
66. See Minnis & Scott, p.208.
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which medieval literary theory may be employed. Robertson's normative
pronouncements may thus be objected to without wholly rejecting his
emphasis on the value of an awareness of medieval literary theory for
modern readers of medieval literature: his interpretative procedures were
already being questioned in the later Middle Ages.
Turning from Biblical to literary exegesis, it must be noted that
while Scholastic attitudes to literary texts evince many of the
characteristics which Robertson sees as typical of all medieval exegesis,
they also contain elements, neglected by Robertson, which bear a relation
to the more radical developments in Biblical exegesis. These elements
provide a transformative potential which opens the possibility of greater
sensitivity to a text's particularising features and of greater resistance to
the closure ofmeaning on a transcendent signified. As I shall
demonstrate, this potential is in fact inscribed within the very procedures
which work to guarantee a sense of the text's ideal reference and to
reduce the signifer to the level of instrumentality. An awareness of such
aspects of Scholastic literary theory is of vital importance when
considering the relation between the discourse of academic Scholasticism
and individual literary texts. That relation need not be merely one of the
latter's passive assent to the conventions established by the former. It
may be one of creative modification, whereby possibilities implicit within
the academic framework can produce models and modes of signification
very different from those from which they are developed.
8
One of the main emphases of Scholastic literary theory, central to its
argument for the essential moral value of imaginative writing, is the
affective function of literature. Through the emotive and mnemonic value
of their sensual appeal literary texts are seen as facilitating an
individual's grasp of universal values. Consequently, Scholastic literary
theory involves not only the emphasis on the ideal sententia of a text
implied in Robertson's account of medieval interpretative procedures, but
also a strong awareness of the needs of the audience to whom that
sententia is communicated. It is this sensitivity to audience, and the
elements of Scholastic literary theory which cater to it, which provide a
key potential for transformation.
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As was noted above (pp.55), the heuristic nature of allegoresis, in
presenting a text as having a range ofmeanings from which different
readers may select according to their own requirements, provides a
means of taking diverse audience requirements into account in
accordance with the affective emphasis of Scholastic literary theory.
Indeed, this is expressly stated by Henry of Ghent with regard to Biblical
allegoresis when, objecting to the argument that the diverse conditiones
of humanity requires diverse modi in the Bible, he observes in his
Summa Quaestiones Ordinarii that this diversity in the audience is
already accounted for in the multiple levels ofmeaning:
The appropriate mode for this science (theology) is not that all the
individual things relating to it should be treated separately, and
receive different treatment as is best suited to various people, and
in so far as [the teachers] can impart information in different ways
about different aspects of Christian belief. But the mode used
ought to be such that disparate teachings (sententiae) concerning
different subjects and different tenets of belief should be contained
in one and the same discourse (sermo), and that these should be
tailored to suit various conditions ofmen, so that the man who
cannot assimilate more may be content with the surface literal
interpretation, but the man who can may seek the spiritual
understanding underneath the literal one, depending on the
progress he has made.67
It must be noted here that Henry's argument is pointedly directed
against the suggestion, implicit in the opinions expressed by Alexander of
Hales', that audience diversity requires singular meaning to be diffracted
into many partial forms. The audience-orientated aspect of his view of
allegory is balanced by a desire to preserve a sense of the ideality of
meaning. Thus he observes that, 'since this [science] is offered for
consideration in its totality everywhere to every condition ofmen, one
should in no way claim that there should be a different mode of imparting
that knowledge because of the different conditions ofmen, so that often a
science that is one whole should be dealt with in different ways, which is
absurd.' (SQ, art.14, q.l, pnt 6, Minnis & Scott, p.253)
Consequently, Henry considers that different audiences are catered
to, not by having the same truth represented from diverse perspectives,
but rather by having different levels of the text refer to different
teachings and tenets of the faith. Any one of these necessarily remains a
67. Henry of Ghent, Summa Quaestiones, xiv, i, vii. Excerpted and translated
in Minnis & Scott, pp.250-66 (pp.253-4).
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partial selection from the total body of truth which underlies any Biblical
text, but each will be perceived by all readers in the same simple form.
Thus, Henry provides the flexibility necessary for the Biblical text to
address people of diverse conditiones, while still maintaining the clarity
of ideal reference. In upholding both these priorities, his allegoresis
conforms to the practice of Scholastic literary exegetes.
But while this aspect of allegoresis ultimately tends to maintain a
sense of the ideality ofmeaning, it also involves an awareness that a
given reading highlights only one from a number of possible
significations. This introduces a self-ironising element to the adduced
meaning, effectively placing it under erasure. Any one sententia appears
as a partial selection from the totality of meaning which governs the text
and is prioritised only according to the demands of particular
circumstances, making no claim to be the final word. Meaning is thus
posited with an awareness of its limitations with regard to the total body
ofmeaning from which it derives. Like the divine Word in Augustine's
thought, the rich significative framework within which a text resonates
provides a validating point of origin which authorises a given
interpretation. But it equally provides a contrast between its own
comprehensive nature and humanity's partial representations of it.
Allegoresis thus operates with both a sense of connection to the divine
Word which vouchsafes certitude, and a sense of distance from it which
cautions humility68.
In this latter aspect of allegoresis, where the unity of the Word is
diffracted so as to address diverse circumstances, an awareness of the
relative and partial nature of meaning is introduced which associates it
with the constraints and limitations of human vision. The potential is
thus provided for a view of signification attentive to those features of
texts which signal their meanings' distance from the divine Word. The
way is opened for a mode of exegesis which can counter the abstractive,
universalising tendencies of Scholastic literary theory, viewing meaning
as constructed under the influence of contingent factors rather than as
simply given in the nature of things.
68. On this dual aspect of allegory, see J. Hillis Miller, 'The Two Allegories', in
Morton W. Bloomfield (ed.), Allegory, Myth, and Symbol (Cambridge, MA, and London:
Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.355-70.
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This aspect of allegoresis, however, is not generally developed by
Scholastic exegetes in such a way as to destabilise meaning, or in any
way compromise its identification with a simple and externally-grounded
truth. Certainly, any specific interpretation, being a partial exposition of
the fullness of a text's overall intentio, is clearly seen as limited and as
only ever claiming to offer a relatively adequate reading. But this
perspective tends to be balanced by and subordinated within a validating
emphasis on the certitude which obtains from the positive connection
between the interpretation and the comprehensive framework of meaning
from which it derives.
This can be illustrated from a passage from Saint Augustine's
Confessiones which vilifies those who argue over the proper
interpretation of sacred Scripture:
Cum vero dicit: Non hoc ille [Moses] sensit quod tu dicis, sed quo
dico; neque tamen negat, quod uterque nostrum dicit, utrumque
verum esse: O vita pauperum Deus meus, in cujus sinu non est
contradictio, plue mihi mitigationes in cor, ut patentier tales feram
qui non mihi hoc dicunt, quia divini sunt, et in corde famuli tui
viderunt quod dicunt; sed quia superbi sunt: nec noverunt Moysi
sententiam, sed amant suam; non qua vera est, sed quia sua est.
(Conf. XII, 25, col.839)
The self-ironising spirit in which a reading should be proposed is
expressed by Augustine as a humility which prevents one from affirming
one's own preferred reading as definitive and which instead leads to a
consideration of it as one among a number of possible valid
interpretations. But Augustine reincorporates this sense of the
limitations of a given reading within a general affirmation of the positive
value of all meanings which conform to the truths of Christian faith, as
revealed and guaranteed by God, 'in cujus sinu non est contradictio':
Alioquin et aliam veram pariter amarent, sicut ego amo quod
dicunt; non quia ipsorum est, sed quia verum est [...].
(Ibid., cols 839-40)
If, in the face of diversity of opinion, Augustine emphasises the
limitations of each interpetation compared to the comprehensiveness of
the Word, he does so only to emphasise the mutual authority which
derives from their common place within the truth. Indeed, he makes it
clear that, in his view, to focus on such differences of opinion as being
matters of note is to stir up unnecessary discord. Ultimately, the
circumstances which cause one reader to prefer one truth, and another to
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prefer a different one, are dismissed from consideration in favour of an
affirmation of all true interpretation's transcendence of local
happenstance:
et ideo jam nec ipsorum est, quia verum est. [...] Ideoque Domine,
tremenda sunt judicia tua; quoniam Veritas tua nec mea est, nec
illius aut illius, sed omniom nostram [...].
(Ibid., col.840)
The particularising and potentially destabilising aspects of this mode of
exegesis thus tend not to be drawn out in a way which actively invites one
to approach a given reading critically with attention to the circumstances
in which it has been produced. Rather, those aspects encourage one to
broaden the assent which one gives to any one sententia so as to equally
encompass other alternatives.
This strategy is also evident in the fourteenth century, in Pierre
Bersuire's prologue to his Ouidus Moralizatus. Bersuire observes that
when he had nearly completed his work he was given a copy of the
French Ovide Moralise in which he found interpretations which had not
occurred to him. But far from allowing this to lead him to a sense of the
inadequacies of his own readings, Bersuire simply extends his sense of
their positive value to include tolerance ofmultiple interpretations:
I found there many good expositions, both allegorical and moral.
So having looked through my own [interpretations] again, if I had
not already put forward these new interpretations I assigned them
to their correct place.
(Minnis & Scott, p.368)
In showing such toleration, Bersuire continues the interpretative spirit
recommended in the Confessiones. He too proffers his readings while
simultaneously refusing to afford them any definitive value, always
remaining aware of alternative possibilities. But, as with Augustine,
Bersuire does not employ this strategy in a manner which accentuates
the particular motivations and contexts which have shaped meaning.
There is no sense that either his own expositions or those which he finds
in the Ovide Moralise have their general validity restricted by the
different circumstances in which they were begotten. The awareness of
the limitations ofmeaning which permits the tolerance of various
readings is reincorporated within a structure which affirms the universal
value that different sententiae equally derive from their participation in
the unified body of Christian truth. In this, Augustine and Bersuire
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remain in step with the interpretative aims of Henry of Ghent and of
Scholastic literary theory in general. The exegetical mode which they
adopt is designed to contain any particularising elements which
compromise the ideal authority ofmeaning.
Despite this rather conservative tendency among most exegetes,
the potential for the development of alternative models of signification
remains inscribed within their interpretative procedure. This potential is
exploited in a number of literary works from the fourteenth century on.
Dante's Commedia provides one such instance. Jesse M. Gellrich has
written on the way in which Dante's poem has frequently been
interpreted as embodying the medieval idea of the book of the world, a
view embodied in Singleton's argument that the correct response to the
Commedia is to treat it as myth, giving oneself over to its fictional world
as though it were reality. The poem is, from this viewpoint, to be taken
as making present the transcendent metaphysical order through the
entirety of which Dante's journey leads him69.
Gellrich points out that while many elements of the poem do
indeed tend in such a direction, there are nevertheless many other
elements which stress the inadequacy of Dante's power to fulfil such a
project in the face of the ineffable order which he aims to describe
(pp. 143-57). The image of the divine book which Dante sees in the light
of the divine essence in the final canto of the Paradiso encapsulates this
aspect of the poem70:
I saw gathered there in the depths of it,
Bound up by love into a single volume,
All the leaves scattered through the universe.
(Par., Canto XXXIII, 11.85-7)
The book in its ideal form constitutes a unity in which diverse parts are
comprehended within a single whole. Yet this unity appears only in the
light of the divine essence, and is only experienced by those separated
from that essence as scattered pages, whose full meaning within the
order of the book never becomes evident. Dante's own actual book is thus
depicted as connected to this ideal book, participating in the
69. Gellrich, pp.140-41. Charles Singleton, 'Dante's Allegory', in R.J. Clements
(ed.), American Critical Essays on the Divine Comedy (New York and London: New York
University Press, 1967), pp.91-103.
70. See Gellrich, p.157.
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comprehensive unity of its meaning, while at the same time being
distanced from it, only offering a partial glimpse of that unity.
This stress on the limitations and necessary incompleteness of the
Commedia in relation to its subject occurs in other aspects of the poem.
Dante frequently draws attention to the inadequacies of his own memory,
emphasising the fact that what we are reading is a reconstruction of his
visionary experience, existing at a distance from the things which he
saw71. The representations presented in the poem are also shown to be
constrained by the inadequacies of language and by the rules of art:
If, reader, I had room to write more,
My poem could still not tell you everything
About the sweet drink of which I could never have had enough.
But since all the pages designed for this
Second part of the poem have been filled,
The rules of art stop me at this point.
(.Purg. Canto XXXIII, 11.136-141)
Equally, and particularly in the Paradiso, Dante highlights his intellect's
incapacity to grasp in their pure form the wonders with which he is
confronted, and emphasises that what he sees is presented to him as an
indirect representation of a higher reality. Thus in Paradiso IV, Beatrice
explains that the souls which Dante encounters on the lowest of the
celestial spheres do not really occupy that place:
They show themselves here, not because this sphere
Is so assigned to them, but to indicate
What is the lowest of the celestial states.
There must be such language for your mind
Because it learns from what is sensible
Matter which, afterwards, it makes fit for the intellect.
(11.37-42)
The Commedia thus presents not a mirror of the book of the world,
but an indirect reconstruction of it, where it is altered by the limitations
of Dante's memory at the time ofwriting, by his mind's incapacity to
grasp what he experienced, by the impossibility of conveying his
experience in language, and by the necessity of selecting from and
reordering those experiences in accordance with artistic principles. Far
from encapsulating the book of the world (the concept of which
nevertheless remains present as an ideal against which Dante's work
71. See ibid., pp.146-47.
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must be weighed), the Commedia is presented as a flawed and indirect
depiction of things which are often themselves a flawed and indirect
image of an ultimate reality which remains ineffable.
It might be argued that these aspects of the Commedia can be
understood as a consequence of the poem's polysemous allegorical nature.
The poem's polysemy has traditionally been understood in two ways. It
has been seen by some critics as the allegory of the poets, where the
literal sense of the fictional text is a beautiful lie which conceals true
meanings established independent of its fictive signings. Others have
identified the Commedia as employing the allegory of the theologians,
where the literal sense signifies things which are themselves true, but
which in turn signify other things. Both accounts of the Commedia's
modus significandi involve a sense of the limitations of meaning. Any
given level of the poem's significance provides only a partial mode of
understanding, open to qualification by significances established on other
levels of its polysemous structure72. An awareness of the poem's multi-
layered nature is certainly vital to its understanding. The perspective
provided when one sees it in terms of the allegory of the theologians is
particularly important. In allowing Beatrice, for instance, to be
understood both as a real person and a representation of theology, it
provides a conjuncture of concrete and abstractive viewpoints, while
distinguishing them in a manner which signals that neither is wholly
adequate in itself. In this, as will be discussed in more detail shortly, the
Commedia's polysemy contributes to the poem's ethical accent which
demands that a positive relation be established beween ideal values and
human life.
However, to understand the Commedia's destabilisations of
meaning merely in terms of its polysemy, regardless of whether one views
it as poetic or theological allegory, is to overlook significant aspects of the
poem. Ultimately, such a perspective reduces the poem's significative
mode to one of reference. The allegory of the poets constructs the text's
72. On the distinction between the allegory of the theologians and the allegory
of the poets, see Ch.l of Dante's exposition of his Convivio, trans. Minnis & Scott,
pp.396-98; Epistle to Can Grande delle Stelle, excerpted and translated in Minnis &
Scott, pp.458-69 (pp.459-60). On the debate over which of these modes of allegory is
applicable to the Commedia, see Richard Hamilton Green, 'Dante's "Allegory of the
Poets" and the Medieval Theory of Poetic Fiction', Comparative Literature, 9 (1957), 118-
28, and Charles S. Singleton, 'The Irreducible Dove', ibid., 129-35.
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fictional aspects as devoid of any real significance, subordinating them to
meanings which are wholly exterior to the poem's textuality. The
allegory of the theologians rescues the fictional letter simply by denying
that it is to be understood as fiction, viewing it as directly signifying
things which are in themselves true. The co-existence of different levels
ofmeaning may accentuate the limitations of any one of these relative to
the totality of the poem's comprehensive significance. But the critics'
descriptions of the Commedia's polysemy have consistently minimised or
excluded any suggestion that its significations are to be taken as having
an indirect relation to reality. This ultimately assimilates the poem's
structure to the traditional pattern established in Scholastic allegoresis.
Both assume a model of signification in which those aspects that suggest
the interpretative nature ofmeaning and indicate its oblique relation to
prior truths, are contained within a structure which reaffirms its
referential authority.
The Commedia's mode of signification, however, differs from the
traditional pattern of Scholastic allegoresis in a manner which critical
accounts of its polysemous structure have overlooked. Dante's
foregrounding of the ways in which his work departs from what it aims to
describe stresses that the meaning of the Commedia is produced not
through reference, nor even imitation, but through interpretation. Rather
than adopting the traditional medieval role of the self-effacing author,
Dante emphasises that his poem has been actively constructed through
human agency, and that it consequently provides an image of the divine
ordo as seen from a perspective within that same ordo. These aspects of
the Commedia are most highly accentuated in Paradiso. But they are
present throughout the poem in its discussions of issues such as memory
and artifice, the implications of which merely become particularly
intensified in the celestial spheres. Dante employs these features to
stress the distance between signified and referent, laying emphasis on
the ways in which his poem's meaning has been shaped by a textual
processing of reality, rather than determined through reference. The
Commedia invites one to qualify assent to its signings with a critical
detachment regarding them which remains aware that their truth value
is compromised by their status as partial constructs73.
73. For views of the Commedia which examine the ways in which the poem's
own textuality becomes part of its subject matter, see John Freccero, 'Infernal Irony: The
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If Dante's work in this way differs significantly from the attitudes
of Scholastic literary exegesis, it is nevertheless important to note that a
continuity also exists between them. In signalling the provisionality of
the Commedia by stressing its interpretative, textual characteristics,
Dante introduces a self-erasing element strikingly similar to that found
in allegoresis, simultaneously positing meaning and calling it into
question. The Commedia certainly develops this to an unprecedented
extent. In foregrounding human creativity and its influence in
constructing meaning, Dante accentuates the particularising features of
literature which the Scholastics sought to dispense with. But for all the
differences between them, Dante's innovations are produced through a
modification of Scholastic literary theory which exploits a transformative
potential which is inscribed therein.
Dante's indebtedness to the Scholastics is also indicated by the fact
that, as in Scholastic allegoresis, these aspects of the Commedia which
destabilise meaning are tied to a strong ethical emphasis which
constantly refers universal and unchanging truths of the poem back to
the temporal vicissitudes of particular circumstances. This ethical
dimension appears throughout the Commedia. In Purgatorio XXXII,
having reached the heights of the earthly paradise and being on the point
of entering the celestial paradise, Dante is presented with an allegorical
vision which depicts the history of the Church on earth, covering such
matters as the Donation ofConstantine, outbreaks of heresy, the rise of
Islam, and the relation between the Church and the secular state in the
fourteenth century (11.109-60). In Paradiso XXI and XXII, in the sphere
of the contemplatives, St Peter Damian and St Benedict complain of the
very earthly matters of the decline and corruption of the monastic orders
(Cantos XXI, 11.130-5, XXII, 11.73-96). In Paradiso XXX, as Dante draws
nearer to his moment of beatific vision, Beatrice parts from him with a
prophecy in which she praises Emperor Henry VII and condemns Pope
Clement V (11.136-48). Such satirical and political elements of the poem
operate in tandem with the general device which operates throughout the
poem whereby Dante repeatedly encounters souls who proceed to recount
events from their temporal life which function as examples of vices to be
Gates of Hell', in Dante: The Poetics ofConversion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1986), pp.93-109. See also Teodolinda Barolini, Dante's Poets: Textuality and
Truth in the Comedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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avoided and virtues to be embraced. The poem thus consistently
underscores Dante's refusal to allow his readers to rest with the spiritual
realities which he describes, insisting instead on constantly referring
their attention back to a consideration of the facts of secular existence
and of their own lives.
This ethical imperative in the Commedia is wholly in keeping with
the requirements of Scholastic literary theory. Moreover, a vital point in
this connection is the relation between the poem's ethical emphasis and
its foregrounding of its own textuality. The Commedia is presented as
only one interpretation of the universal order, orientated towards a
selective depiction of secular realities, which is determined by the
constraints of Dante's particular situation. But Dante's perspective may
not be appropriate for others. The Comeddia thus highlights its own
provisional status, signalling that other valid representations are
possible, and indeed, necessary. Dante's priority is not to present ideal
truths per simplice. Rather he introduces a powerful emphasis on the
specific contexts from which such values are approached, and makes the
awareness of how a text's meaning is shaped within such contexts an
essential object of interpretative concern if one is to arrive at a properly
ethically-orientated reading. The Commedia accordingly aims to direct
the audience away from a consideration of the poem in itself, instead
alerting them to the need to arrive at an understanding appropriate to
their own circumstances.
The relation between Dante's Commedia and Scholastic literary
theory thus appears as one of both difference and indebtedness. In
introducing emphases on the limitations of meaning, on the role of poetic
creativity in constructing it, and on the importance of an understanding
of the context within which it has been produced, Dante's literary
attitudes clearly differ markedly from those of the European schoolmen.
But these innovations are introduced in the interests of an ethical
emphasis which he inherits from those same schoolmen, and they are
produced through a radical development of possibilities which are already
inscribed within the theoretical assumptions and interpretative practices
of such exegetes. Dante's Commedia, for all its originality and
innovativeness, constitutes not a break from the attitudes current in
academic Scholasticism, but rather a radical development which is born
of those same attitudes.
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The example of Dante provides a clear warning against the
Robertsonian view of the relation between medieval texts and medieval
literary theory. Far from involving a passive assimilation of and assent
to the interpretative procedures and attitudes of Scholasticism, The
Commedia shows that literary texts can engage with Scholastic literary
theory critically, adopting many of its strategies and priorities while at
the same time creatively transforming them. Such flexible literary
deployment of its resources means that medieval literary theory cannot
be used as a metalanguage, authorising a single interpretative approach
to all medieval texts. Rather the engagement of literature with Scholastic
literary exegesis can evolve models of signification which differ radically
from the valorisation of universal meaning which Robertson insists upon,
permitting, as is the case with Dante, considerable sensitivity towards
what is particular and distinctive in a text. General pronouncements
such as Robertson's can only blind one to a diversity in medieval writing
which defies such oversimplification.
Dante's example also illustrate a key direction in which attitudes
towards literature were being developed by late-medieval writers. If
viewed in the context of developments in other theoretical areas, the
literary strategies of the Commedia can be seen not merely as an
idiosyncrasy on Dante's part, but as a response to certain deepening
tensions occuring throughout medieval Scholastic philosophy which put
considerable strain on the assumptions and strategies of literary exegesis.
These tensions appear most vividly, and in a way most pertinent to
Scholastic literary theory, in late-medieval thought on the nature of
universals.
9
In Platonic thought, universals were viewed as real and separate forms,
in which individual beings participated and from which they derived
their nature. In Aristotelian philosophy, they were seen not as existing
outside individuals, but as a common nature located in those individuals.
Both philosophies in their different ways insist on universals as
something real. Any given existent is what it is through the action of
form on matter. While individuated by matter, its form nevertheless
operates as a telos, orientating the existing thing towards the most
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perfect realisation of that form. In so far as that realisation is imperfect,
the existent has failed to realise its nature. Consequently, a proper
understanding of reality must depend on an understanding of that which
is universal in it. In both ontological and (when dealing with rational
beings) ethical terms, particular realities move towards the realisation of
an ideal form, and they are to be understood in terms of the degree to
which their assimilation within that ideal has been achieved.
This attitude is inscribed within the Averroistic Poetics, in a
discussion of 'indirection' (circulatio) deeply relevant to medieval theories
of comedy:
Omnis enim representatio aut imperat sibi locum per
representationem sui contrarii et post permutatut ad suam
intentionem. Et est modus qui dicitur apud eos circulatio. Aut
rem impsam non mentionem aliquam sui contrarii. Et hoc est
quod ipset nominabant significationem.
(pp.20-21)
Consequently, if tragedy directly depicts a set of ideal values and aims to
produce an assimilation between those values and the audience, raising
the particular to the level of the universal, comedy, being the art of
blame, achieves the same end by different means. It is viewed as
directing the audience towards the ideal in a roundabout manner,
presenting vices in order to inculcate a loathing of them and
concomitantly leading the audience to embrace the contrary virtues. In
both cases, the specific details of the text and the distinctive features of
the mode employed are subordinated to a prior set of universal values in
relation to which their significance and function are defined. Such a
viewpoint is fundamentally realist in its privileging of the universal. It
embodies a faith in the possibility of aligning particular reality within the
bounds of universal norms, this faith being underpinned by the conviction
that to do so is not to neglect or retreat from important aspects of the
realities of existence, but to depict that which is most real in it74.
In his History of Christian Philosophy, Etienne Gilson outlines a
series of developments which constitute a dramatic rethinking of the
relation between universals and particulars75. These developments
reflect an increasing dissatisfaction with the realist privileging of the
74. On this privileging of the universal over the particular in Aristotle's
thought, see Gilson Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Medieval Studies, 1949), p.59.
75. Gilson, History, pp.471-520.
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universal, and a sense that individual existents cannot and should not be
neatly comprehended within universal categories but should instead be
understood in such a way as to give the fullest respect to their
particularities, treating the differentiating features of a thing as in
themselves being fundamental and irreducible properties of its reality.
This impetus towards an attention to the particular is already evident in
the thought of philosphers who are undeniably realist. Aquinas' ethical
writings, for instance, while maintaining a sense of the governing priority
of absolute moral values as the essential foundation of moral judgement,
nevertheless minimises any reductivism into which such a view might
lead by also discussing in considerable detail the diverse and indirect
ways in which such norms pertain to actual temporal circumstance.
Aquinas thus maintains a sense of the universal resonance of particular
things being the most vital aspect of their reality, and the key
consideration for a proper understanding of them, while at the same time
aiming to make his philosophy as sensitive to the individual as it possibly
can be76.
Another such instance is to be found in the philosophy of John
Duns Scotus (d.1308). Scotus1 famous concept of haecitas, offsetting
Aquinas' essence (quidditas), aims to account for the individuality of
material things without resorting to the widely held opinion that it
results when universal form is individuated by matter, a view which
makes individuation something external to form, which itself remains
universal and undifferentiated. For Scotus, haecitas operates within
form itself. If in Aquinas' philosophy quidditas is a principle which
functions within form to lead it to produce a particular kind of thing
when acting on matter, Scotus' haecitas is a principle which functions
within form to leads its action on matter to produce a particular
individual thing. For Scotus, then, individuation is not to be viewed as
the result of a thing's accidental properties, but is instead seen as an
irreducible feature of its reality, vouchsafed at an essential level77.
Both Scotus and Aquinas are concerned to address as closely as
possible the differentiating features of individual things, and display in
their different ways an awareness that existents cannot be adequately
76. For a detailed discussion of this aspect of Aquinas' ethical writings see
below, pp.135-37.
77. See Gilson, History, pp.461-62, 766-67n..
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described by attending merely to what is universal in them. Both develop
strategies which aim to give the fullest possible consideration to those
areas where contingent realities depart from the simplicity of the ideal, or
where existence exceeds the limits which are defined by its informing
universal principles.
Many of the contemporaries of Scotus and Aquinas, however, are
not so sensitive to such matters. Indeed, the example of Scholastic
literary theory shows that even within an analytical schema whose
ethical emphasis demands an awareness of ideal values as something
actually lived, exegetes of both Platonic and Aristotelian bents
consistently make universal norms rather than contingent facts the
prime focus of their attention. The generally-held principles that
universals preceded particulars in the order of being (even if, from the
Aristotelian perspective, the priority was reversed in the order of
knowing), and that this order of being involved an ontological hierarchy
rising from things through their universal forms to the divine Ideas in
the mind ofGod, tend to reinforce the assumption that what is universal
in existence is also what is highest therein and thus most worthy of
attention, being closest to God. It is perhaps due to the influence of this
deep-seated assumption in realist thought that late-medieval
philosophers seem to have been unable to emulate the nuanced approach
which enables Scotus and Aquinas to balance a focus on universals with a
due appreciation of particularities.
Consequently, one finds that something of a polarity develops.
Many thinkers continue, in the spirit of Henry of Ghent, to insist on the
importance of intellectually grasping universal principles in their simple
forms, refusing to prioritise the examination of how such simplicity is
diluted when acting on concrete realities. The example of Scholastic
exegesis testifies to this much. Conversely, however, a line of thought
develops which forcefully privileges the individual over the universal, and
in doing so departs radically from realist philosophies, tending in fact to
undermine or deny the claim that universals have any substantial basis
whatever.
Gilson outlines the philosophical positions of a number of the key
figures in this line of development. He describes the thought ofDurand
of Saint-Pourcain (d.1334) thus:
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According to Durand, [...] all that which exists is singular by itself
and the principle of individuation lies in the very nature of the
thing. Since it exists, a thing is an individual, because, since they
exist, both its form and its matter are individual. Now, if
everything that exists outside of the intellect is individual, there is
nothing universal in reality.
(History, p.475)
Universal concepts are seen as resulting from 'a mere consideration of the
intellect leaving out the individuating conditions of the thing.' (pp.475-6)
Peter Auriol (d.1322) differs from Durand in retaining some real basis for
universal concepts, but his position is again, far from any conventional
form of realism. For Auriol, universal concepts are produced by the
mind's assimilation of a resemblance (similitudo) between different
things, this resemblance being an actual property of the things
themselves, rather than merely a mental construct. Nevertheless, while
having a basis in reality, such universal concepts are not in any way
related to a defining ontological principle therein. Auriol's universal is
not an informing force which determines a thing's nature and guides it
towards the fullest realisation of that nature. Rather, the concept is
simply the singular thing as it appears to the intellect. As such, while
certainly having a real basis, a universal concept nevertheless offers only
an impression of a thing's reality, rather than a direct grasp of that
reality itself78. As Gilson remarks 'There is therefore only the knowledge
of the singular which attains the real itself: notitia individui
demonstrati.' (History, p.480) Moreover, universal knowledge of a thing,
since it only consists in a partial impression of a singular, is subject to a
considerable degree of error, as accidental circumstances can easily affect
that impression. It is therefore necessary that universal knowledge can
be tested against sense knowledge, which gives a more accurate reflection
of the thing's reality. Knowledge of singulars, derived from the senses, is
more certain than intellectual knowledge of universals79.
Other instances are cited by Gilson, such as Henry of Harclay
(d.1317) and William Farinier (d.1361), both of whom in a conclusion
similar to that ofAuriol define universal concepts as simply confused
knowledge of an individual thing (though their means of arriving at this





tendency is found in the philosophy of the nominalist William of Ockham
(d.c.1350). For Ockham and his school a universal is nothing more than a
mental construct. Particular existents are seen as being individual and
wholly separate things, ontologically prior to any universal concepts
which might be derived from them.
Thus, Ockham states that 'universale non est aliquid reale habens
esse subiectivum, nec in anime nec extra animae, sed tantum habet esse
obiectivum in anima, et est quoddan Actum habens esse tale in esse
obiectivo quale habet res extra in esse subiectivo. [...] Similiter,
propositiones, syllogismi et huiusmodi, de quibus est logica, non habent
esse obiectivum, ita quod eorum esse est eorum cognosci.'81 As the final
sentence indicates, as well as the universals predicable ofmany
individuals, relations between individual existents are also seen as
produced by an intellectual act, rather than subsisting in reality, as
Sheila Delany observes:
Another form of universal is the relation concept: similarity
difference, paternity, causality, etc. These relation concepts also
have no being, but are only an act of the intellect. Like other
universals, the relation concept is a kind of shorthand, a
convenient way to express several separate perceptions at once.82
Rather than something directly traceable to the structure of reality, such
concepts become something produced purely by an act of mind, with no
subsisting correlative in external reality.
The developments outlined above, occurring in the thought of a
diverse range of thinkers, and receiving a systematic and influential
formulation in the Nominalist school ofOckham, embody a strong
tendency to afford ontological and cognitive privilege to the particular
over the universal. In this they express a sense that universals, far from
being the highest level of material reality, to which the consideration of
singular existents should always be referred, in fact only represent a
partial representation of what is real. For Durand they constitute a
consideration of singulars which excludes, rather than transcends, what
is individual about them. For Auriol they are the partial impression
which singular things make on the intellect, this impression being more
81. William of Ockham, In Sententiae, I, ii, 8, excerpted in Stephen Chak
Tornay, Ockham: Studies and Selections (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1938), p. 132.
82. Sheila Delaney, 'Undoing Substantial Connection: The Late-Medieval Attack
on Analogical Thought', in Medieval Literary Politics, pp. 19-41 (pp.36-7).
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or less distinct according to perspective (the degree of vagueness being
what produces and distinguishes concepts of species and genus). For
Henry of Harclay and William Farinier they are a confused knowledge of
a thing's particular reality, while for Ockham they are simply a mental
fiction. All these perspectives suggest that a universal is fundamentally
a misperception or partial undestanding of a thing's actual and full
reality. What they emphasise is universalising thought's inadequacy in
providing knowledge of a particular reality which it can only ever
incompletely represent, and they insist on a concomitant imperative that
those aspects of reality which exceed the bounds of the universal must
receive due attention in themselves. These thinkers thus participate in
and respond to a changing understanding of the nature of individual
things, the beginnings ofwhich which Jorge J.E. Gracia has detected in
the twelfth century:
There seemed to be not only a greater understanding of
individuality but also a growing awareness that individuality is
much more important than had been thought before and that its
place and role in a complete ontology would have to be accounted
for at greater length. Indeed, there was a tendency towards a more
nominalistic approach in which individuality was considered at
least as important as universality in the makeup of the universe
and its description.83
It is perhaps puzzling that the refinements which thinkers such as
Aquinas and Scotus introduced to their consideration of the relation
between the universal and the singular in order to afford greater respect
to the individual did not serve to prevent the polarisation which occurred.
Certainly, Ockham and the other above-noted thinkers saw little or
nothing in realist thought to recommend it as something capable of
adequately addressing particular reality. This is hardly surprising when
fourteenth-century Augustinian scholars such as John of Rodington and
Hugolin Malabranca of Orvieto are making no effort to address it
adequately, continuing to minimise the value of sense knowledge in itself.
John points out that knowledge of sensible things can only be held as
valid through the light of divine illumination which allows one to grasp
the truth of a proposition through reference to the divine Ideas, thus
privileging intelligible realities as providing the only grounds of
83. Jorge J.E. Gracia, 'The Legacy of the Early Middle Ages', in Individuation in
Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650 (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1994), pp.21-38 (p.33).
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certainty. It is to these that the mind must ultimately be turned.
Hugolin dismisses all the arguments and proofs of philosophy, arguing,
like John, that human reason can only achieve knowledge through divine
illumination. This leads him to dismiss completely the value of ethics as
a science, affirming, as Gilson observes, that 'Ethics is superfluous to the
faithful.' (History, p.454) The principles of moral virtue are provided by
revelation, and any confusion of the simplicity of these principles which
might result from considering them in relation to actual circumstances is
to be avoided84. (See Gilson, History, pp.453-4) Such thinkers, alarmed
by the uncertainty of sense knowledge, remain inclined to avoid it, giving
themselves over to the inbuilt tendency within realism to hierarchically
elevate the ideal over the actual85.
There is also a tension within Aristotelianism itself which may
have exacerbated the problem. Aristotelian epistemology gained
considerable ground in the later Middle Ages, combining with more
Platonic elements to inform the thought even ofAugustinian thinkers
such as Scotus86. Assigning forms the status of universal reality, and at
the same time insisting that they are found only in compound with
matter within particular things, Aristotelianism is based on two premises
which tend to oppose each other. Form is affirmed to be a universal,
having a unity which transcends the diverse things in which it operates,
but it becomes difficult to see how it can exist only within singular things
without itself being singular and separate in each of them87. Thus
Scotus, despite attempting to make his philosophy sensitive to the
irreducible importance of individuated existence, has his arguments torn
apart by Ockham, who seizes and ruthlessly on the difficulties outlined
above88. Given this situation, one can understand how many thinkers,
wishing to preserve the access of the human mind to general truths
founded in reality, were reluctant to give close consideration to universals
84. On John of Rodington and Hugolin Malabranca, see Gilson, History, pp.453-
54.
85. This uncertainty is recognised and addressed by Aquinas in his ethical
consideration of the relation between universal norms and specific circumstances. See
for instance, ST, II-II, xlix, i, and below, Ch.3, pp. 135-37.
86. See Gilson, History, pp.447, 462-3.
87. On this problem as it occurs in Aristotle's thought, see Gilson, Being, pp.50-
51. Gilson, however, is inclined to view Aquinas as having adequately addressed and
dealt with this problem, as his remarks on the relation between esse and essentia here
indicate. See ibid., p.51, and cp. History, p.368.
88. See William of Ockham, Summa, I, xvi.
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in their relation to individuated realities. The diffraction of the unity of
universals which results from such an analysis risks exacerbating the
effects of a tension, already present, which erodes the grounding of such
concepts in external reality, thus undermining the authority of the form
of knowledge which they provide.
One can equally understand the privileging of singulars by
Nominalist and proto-Nominalist thinkers. The proto-nominalists often
aim to provide some objective basis for universals and singulars: for Peter
Auriol they derive from a common quality of resemblance, while for
Henry of Harclay they designate a nature which is in the thing, but
singular (i.e. when we predicate 'man' of Plato, we are not designating the
same thing as when we do so of Socrates89). But while providing some
real basis for universal concepts, all of them show a clear discomfort with
the idea that universals exist in things as universals, and they
accordingly make the relation between universal concept and objective
reality ever more indirect. Ockham, characteristically, takes the problem
to its logical conclusion, denying that it is possible to simultaneously
consider universals as having any form of unity and as being predicated
of a diversity of things unless one sees them as having a purely mental
existence90. Such a position, with its extreme ontological and
epistomological privileging of singulars, is far removed from the flexibility
ofAquinas' thought on the relations between particulars and universals.
But if those who came after Aquinas were unable to emulate the balanced
and nuanced nature ofAquinas' thought, it is perhaps ironic that one of
the major contributions to this inability was the tensions within the
Aristotelian philosophy for whose deep influence Aquinas himselfwas
largely responsible.
Scholastic literary theory exists in a particularly pointed relation
to these philosophical tensions. The Scholastic tendency to address the
problematic nature of literature by subordinating its significative
structure to an external and ideal meaning becomes highly problematic
when confronted with a developing sense that particular reality cannot be
adequately addressed by modes of thought which afford ontological and
epistemological privilege to simple universals. This awareness that
individual things cannot be properly accounted for within the framework
89. See Gilson, History, pp.480-82.
90. Ockham, Summa, I, xiv.
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of universal categories places the internal coherence of the Scholastic
model under considerable strain. In tending to privilege ideal values,
that model finds itself unable to fulfil the imperatives of its ethical and
affective emphasis which demands that literature be shown to address
actual circumstances, being relevant to the lives of the audience.
Equally, having as its organising basis a sense of the dangers of those
aspects of literature which threaten to undermine a sense of the ideality
ofmeaning, there is inscribed within Scholastic theory a trepidation
about allowing the ideal basis of a text's significance to be diffracted, a
process which gives ground to those very features whose reduction and
containment lies at the very core of that theory's constitution. The
developing sense of a gulf between the ideal and the actual thus initiates
a tension between the two key emphases on which the Scholastic
justification of literature is founded.
An awareness of this tension casts considerable light on Dante's
literary strategies in the Commedia, which can be seen to be aimed at
addressing and resolving this developing tension. The poem's self-
ironising emphasis on Dante's literary creativity responds to the ethical
imperative of Scholastic literary theory by insisting that its significance
is produced through an interpretation of reality derived in and for a
specific set of circumstances. It thus aims to produce on the part of the
audience an awareness that their response will require their own self-
examining act of interpretation if they are to arrive at an understanding
of the ordo which Dante depicts which will be appropriate to their own
situation within it.
But while thus drawing attention to the creative and interpretative
aspects of the Commedia which particularise its significance, Dante
nevertheless avoids any risk that this might lead one to lose sight of
meaning's grounding in a transcendent basis. The textualising features
of the poem, while foregrounding the uncertainty which is attached to its
significations, are at the same time organised in such a way as to permit
that uncertainty to be accounted for and controlled within a theocentric
framework. As is indicated in the image of the divine book with its leaves
scattered throughout the universe, Dante presents the uncertainty which
attaches to the Commedia's worldly-orientated significance as being a
consequence of the way in which the ideal enters the actual only in
manifold obliquities, revealing itself in different aspects in different
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circumstances, without being fully present in any of these. Any definition
of the intelligible resonance of actual reality, in truly delineating one of
many possible modes of adjustment between the contingent and the
absolute, may thus have a relative degree of certitude in a restricted
context, but it can never be paradigmatic, as it necessarily involves only a
partial understanding of the ideal basis from which this certitude derives.
The Commedia thus operates in such a way as to retain a sense of the
grounding ofmeaning in the structure of reality, only qualifying this by
insisting that an attention to the inadequacies which become apparent
when any such meaning is considered in absolute terms is necessary in
order that one can delimit the relative terms in which it may be deemed
valid.
This constitutes a model of signification which, while inviting one
to approach any given depiction of reality with a critical sense of its
contingent limitations, nevertheless avoids any outright skepticism.
Dante, while emphasising for ethical reasons the creative and
interpretative aspects of his poem, thus equally responds to the
Scholastic concern over the disruption of certitude which such emphases
produce. In defining the operation of these potentially disruptive aspects
of poetic discourse in theocentric terms, associating them with his poem's
distance from the divine Word against whose informing and absolute
authority its limitations are defined, Dante aims to balance the
conflicting imperatives that meaning be assigned an absolute basis and
related to the secular world. The self-referential strategies employed in
the Commedia thus retain as a priority the need to relate actual reality to
an ideal moral and spiritual order, while at the same time remaining
aware of the oblique nature of this relation.
These aspects of Dante's literary strategy can be found among
other late-medieval writers. In the English poem Pearl, which deals with
the narrator's incapacity to comprehend his daughter's death or the Pearl
maiden's attempts to console him by locating it within a spiritual and
providential perspective, the centre of the poem is dedicated to a
discussion of heavenly reward. The discussion begins with the Pearl
maiden retelling the parable of the vineyard (Matt, xx, 1-16), her
conclusion then being debated by the dreamer who disagrees with her,
citing an alternative Biblical authority to justify his own point,
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whereupon she in turn counters his arguments with a discourse on merit
and grace91.
Here one finds a structure wherein meaning begins with the
singular certitude of the divine Word which underlies the Bible. This,
however, is mediated through the indirect narrative form of Christ's
parable, whose internal structure introduces a further dilution of ideal
significance as singular meaning is spread across the multiple voices of
the various characters. This parable itself is retold in the words of the
Pearl maiden, and applied to issues raised in the particular situation of
her encounter with the dreamer. This application is then tested against
other passages from scripture and debated, before, finally, a conclusion is
arrived at. In this the poem provides a powerful image of the necessary
diffraction which the simple precepts of divine Wisdom must undergo in
their application to particular circumstances. Pearl thus expresses a
sense of the ultimate anchorage of human representations in the
authority of the divine Word. But it equally underscores the distance
between them which results from the poverty of human vision and which
necessitates the indirect and imperfect forms in which divine Wisdom is
made manifest, among which are the imaginative representations which
the poem itself so artfully employs92.
In pointing to its own splendid artifice as an imperfect
representation of the mysteries which it reveals, and as a necessary
concession to the limits of human vision, Pearl employs a literary
strategy found in the works of yet other late-medieval writers. One
thinks of the ironic structure ofChaucer's Canterbury Tales, where the
diverse generic conventions employed by the different speakers
consistently undermine each other, reminding one of the varying
circumstances which motivate their representations, and at the same
time refusing priority to any one such representation as being the final
word. Similarly, the quest in Langland's Piers Plowman for the meaning
of'dowel', 'dobet', and 'dobest' yields a number of definitions, each
91. Pearl, in Pearl; Cleanness; Patience; Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, ed.
A.C. Cawley and J.J. Anderson (Dent: London and Melbourne, 1976), pp.1-48 (Pass.IX-
XI, 11.481-660).
92. For a reading of Pearl which clearly explicates these aspects of the poem, see
A.C. Spearing, 'The Gawain-Poet's Sense of an Ending1, in Readings in Medieval Poetry
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 195-215.
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adequate for specific circumstances, but each ofwhich undermines the
others so that none can be taken as the final statement on the matter.
Chaucer, Langland, and the Pearl poet all provide modes of
representation which place a strong emphasis on the circumstances in
which and for which meaning is constructed. But they also have a
powerful sense of the limitations with which that circumstantial basis
imbues meaning, undermining the sententiae which they produce, and
thus pointing to the inadequacy of their claims to final certitude, which
always remains, in this world at least, an unrealisable ideal goal. In this
they can be seen to share the key concerns of Scholastic literary theory.
Their close attention to the relation between meaning and local
circumstance preserves the ethical imperative which demands that the
significance derived from a text be related to one's actual life. Their
accent on the inadequacies of such particularised meaning maintains a
privileging of ideal values per simplice against whose certitude the
limitations of any contingently bounded significations are defined.
The new modes of signification which develop in the works of these
writers can thus constitute a response to the growing tension between
these idealising and particularising requirements, radically extending the
self-ironising tendency which was already inscribed within Scholastic
literary theory, and exploiting the potential for transformation which
that tendency provides. Thus, viewed in relation to the problems which
were emerging in Scholastic literary theory in the fourteenth century, the
literary strategies of these writers can be seen as participating, along
with Dante, in a general response to those problems. And as with Dante,
while the emphases of the modes of signification which they develop
differ considerably from what is found in academic Scholasticism, this
response can be seen to share and indeed to be driven by its fundamental
priorities.
Robert Henryson, writing in the latter half of the fifteenth century,
comes late to this line of development. Indeed, Henryson has been linked
to the humanistic attitudes towards literature which were very much on
the rise throughout Europe93, bringing with them a strong sense of the
divine nature of human creativity, and a philological sensibility which
was increasingly aware of the historical and cultural circumstances in
93. See, for instance, John MacQueen, Robert Henryson: A Study of the Major
Narrative Poems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp.21-3.
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which texts were produced94. These attitudes were being adapted in the
fifteenth century in ways which depart from the emphasis which they
receive in, for instance, the Commedia, in which Dante's awareness of the
inadequacies of such contingently-grounded meaning prevent him from
adopting the more straighforward positive celebration of such elements
which one finds in later humanism. This might suggests that Henryson
is to be viewed in a context which in many ways markedly departs from
the world of Scholasticism.
John MacQueen, in arguing for the influence of continental
humanism in Henryson's work, distinguishes between southern and
northern humanism. The latter, within which he situates Henryson, is
seen as involving much less of a break with medieval attitudes, instead
producing an integration of the new and the old95. MacQueen's location of
Henryson at an interstice ofmedieval and humanistic literary attitudes
provides a valuable perspective, suggesting that Henryson's work resists
any simple alignment with either Scholasticism or humanism, being
critically distanced from both.
In the following chapters it will be argued that Henryson's
engagement with Scholastic literary theory is profound and involves a
deep commitment to its priorities and a clear-sighted and sophisticated
consideration of the problems which accompany them. But where the
works of writers such as Dante and the Pearl poet constitute assured
statements which address and confidently propose a resolution of the
tensions implicit within Scholastic literary theory, Henryson's approach
is much more anguished. Writing at a time when the literary innovations
ofDante and other writers are being developed in directions which give
those innovations a quite different emphasis, Henryson is profoundly
aware of the dangers which accompany them. Thus, the difficulties
which result from the tensions between the ethical and idealising
imperatives of Scholastic literary theory appear in his work as an almost
insurpassable obstacle. Henryson is deeply conscious of the need to
modify the emphasis of academic Scholasticism if the moral utility of
literature is to be maintained, developing literary strategies which in
94. On these aspects of Renaissance literary humanism, see A.C. Spearing,
Medieval to Renaissance in English Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), pp.1-14.
95. MacQueen, Robert Henryson, pp.22-3.
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many instances bring him closer to humanist positions. But he is equally
suspicious of the direction in which such transformation tends. The
impulse for and direction ofHenryson's creative modifications, along with
the reservations with which he regards them, derive from and maintain
the essential concerns of Scholasticism. These concerns are for Henryson
deeply problematic, a fact which prevents his work from settling into any
neat conceptual synthesis, whether Scholastic or otherwise. This,
however, does not imply any incoherence on Henryson's part. Rather, his
texts provide a detailed and sophisticated consideration of the tensions
which inhabit late-medieval thought on literature, with these tensions




Henryson on the Uses
and Abuses of Poetry
And they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be
turned unto fables.
(2 Tim.: 4, iv)
One of the most striking features ofRobert Henryson's Moral Fables, and
one which has received much attention from critics, is the frequent
occurence of strong disjunctions between the apparent sense of the tale
and the readings proffered in the moralitas. In this chapter it will be
argued that Henryson's manipulation of these disjunctions becomes more
intelligible and can be seen to be highly subtle when considered in
relation to the background of Scholastic literary theory. Before
examining this relation, however, it will be useful to look at the
disjunctions which appear in two of the fables: 'The Trial of the Fox' and
'The Cock and the Jasp'. The chapter will go on to examine some
different modern critical reactions to the Henrysonian disjunctions, along
with the assumptions underlying those reactions, and examine how they
fail to provide an adequate account of the fables. It will be seen that the
manipulation of the dichotomies between tale and moralitas in these two
fables draws and reflects significantly upon Scholastic literary theory,
and that this casts new light upon the import of the disjunctive patterns
identified by other critics.
Often in the Fables, figures who within the framework of the story
appear admirable are interpreted in the moralitas as representing
something evil. This can be seen in 'The Trial of the Fox', in which a
moralising voice is introduced in the tale, denouncing the fox's attempt to
avoid coming to the attention of the lion:
O fylit spreit, and cankerit conscience!
Befoir ane roy ren3eit wih richteousness
Blakinnit cheikis and schamefull countenance!
(11.971-73)
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The poem continues in this vein over two stanzas which conclude with a
moral injunction, instructing us to 'Luke to this tod, how he wes in effray,
/ and fie the filth of falset,' (11.982-93). The lion thus appears as an image
of powerful virtue cowing the ungodly, and this seems consonant with his
actions in the fable, where he insists on peace between the animals and
hears the complaints of those who have been exploited, in order that
amends can be made1.
Yet having been offered this moral in the tale, we find that this 'roy
ren3eit with richteousness' is taken in the moralitas as 'the warld be
liklynace' (1.1104), whose attractions virtuous people abjure. It seems odd
that the fox, who is allegorised as temptation and who in the story is
wicked (if roguishly appealing), should seek to avoid the world. But the
poem does not engage with this problem: the incident of the fox seeking to
avoid the lion is simply not mentioned in the moralitas. The positive
presentation of the lion in the fable, which has already provided a
perfectly good moral, is also pointedly ignored in the moralitas. This
exclusion is all the more striking for the fact that the earlier moralisation
has already reinforced the impression given by the literal presentation of
the lion.
A similar disjunction appears in the first of the Fables, 'The Cock
and the Jasp', which establishes from the outset of the collection a
pattern that recurs throughout. The two sides of this disjunction are
embodied in an ambiguity which appears in the very first stanza, where
the cockerel is described as 'cant and crous, albeit he was bot pure' (1.65).
The adjective 'crous' could mean either conceited and boastful, or lively
and spirited. If the former meaning is taken, the phrase suggests that
the bird has an opinion of himself far above the humility of his station.
The latter meaning, however, would agree with 'cant', meaning brisk or
smart, thus giving a positive impression of the cockerel as refusing to be
weighed down by his poor condition.
The tale, in fact, appears to resolve the ambiguity in favour of the
latter possibility. The cockerel's diligence in rising 'sone by day' (1.66) is
contrasted to the slackness of the 'daimisellis wantoun and insolent' (1.71)
who are supposed to have carelessly swept the jewel from the house. His
opinion that the jasp is of no real use to him seems perfectly reasonable
1. See 943-49, 1068-1086.
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given the needs of a farmyard bird. Furthermore, his rejection of it is
grounded in a clear sense of the gulf between its value and the
appropriate requisites for his own social status. This sense of the stone's
worth is shown in the gradual expansion of the details of the appropriate
setting for the jasp which appears in the three rhetorical questions of his
high-style panegyric to the stone2:
Quhar suld thow mak thy habitatioun?
Quhar suld thow duell hot in ane royall tour?
Quhar suld thow sit, hot on ane kingis crown
Exalt in worschip and in grit honour?
(11.106-9)
The only point where it is suggested that the cock has misjudged the true
value of the jasp is in the stanza which describes, in the tradition of the
medieval lapidary, how the stone can protect and empower its owner by
its innate virtues (11.120-26). Yet this is a strange and awkwardly
situated stanza which by no means resolves the issue, and I shall discuss
its significance later.
Despite all those aspects of the tale which reflect favourably on the
cockerel, the moralitas refuses to bestow any positive judgement on him.
Instead, it announces that the jasp 'betakinnis perflte prudence and
cunning' (1.128) and compares him to 'ane fule [...] / Quhilk at science
makis hot ane moik and scorne' (11.142-43). The authority of the
moralitas' reading is strengthened by Biblical references, from both Old
and New Testaments. John MacQueen has pointed out that there are
general parallels with several passages from Proverbs and the gospels of
Matthew, Luke and John, along with two specific references to the
Sermon on the Mount3. This suggests that, despite disagreeing with the
initial favourable impression given of the cockerel in the tale, the
moralitas does contain a store ofwisdom, and should be heeded.
Yet any attempt to review the initial impression given by the tale
so as to see if any interpretative error can be found must meet with little
fruit. Such an attempt might find some encouragement in the tale's
assertion that 'To get his dennar set was al his cure' (1.67), and the
2. For a similarly positive assessment of the cockerel, see George Clark,
'Henryson and Aesop: The Fable Transformed', English Literary History, 43, Spring
(1976), 1-18. For a more negative reading see Denton Fox, 'Henryson's Fables', English
Literary History, 29 (1962), 337-56, and also the views of John MacQueen discussed later
in this chapter.
3. John MacQueen, Robert Henryson, pp. 100-5.
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cockerel's concern with filling his 'tume intraill1 (1.91), which could be
taken to suggest a prioritising of sensual gratification over spiritual
matters. This reading places much weight on the phrase 'al his cure',
treating it as a sweeping statement about the cock's general outlook on
life rather than as a statement about his priorities on the particular
morning in which the tale is set. But it is by no means clear that the
phrase has such a general application. At most, the support which the
tale provides for the moralitas' interpretation derives from possible
overtones rather than clear signalling. Moreover, such implicit
suggestions of the cock's possibly negative moral status do nothing to
counter those points where the tale explicitly challenges the reading
provided in the moralitas. Far from mocking and scorning the jasp, the
cockerel praises it in the highest terms. The intelligence of the cock's
arguments, and his evident respect for the jasp, belie any obvious analogy
between him and a scornful fool. And indeed, the most difficult objection
to such an analogy must be that while wisdom may be of value to a fool, it
remains difficult to see how a precious stone could be useful to a cockerel.
2
Such disjunctions in Henryson's Fables have spawned a number of
critical reactions which seek to account for them in various ways. Some
critics seek to harmonise the dichotomies which appear by arguing that
the narrative sections of the fables are to be interpreted almost wholly in
the light of the moralitates. Stephen Khinoy's reading of 'The Cock and
the Jasp' provides one such privileging of the moralitas' view of the
cockerel. He cites the 'lapidary' stanza as evidence that the jewel has
hidden properties ofwhich the bird is unaware. But dissatisfied with this
he turns to conventional allegorical meanings:
The admittedly remarkable qualities of the jacinth still might not
be ofmuch use to a dunghill cock. Henryson, however, has selected
the jacinth because it has three major allegorical meanings [...].4
These are then listed as Adam and his sin, wisdom, and figural poetry of
the same sort as Henryson's Fables. The word 'however' here suggests
that the introduction of an allegorical perspective somehow resolves the
4. S. Khinoy, 'Tale-Moral Relationships in Henryson's Moral Fables', Studies in
Scottish Literature, 17 (1982), 99-115 (p.103).
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issue of the jewel's value, showing us how it was indeed of use and that
the cock was wrong to reject it. The suggestion is that an awareness of
the conventions of medieval symbolism would have predisposed the
audience to consider the cockerel foolish and view the jasp as allegorically
representing positive spiritual values, and that the moralitas' judgement
is therefore quite in line with the fable's narrative.
Such privileging of allegorical meanings, however, begs the
question. Regardless of whether wisdom would be useful to a fool, the
fact remains that a precious stone would be of little use to a bird.
Allegorical meaning does not swamp the literal sense in the way Khinoy
suggests here, and the significance which incidents or details have within
the narrative context in which they occur cannot simply be identified
with their allegorical meanings. If this were the case, twelfth-century
exegetes of the Biblical story of David and Uriah would have had to argue
that ifDavid represented Christ then his murder of Uriah was in itself a
good deed. Needless to say, they argued no such thing, content to allow
for several discrete levels ofmeaning5.
John MacQueen, in the reading of'The Cock and the Jasp' offered
in his Robert Henryson also attempts to harmonise tale and moralitas,
arguing that the implications of the story support the viewpoint of the
moralitas: 'Clearly, the cock's action is wilful and foolish.' (p. 109) But
demonstrating this requires some rather strained reading. MacQueen
argues that the moralitas' interpretation is anticipated in the tale, citing
the description of the cock as 'Rycht cant and crous, albeit he was bot
pure' (1.65) as evidence that the bird has ideas above his station (p. 107).
But this underplays the ambivalence of the line, which as was pointed out
above, could equally imply that he refuses to be disspirited by his lowly
material status.
MacQueen proceeds to argue that generally in the Middle Ages 'the
cock, as in the Moralitas of the Taill ofSchir Chantecleir and the Fox, is a
type of pride, in the present instance false intellectual pride.' (p. 107)
This, however, merely repeats Khinoy's error of assuming that the
significance of narrative details is determined by conventional allegorical
meanings, an assumption which verges on Robertsonianism and is not
validated by the practice ofmedieval exegesis. Furthermore, while the
5. For discussion of twelfth-century exegesis of the story of David and Uriah see
Authorship, pp. 103-7.
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cock is often taken as a type of pride in the Middle Ages, and Henryson's
moral is in fact a conventional one, there is clear evidence that more
varied interpretations of cockerels were possible. Douglas Gray, querying
the assumption that the cock would automatically be identified with folly,
has observed that Lydgate's version of this fable offers a moral in which
the cock represents the virtuous man who avoids 'all ydelnesse' and
contents himselfwith 'suffisaunce'6. It seems then that not all medieval
interpreters of-fictional cockerels felt constrained by conventionally
ascribed meanings.
MacQueen's argument continues with the assertion that the cock's
folly is demonstrated by the fact that he 'clearly recognises the worth of
the jasp', while nevertheless rejecting it for what he knows to be of
inferior value (p. 107). Yet in the light of fables such as 'The Two Mice'
and 'The Wolf and the Wether', with their emphasis on the folly of
seeking to rise above one's given social status, the rejection of something
appropriate to a superior station can hardly be condemned. Finally, it is
argued that 'the things that he loves are grossly physical' (ibid.). This
overlooks the fact that the jasp itself is physical: considered as a precious
stone it has material and aesthetic value, while all its magical properties
outlined in the lapidary stanza serve only to protect the owner from
physical harm. In the terms of the cock's argument the rejection is not of
the spiritual in favour of the grossly material. Rather, he rejects
superfluity in favour of sufficency.
Thus, the tensions and ambivalences of the fable cannot easily be
argued away. While John MacQueen is certainly right in arguing that
the moralitas' Biblical references lend an authority to its reading which
prevent its outright rejection, his claim that this should lead to a simple
acceptance of it is unwarranted:
One may probably assume that Henryson and his audience were
prepared to accept Biblical authority as final. The Biblical
references thus provide a norm by which the relative validity of
point of view in Taill and Moralitas may be indicated.
(p.106)
This is to miss the point entirely. The authority of the Bible may be
unquestioned, but the relevance of a given passage to particular
circumstances is not, and it is the relevance rather than authority of the
6. Douglas Gray, Robert Henryson (Leiden: Brill, 1979), p.122.
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moralitas which is the issue here. The conflict between the moralitas'
claim that the cockerel is like a fool who makes 'moik and scorne' of
wisdom, and the bird's clear respect for the jasp and awareness of its
value prevents any identification of the moralitas' reading with the
implications of the tale itself.
Other critics have taken the view that Henryson's tales and
moralitates are not in agreement and base their readings on this
assumption. Geoffrey Tillotson, adopting a viewpoint common among
earlier critics, considers the use of the moralitas as no more than a
clumsy attempt by Henryson to make his fables doctrinally acceptable, as
though he were carried away in the act of writing and then had to
attempt to restrain the exuberance of the narrative by containing its
implications within the interpretative frame of the moralitas1. The same
suggestion is made by Kurt Wittig in seeking to explain the tension
between tale and moralitas in 'The Cock and the Jasp': 'It seems almost
as if the poet has allowed his own colourful fable to run away with him,
and is now returning to his duty'8.
A more sophisticated view of the disharmony between tale and
moralitas is given by H.E. Tolliver, who considers that there is a closely
determined thematic disharmony between the tales' sympathetic
perspective on the difficulties presented to their protagonists in a fallen
world and the moralitas' adoption of a more judgemental view. In 'Robert
Henryson: From Moralitas to Irony' Tolliver argues that Henryson seeks
to balance moral judgement with sympathy for his protagonists and thus
adopts 'an ironic mode capable of embracing both extremes'9.
This tension between sympathetic and judgemental attitudes is
later taken up by George Clark as the dominant structural and thematic
characteristic of the Fables, though with a very different, more
pessimistic, emphasis. Clark sees the characters as caught up in a
deterministic world where they have no clear vision of the judgement
their actions will bring down on them, and where their power of choice is
7. Geoffrey Tillotson, 'Henryson's Fables', in Essays in Criticism and Research
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1942), pp. 1-4.
8. Kurt Wittig, The Scottish Tradition in Literature (Edinburgh and London:
Scottish Academic Press, 1958), p.40.
9. H.E. Tolliver, 'Robert Henryson: From Moralitas to Irony', English Studies 46
(1965), 300-9 (p.306).
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severely limited10. He too argues for a dichotomy between the two
sections, but where Tolliver considers this a strategy for harmoniously
comprehending opposing perspectives, Clark considers these perspectives
thoroughly divergent. Henryson is seen as attacking what is seen as the
harsh misanthropy ofAesopic fable, with its simple moral dictates. Clark
argues that the disjunctions which appear tend to undermine the
moralitates by showing the inadequacy of their simple moral imperatives
when contrasted with the constraints and complexity of the world to
whose inhabitants they are addressed. For Clark, Henryson's message is
that such an inhabitant is seen as 'more suffering than sinning, less a
free agent with unambiguous moral choices than the victim of his
inescapable environment.' (pp.5-6)
This is a view which presents important considerations for many of
the fables, but it too has its limitations. Daniel M. Murtaugh, in an
article which expresses a view of the Fables similar to that of Clark has
some telling reservations about his own reading. He too considers that
Henryson presents a picture of a world whose complexities and
constraints deny the legitimacy of the moralitas' simple imperatives, and
he takes this as the most important part of Henryson's vision. At one
point he in fact describes the moralitas as a 'post facto rationalisation'.
This suggests that the moralitas is a retreat from the problems of the
tale, rather than an attempt to address them, and in this his view seems
in line with that of Clark11.
But Murtaugh also admits that his reading is 'partial', deliberately
focusing on what is excluded by the moralitas. (p.408) Since he also
suggests that the moralitas contains a 'positive assertion of an order of
values which must supplant the one at hand' (ibid), one might conclude
that it is equally justifiable to concentrate on the moralitates as including
that which the tales exclude. But while Murtaugh seems aware of the
possible importance of the moralitas, Clark tends to see its moralising
perspective as entirely undermined by the sympathy of the tale. Thus, in
his reading of 'The Cock and the Jasp', Clark ignores the impact of the
Biblical parallels pointed out by MacQueen in lending an authoritative
tone to the moralitas' perspective, even if its applicability to this
10. See above, p.101, n.2.
11. Daniel M. Murtaugh, 'Henryson's Animals', Texas Studies in Literature and
Language, 14, Fall (1972), 405-21 (p.408n.).
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particular tale remains in doubt. Such a consideration undermines
Clark's view that the general value of such moral imperatives is being
attacked, since it suggests a sense that the moralitas' insights may still
be of value in other more appropriate circumstances. In privileging the
perspective of the tale over that of the moralitas, Clark and Murtaugh
both oversimplify the complexity of the relation between the two (though
Murtaugh is at least rather more aware of this). In this respect, their
perspectives seem to share some of the features of the views of earlier
critics like Tillotson, in their tendency to underplay the significance of the
moralising aspects of the Fables.
Furthermore, while this tension between sympathy and judgement
is certainly an important feature of the Fables, it is not one which can be
easily applied to all of the disjunctions between tale and moralitas. In
'The Trial of the Fox', for instance, a moralising voice appears in the tale
which is no more sympathetic to the fox than the formal moralitas, but
whose reading clashes with the later moral in its assessment of the lion.
This suggests that the dichotomies are not merely organised around the
sympathy/judgement opposition, but are more varied than Tolliver, Clark
and Murtaugh suggest12.
Finally, Evelyn S. Newlyn's 'Affective Style in Middle Scots'
attempts to mediate between the harmonising and dichotomising
approaches to the relation between tale and moralitas, with a perspective
influenced by the reader-response theory of Stanley Fish13. Newlyn
argues that the tales lead the reader into assenting to a morally
erroneous view, only to have their error pointed out in the moralitas.
This forces the audience to reassess their reading, alerting them to their
own moral failings as indicated by their initial erroneous assent. Again,
this is an important consideration for the Fables, especially those drawn
from the Reynardian corpus, and I shall have occasion to return to it.
But Newlyn's approach assumes too easily that the view of the moralitas
will command assent and consign the initial impression given by the tale
to the realms of error. As we have seen, this is not the case with 'The
Cock and the Jasp'. Similarly, of the two suggested morals in 'The Trial
12. For a more detailed critique of Tolliver's view in relation to a particular
fable, see below, pp.127-34.
13. Evelyn S. Newlyn, 'Affective Style in Middle Scots: The Education of the
Reader in Three Fables by Robert Henryson', Nottingham Medieval Studies, 26 (1982),
47-56.
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of the Fox1 it is hard to see how the one which harmonises with the tale's
positive representation of the lion can be said to be in error, either from a
moral or an interpretative standpoint. Furthermore, in Newlyn's
readings, especially of'The Cock and the Jasp', the fables do little to
define precisely the type of error into which the audience is supposed to
have fallen. At most, a general failure to think clearly about the action
presented is pointed to. This seems a rather vague warning, especially
given the value placed in the later Middle Ages on an affective literature
which closely addresses the particular needs of the audience.
Many of the critical perspectives which I have outlined provide
valuable insights into aspects of Henryson's Fables. But the poems
consistently display aspects which do not fit with the tale/moralitas
patterning suggested by any one hypothesis. Henryson's manipulation of
the relations between the different parts of the fables is fluid and varied,
defying any paradigmatic account. In my own approach I aim to take
account of the flexibility of the fables' structuring and the complexity of
attitudes which it suggests. An analysis of the Fables' relation to the
Scholastic background will show that this complexity focuses on and is
organised around a concern over the function and value of imaginative
writing. This background illuminates the type of structuring found in
'The Cock and the Jasp' and 'The Trial of the Fox', and introduces a
framework in which other patterns of disjunction which occur elsewhere
in the Fables take on new resonances.
3
All the above-mentioned critical accounts of the tale/moralitas relation in
the Fables, even those which try to take account of dichotomies, have as a
key assumption the idea that the literary norm is one wherein the two
should harmonise in a univocal statement. This is clear in the cases of
Khinoy and MacQueen. The latter is certainly aware of the medieval
tolerance for a range of different meanings being assigned to the same
text, and its relevance to Henryson's work:
Sometimes [...] the narrative detail will suggest one form of
sentence, which, however, Henryson avoids in his Moralitas while
concentrating on a particular interpretation of a single episode.
(MacQueen, Robert Henryson, p. 100)
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In this view an interpretation which does not agree with that suggested
by the literal sense of the text is seen as part of a system of multiple
significances which allows for different readings on different levels of the
same text. However, to judge from his treatment of'The Cock and the
Fox', it seems that MacQueen, preferring harmonious variation to violent
dissonance, balks at extending this insight to encompass the extreme
divergence which characterises the different levels of meaning in
Henryson's work.
In a different way, Evelyn S. Newlyn also seeks to resolve the
conflicting meanings into a univocal statement by encompassing the
apparent significance of the tale within an interpretative hierarchy which
privileges the meaning suggested by the moralitas. Within this reader-
response framework the interpretation suggested by the tale is invoked
only as an initial, erroneous interpretation, with the meaning finally
coming to rest in the authority of the moralitas. Again, the text closes on
a univocal statement.
Murtaugh and Clark, although aiming to take account of the
dichotomies, actually tend towards a view similar to Newlyn's. Both are
inclined to see the moralising aspect of the Fables as being undermined
by the tales, whose perspective they take as the dominant one. In this
respect they ultimately tend, like Newlyn, to resolve the conflict they find
in favour of one side. The main difference is that they choose the opposite
side from Newlyn. Furthermore (and this is especially notable in Clark's
view ofHenryson as deliberately subverting the conventions of fable),
their construction of the conflict between a sympathetic tale which
precludes simple judgement and a harsh moralitas which insists on
imposing it assumes that the moralitas aims to fully account for all the
details of the tale. For both critics, the fables' disjunctive structuring is
noteworthy in so far as it deviates from the expectation that meaning
closes in the final judgement of the moralitas.
Tillotson and Tolliver, while also allowing for the co-existence of
different and opposed meanings in Henryson's work, nevertheless also
see it as a deviation from the norm of a singular meaning, and consider
this deviation to have occurred for specific reasons. In Tillotson's opinion
it stems from the need of a rather dour moralist to render the energetic
fables acceptable to sober doctrine. From this viewpoint the plurality of
meaning is essentially the result ofHenryson's inability to arrive at a
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coherent and balanced view of life. In Tolliver's view it results from the
specific problems presented by the moralistic writer's need to reconcile
sympathy and judgement, and is an effort to achieve precisely the balance
that Tillotson sees as lacking. In both instances the differing
perspectives of tale and moralitas are seen as deviations ascribable to
certain peculiarities: for Tillotson, authorial temperament, and for
Tolliver the special demands of a particular authorial role.
However, the readiness to offer readings which depart from the
apparent sense of a text is a constituent feature of Scholastic exegesis,
perfectly characteristic of its valorisation of moral utility and reduction of
aesthetic considerations. An awareness of the heuristic tradition of
Scholastic allegoresis of fabulous writings, and of the construction of
distinctiones wherein conflicting meanings can be assigned to the same
signifier without impinging on each other, should allow one to see that
the disjunctive form ofHenryson's Fables has a rigorously conceived
methodological basis within the literary theory of his own day. Douglas
Gray makes this connection in his book on Henryson, citing the Ovide
Moralise as an example, and quoting a fifteenth-century sermon by
Bishop Fisher:
[...] Allegory is open-ended, and alternative interpretations may be
selected according to context 'by a dyvers consyderacyion', or 'held
in mind' at the same time as two different perspectives, or as ironic
alternatives. [...] The moralitas does not purport to give the final
and exclusive meaning of the fable. It is not 'the moral message',
but one possible and useful significance of it: it hardly gives an
adequate account of the rich intentions of the fable and is obviously
not intended to do so.
(p.128)
Thus, the disjunctions which occur in the Fables are not a deviation from
a norm of univocal meaning, but a standard feature of a familiar mode of
exegesis associated with fabulous literature.
Henryson's debt to the practice of Scholastic exegetes is indicated
by the stress throughout the Fables on the provisional nature of the
morals. Almost all the moralitates open with assertions that this may be
its meaning, or that the narrator supposes this to be a possible
interpretation, always leaving open the possibility of other equally valid
accounts. In this, Henryson expresses a view wherein particular readings
are seen as actualising one aspect of a comprehensive body of significance
which underlies and motivates the signs of the fictional text. This
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produces a structure similar to that found in the distinctione, wherein the
potential significance of a particular textual detail is extended beyond
that suggested by the relations established within the particular
structure of the text. Reading is opened onto an infinitude of potential
permutations which relate the details of the text to diverse aspects of a
network of external and prior meanings. Any one of these permutations
can be valid and useful in the particular circumstances which elicit them,
but no one can fully capture the divinely patterned framework which
validates them.
This outlook underlies medieval writers' tendency to refer their
work back to a prior auctor in a self-effacing manner, while nevertheless
deviating from what that auctor has actually written. It similarly
underlies the concept of auctoritas manifested in the exegetical practice of
Scholastic commentators on literary texts, as described by Minnis:
The commentators were more interested in relating the work to an
abstract truth than in discovering the subjective goals and wishes
of the individual author. The intentio auctoris - the intended
meaning 'piously expounded' and rendered unimpeachable - was
considered more important than the medium through which the
message was expressed.
(.Authorship p.21)
The auctoritas associated with this intentio auctoris (as evoked by both
writers and commentators) is an impersonal one. It is seen to consist in
the consonance of the auctor's mind with the comprehensive harmony of
the divine ordo. This allows the significative potential of a work to be
seen as transcending the particularised limitations of a specific utterance:
the 'subjective goals and wishes' embodied in an individuated 'medium'.
Instead the specificities of a given text aquire a vast range of resonances
through being subsumed within this prior comprehensive ordo. Any
reading or translation of an auctor's work, provided the exposition is
consonant with Christian doctrine, can thus be seen as anchored in the
intention of a previous auctor and partaking of his auctoritas, while at
the same time being only a partial exposition of the overall intention
which motivates a text. This permits the translator or expositor of an
authoritative work to introduce his own innovations while simultaneously
denying ultimate responsibility for them, as they are seen as the partial
actualisation of the vast potential ofmeaning gathered in a prior intentio
auctoris.
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Guido da Pisa (d.c.1330) reflects this view in his commentary on
Dante's Commedia. In his prologue he expresses a sense of the
comprehensiveness of the poem's meaning by drawing Biblical parallels,
comparing Dante's vision to that of the prophet Ezekiel, and drawing a
further analogy between the Comedy and Noah's ark, whose three levels
containing different types of animals is compared to Dante's visions of
hell, purgatory and heaven14. He proceeds to claim that Dante writes
under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit:
Ipse enim fuit calamus Spiritus Sancti, cum quo calamo ipse
Spiritus Sanctus velociter scripsit nobis et penas damnatorum et
gloriam beatorum. Ipse etiam Spiritus Sanctus per istum aperte
redarguit scelera prelatorum, et regum et principum orbis terre.
(p.4)
Guido's insistence on Dante's divine inspiration may owe something to
the development in thirteenth century Biblical scholarship of the concept
of a duplex causa efficiens, which allowed exegetes to maintain an
emphasis on the divine source of Biblical meaning while taking account of
the individual contribution of the human author. In Biblical exegesis this
concept allowed a closer attention to the specific motivations of the
human writer, and contributed to a distrust of allegorical exegesis which
was out of harmony with the literal sense15. Its use in Guido's
commentary however has the opposite effect. The references to the
inspiration of the Paraclete along with the comparisons to the Bible open
Dante's text onto a comprehensive frame of reference. The
particularising features of his work and his specific motivations in
writing are included within this frame as valid considerations for
understanding the text. But the Commedia's meaning is now extended
far beyond such constraints, being inscribed within a complex nexus of
significance which make possible a host of latent meanings:
Circa [...] causam finalem, nota quod autor istud opus composuit ad
hunc finem principaliter, licet et multi alii possint assignare fines.
(Ibid.)
Guido proceeds to enumerate four possible final causes, the first ofwhich
is to persuade people to abandon their sins. Guido takes this as Dante's
14. Guido da Pisa, Expositiones et Gloses super Comediam Dantis, or
Commentary on Dante's Inferno, ed. V. Cioffari (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1974), p.2.
15. See Authorship, pp.79-84, Minnis & Scott pp.196-200. See also Evans,
Language and Logic, pp.42-50.
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primary motivation, also listing the desire to improve the style of others
by his good example, the bringing to the attention of the world certain old
poets who are now neglected but whose works contain much that is good
and useful, and the condemnation of wicked prelates and nobles. But the
assertion that 'multi alii' intentions can be assigned suggests that even
more than these are possible. While Pietro thus takes account of certain
determinate motivations, he refuses to limit the fullness of the text's
meaning to these, ultimately assimilating them within the absolute
authority and comprehensive vision of the Holy Spirit.
Similarly, Pietro Alighieri (d. 1364) opens his commentary on the
Commedia by stating that he is motivated to write by a conviction that
the richness of the poem's meaning has not yet been fully tapped:
Quamvis poema Comedie [...] dudum nonnuli calamo temptaverint
aperire ita in suo integumento clausum et absconsum, licet in
parte, nondum tamen in totum judicio meo illud utique peregerunt
U.16
He continues thus:
Nitar et ego nunc [...] in alia quali particula illud si potero per
modum Comenti ulterius etiam reserare [...]. Veniet inde tandem
sic forsam et alius qui hijs nostris aminiculatibus ipsum librum
portabit in humero, ut dicitur Job, capitulo xxxj [:36], ubi Glosa
exponens hoc ait: Portare librum in humero est scripture
aperitonem perficere.
(Ibid., pp.1-2)
Pietro thus presents his commentary as a partial exposition of a rich
complex of meaning. The writers of previous analyses of the Commedia
have produced valid but limited insights on the text, which may be
complemented by Pietro's own contribution. This in turn leaves open the
possibility of yet other valid interpretations arising from the works of
future exegetes. Both Guido and Pietro thus see the specificities of
Dante's text as being subsumed within a wider framework of prior
meaning. The Commedia's potential resonances within this framework
extend the poem's significance beyond the determinative power of the text
and its immediate motivating contexts.
In the work of these exegetes, as in Henryson's Fables, the
particular meanings suggested by the letter of the fictional text are seen
as only one level of significance within a multi-layered structure. The
16. Pietro Alighieri, II Commentarium Di Pietro Alighieri, ed. R. Delia Vedova
and E. Ottoboniana (Florence: Olschki, 1978), p.l.
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acknowledgement of the existence of such a wide set of possible meanings
prevents the particularising aspects of the text from being assigned any
determinative role in signification. Instead the text defines one aspect of
a wealth of prior and external meaning, within which its details have
many possible meaningful configurations beyond those established within
the argument of the letter. In this way the determining influence of the
letter of the poetic text is reduced, and the certainty that its meaning is
authorised by the given structure of reality is maintained.
4
While Henryson's literary strategy in the above instances certainly draws
on an established and sophisticated exegetical tradition, this does not
mean that his treatment of the disjunctions between the letter of the text
and the interpretation provided in the moralitas are unremarkable in the
light of this tradition. Phillipa M. Bright, in an article which places
Henryson's exegetical methods in a wider context of medieval techniques
of figural and exemplative interpretation, observes that the disjunctions
between different levels ofmeaning, and the tendency not to take into
account all details of the passage being treated, are commonly accepted
features of such methods. From this she draws the following conclusion:
When Henryson's figurative methods are properly understood [...]
what at first may appear to be discrepancies turn out, on closer
inspection, to be accepted features of the traditions in which he is
writing17.
Bright's contextualisation ofHenryson's methods is a welcome
antidote to the assumption of a univocal meaning found in so many other
critics. Some reservations remain, however, as to the degree of unity
which she ascribes to the context within which she sets Henryson. While
Bright observes a parallel between twelfth-century exegesis of the
Biblical story ofDavid and Bathsheba and Henryson's interpretative
method in his fables18, she omits the fact that, while after the twelfth
century such approaches to the text were increasingly adopted in the
interpretation of poetry, in Biblical scholarship the same period saw a
reaction against them. This reaction was characterised by an emphasis
17. Phillipa M. Bright, 'Figurative Techniques in Henryson's Fables', Studies in
Scottish Literature, 25 (1990), 134-53 (p. 153).
18. Ibid., pp.142-43.
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on the importance of the literal sense as the arbiter of meaning, and an
increasing reluctance to adduce allegorical meanings which were wildly
disconsonant with it. Exegetes came to view texts as produced by
individual authors writing in a manner appropriate to different
particular sets of circumstances19. The concept of a duplex causa efficiens
allowed exegetes to reconcile this new emphasis with the absolute
authority of the Bible. The author was still seen as working under the
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who was seen as the primary efficient
cause. But the human author was increasingly felt not to be merely the
pen of the Paraclete, but to have expressed his divinely inspired meaning
in a manner appropriate to his individual concerns and the particular
circumstances within which he wrote20.
Thus, rather than a unified approach to reading, there is in fact a
clear distinction in the later Middle Ages between the exegetical modes
applied to the Bible and to poetry. This suggests that, while there is
certainly a consistency in interpretative practice in so far as each of these
differing approaches tended to be seen as appropriate for a different mode
ofwriting, there was nevertheless more potential for variance in attitudes
towards exegetical procedures than Bright claims. I would therefore
dispute her claim that an awareness of this context removes the problems
caused by Henryson's disjunctions. Rather, the Scholastic tolerance of
diverse significations in poetry should be seen as providing the
background against which the problematisation effected by the
dichotomies found in the Fables should be measured.
What distinguishes Henryson from his Scholastic forebears is his
presentation of the relation between different levels of meaning, which
appears much more strained than is usually found in Scholastic exegesis.
Neither Guido da Pisa nor Pietro Alighieri show any explicit sense that
the surface meaning of the text might prove an obstacle to their
interpretative practice. Both simply assert their approach and proceed
with it, secure in the belief that the letter of the text simply provides one
interpretative permutation among others. In fact Pietro's comfort with
the letter is such that he counsels his readers that not all parts of the text
have allegorical significance, some only contributing to the literal level21.
19. See Authorship, pp. 103-7. See also Minnis & Scott, pp.207-9.
20. See above, p.112, n.15.
21. Pietro Alighieri, Commentarium, pp.6-7.
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Boccaccio does devote some time to excusing the obscurity of poetry
and justifying the difficulty which may accompany the search for valid
sententiae beyond the figments of the letter:
Nec sit quis existimet a poetis veritates fictionibus invidia
conditas, aut ut velint omnino absconditorum sensum negare
lectoribus, aut ut artificiosores appareant, sed ut, que apposita
viluissent, labore ingeniorum quesita et diversimode intellecta
comperta tandem facient cariora. Quod longe magis Sanctum
fecisse Spiritum unusquisque, cui sana mens est, debet pro
certissimo arbitrari.
(.De Gen. Deor. Bk XIV, ch.xii, vol.11, p.716)
Yet for all Boccaccio's emphasis on the obstacles presented by poetry to
the understanding, and on the intellectual effort involved in
interpretation, these are evoked as being ultimately a virtue of poetry
rather than a danger. The passage is closely followed by two quotations
from Augustine which present such obscurity as enhancing one's sense of
the rich body of significance concealed behind the text:
Quod per Augustinum in libri Celestis Ierusalem XI firmare
videtur, dum dicit: Divini sermonis obscuritas etiam ad hoc est
utilitas, quod plures sententias veritatis parit et in lucem notitie
producit, dum alias eum sic, alius sic intelligit. Et alibi Augustinus
idem super Psalmo CXXVI dicit: Ideo forte obscurius positum est,
ut multos intellectus generet, et ditiores discedant homines, qui
clausum invenerunt, quod multis modis aperiretur, quam si uno
modo apertum invenirent.
(Ibid.)
This tendency to present the obscurity of the letter as ultimately
facilitating a better understanding of the sententia is continued in the
following chapter ofDe Genealoge Deorum Gentilium, where Boccaccio
argues that poets are not liars, since lies are intended to deceive, while
the evidently fictional nature of poetic texts is a clear sign that they must
not simply be taken at face-value (see above, Ch.l, p.34, n.74). Thus, for
Boccaccio, the obstacle to a proper understanding which the text presents
is offset by the fact that the overtly fictional structure serves a self-
erasing function. The evident emptiness of a poem's fictional
significations indicate that they merely form a veil, to be drawn aside to
reveal a variety of true and independent meanings, while serving a
worthwhile instrumental role as an aid to understanding.
This sense of a comfortable relation between the letter of a text and
allegorical readings of it, and the minimisation of the possibility of any
interpretative conflict being provoked by discrepancies between them, is
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widely reflected in the layout of text and commentary which appears in
medieval manuscripts. In these the commentary generally appears
around the text, in its margins, or even actually inserted within the body
of the text. This minimises the conflict between the determinative force
of the text and the countering force of the commentary in their battle over
the grounds ofmeaning. For since no sense of the meaning of either can
be attained without including an awareness of that of the other, then any
sense of textual closure is pre-empted. The process of reading becomes at
most a continual modification of perspective between parallel levels of
meaning, with a sense that no one of these levels has the final word. Any
unsettling effect which might be produced by disjunctions between these
levels is comfortably contained within the mode of reading represented by
this structure.
For Henryson, however, this containment is not so assured. In
fact, a sense of the strong resistance of poetry to the Scholastic attempt to
transcend the limitations of textuality is already evoked in Henryson's
justification of poetic fiction in the 'Prologue' to the Fables. Here we are
told that ifmeaning emerges from poetry as flowers from the earth and as
the kernel of a nut from its shell, the earth is nevertheless 'bustious' and
must 'be laubourit with grit diligence' (11.8-9), while the nut's shell is
'hard and teuch' (1.15). This sense of difficulty also appears in the
moralitas to 'The Trial of the Fox', where the determination of a good
sententia is compared to the work of miners who 'Fair gold with fyre may
fra the leid weill wyn' (1.1098). The task, while certainly possible,
nevertheless seems fairly onerous.
Furthermore, this difficulty is also associated with danger. The
very first line of the 'Prologue' refers to 'feindit fabills', and the term
'feindit' recurs throughout as a description of the fables. However, it is
also frequently used as a description of the fox in Henryson's Reynardian
fables. 'Feindit', while referring to the fictionality of the poems, also has
overtones of deceptiveness and dissimulation, suggesting that one has to
be wary in approaching such writing22. This outlook, with its emphasis
on the difficulty and risk associated with reading fictional texts, is
particularly remarkable when considered as a description of the fable
22. Henryson's ambivalent attitude towards fable has been noted by Lois A.
Ebin in Illuminator, Makar, Vates: Visions ofPoetry in the Fifteenth Century (Lincoln,
NE, and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), p.74.
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genre, as it is traditionally seen as being the most transparent and least
deceptive of fictions, even escaping the censure of the normally suspicious
Augustine since no-one would be fooled by its evidently preposterous
stories23. From Henryson's perspective it seems that the capacity to see
through it is much weaker, and the risk of being fooled much stronger.
This view of poetry as both useful and potentially dangerous is
thematised in the opening passages ofHenryson's Orpheus and
Eurydice24, notably in the account ofOrpheus' genealogy with its
description of the nine Muses and their origin. This lineage is outlined in
stanzas five to nine and the figures described are very much concerned
with poetry and music, thus emphasising Orpheus' role as poet-singer,
and defining the qualities to which he is heir in this role. Hence the
passage also functions as an account of the nature and uses of poetry.
The poem opens by declaring that the recounting of a noble man's lineage
in this manner is done 'So that his hert he mycht enclyne thare by / The
more to vertu and to worthynes, / Herand reherse his eldirs gentilness'
(11.5-7). This refers the audience to the capacity of poetry to move its
readers to virtue, and simultaneously indicates that the following
genealogy will define this ideal capacity, since in Orpheus' case the ideal
role defined by his ancestry is that of the poet. But the passage also
raises the possibility that Orpheus and his poetic and musical powers
may fall away from the perfection of this ideal, indicating that here too
Henryson is concerned with the possible dangers of poetry:
It is contrair the lawis of nature
A gentill man tobe degenerate,
Noucht folowing of his progenitoure
The worthy reule and the lordly estate [...].
(11.8-11)
As we shall see, the recounting of Orpheus' lineage also deals with the
ways in which poetry can be thus 'degenerate' and warns of the possible
dangers which it involves.
In the genealogy we are first told that Orpheus' grandparents are
Jove and Memoria, whose offspring are the nine Muses. Jove, as king of
the Gods, was often identified with the Christian God, emphasising that
Orpheus' poetic power is ultimately to be traced to a divine origin, while
Memoria indicates its mnemonic function. Henryson's inclusion of these
23. See above Ch.l, p.34, n.74.
24. In Fox, ed., Poems, pp.132-153.
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figures is significant, recalling the Scholastic emphasis on poetry and
fiction as a mnemonic and affective organising system which helps fix
moral truths in the mind, thus leading its audience to the path of virtue
and ultimately back to God through salvation. This is presented as the
origin of Orpheus' lineage, the ideal point from which his powers may
decline. At this origin, poetry is presented as an alliance of sensible
imagery with divine wisdom.
The offspring of Jove and Memoria, the Muses who are the
inspiration of poetry and song, comprise Orpheus' mother and aunts, and
they too are described in significant terms. Of the first eight described
some of them seem to embody the more sensual features of poetry and
song, while some embody more rational aspects. Thus Euterpe and
Melpomene are 'gude dilectacioun' (1.37) and 'as hony suete in
modulacion' (1.39) respectively. 'Dilectacioun' is, of course, delight, while
'modulacion' refers to the harmony of her music. Pollymyo is described as
she 'Quhilk could a thousand sangis sweetly sing', again stressing the
sensual force of the songs' sweetness.
Caliope, interestingly since she is the mother of Orpheus, is given
an unspecifying designation as 'of all musik maistresse' (1.44). The
phrase could suggest a quasi-divine command over all aspects of music,
combining both sensual and rational, and encompassing musica
mundana, musica humana, and musica mundana. But situated as it is
between descriptions of those muses who are associated with the sensual
elements ofmusic and the immediately following descriptions of those
identified with its rational elements, it could equally suggest that
Calliope remains uncommitted, in potency to either extreme. Tersicor, 'is
gude instruction / Of ewiry thing' (11.40-41), while Cleo is 'meditation / Of
ewiry thing that has creation' (11.48-49). Herato is, perhaps rather
cryptically, described as she 'Quhilk drawis lyke to lyke in ewiry thing'
(1.51). I take this to suggest that she represents the power ofmetaphor
and analogy. This has a more than merely decorative force here, since as
the phrase 'lyke to lyke' indicates, this power is based on a perception of
real resemblances and thus connected to a perception of the structure of
creation. Thelya is assigned a clear moral function:
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Thelya syne, quihilk can oure saulis bring
To profound wit and grete agilitee
To vnderstand and haue capacitee.
(11.54-6)
But although the moral function is emphasised here, Thelya is not simply
identified with the rational as opposed to the sensual, for the emphasis on
her affective power to move the soul suggests a combination of the two.
The stanza in which the last muse, Wranya, is described extends
this combination of the sensual and the rational. Wranya represents not
just harmony, but the music of the spheres, the 'armony celestiall1 (1.59).
This is the musicus mundana which is produced by the harmony and
order of creation, and which embodies in eternal form those rules which
are the source of terrestrial music. This connection between the celestial
and the terrestrial is indicated by the fact that this harmony is 'Reioising
men with melody and sound1 (1.60): it is the ultimate source of the sensual
pleasures ofmusic. This passage thus looks forward to Orpheus' learning
of the rules of harmony from the music of the spheres in 11.219-39.
Furthermore, this is the stanza in which we are told that Caliope, whose
relation to either reason or the senses is left ambivalent, weds Phebus, a
god very much associated with reason.
Henryson gradually changes the relative weight given to the
rational and the sensual in each stanza. The first of these stanzas
contains two Muses associated with the sensual aspects and one with the
rational features (Euterpe, Melpomene, and Tersicor), the second
contains one neutral and one rational (Caliope and Cleo), while the third
contains two with an emphasis on the rational and one sensual (Herato,
Thelya, and Pollymyo). Furthermore, while the two are initially kept
separate, the concluding descriptions of Thelya and Wranya give a sense
of the powers of music and poetry as combining the rational and the
sensual. Thus, taken as a whole, these stanzas suggest the combination
of the intellectual and sensible powers in poetry and music. But
considered as a progressive sequence, they suggest the possibility of the
separation of these powers, and by placing an increasing importance on
the rational, they emphasise that it should not be forgotten and that
appreciation of the sensible ought to be combined with it. This is also
suggested by the marriage of Caliope to Phebus. While in the description
of the Muses, Caliope's allegiance to the sensible or the rational is left
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uncertain, this uncertainty is resolved by her marriage. Her initially
uncertain designation, however, implies the possibility that the music of
which she is mistress, the 'sweit licour' which Orpheus sucks from her
breast (1.70), need not necessarily be allied to reason but might remain
separate. In these respects, the poem's account of the muses suggests
that, to adapt the terms of the moralitas, the harp of eloquence might
sound without reason playing upon it.
The opening passages of the poem, then, express an awareness of
the possible dangers of poetry, and the terms in which this awareness is
expressed associate it with the early-medieval distrust of imaginative
writing. The division of poetry and music into sensual and rational
elements, and the concern that the balance between these might be be
lost (a concern on which the moralitas ofOrpheus explicitly focuses)
recalls the accusation that poetry rouses the passions. This evokes the
traditional concern over the risk that the sensible forms of language
might usurp a proper understanding of how their beauty and proportion
is based in a universal ratio which transcends their material disposition.
Henryson's sense of the dangerous aspects of imaginative writing is thus
based around the fear that the poetic text will come to be seen as the
arbiter of a meaning no longer grasped in its relation to prior truth, but
only as a contingent construct, divorced from any ideal origin.
This concern is continued in the Fables, where the determinative
influence of the poetic text is powerfully evoked. The difficulty which is
foregrounded in the imagery of the 'Prologue' appears in the fables
themselves as an interpretative conflict orientated around the problem of
whether or not a reading is consonant with the literal sense of the tale.
The strained relation between the letter of the text and the
interpretations adduced is accentuated through Henryson's use of the
binary tele/moralitas structure as it appears in 'The Trial of the Fox' and
'The Cock and the Jasp'. In these poems, the linear ordering of the
different layers of meaning is much less reassuring about the relation
between them than is the conventional layout of Scholastic commentary.
Henryson's structure establishes a dynamic pattern wherein audience
expectations are aroused, apparently satisfied within a settled reading
(and one which in both poems seems morally sound), and then
confounded. Such a pattern disorientatingly maximises on a hermeneutic
level the interpretative conflict produced by extreme disjunctions between
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text and allegorisation, and foregrounds the problems that such
disjunctions present to the understanding.
This maximisation is achieved by yet other means in 'The Cock and
the Jasp'. The effect of the ambiguity of'crous' in the first stanza,
discussed above, is to create an expectation that the moralitas may be in
some way sanctioned by the text, and to increase the confusion at the
disconsonance which still appears when more evidence of this is sought in
re-reading. Furthermore, comparing the fable to its source in Gualterus
Anglicus, one can see that this effect is one which Henryson's alterations
seem designed to produce. The fable is expanded from a bare ten lines in
Gualterus to ninety-seven lines in Henryson25. In the narrative, the
major additions are those passages about the careless maids and the
cock's panegyric to the jasp, which both reflect well on the bird. The
moralitas' interpretation is essentially the same in both writers, but
Gualterus' sparse telling of the story has nothing of the sympathetic
detail added by Henryson. The main effect of this expansion is thus to
emphasise the disjunction between narrative and moralitas, further
heightening the interpretative difficulties.
Henryson's maximisation of the conflict between different levels of
meaning thus markedly differs from the strategies of academic Scholastic
commentators, and represents a significant development from the outlook
of earlier theorists. Far from their assured containment of the disruptive
influence of poetic textuality within an affective framework, Henryson
stresses the determinative influence exerted by poetic language on the
level ofmeaning, and sets this in open conflict with any attempt to reduce
or transcend it. If, for Boccaccio, the failure to realise that poetic
meaning involves more than is contained in the fictional letter is a gross
misunderstanding of the obviously self-erasing nature of fiction, for
Henryson such misunderstanding has become a much more immanent
possibility.
5
Despite this more overtly suspicious attitude towards the poetic text,
Henryson still remains committed to the Scholastic model of literature.
25. For Gualterus' latin version, see Fox, ed., Poems, p.194.
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The moralitas of'The Trial of the Fox' states the priority which should
govern reading when it declares that the material of poetry is orientated
'to our leuing' (1.1102). This assertion shifts the grounds of interpretative
decision from a hesitation based on a hermeneutic concern over
consonance with the text, to one where selection is made according to the
moral requirements of a given reader. In 'The Cock and the Jasp', the
moralitas' injunction not to scorn wisdom reflects similarly on the
interpretative problem which has been posed. Both the narrative and the
moralitas suggest perfectly sound morals, with the former being a perfect
illustration of the point made in 'The Two Mice', that 'Quha has aneuch
of na mair hes he neid' (1.375). To dismiss either of them as wrong would
thus be to fall into precisely that error which the moralitas denounces.
According to the moralitas, the wisdom which the jasp represents
is 'perfite prudence and cunning' (1.128), the ability to govern one's
actions wisely through prudence, which, combining a knowledge of past,
present, and future, shadows the eternal and comprehensive divine
vision26. The mode ofvirtue recommended by the moralitas is thus one
which emphasises moral action based on a sense of the
comprehensiveness of the divine pattern and one's place within it. This
same emphasis is highly pertinent to the interpretative problem posed by
the fable, for it demands that in reading, as elsewhere, the priority in
judgement should be given to one's own moral circumstances. But the
conflict between the narrative and the moralitas and the desire to resolve
it leads one to lose sight of this priority. By inviting a resolution in
narrow hermeneutic terms it obstructs the perception that either of the
suggested morals may be judged as valid if considered in terms of their
utility for different readers.
'The Cock and the Jasp' thus operates in a manner similar to that
proposed by E.S. Newlyn, where the pattern is one of interpretative error
followed by the rectification of that error. But this is much more clearly
motivated than Newlyn's article suggests, operating on a meta-textual
level which directly addresses the morality of reading, and which is
highly appropriate for the first fable of the collection. Henryson leads his
audience into precisely that fault which he denounces in the moralitas,
and in doing so comments on the general principles which should govern
26. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, xlvii, 1, resp.
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particular interpretative decisions. He reinforces the ethical emphasis of
Scholastic literary theory by showing his audience the pertinence of his
moral to their own lives, indeed, to their own attitudes to exegesis,
forcefully illustrating the fact that reading should be accompanied by an
active process of self-examination leading to penitence and moral reform.
Reading thus becomes focused not on the text but on the moral
requirements of the world outside it: a world consisting of fallen beings of
manifold conditions, all of whom must achieve a perspective on the
perfect ordo within which they exist appropriate to their own position
within it. This demands a pluralistic approach to reading in which a text
yields up diverse levels of significance in order to address the varying
moral needs of different people. In this, Henryson expresses both a sense
of the necessary incompleteness of vision in a fallen world, where no
single viewpoint can be taken as the final word for all purposes, and a
sense that the limited significance which such vision furnishes is
validated by its participation in a totality ofWisdom which is revealed in
different aspects to different conditions of humanity. Thus, 'The Cock
and the Jasp' concludes with an injunction to the audience: 'Ga seik the
jasp, quha will, for thair it lay.' (1.161) Its precise location is left to them
to determine, according to their own ethical requirements.
This aspect of the Fables is clearly very much in line with the
strategies of Scholastic literary theory. In both there is a reduction of the
determinative influence of textuality within a framework in which poetry
mediates between an audience and a body of truth founded in an extra-
textual reality. Both tolerate a wide range of readings organised within
the broad constraints ofChristian doctrine and defined with reference to
a specific audience's moral condition. But it is important to note that in
sanctioning this approach, those disruptive forces which Henryson so
powerfully evokes in the act of reading always remain a constant threat,
just as in the moralitas of 'The Trial of the Fox' temptation 'daylie sagis
men of religiounis, / Cryand to thame, "Cum to the warld agane!"'
(11.1134-35). The 'thochtis vane' (1.1133) which daily besiege religious
people are like the temptation to read in exclusive hermeneutic terms and
so to reject one of the morally sound readings. The force of the desire to
look back to the letter of the text and so to lose sight of the true basis and
end ofmeaning is thus an immanent concern.
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For Henryson, the danger that the understanding will become
engrossed by the text in a manner which problematises the relation of
meaning to prior truths is not something which is adequately countered
by any self-erasing effect of fictionality, or which can be contained by a
modifying interplay between simultaneously registered levels of meaning.
Instead, Henryson greatly increases the reflexive references to the text's
significative structure and to the reading process which are implicit in
both of these conventional Scholastic approaches. In Henryson's work, a
correct sense of the relation between poetic language and meaning can
only be arrived at by first evoking, and then revealing as erroneous, an
approach to interpretation wherein the determinative influence of the
text exerts a powerful influence on reading. So incumbent is the risk of
error on this level that it must constantly be recalled in order for a
morally appropriate reading to be successfully attained.
Henryson's open engagement with the problems which poetry
poses for any view which seeks to maintain the ideality ofmeaning
suggests a much stronger and more explicit sense of the dangers of
imaginative writing than was evident in his Scholastic precursors. The
assured containment which they had established is replaced with a much
more vigilant approach which clearly delineates the risks in order to
supervise them more efficiently. Accordingly, as we see in 'The Cock and
the Jasp', the emphasis on the positive value of poetry is qualified by the
evoking of its potential hazards. Henryson's view of poetry as a
conjunction of utility and threat thus appears as a modification of
Scholastic literary theory: a modification which recognises a renewed
impetus for poetic language to transgress the limits of its assigned
instrumental function within such theory, and which seeks to counter
this while preserving the essence of the Scholastic framework.
6
The Fables, however, is a complex work encompassing a range of differing
and vying attitudes. Ifmany aspects of Henryson's manipulation of the
narrative/moralitas structure continue the fundamental concerns and
strategies of Scholastic literary theory, other aspects nevertheless suggest
a more radical departure. Taking 'The Cock and the Jasp' as an example,
I have sought to illustrate the extent to which it draws on the
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fundamental Scholastic attitudes towards literature. Yet, given this, we
are still left with that awkward stanza of 11.120-126, which poses some
rather more difficult problems. The stanza is at odds with the general
tenor of the moralitas, which describes the figural significance of the
fable, rather than adding details to the narrative. Nor does it belong with
the narrative section of the fable since the preceding stanza announces
the intention to move on to the 'inward sentence and intent1 of the fable
(1.117).
This uncertainty is reflected in the manuscript tradition. The
Bannatyne manuscript places the stanza in the moralitas, while the other
manuscripts have it as the final stanza of the tale27. The stanza also
seems incomplete and ill-conceived, announcing that the jewel has seven
properties without clearly delineating these, and in fact only outlining
five. Of these, protection from fire and accidents hardly seems to add
anything to preservation from 'cacis perrillous'. Moreover, the praise of
the colours of the jewel (1.121) seems rather lame, coming as it does only
two stanzas after the cock's reasoned rejection of such frivolous concerns
(11.100-1). It is probably not a scribal interpolation, since it is stylistically
and verbally Henrysonian. Denton Fox has remarked that 'it seems very
possible that it is a fragment which Henryson intended to cancel or
rewrite'28. No doubt. But it expresses a significant hesitation in the
transition into the moralitas.
The stanza seeks to base its negative reading of the cock's actions
on the literal sense of the narrative, asserting that he fails to recognise
certain material benefits which the jasp could have for him. But that this
assertion should be located after the narrative section has ended, poised
awkwardly between it and the moralitas, suggests some discomfort with
the moralitas' assessment of the fable, and implies a recognition of the
greater validity of the cock's interpretation of events. It is as though at
the moment of transition to a moralising exegesis the need is felt to make
the moral correspond to the fictional details of the narrative by adding
new information which will undermine the cock's perspective. These
features of the stanza imply a dissatisfaction with the disparity between
the tale's presentation of the cock and the figural reading offered in the
rest of the moralitas.
27. See Fox, ed., Poems, pp.197-98.
28. Ibid., p.198.
127
At the same time, the stanza's incomplete state and the
uncertainty with which it is situated in the poem, belonging neither to
the tale nor to the moralitas (which develops in an altogether different
direction as it analyses the figural rather than magical and material
significance of the stone), suggest a discomfort with this gesture of
reconciliation between tale and moralitas. Thus, in this stanza, and at
the decisive interpretative moment of the first fable, the poem hovers
uncertainly between the desire to derive a reading which is consonant
with the specific fictional framework of the narrative and a sense that
interpretation should not be limited by such merely textual constraints.
This tension recurs in varying forms throughout the Fables. If
Henryson seeks to reassert and bolster Scholastic attitudes towards the
literary text, he also registers a sense that such attitudes are increasingly
unsustainable and that other approaches to interpretation may be
required. This sense is most notably manifested in those fables where the
narrative and the moralitas not only differ, but actually appear to
contradict each other. 'The Two Mice' is a good example of this. In the
tale, there is a pathetic emphasis on the poverty of the country mouse,
who 'in to the wynter tyde / Had hunger, cauld, and tholit grit distres'
(11.169-70). In the light of this her attempt to better her circumstances
appears understandable and justified. The moralitas, however, sees this
attempt as pure folly and from the mouse's example goes on to condemn
'wantoun man that vsis for to feid / Thy wambe, and makis it a god to be'
(11.381-2), recommending instead that one should sit by one's 'awin fyre,
thocht it be hot ane gleid' (1.389), since 'Quha hes aneuch, of na mair hes
he neid' (1.375).
This fable is one where E.H. Tolliver's view might provide a
convincing account, seeing the sympathy/judgement dichotomy as
contained within an ironic structure of attitudes which, comprehending
both sides of the dichotomy, recognises both the necessity and limitations
of each of them. This argument is strengthened by some of John
MacQueen's observations on the fable. The statements that the country
mouse lives 'as owtlawis dois' (1.168), and that her dwelling is 'Withoutin
fyre or candill birnand bricht, / For commonly sic pykeris luffis not lycht'
(11.202-3), suggests that the mice have certain moral shortcomings. The
cat's toying with the country mouse is recounted in terms which recall
medieval descriptions of the wheel of Fortune: 'Fra fute to fute he kest hir
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to and fra, / Quhylis vp, quhylis doun, als tait as ony kid1 (11.330-331).
This brings to mind the Boethian emphasis that concern over earthly
pleasure subjects one to the whims of fortune, which can only be escaped
by placing one's happiness in God, implying that the country mouse
makes precisely such an error. The lines 'Without God speid thair
harbery wes tane' (1.101), and 'Withouttin grace thay wesche and went to
meit' (1.107) further indicates the mice's lack of spiritual values in their
concentration on material concerns. All these aspects of the fable can be
seen to prepare us for the moralitas' judgement29. The tale could thus be
argued to entail both a sympathy for the mice and an awareness of the
limitations of their materialistic concerns which allows for a sense of the
need for reform.
Further analysis seems to strengthen this reading. The moral
flaws of the mice suggested by the elements of the tale noted by
MacQueen are condemned in the moralitas in terms which attack the
idolatry ofmaterialism, and remind one of the instability of earthly
pleasure:
O wantoun man that vsis for to feid
Thy wambe, and makis it a god to be;
Luke to thy self, I warne the weill on deid.
The cat cummis and to the mous hes ee;
What is avale thy feist and royaltie,
With dreidfull hart and tribulatioun?
(11.381-6)
John MacQueen points out that this passage recalls Phillipians 3, 8-19:
'For many walk, of whom I have told you [...], that they are the enemies of
the cross of Christ: whose end is destruction, whose god is their belly, and
whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things.'30 One thinks
also of the parable of the rich fool in Luke 12, 16-21. But the passage
also recalls Boethius' De Consolatione Philosphiae in emphasising the
instability of earthly pleasure (a point also made in the first stanza of the
moralitas-. 'As fitchis myngit ar with nobill seid, / Swa intermellit is
aduersitie / With eirdlie joy, swa that na state is frie / Without trubill or
sum vexatioun [...]' (11.367-70)), and stressing that to place so much store
by such pleasure as to seek more of it can only increase the uncertainty
29. MacQueen, Robert Henryson, pp.122-27.
30. Ibid. p.126.
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and unhappiness of one's existence. Thus, in the De Consolatione, Dame
Philosophy asserts that
Anxia enim res est humanorum condicio bonorum et quae vel
numquam perpetua subsistat. [...] Quam multis amaritudinibus
humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa est! Quae si etiam fruenti
iucunda esse videatur, tamen quo minus cum velit abeat retineri
non possit. Liquet igitur quam sit mortalium rerum misera
beatitudo quae nec apud aequanimos perpetua perdurat nec anxios
tota delectat. [...] Manifestum est quoniam ad beatitudinem
percipiendem fortunae instabilitas adspirare non possit.31
The concomitant futility and self-defeating nature of the quest for
material happiness is later expanded on in terms most pertinent to 'The
Two Mice':
Quid autem tanto fortunae strepitu desiseratis? Fugare credo
indigentiam copia quaeritis. Atqui hoc vobis in contrarium cedit.
Pluribus quippe adminiculis opus est ad tuendam pretiosae
supellectilis varietatem, verumque illud est permultis eos indigere
qui abundantiam suam naturae necessitate non ambitus
superfluitate metiantur.
(Ibid., Bk II, Prose v, p.204)
The Boethian nature of the moral is also indicated by the final
stanza of the tale which tells of the country mouse's return to her home:
[...] I hard say scho passit to hir den,
Als warme as woll, suppose it wes not greit,
Full beinly stuffit, baith but and ben,
Off peis and nuttis, beinis ry, and quheit;
Quhen euer scho list scho had aneuch to eit,
In quyet and eis withoutin ony dreid [...].
(11.358-63)
This shift from feelings of hardship to a sense of satisfaction in sufficiency
suggests a change in perspective both on the mouse's part and on that of
the narrator. The priorities have changed from the mouse valuing the
increase ofmaterial pleasure as a means to happiness and the narrator
sympathising with and apparently supporting her aspirations, to both
recognising that this only leads to more unhappiness. To reject the
attractions of wealth and make do with a sufficiency, small though it may
be, produces a security which the instability of earthly goods cannot.
This change of priorities recalls Boethius' argument that while the
ultimate end desired by all is the good, those who seek it in material
31. Boethius, Tractates; De Consolatione Philosophiae, tr. H.F. Stewart, E.K.
Rand, S.J. Tester (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1973), II, iv, pp.192-96.
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things have mistakenly identified this final good which is only found in
God, and thus thwart their own desire. Hence Boethius can state that
despite any material prosperity which may come to the wicked, evil is its
own punishment:
[...] veramque illam Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod
desiderent facere posse sapientes, improbos vero exercere quidem
quod libeat, quod vero desiderent explere non posse. Faciunt enim
quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id bonum quod
desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam
ad beatidudinem probra non veniunt.
(.De Cons., Bk IV, Prose ii, p.328)
The mouse discovers that happiness does not lie where she had sought it,
and that she was mistaken not to have found it in her original condition.
The narrator's earlier description of the misery of the country
mouse's life, with the sympathy for her aspirations which its emphasis on
her hardship implies, thus appears to express support for a perception of
her condition which turns out to be erroneous in the light of the tale's
outcome. But this need not necessarily suggest that the narrator's initial
sympathetic view is simply wrong or that he holds two heterogeneous
views: if the mouse's dissatisfaction with her poor condition is wrong, the
sympathy with which that dissatisfaction is viewed is not obviated. The
fact that the mouse cannot put her poor condition in a proper perspective
until she can compare it with direct experience of a wealthy life makes
her error seem almost unavoidable. The moralitas' condemnation of her
actions is thus offset by an awareness in the narrative that they stem
from an ignorance produced by the constraints on her knowledge, rather
than from vice. Given this consideration, the sympathetic view of the
mouse's aspirations is necessary if one is to take account of the difficulty
involved in acting morally when guided by the weak vision available in a
fallen world. It is thus an appropriate counterpoise and complement to
the judgemental emphasis on the need for moral reform. This balance
produces a moral fable which both stresses the urgency of such reform
and alerts its audience to the need for extreme discernment in the face of
obstacles which could mislead even the most well-intentioned.
This reading would accord with Tolliver's view that apparently
conflicting perspectives are harmonised through Henryson's ironic
manipulation of the fable structure. But satisfying as such a reading
appears, the fable is in fact more complex than it suggests. The final
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stanza which tells of the mouse's new-found contentment is reported
indirectly, with the narrator disclaiming any direct knowledge of her fate
upon leaving the town:
Quhen scho wes furth and fre scho wes full fane,
And merilie markit vnto the mure;
I cannot tell how eftirwart scho fure,
But I hard say scho passit to hir den [...].
(11.355-58)
By assigning it the status of hearsay, as opposed to the direct reporting of
the rest of the tale, Henryson distances us from the only part of the
narrative which supports the moralitas' assertion that the happiest life is
'sickernes, with small possessioun' (1.380), making us much less certain of
the validity of its apparently neat resolution of the story. Furthermore,
the close juxtaposition of the mouse's leaving town 'full fane' and 'merilie'
with the statement 'I cannot tell how eftirwart scho fure' raises the
possibility that her merriness may not have continued for long. In
suggesting that the mouse's misery may continue despite what she has
learned from her experience, these aspects of the tale indicate that the
sense of hunger and distress which motivates her actions is more than
merely a materialistic delusion. Rather, the dismissal of such concerns as
being merely delusory appears as narrow and reductive, failing to
understand or engage with significant aspects of reality.
Rather than harmoniously comprehending different views of the
mouse, then, the fable embodies two judgemental perspectives which sit
much less easily together. The moralitas roundly condemns the mouse's
attempt to better her circumstances, couching its execration in terms that
identify the desire for material good with a disruption ofmoral order in
which the pleasures of the world usurp the position due to God: 'wantoun
man that vsis for to feid / Thy wambe, and makis it a god to be' (11.381-2).
In this the moralitas constructs the significance of the mouse's actions in
relation to a fixed moral system wherein the pursuit ofmaterial pleasure
is condemned a priori. The elements of the tale which challenge the
moralitas' assessment of the mouse suggest that such privileging of a
priori values as the prime determinant of moral judgement is reductive,
failing to take account of the complexities which attend human actions in
their particular temporal settings. In this, the tale invites a more flexible
vision in which judgement is not merely balanced with a sympathetic
attention to the temporal circumstances which circumscribe moral
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actions, but is actually tempered with and shaped by the consideration of
such factors. Rather than existing in a complementary relationship,
these perspectives tend to displace one other, as the differing priorities of
each make the other's perspective unsustainable. If one wishes to
support the moralitas in maintaining the precepts of the moral law as the
key criterion ofjudgement, one must abandon the tale's focus on those
material considerations which invite a different assessment. If one
wishes to endorse the tale's sympathetic attention to the circumstances
which constrain the mouse's perceptions and actions, one must abandon
the moralitas' focus on ideal moral principles, as the tale denies these any
evaluative power in application to actual situations.
This of course states the opposition between the two parts of the
fable too boldly. The differing attitudes are interfused and in tension
throughout. The moralitas' insistence that 'Of eirdly ioy it beiris maist
degre, / Blythines in hart, with small possessioun' (11.395-96) suggests a
desire to comfortably harmonise a conformity to absolute values with the
material outcome of such conformity. Simple harmony of this sort,
however, is not forthcoming from such an ethical system. Boethius, for
instance, argues that virtue is its own reward and that despite any
misery which may befall, a person achieves happiness in simply being
good: 'Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit praemium, ita improbis nequitia
ipsa supplicium est.' (De Cons., Bk IV, Prose iii, p.333). Happiness is
thus seen to lie in spiritual disposition, regardless ofmaterial
circumstance. Furthermore, when addressing the effects ofmaterial
fortune on the good and the bad he has Dame Philosophy state that
'Omnem [...] bonam prorsus esse fortunam' (Bk IV, Prose vii, p.374) and
argues from mystery and faith to justify this:
[...] neque enim fas est homini cunctas divinae operae machinas vel
ingenio comprehendere vel explicare sermone. Hoc tantum
perspexisse sufficiat, quod naturarum omnium proditor deus idem
ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat [...].
(Bk IV, Prose vi, p.370)
All things are seen to tend towards the good as parts of the divine plan,
and even those things which lead to material misery are good in terms of
this ordo, albeit in ways which we may not understand.
In thus defining the good in terms of a spiritual telos, Boethius
effectively discounts consideration ofmaterial circumstance from any
essential role in ethical judgement. Earthly misery is to be accepted as
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ultimately tending towards a realisation of a transcendent spiritual
happiness. This set of ethical priorities is the same as that interrogated
by Chaucer in The Clerk's Tale, where Griselda's complete embodiment of
the abstract virtue of patience risks permitting her husband to harm
others uncontested. Her virtue is one which takes no account of its
material consequences, but which is simply defined in terms of its
consonance with an ideal value32. Henryson's moralitas, however, in so
pointedly ignoring the possibility that the country mouse's virtue may
lead to continued unhappiness, appears unable to countenance such
disconsonance between abstract virtue and material effect. In this, even
as the moralitas affirms its moral stance, it simultaneously implies a
discomfort with the possible consequences of its unyielding nature.
The tale shows a similar complexity of viewpoint. The references
to the lax praying habits of the mice, and the description of them as
'pykeris' who 'luffis not lycht' (1.203) (recalling John 3:20, 'For every one
that doth evil hateth the light'), imply a sense of their immorality and
need for reform, even as the other aspects of the tale mentioned above
express a dissatisfaction with any simple moralising judgement of their
actions. The fable as a whole thus expresses an anxiety, caught as it is
between a sense of the urgent need for moral reform (the urgency being
emphasised by the imminent threat of death represented by the cat), and
a discontent with the mode and criteria of judgement according to which
such reform is to be achieved.
With regard to Henryson's manipulation of the tale/moralitas
relation, it is clear that the structure is more complex than suggested in
those accounts in which the two sections are made to neatly embody
different attitudes, be they sympathy and judgement, or error and truth.
Here, while the conflict of moral attitudes is made most apparent through
the different emphases of tale and moralitas, a close analysis reveals that
these attitudes are much more closely intertwined, with the tension
between them implicit in both parts of the fable. This highlights the fact
that one should be careful of resolving these tensions too easily, whether
it be by privileging tale or moralitas, or by seeking to harmonise them.
The intermingled nature of the different attitudes suggests that the
relationship between them is much more unsettled than even in Tolliver's
32. Chaucer, The Clerk's Tale, CT, IV, 57-1212, (pp.138-53).
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view, where different attitudes are seen to coexist as alternative
perspectives which indicate each other's inadequacy as a total viewpoint,
while nevertheless remaining adequate in their own way. The close
intertwining of the sympathetic and judgemental perspectives means that
neither one is ever asserted without the other threatening to displace it.
Far from being harmonised within a framework which delimits a
different valid ground for each of them, the differing attitudes encroach
forcefully on each other's territory. This ultimately leaves an impression
of doubt over the validity of either, rather than the sense of the relative
adequacy of each which is essential to Tolliver's argument.
The nature of the moral tensions expressed in 'The Two Mice' is
highly pertinent to Henryson's attitudes towards literary exegesis. We
have already seen in 'The Cock and the Jasp' how Henryson draws a
relation between the act of reading and the virtue of prudence. Prudence
involves the intellectual comprehension of past, present and future so as
to assimilate them to a singular moral essence and comprehend the
resonances of specific actions within the frame of universal ethical
principles. Thus, in the words of Aquinas, among the moral virtues
'prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus' (ST, II-I, q.61, art.2,
obj.l), as it is the means by which an abstract moral idea can be most
fully actualised, and the particular raised to the level of the universal.
This valorisation of prudence tends, as in Boethius' thought, to locate the
ultimate ground of ethical judgement in a priori principles. 'The Two
Mice', in presenting a crisis of moral epistemology initiated by a sense of
the lack of correlation between the universal and particular dimensions of
reality, thus also presents a crisis of literary signification and
interpretation. The uncertainty and indirectness which characterises the
relation between individual things and universal natures severly impedes
the capacity of the literary text to maintain the ideality of its reference
while effectively relating meaning to actual circumstances. The
interpretative tensions in the fable are thus structured by Henryson's
attempts to find a mode of representation which can fulfil both of the
requirements laid down by Scholastic literary theory in a context where
the two are no longer necessarily compatible.
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The strength of the privilege afforded to moral quiddities in medieval
ethics, and, by extension, in medieval literary theory, is clear from its
presence in the thought of Aquinas. In his ethical writings Aquinas
assigns the consideration of the particularising elements of an action an
important place in moral judgement:
In actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest. Una
quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum
habet de actione et entitate tantum habet de bonitate [...]. Alia vero
secundum speciem, quia accepitur secundum obiectum conveniens.
Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia
quaedam. Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum
habitudinem ad bonitas causam.
(ST, II-I, q.xviii, art.4, resp.)
I presume that by the genus of an act Aquinas here means its
classification as either evil or virtue, while species certainly refers to the
precise category of vice or virtue under which the act falls: ie., evil is the
genus of the species theft, just as animal is the genus of the species
man33. The 'obiectum' (object) of which he speaks specifies the kind of
action being carried out, such as taking another's property, which places
the action in the species of theft and therefore in the general category of
evil (ibid., art.2, resp.). The end of an action is, quite simply, the purpose
for which it is carried out (ibid., art.4). The circumstances seem to be the
particularities of its context, so that while to take another's property
implies a general object which is classified within the species of theft, the
fact that the property belongs not just to someone else, but to a specific
person falls under a consideration of circumstances (ibid., art. 10, resp.).
Aquinas' sense of the importance of the particular context of an action is
indicated by his assertion that in order for an act to be absolutely good it
is necessary that it be good in all four ways (ibid., art.4, resp.).
Furthermore, this schema allows for a complex interplay of these
different areas so as to permit different modifications of ethical
judgement. Aquinas cites the example of someone committing theft in
order to give to the poor (ibid., obj.3), thus making the act evil with
33. Aquinas himself is not very clear on this point. He never expressly states
exactly what he considers as the genus of an act, and while in the passage just cited he
distinguishes it from species, elsewhere he uses it as a synonym for species (eg. ST, II-I,
q.18, art.2, resp.).
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regard to its object and good with regard to its end. In assessing this case
he argues that 'nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum
bonitatum deesse aliam' (ibid., ad.3). While deficiency in any one area is
enough to classify an act as evil, since evil is seen as a deficiency in
goodness (ibid., art.l, resp.), it is so to a lesser degree than an act which
is lacking in more than one of these areas. It seems then that the
intended end of an act can ameliorate an action.
In his discussion of circumstances Aquinas also argues that these
have an important role in the assessment of the goodness or evil of an act,
citing two ways in which they are significant. The first of these is that
circumstances affect the determination of the species of the act (ibid.,
art. 10). For example, when someone takes another's property the fact
that this property belongs to one particular person and not another places
the act in the category of theft, even though the fact is wholly contingent
(ibid., resp.). To expand a little: for Aquinas, the principle of property is
in accord with universal reason (ibid.). But while this means that
possession always has a universal element to it, the fact that a specific
person should own a particular thing is in itself circumstantial. Yet it
can be a fundamental consideration in moral judgement.
Secondly, Aquinas argues that consideration of circumstance can
aggravate or diminish the goodness or evil of an act without affecting its
species. Thus, in a theft the amount stolen has no effect on the
classification of the act as theft, but does reflect on the evil of the act and
the amount of blame apportioned (ibid., art. 11). In both of these
instances, Aquinas' careful consideration of particular circumstances is
typical of the general tendency of his thought, which preserves the
priority of the absolute while maintaining a flexibility which can
encompass the manifold conditions of secular life. The same tendency is
observable in Alexander of Hales' view of the Bible as employing diverse
modi or styles in order to make the one truth accessible to people of
different conditions to whom it manifests itself in different ways.
But it is important to note that just as Alexander's appreciation of
stylistic variation in the Bible is ultimately founded on a sense of a
singular truth which ultimately transcends its different textual
formulations and retains its governance of their meanings, so too Aquinas
considers the particularising elements of moral actions as having a
definitive or modificatory rather than determinative role in shaping the
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significance of human actions. Hence, an act's attending circumstances
and its end are never the originating cause of its evil or virtue.
Circumstances may influence the relation between a given action and its
universal species, altering its degree of virtue, or placing it under one
category of good or evil rather than another. But it is these prior
categories, established in accordance with the dictates of the natural law,
which are the prime determinant of the value attached to human
actions34. The same holds true for the end. The ameliorative effect of a
good intended end on an action which is evil with regard to its object is
ascribed to the fact that this end places the act under another moral
species (in the above instance charity) in addition to that of theft35.
Again, it is only in terms of its resonance within this prior category that
the virtue or evil of the act is determined. Furthermore, Aquinas'
assertion that a deficiency of good in one of the four areas he takes into
consideration is sufficient to classify an act as evil also implies this same
privileging ofmoral essences. It indicates that the classification
ultimately depends on the relation of an act to virtue as its genus. Its
relation to the prior category is the sole determinant of the judgement as
to whether it is good or evil. The particularising elements which
circumscribe the individual action can only define or modify the act's
relation to such categories. Thus, theft is judged as wicked not because of
its effect on the victim but because, as a breach of the universal principle
of property, 'repugnat rationi' (q.18, art.11, resp.). In short, whether an
act be judged good or evil is wholly determined by its relation to prior
ethical categories defined by a universal order of reason.
Prudence, then, is the central moral virtue precisely because it is
the means of clearly perceiving this relation, drawing past, present, and
future (prior example, immediate circumstances, and ensuing
consequences) together to reveal an act's singular moral essence and
ultimately enabling the assimilation of the particular to the universal.
The same structure operates in the Scholastic approach to reading, where
the text mediates between its audience and a morally appropriate
sententia, allowing the readers to fix this sententia in their memory and
34. See ST, I-II, xciv, 3, resp.
35. On the possibility of an act having diverse species see ST, II-I, xviii, vii.
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assimilate it to their present conditions, from where it can serve as a
guide for future action36.
'The Two Mice1, however, problematises the privileging of ideal
values in a way which disrupts the operation of prudence both in its
ethical and in its literary modes, the two ofwhich are here so closely
intertwined as to be inseparable. The prudential mode ofmoral
judgement which assimilates the particular to the universal is also a
mode of textual exposition, and the fable's dissatisfaction with idealising
moral judgement thus also applies to idealising exegesis. Both are seen
to involve a privileging of universal values which leaves them unable to
address those significant material dimensions of the country mouse's
actions which, if not exactly vindicating them, at least preclude any
simple assessment of them as right or wrong. In this respect, the
problems which the poem raises about the lack of congruence between the
exigencies of particular existence and the dictates of universal laws
exceed even the capacity of an ethical system as flexible as that of
Aquinas. Aquinas could certainly allow for the mouse's circumstances as
ameliorating her actions and minimising the condemnation to which they
are subject. But in the fable the circumstances actually challenge the
classification of those actions as evil. In foregrounding the exclusions on
which the moralitas bases its judgement, the fable suggests that the a
priori categorisation by which her behaviour is evaluated as wicked
ultimately fails to give an adequate account of those aspects of secular life
which give legitimacy to her actions and which lead one to rebut any
negative judgement on them.
This ethical problem ultimately reflects upon the moral utility of
Scholastic exegesis. In the moralitas of the fable the poor are directly
addressed as the audience towards whom the moral is directed: 'Thy awin
fyre, freind, thocht it be bot ane gleid, / It warmis weill, and is worth gold
to the [...].' In this the fable declares its aim of addressing the
circumstances of a particular audience, in accordance with the affective
requirement of Scholastic literary theory. The moralitas claims a
universal application which is as relevant to the lives of the real poor as it
is to that of the mouse in the fable. But the tale's foregrounding of the
36. See, for instance Barbour's Bruce, XX, 621-30, (Vol.Ill) where the poem is
presented as putting the example of the great men of the past in memory for present
readers in order to raise their future conduct once more to this superlative level.
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exclusions which the moralitas must make in order not to compromise the
authority of its judgement places the legitimacy of this claim of relevance
in serious doubt.
In this, the fable's critique of the weak particular application of the
moralitas' perspective demonstrates the extent to which the increasing
sense of disparity between universals and particulars in the later Middle
Ages has exacerbated the tension between the idealising and affective
aspects of Scholastic literary theory. The moralitas' exclusion of
significant dimensions of the life of the poor, its counting as illusory
urgent material concerns which the tale suggests to be all too real, is an
instance of bad judgement. Judgement here is used in its rhetorical sense
where it designates a clear discernment of the nature and needs of the
particular audience being addressed so as to properly orientate what is
being said towards them37. Since a stress on the ethical function of
literature as addressing itself to the lives of specific audiences in order to
incline them towards virtuous action is essential to Scholastic literary
theory, the moralitas is being indicted according to criteria laid down by
the affective axis of that theory. Moreover, the moralitas' failure to
adequately relate its sententia to the actual circumstances which it seeks
to address is directly associated with the incapacity of an a priori ethics
to adequately address the problems of contingent existence. The
moralitas' privileging of simple universal precepts as its criteria of
judgement means that it is incapable of attending to the ways in which
actions take on significances in the here and now which are independent
and divergent from any absolute qualities which might be attached to
them, and which may tend, indeed, to rebut the ascription of such
qualities. In effect, the idealising priority of Scholastic literary theory is
actually being challenged in this fable in terms derived from that same
theory, being viewed as an obstacle to the proper fulfilment of its affective
imperative.
It seems, then, that what is required is a mode of poetic
signification which, rather than prioritising the universal over the
particular, will more directly invoke the contingent complexities of actual
circumstances and relate meaning more closely to them. That Henryson
does indeed move towards such a mode is implied in the parallel drawn in
37. See Ake Bergvall, The Enabling ofJudgement (Uppsala: University of
Upsalla Press, 1989), p.29.
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'The Two Mice' between the lives of the audience and that of the country
mouse, each having a greater complexity than the moralitas allows. The
parallel complexity suggests the possibility of a mode ofwriting and of
exegesis which, rather than assessing actions or beliefs in terms of their
absolute resonance within a static system of values, will instead examine
their significance within a dynamic network of particular relationships
established on the level of plot. The implication is that this dynamism is
a more accurate reflection of the complexity of actual life and can more
fully account for the resonances which actions accrue in their temporal
contexts, the importance ofwhich the allegorical and exemplative modes
tend to exclude or minimise. In ethical terms, this literary mode usurps
the privilege of an ideal moral essence as the main criterion ofjudgement.
It instead prioritises the particular ramifications of different actions and
beliefs, looking to local context rather than eternal verities as the arbiter
ofmeaning.
But while the tensions in 'The Two Mice' suggest that such a mode
is attractive to Henryson, the fable also suggests a strong discomfort with
its more particularising emphasis. This is most obviously indicated by
those elements of the tale which, in suggesting a sense of the moral
shortcomings of the mice, anticipate the view of the moralitas and
express a need for its perspective. But the discomfort is manifested even
in those aspects of the tale which undermine the moralitas' viewpoint. I
have already observed that in foregrounding in its final stanzas the
contrived nature of the conclusion and the possibilities excluded by the
moralitas, the tale precludes any simple judgement on the country
mouse's action without exactly vindicating it. If the mouse continues
unhappy in her poor condition, as the final stanzas suggest she may well
do, then her dissatisfaction cannot be condemned as a false perspective.
Her misery appears irreducible, despite the awareness that wealth brings
its own discomforts.
But this same awareness of the problems of wealth means that one
cannot praise her action either. The hardships which have to be endured
are presented as a universal quality of existence. The town mouse is
prepared to tolerate the danger presented by the cat in order to have
plenty, while the country mouse finds the tribulations of poverty less
debilitating. The tale's close consideration of the circumstances which
circumscribe the mice's actions, in displacing any absolute bases of
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judgement, means that there are no stable terms whereby these choices
can be seen as meaningful. The significance of an action or belief can
only be assessed on pragmatic grounds, according to a particular set of
interests: the town mouse and the country mouse can each consider their
own choices the wisest. In both cases the judgement is based not on any
essential quality inherent in their actions or convictions but only in their
perceptions of where their own best interests lie. Both their choices seem
equally legitimate and equally meaningless.
In this we see Henryson's difficulty with literalistic interpretations
which makes the text the arbiter ofmeaning. The prioritisation of the
details of the poetic text foregrounds the fact that whatever meaning is
drawn from it is contingently constructed, rather than given. This
certainly has the virtue of allowing meaning to be closely related to the
circumstances for which it declares itself valid. But divorced from any
stable authorising centre it will also appear merely as the product of a
particular viewpoint, predicated only on pragmatic grounds which reflect
a set of interests at stake in the circumstances in question, and bearing
no relation to any stable truth which transcends them. The subjection of
literary signification to the constraints of the letter produces the same
disruption of authority as is effected in the field of ethical judgement by
the prioritisation of local circumstance, undermining any sense of a stable
ground which can validate meaning. Thus the implications of the tale in
this fable lead to what seems to appear to Henryson as a rather nihilistic
relativism, indicated in the futility of the choices open to the mice. The
literalistic mode of reading which the tale demands as a counter to the
moralitas' transcendence of its particularising details localises meaning
to a degree which leaves no fixed position for judgement. Accordingly, no
assessment of the depicted events can be seen as more than a
fundamentally arbitrary construction of them: in place of the moralitas'
unbending conviction the tale is only able to offer a negative gesture of
despair.
In this respect, 'The Two Mice1 calls into question the diffraction of
unified meaning which the affective emphasis of Scholastic literary
theory demands if the varying contingencies of diverse circumstances are
to be adequately addressed. Henryson expresses a concern that an overly
close relation of sententia to circumstance deprives meaning not only of
any universal basis and normative application, but also of any
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substantial relation to particular realities, whose lack of inherent value
infects all judgements that are predicated of them with an enervating
arbitrariness. In this, the fable reaffirms a sense that the moralitas'
idealising mode ofjudgement is indispensable if our actions and beliefs
are to be valued as anything more than a facade raised against the
underlying futility and emptiness of existence38.
The issues raised in 'The Two Mice' cast light on the modification
of Scholastic literary theory which appears in 'The Cock and the Jasp'
and 'The Trial of the Fox'. The sense in these fables of the strong
temptation exerted by the poetic text, which leads to their increased
vigilance as to the dangers of poetry, is symptomatic of a sense that
Scholastic exegesis inadequately addresses the problems of its audience.
This sense of inadequacy leads to a desire for an alternative mode of
representation and reading which can more fully encompass and address
the complex particulars ofworldly life. But this desire is offset by an
awareness of the destabilisation ofmeaning which this desired mode
produces. This leads to a reassertion of traditional Scholastic protocols in
a form acutely sensitive to such temptations, and which aims to reassert
strongly the relevance of these interpretative procedures to the particular
moral circumstances of its audience. But the final stanza of the narrative
section of'The Cock and the Jasp', in embodying both a desire to draw a
relation of consonance between text and interpretation and a discomfort
with that desire, suggests the tenacity of the contrary impulse and
implies a hesitation as to the adequacy of either course.
The aspects of the disjunctive patterning of the Fables which have
been discussed above demonstrate the extent to which the late-medieval
sense of the incommensurability of universals and particulars throws the
Scholastic model of literature into crisis. The tensions and
discontinuities which characterise the relation between the letter of the
text and the moralitas are far from the unremarkable deployment of
familiar conventions which Phillipa Bright argues them to be. Rather,
they are symptomatic of a general breach between the simple imperatives
of a universal moral order and the complexities of contingent existence
38. See Steven R. McKenna, 'The Consolation of Myth in Henryson's Fables',
Studies in Scottish Literature, 26 (1991), 490-502. McKenna argues that the Fables
expresses a strong sense of existential crisis in the tales which leads to the moralitates'
assertion of moral law to maintain some sense of an order in life.
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which casts the idealising and affective axes of Scholastic literary theory
into a relationship of antagonism. This effectively undermines the
capacity of Scholasticism's idealising heuristic interpretative method to
achieve the ethical end which is set for it.
Henryson's deep committment to the Scholastic vision of literature
thus actually prevents him from unproblematically deploying its
conventional interpretative protocols and models of signification: these
are no longer felt to be adequate to fulfil the twin imperatives of
Scholasticism which Henryson takes so seriously. The mutual
destabilisation which is effected by the interference between the
universalising and particularising perspectives of 'The Two Mice'
demonstrates the disruptive effect of the resultant crisis of
representation. The understanding is left poised uncertainly between
two mutually incompatible perspectives, both ofwhich yield up images of
reality whose reference is oblique and whose evaluatory authority is
inadequate. The fable thus testifies to the urgent necessity and extreme
difficulty of finding a mode of representation which can bridge the gap
between them. The necessity of this project spurns Henryson to
experiment, developing alternative modes of signification and subjecting
the traditional resources of Scholastic literary theory to modification; the
difficulty prevents him from settling on any one mode of signification as
being able to retain the authority of the absolute while still being able to
address the complexities of temporal existence.
In the next chapter I shall examine the ways in which Henryson, in
attempting to resolve the problems which he faces, inaugurates new
perceptions of authorship and of literary signification. While, as we shall
see, the concepts which he develops are often considered characteristic of
the thought of later periods, and frequently conceived as being opposed to
Scholastic values, an analysis of their function in Henryson's work will
show that they do not simply emerge as a reaction to Scholasticism.
Rather, they appear in Henryson's work as part of a modification of
Scholastic thought on literature, and have a different set of resonances
within Scholasticism from that which they have when utilised in later
contexts. Henryson's treatment of the concept of authorship provides a
powerful starting point for a more general analysis of the literary
attitudes emerging in his work, serving as a focal point where all the
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fundamental issues converge. It is thus to Henryson's treatment of
authorship and authority that I now turn.
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Chapter Four
Fen3eit of the New: Henryson,
Authorship and Auctoritas
For out of olde feldes, as men seyth,
Cometh al this newe corn from yer to yere,
And out of olde bokes, in good feyth,
Cometh al this newe science that men lere.
(Chaucer, Parliament ofFowls, 11.22-5)1
1
Walter Map's Dissuasio Valerii ad Rufinum, written in the late twelfth
century, commanded considerable respect in its time. So much respect, in
fact, that many of Map's contemporaries refused to believe that he had
written it, instead ascribing it to the first century Roman historian,
Valerius Maximus. Map remarked trenchantly, 'Hoc solum deliqui, quod
uiuo. Verumptamen hoc morte mea corrigere consilium non habeo.'2 As
Alistair Minnis has observed, Map's situation reflects the common
medieval perception that 'the only good author was a dead one.'
{Authorship, p.12) The achievements of the ancients were considered to
far greater than anything of which a modern writer might be capable. If
the moderns had greater knowledge it was only because they were dwarfs
standing on the shoulders of giants, adding what they could gain from
their own small efforts to the great store of learning which they inherited
from the ancient auctores. Thus, claiming no merit in themselves,
medieval writers often tend to defer to the auctoritas of previous writers,
in a simultaneously self-effacing and self-justifying gesture3.
In many respects Henryson's treatment ofAesop in the Fables
seems to assent to this view of authorship and auctoritas. Aesop is often
referred to with a self-effacing deference. Phrases such as 'Esope, myne
author makis mentioun' (1.162), and 'Esope, that nobill clerk, / Ane poet
worthie to be lawreate [...] this foirsaid fabill wrate' (11.1888-91) imply a
continuity between Henryson's work and the writings of his auctor. This
tends to devolve responsibility for the composition of the fables, and for
1. The Parliament ofFowls, in Riverside Chaucer, pp.385-94 (p.385).
2. Walter Map, De Nugis Curialium, ed. and trans. M.R. James; rev. C.N.L.
Brooke and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), IV, v, p.312.
3. See above, Ch.l, pp.18-19.
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the moral wisdom which they contain, away from Henryson and onto
Aesop. In 'The Lion and the Mouse', Aesop in fact appears in a dream to
personally relate the tale and expound a moral on it. This seems to
conjoin with the other references to Aesop in the Fables in presenting the
ancient poet as the true source of the work's auctoritas.
Yet the treatment of authorship in 'The Lion and the Mouse' is in
fact more complex than this. The fable displays not an uncritical assent
to and application of traditional views of authorship, but a significant
departure from them. 'The Lion and the Mouse' forms part of a
rethinking of the nature of authorship which is continued in other of the
fables and in The Testament of Cresseid. In the rest of this chapter I shall
analyse the ways in which Henryson departs from traditional concepts of
auctoritas, examining the diverse views of authorship which appear in
the Fables and in the Testament. The innovations which appear in
Henryson's work reflect a dissatisfaction with the traditional medieval
view of authorship and its associated interpretative modes, and in certain
respects seem closer to Renaissance humanist literary attitudes. It will
nevertheless be seen that the underlying premises of Henryson's
innovations are very different from those of Renaissance humanism. The
theoretical attitudes implicit in Henryson's work will be shown to result
from a modification of Scholastic thought which maintains its central
preoccupations.
2
Despite the frequent self-effacing references to Aesop in the Fables, the
contribution of the translator/narrator to the fables' composition is in
many places foregrounded. In 'The Cock and the Fox', the narrator
announces that 'I purpois for to wryte / Ane cais I fand quhilk fell this
ather 3eir / Betwix a fox and gentill Chantecleir.' (11.408-10) As in all of
Henryson's Reynardian fables, no mention is made of Aesop as the
originator of the story, and the claim to be reporting real events is
obviously a joke. The fact that the story is the invention of the narrator is
thus clearly indicated. Indeed, the evidently absurd nature of the
narrator's claim merely to be reporting events in a story which he himself
has invented may invite a suspicion of all such attempts to disclaim
authorial responsibility. In 'The Preiching of the Swallow', the narrator
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(who in the previous fable of 'The Lion and the Mouse' has clearly been
identified as the translator rather than Aesop), is projected into the fable
as a witness to its action. This belies his claim in the moralitas that
'Esope, that nobill clerk [...], this foirsaid fabill wrate', instead indicating
that the fable has been substantially transformed by the vernacular
writer's exercise of his own literary powers. In 'The Sheep and the Dog',
having ascribed the fable to Aesop (1.1146), the narrator personally
encounters the sheep in the moralitas and overhears its complaint, once
more foregrounding the modern writer's active construction of the
fictional world of the fables.
This aspect of the treatment of authorial role in the Fables appears
as early as the 'Prologue', in the modesty topos:
In hamelie language and in termes rude
Me neidis wryte, for quhy of eloquence
Nor rhetorike, I never vnderstude.
Tharfoir meiklie I pray Jour reverence,
Gif ye find ocht that throw my negligence
Be deminute, or 3it superfluous,
Correct it at Jour willis gratious.
(11.29-42)
This stanza is significant when considered in relation to the narrator's
transference of responsibility for the auctoritas of the Fables from himself
to Aesop. As John MacQueen has pointed out, the disclaimer of rhetorical
skill is itself a rhetorical device, recommended in texts such as the
Rhetorica ad HerreniumA. In thus indicating the presence of rhetorical
expertise in the very denial of any such skill, the passage suggests that
one should be suspicious of these disclaimers, since this writer seems
most active where he least claims to be. Furthermore, the emphasis on
the risk of failure in the passage draws attention to the fallibility of the
translator and the possibility that he may transform the source text
through his own literary activity. The stress on the positive connection
between the Fables and its authoritative original is in this way once
again undermined by the implication that the texts upon which the
moralitates build their interpretations cannot simply be ascribed to Aesop
as the guarantor of their auctoritas, but may contain elements newly
produced by the modern writer. From being an immediate presence
behind the text, the auctoritas of Aesop recedes into the distance. The
indications in the 'Prologue' that the narrator does not passively translate
4. MacQueen, Robert Henryson, p.99.
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but actively transforms his alleged source thus combine with the
foregrounding of his literary creativity in the fables proper to suggest
that the self-effacing ascription of the work to Aesop is itself a fiction of
the modern author.
In 'The Lion and the Mouse', the meeting between Aesop and the
narrator reinforces this suggestion. Aesop appears in a dream-vision,
which by the mid-fifteenth century was a highly familiar and
conventional literary form, whose artificial and stylised nature was
increasingly evident5. Hence, rather than being seen as an authentic
vision, Aesop's manifestation appears as the product ofHenryson's poetic
art, evoked in the exercise ofwell-established fictional conventions.
Furthermore, by having Aesop appear as a fictional character within a
work imputed to him, and having him address the fifteenth-century
translator of that work, the fictionality of the supposed source and the
independence of the modern writer are emphasised. If Aesop's presence
gives this fable a particularly authoritative tone (appropriately, since of
all the fables it is the only one which shows the behaviour of the
characters in the tale to be in harmony with the values of the moralitas),
this authority is nevertheless seen to be ultimately derived from the
modern vernacular writer rather than the ancient Latin one.
The conclusion of the fable in fact has Aesop handing responsibility
for future moral compositions to his supposed translator:
'My fair child,
Perswaid the kirkmen ythandly to pray,
That tressoun of this cuntrie be exyld,
And iustice regne, and lordis keip thar fay
Vnto thair souerane lord baith nycht and day.'
(11.1615-19)
Aesop is invoked as a figure of authority in order to hand over the laurels,
requiring the modern author to continue the work of ethical persuasion.
But this Aesop is also already clearly a part of the modern author's
fiction. Henryson thus asserts both his community with and
independence from Aesop in an act of self-authorisation, presenting the
vernacular poet as continuing in his own work the project of the classical
auctor. This combines with the foregrounding of the narrator's presence
5. See A.C. Spearing, Medieval Dream Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), esp. his comments on Dunbar, pp.192-97.
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elsewhere in the Fables to suggest that the modern author can himself
claim the auctoritas previously afforded only to the ancients6.
In this, Henryson parallels the developments in late-medieval
thought observable in the attitudes of Guido da Pisa and Pietro Alighieri
towards Dante, and which would be taken up in Renaissance humanism,
where the modern author was being assigned a new dignity, and placed
on an equal footing with the ancients. The precise nature and
implications of the auctoritas being claimed by Henryson, however,
remain to be seen.
3
In the previous chapter it was argued that two distinct views of literary
signification are present in Henryson's work. The first and more
traditional view is exemplified in 'The Cock and the Jasp', where the text
is seen as inscribed within a broad framework ofmeaning which
authorises a vast number of possible significations, the criteria by which
these are judged as legitimate being their conformity with Christian
doctrine and their ethical utility for given readers. The second, more
innovative, view emerges in 'The Two Mice' and in the hesitation which
appears in the transition from narrative to moralitas in 'The Cock and
the Jasp'. In this view a dissatisfaction with heuristic exegesis emerges.
There appears a sense that the dominant focus of interpretation should
be the meaning defined in the letter of the text. The parameters of
literary signification are from this perspective considered to be much
more strictly delimited by the constraints of the literal sense.
These two possible views of literary signification are associated
with two different concepts of authorship. The first assumes the ineffable
comprehensiveness of an auctor's intention, which both exceeds and
validates any particular exposition of a text. The author's meaning is
thus presented as essentially an imitation of the divine Word, mirroring
its all-encompassing vision. The second view suggests that the intentio
auctoris, far from being ineffable, consists of a specific and determinable
viewpoint which is accessible through due attention to the specificities of
6. On these aspects of'The Lion and the Mouse'see Machan, 296-97. On the
Fables' ascription to Aesop as a fictional background against which Henryson
establishes his own role as auctor, see Robert L. Kindrick, Henryson and the Medieval
Arts ofRhetoric (New York and London: Garland, 1993), pp.252-54.
150
the text. This latter view foregrounds the individual motivations and
concerns of different writers, and stresses their literary creativity in
constructing the text in such a way as to embody and express a particular
outlook7. Thus, as Minnis observes of medieval Biblical exegesis, the
strong emphasis on the literal sense from the thirteenth century
onwards, which saw a diminishing of the value attached to allegorical
exegesis, is accompanied by a much closer attention to the individual
author's creative input, focusing on both his literary and moral activity8.
Despite its innovative character, the suggestion in Henryson's
work that ancient and modern writers alike can be considered as bearers
ofwisdom, does not necessarily involve a radical departure from the
traditional concepts of auctoritas associated with literary auctores. While
late-medieval Biblical exegesis sees a new emphasis on the individual
writer's contribution to the text, there remains in medieval literary
exegesis a strong emphasis on allegorical interpretation, along with a
refusal to privilege limited and determinate authorial motivations as a
guide to interpretation. While Minnis stresses the "'coming together" of
sacred and secular texts within a universal interpretative model' (Minnis
& Scott, p.4), his formulation of the developments in exegesis which made
this possible indicates the difference between the two: 'Scriptural auctores
were being read literally [...]; pagan poets were read allegorically or
"moralised" - and thus the twain could meet.' (Authorship, p. 142)
Hence, even in Italy where from an early date strong claims were
being made for the auctoritas of modern writers, there was a powerful
emphasis on the comprehensive nature of the significative framework of
their work, as can be seen from the examples of the commentaries on
Dante's Commedia by Guido da Pisa and Pietro Alighieri, discussed above
(pp. 112-13). Both these commentators, despite their radical esteem for a
modern vernacular writer, nevertheless retain a traditional concept of the
auctor. They avoid any sense that the individuating and particularising
features of his work should be the dominant consideration in exegesis. As
Guido's assertion that Dante was the pen of the Holy Spirit indicates, any
such determinate limitations ofmeaning are ultimately derived from
provisional and partial interpretative decisions by the reader, and the
7. See my observations on Petrarch on pp. 152-55 below.
8. See Authorship, pp.85-112, passim.
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text remains inscribed within a broader framework wherein the overall
significance of Dante's work is assimilated to the divine Verbum.
A similar combination of innovative and traditional attitudes to
authorship is evident in the Fables. While certain aspects of the poems
undermine their ascription to Aesop and suggest that the modern writer
can partake of the same auctoritas as the ancients, the heuristic mode of
exegesis recommended in fables such as 'The Cock and the Jasp' and 'The
Trial of the Fox' continues the traditional view of that auctoritas. Just as
Guido da Pisa and Pietro Alighieri assimilate Dante's intention in the
Divine Comedy to the comprehensive vision of the Holy Spirit, so the
auctoritas which Henryson ascribes to Aesop but more covertly claims for
himself is one which assumes a similarly overarching intentio auctoris
authorising many different potential expositions.
Nor can Henryson's various heuristic interpretations be identified
as arbitrary but useful similitudes in the manner suggested by William of
Auvergne with regard to Biblical allegoresis9. The moralitates are not
depicted as well-intentioned appropriations of texts whose true meaning
may be quite different from that adduced in the moralitas. Henryson's
emphasis on the auctoritas which underlies the Fables makes these
readings co-extensive with an originary authorial intentio, retaining for
them the status of expositions rather than impositions10. The author
thus remains an impersonal figure whose texts only have their meaning
individuated through the exegete's partial reading, which defines only
certain aspects of the text's overall significance. While any given
interpretation is thus seen to partake of particular motivations and
contextual constraints, no such limits apply to the overall meaning of the
authoritative text.
Henryson's retention of the view of a writer's auctoritas as
consisting in a transcendent and ineffable intentio, even as he indicates
the comparability of ancient and modern authors, is also apparent in 'The
Lion and the Mouse'. In this fable the auctoritas claimed for Aesop is
quietly transferred to the modern writer with no disruptive sense of the
different interests and concerns proper to each of them. The only sense of
incongruity in this transfer is manifested in the fact that Henryson does
9. See above, Ch.2, pp.69-70.
10. On the supposition of continuity between medieval allegorical
interpretations and authorial intention, see Copeland, pp.80-2.
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not expressly assert his own auctoritas and dispense with Aesop
altogether. This circumspection perhaps suggests a discomfort on
Henryson's part over the possible presumptiousness of the modern
writer's claim to an authority comparable to Aesop. But that discomfort
is itself based on a sense of the transcendent nature of an auctoritas
which may be felt to be above the reach of the moderns11.
Thus there is no sense that the question of the authorship of the
Fables should in any way affect their meaning or alter the way in which
they should be approached by readers. It appears that whichever auctor
they are written by, the learned citizen of Classical Rome or the fifteenth-
century schoolmaster from Dunfermline, the significance of the fables
remains essentially unaltered. The text is seen as opening onto a trans-
historical meaning of universal validity and application, and as thus
uniting with other works in an essentially undifferentiated auctoritas.
Concern over originality and distinctive authorial interests or talents is,
then, excluded from the depiction of the literary relationship between
Henryson and Aesop. An awareness of the differences between the two
writers may be implicit in the foregrounding of the narrator's literary
activity, but these remain ultimately superficial as both ancient and
modern are assimilated to the same comprehensive vision.
These aspects of the Fables indicate that, while Henryson departs
from medieval convention in suggesting the parity of ancient and modern
writers, he remains fundamentally conservative in his conception of
authorship and the nature of a writer's auctoritas. Henryson's work thus
testifies to the strong persistence of traditional concepts of authorship in
discussions of secular literature, despite the more innovative attitudes
current in Biblical scholarship.
There is, however, evidence that the sensitivity to the distinctive
thematic and stylistic characteristics of an author's work which is found
in late-medieval Biblical exegesis was beginning to impinge on the sphere
of secular literature from the fourteenth century. Moreover, such is the
complexity which characterises Henryson's work that these more novel
attitudes towards authorship can be found therein alongside the
traditional concepts detailed above. This can be illustrated by comparing
Henryson's writings with those of Francis Petrarch (1304-74). Petrarch's
11. For discussion of a similar sensitivity regarding modern claims to auctoritas,
see Minnis1 observations on Gower in Authorship, p.175.
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levelling of the hierarchical distinction between ancient and modern
writers and the reshaping of attitudes towards auctores which this entails
provide an instructive contrast with the traditional aspects of Henryson's
work and a useful comparison with the Scottish writer's more innovative
concepts. By focusing on the ways in which certain aspects of the Fables
imply a clear divergence from the views of Petrarch, while others suggest
a parallel with those views, one can delineate clearly the ways in which
heterogeneous attitudes are dramatically juxtaposed in Henryson's
writings.
In the Secretum, a fictitious dialogue between Petrarch (appearing
as Francesco) and St Augustine, concern is shown over the violation of
authorial intention12. Francesco proposes an interpretation of Virgil's
description of Aeolus in the cave ofwinds (Aeneid, I, 52-7):
Ego autem, singula verba discutiens, audivi indignationem, audivi
luctamen, audivi tempestates sonoras, audivi murmur ac
fremitum. Hec ad iram referri possunt. Audivi rursum regem in
arce sedentem, audivi sceptrum tenentum, audivi imperio
prementem et vinclis ad carcere frenantem; que ad rationem
quoque referri posse quis dubitet?
(Bk II, p.104)
Augustine responds thus:
Laudo hec, quibus abundare te video, poetice narrationis archana.
Sive enim id Virgilius ipse sensit, dum scriberet, sive ab omni tali
consideratione remotissimus, maritimam his versibus et nil aliud
describere voluit tempestatem; hoc tamen, quod de irarum impetu
et rationis imperio dixisti, facete satis et proprie dictum puto.
(Ibid., pp.104-6)
Francesco's reading has many of the hallmarks of the Scholastic
utilisation of poetry as an affective and mnemonic aid13. As in
Henryson's moralitates to his fables, the interpretation is presented as
provisional rather than definitive, as is indicated by the conditional
tenses in 'referri possunt' and 'referri posse'. The interpretation is good
not because it accurately captures the text's meaning, but because in
terms of moral truth it is a valid sententia which puts the text to good
use. But rather than grounding the reading in the author's intention,
Petrarch has Augustine suggest that, while valuable, this interpretation
may have been the furthest thing from Virgil's mind when writing.
12. Petrarch, Secretum, ed. and trans. Enrico Carrara (Milan and Naples:
Ricciardi, 1955; Turin: Einaudi, 1977).
13. See Carruthers, pp.167-8.
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Petrarch thus raises the possibility that the interpretation in question
may merely be an appropriation of the Aeneid, and he thus distances his
reading from the actual significative structure of the text14. Virgil, it
seems, had quite precisely defined intentions, and this reading may not
have been part of them.
Petrarch's Epistolae Familiares provides further instances of this
sense of the individuality of the literary auctor, and of the particularised
nature of his concerns15. In two letters to Boccaccio, Petrarch outlines his
view of the relationship between ancient and modern writers. In Book
XXII, epistle ii, he addresses the problem of originality, complaining that
in his reading of classical auctores he has assimilated their work to such
an extent that in his own writing their thoughts and styles occur to him
as though new, leaving him hard pressed to discern clearly what is his
own and what he has taken from his reading. He continues thus:
Vitam michi alienis dictis ac monitis ornare, fateor, est animus,
non stilum; nisi vel prolato auctore vel mutatione insigni, ut
imitatione apium e multis et variis unum fiat. Alioquin multo
malim meus michi stilus sit, incultus licet atque horridus, sed in
morem toge habilis, ad mensuram ingenii mei factus, quam
alienus, cultior ambitioso ornatu sed a maiore ingenio profectus
atque undique defluens animi humilis non conveniens stature.
(Vol.4, pp.106-7)
Hence, he argues, while an actor can adopt any kind of costume, a writer
cannot adopt just any style (p. 107):
Suus cuique formandus servandusque est, ne vel difformiter alienis
induti vel concursu plumas suas repetentium volucrum spoliati,
cum cornicula rideamur. Et est sane cuique naturaliter, ut in
vultu et gestu, sic in voce et sermone quiddam suum ac proprium,
quod colere et castigare quam mutare cum facilius sum melius
atque fecilius sit.
(Ibid., p.107)
This concern over maintaining a clear sense of the individuality of
both ancient and modern authors, and of seeing how that is embodied in
literary style, is also expressed in Book XXIII, epistle xix. There,
Petrarch discusses imitation and argues that one should adapt one's
models in such a way as to transform what is taken from them into
14. There is a parallel between the views which Petrarch expresses here and
William ofAuvergne's distinction between significations and similitudes in Biblical
exegesis (see above, Ch.2, pp.69-70). This might be taken to confirm the relation
between attitudes found in literary humanism and those found in Scholastic Biblical
exegesis.
15. Petrarch, Le Familiari, ed. V. Rossi and U. Bosco, 4 vols (Florence: Sansoni,
1933-42).
155
something recognisably one's own16, a viewpoint implied in his above
analogy of bees uniting nectar taken from diverse sources into a single
honey. This is a far cry from the medieval writer's self-effacing
submersion of his own literary activity within the validating auctoritas of
his source. In Petrarch's view the modern writer is not merely a dwarf
standing on the shoulders of giants. Rather, the concern over poetic
individuality shows that ancients and moderns are now seen as fellows
within a common tradition, with the modern writer having his own strong
and distinctive contribution to add to what he has learned from the
ancients.
This view of ancients and moderns as fellow participants in a
common tradition is similar to that expressed by Henryson when, in 'The
Lion and the Mouse', he presents himself as being invited to continue the
Aesopic tradition, addressing the corruption of his own day. But
Petrarch's attitudes towards authorship clearly differ from the
conservative aspects of Henryson's work outlined above. For Petrarch the
sense of a common tradition uniting both ancient and modern authors is
based on a recognition of the individual qualities of each, both in terms of
their style and of their particular concerns and motivations in writing.
Where Henryson seems to suggest that both ancient and modern writers
can participate in a transcendent and essentially undifferentiated
auctoritas, Petrarch views an auctor as a man speaking to men in his own
distinctive voice and with his own particular message to impart. While
such an auctor may be a great and even visionary figure, he remains
essentially comprehensible and approachable on human terms.
Other aspects of Henryson's Fables, however, suggest that in
certain respects he shares Petrarch's more innovative attitudes. As was
argued in the previous chapter, Henryson sets against the universalising
and heuristic exegesis of his moralitates an alternative perspective in
which meaning is seen as established within the tale's discursive frame,
with the concomitant implication that reading should respect the
determinative claims of the text. This latter perspective parallels
Petrarch's focus on the idiosyncrasies which distinguish the writings of
different authors and which should therefore receive careful attention. A
similarity to Petrarch's views, with the accent this time on authorial role
rather than on textual semiotics, is also implicit in the presentation of the
16. Ibid., Vol.4, pp.203-7.
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relationship between Aesop and his putative translator in the 'Prologue'
to the Fables:
Of this poete, my maisteris, with dour leif,
Submitting me to dour correctioun,
In mother toung, of Latyng, I wald preif
To mak ane maner of translatioun [...].
(11.29-32)
Those aspects of the Fables which stress the modern writer's own
contributions to the poems and his independence from Aesop indicate, of
course, that this claim to be translating is false. But analysis of the
terms in which Henryson defines this fictive role reveals a view of
translation which departs significantly from medieval tradition in its
assumptions about the nature of authorship and literary meaning.
The passage, while explicitly affirming a continuity between the
Fables and the works ofAesop, also draws attention to the distance
between them. The focus on the linguistic transition from Latin to
vernacular is the key indicator of this distance. Henryson emphasises
this linguistic disparity by stressing the difficulties of translation, as
indicated by the word 'preif. This emphasis is continued in the following
stanza, where Henryson draws attention to the possibility of failure
which results from the translator's 'hamelie language' and 'termes rude'
(11.36-42). This may suggest a sense of the paucity of the linguistic
resources of Scots in comparison to Latin17. At any rate, it certainly
expresses a concern over the narrator's capacity to match the eloquence of
Aesop which again underscores the verbal and stylistic differences which
separate their works. Furthermore, the translator's submitting himself
to the correction of his audience may imply an invitation to compare
translation and source, as may his later suggestion that they correct
whatever they find to be 'deminute, or 3it superfluous' (11.41-2). This
again implies a sensitivity to areas of obvious divergence between the two
texts.
The dominant view of translation in the Middle Ages was one in
which close attention to the peculiarities of a text's linguistic formulation
was frowned upon, with fidelity to res being prioritised over fidelity to
verba18. This approach was instituted by St Jerome, whose dictum, 'non
17. Gavin Douglas in fact makes this point explicitly, affirming that 'Besyde
Latyn our langage is imperfite'. See Gavin Douglas, Virgil's Aeneid, ed. David F.C.
Coldwell, 4 vols (Edinburgh: Scottish Texts Society, 1957), I, prologue, 359 (Vol.11).
18. Biblical translation is a general exception to this rule. See Copeland, p.50.
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verbum e verbo, sed sensum [...] de sensu', provided western Christendom
with a concept of translation as fidelity to a unitary signified, unimpeded
by considerations of linguistic difference, which are seen to disrupt the
proper grasp of meaning's transcendence of circumstance19. In terms of
the fourfold division of authorial role into that of scriptor, compilator,
commentator, and auctor, the translator is closest to the commentator,
whose role, as Robert L. Kindrick observes, 'provided extensive latitude
for insertion of authorial voice and personal prejudice.'20 However, as
with the commentator, this active role is still combined with a self-
effacing claim of fidelity and subservience to the auctor21. While the
source text may have sententiae imputed to it which are alien to its
apparent sense, their character as misprisions and reconstructions can be
effaced, as they remain ascribable to an auctor whose transcendent
intentio opens the text onto meanings which are exterior to its form and
language22.
Henryson's discussion of translation in the 'Prologue' introduces
considerations which run counter to this derogation of the signifier's
priority in controlling meaning and interpretation. The 'Prologue' in fact
suggests that right translation ofAesop requires a close attention to the
verbal structure of the Latin source text, accompanied by a clear
awareness of the linguistic and stylistic differences which must be taken
into account if one is to emulate that structure in the vernacular. This
19. St Jerome, Epistola LVII, PL, 22, 568-79, v (col.571). On the dominance of
Jerome's model of translation in the Middle Ages, see Copeland, pp.46-55, where she
also observes that even those who depart from Jerome's strictures do so in a way which
still aims to recuperate a unitary signified from the differentiations of heterogeneous
languages.
20. Kindrick, Henryson and the Medieval Arts ofRhetoric, p.26. On the fourfold
classification of authorial role, see ibid., pp.25-26. Kindrick himself suggests that the
translator's role is closest to that of the scriptor (p.253), whom he defines as 'merely a
transcriber' who 'conveys the text nihil mutando with an eye to precise preservation of
what has been transmitted to him' (p.25). The scriptor's role thus involves the faithful
reproduction of both text and sententia. In Jerome's definition, however, the translator's
task involves fidelity to a sense which transcends verba. This licences a transformative
approach to the source text which is prohibited to the scriptor.
21. On the combination of free translation with the self-effacing claim that the
translator's work serves as a transparent window onto the works of his auctores, see Tim
William Machan's comments on Lydgate (Machan, pp.285-95). See also Ruth Morse,
Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages: Rhetoric, Representation, and Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.189-90.
22. On the definition of the commentator in terms which permit interpretative
freedom to be conjoined with a self-effacing deference to the priority of the auctor, see
above, Ch.3, pp.110-14. On the creative character of commentary, see Copeland, pp.63-
86 (although her conception of the relation between translation sensum de sensu and the
commentary tradition differs considerbly from mine). Some suggestive remarks on the
relation between translation sensum de sensu and the tradition of allegorical
commentary are provided in Morse, pp. 198-200.
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association of accurate translation with attention to textual form implies
that Aesop's work is being viewed not merely as the repository of a
transcendent wisdom, but as the distinctive product of an author whose
individual literary traits must be respected if good faith in translation is
to be maintained. Furthermore, the concern which the 'Prologue'
expresses over the translator's stylistic limitations indicates that his task
too is one which entails creativity. It suggests that he is not merely
required to copy his source text, but that he should re-enact its act of
signifying through his own manipulation of the vernacular. In these
respects, Henryson's comments on translation suggest that his conception
of authorial role does not fit neatly into any one of the categories of
scriptor, compilator, commentator, or auctor. The auctor's own work
takes on an individuated character which prohibits the interpretative
latitude of the commentator. Instead it demands a respect for formal and
verbal structure which is more closely associated with the role of the
scriptor in its concern over textual rather than merely sentential fidelity.
Equally, the suggestion that the translator should exercise a command of
his native language through which he can emulate the eloquence of his
source assigns an explicitly creative element to his task. This expands
the definition of the translator's role beyond what is provided for in the
self-effacing categories of scriptor, compilator, or even commentator. It
acquires an explicitly active character which, in placing an accent on the
translator's own literary prowess, imbues his own achievements with
intrinsic significance, and permits them to be viewed with an approbation
traditionally reserved for auctores23. The model of translation implied in
the 'Prologue' to the Fables thus differs from earlier definitions in
involving both a greater need for strictness in observing constraints
imposed by the formal structure of the source text, and an awareness that
successful translation depends on the independent creativity of the
translator.
In these respects, then, the Fables displays a sensitivity to
authorial individuality and creativity, and to the distinct and comparable
merits of both ancient and modern writers, which parallels the attitudes
of Petrarch. The presence of such features in Henryson's work would
seem to support the views of those critics who argue for the influence of
23. Kindrick also notes Henryson's accent on the creative nature of translation.
See Henryson and the Medieval Arts ofRhetoric, p.253.
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continental humanism on Henryson's writings24. R.J. Lyall, however, has
vigorously opposed such claims. In an article aimed at refuting John
MacQueen's arguments for the influence of Boccaccio on Henryson, Lyall
concludes that there are no points where any direct influence can be
clearly determined. He further notes that there are in fact many
indications that Henryson was working from sources which deviate from
the Fulgentian tradition within which Boccaccio's De Genealoge is
squarely set25. Moreover, while admitting that Henryson frequently
elaborates conventional material (pp.45-7), he does not consider
Henryson's discussions of literary theory to go beyond the assertion of the
basic and long-established view that poetry combines pleasure and profit
(pp.55-6). Pointing out the traditional nature of the images of the nut's
shell and of the flower pushing through the earth which occur in
Henryson's discussion of literary theory in the 'Prologue', Lyall argues
that Henryson is simply employing images which are either thoroughly
traditional or expanding those he finds in Gualterus Anglicus (pp.54-7).
He concludes that Henryson's work is 'characteristically medieval' (p.58),
with humanism playing little or no part in it, and sees nothing therein
which constitutes a significant departure from established medieval
traditions.
There is much in Lyall's arguments to recommend them. Firstly,
given how little is known ofHenryson's life, and given the circumstantial
and ambivalent nature of the textual evidence which has been cited in
support of continental influence26, Lyall's warning against giving hasty
credence to speculations which are impossible to ascertain seems
judicious. His insistence that the determining context for Henryson's
work is a medieval one is also worth noting, and one with which I would
24. For suggestions that the general world-picture which emerges in Henryson's
writings bears a relation to values and philosophies associated with humanism, see
Evelyn S. Newlyn, 'Humanism and Theodicy: Oppositions in the Poetry of Robert
Henryson', in Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Scottish Language
and Literature: Medieval and Renaissance, ed. R.J. Lyall and F. Riddy (Stirling and
Glasgow: Stirling University Press, 1981), pp.251-9, and Stephen Kohl, 'Henryson's
Testament of Cresseid: Part of the Medieval Tradition?', in ibid. pp.285-300. For
suggestions of literary and theoretical influence, see MacQueen, Robert Henryson, pp.18-
23; R.D.S. Jack, The Italian Influence on Scottish Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1973), pp.7-14; Robert L. Kindrick, Henryson and the Medieval Arts of
Rhetoric (New York and London: Garland, 1993), pp.373-80.
25. R.J. Lyall, 'Henryson and Boccaccio: A Problem in the Study of Sources',
Anglia, 99 (1981), 38-59. For MacQueen's arguments, see Robert Henryson, pp.18-23.
26. The circumstantial and inconclusive nature of the evidence is fully
acknowledged by the proponents of the view that Henryson was subject to continental
influence. See Jack, p.13; Kindrick, Robert Henryson, pp.280-2, 305.
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agree fully. But this is not the same as arguing Henryson to be
'characteristically medieval'. This affirmation in fact ignores the very
untraditional sense of difficulty in the 'Prologue' imagery which Henryson
uses to describe fable, and which Lyall cites as evidence of his
conventionality. It is in this narrow understanding of Henryson's
relation to medieval traditions that Lyall's arguments must meet with
objections. A more flexible conception of the relation between
Renaissance humanism and medieval Scholasticism can permit one to
recognise the innovative character of Henryson's work while maintaining
a sense of his commitment to medieval traditions. John MacQueen,
setting Henryson in the context of the 'Northern Renaissance', sees his
work as effecting a mutual adaptation between humanist and medieval
attitudes. In this process, humanistic concepts are incorporated within a
medieval framework, while at the same time that framework is
transformed in the direction of humanism27. Robert L. Kindrick offers a
similarly flexible perspective in his summation ofHenryson's deployment
of medieval rhetorical traditions:
Henryson's freshness in his use of every tradition that he
approached is also remarkable. While he would have likely taught
the elements of the ars poetriae and would have been familiar with
the ars dictaminis, most scholars who approach his work would
agree that his poems do not 'smell of the lamp.' His use of the ars
praedicandi also shows such innovation. Henryson uses the
techniques of the art of preaching but substantially modifies them
through his use of the first personal tone, his introduction of
Aristotelian psychology, his extra attention to detail in
characterization, and other devices. In part, John MacQueen is
correct that in this sense Henryson's rhetoric suggests his
movement towards Renaissance humanism. Yet Roderick Lyall is
also accurate in suggesting that the general framework of
Henryson's work is medieval, owing a considerable debt to the
scholarly traditions ofwhich he would have become aware in his
academic training.
(Henryson and the Medieval Arts ofRhetoric, pp.255-56)
MacQueen's perspective allows for the possibility that whatever
Henryson may have derived from humanism is best understood in
Scholastic terms, having been transformed in Henryson's creative
appropriation of it, even as that appropriation transforms the protocols of
Scholasticism. Kindrick's perspective, in highlighting Henryson's
creative and transformative relation to medieval tradition, similarly
provides a mode of understanding in which appreciation of the innovative
27. See above, Ch.2, p.97, n.95.
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characteristics ofHenryson's work can be combined with a recognition of
its thoroughly Scholastic grounding.
It is my contention that, regardless of where Henryson's more
novel concepts of authorial role originate, their humanistic affiliations are
superficial. They are inscribed within Henryson's texts as part of a
modification of Scholastic literary theory, and they are most intelligible
when seen in the context of such theory. As Kindrick observes in the
passage cited immediately above, Henryson does not employ traditional
material and conventions in a passive manner. Rather his approach is
exemplified in 'The Cock and the Jasp' which, while affirming Scholastic
interpretative protocols, nevertheless utilises them critically,
transforming and adapting them. The innovative attitudes found in
Henryson's work are structured according to criteria laid down by
Scholastic theory in a manner made possible by the inbuilt flexibility and
dynamism of that theory, and by Henryson's own creativity in drawing on
traditional resources.
The extent to which specific elements of Henryson's work can both
parallel humanistic literary attitudes and at the same time diverge from
them quite dramatically in its underlying assumptions can be
demonstrated through a comparison with Gavin Douglas' Eneados. The
rest of this chapter will accordingly examine the similarities and
differences between attitudes towards authorship in Douglas' work and in
The Testament of Cresseid, where Henryson's more innovative concepts
find their fullest expression.
4
As Eugene Vance writes in Mervelous Signals, among humanist
translators, 'Emulation of the signifier (as well as of the signified) began
to alter the nature and purpose of translation' (p.322). This can be seen
in Gavin Douglas' translation of the Aeneid, where Douglas berates
Caxton for presuming to offer a prose translation of a French text as the
work ofVirgil:
Thocht Will3ame Caxtoun, of Inglis natioun,
In pros hes present ane buik of Inglys gros,
Clepand it Virgill in Eneados,
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Quhilk that he sais of Franch he dyd translait,
It has na thing ado tharwith, God wait [...].
(Bk I, Prol., 11.138-42 [Vol.11])
As Douglas satirically observes, Caxton's text and that ofVirgil are 'na
mair like than the devill and Sanct Austyne' (ibid., 1.143).
In his own practice as a translator Douglas aims to follow Virgil's
text as closely as possible:
Quha is attachit ontill a staik, we se,
May go na ferthir, hot wreil about that tre:
Richt so am I to Virgillis text ybund,
I may nocht fie, les than my fait be fund [...].
(Ibid., 11.297-300)
This, however, does not imply literal word-for-word translation, and
Douglas in fact takes Chaucer to task for claiming in The Legend ofGood
Women that he could follow Virgil's text in this way (ibid., 11.339-46). For
Douglas, it is necessary that fidelity to the source text be balanced by an
awareness ofwhere one must depart from it.
This departure, necessitated by linguistic disparity and the need
for explanation of possibly obscure passages so as to clearly convey the
text's meaning, compels the translator to be a creative artist, not merely a
slavish copyist. The translator actively effects a mutual adaptation
between the original significance and literary devices of the source text
and the linguistic and cultural resources of the medium into which it is
being translated. Hence Douglas states that he must modify the
language available to him in order to better emulate the original Latin of
Virgil:
Lyk as in Latyne bene Grew termys sum,
So me behufyt quhilum, or than be dum
Sum bastard Latyne, Frensch or Inglis oyss,
Quhar scant was Scottis -1 had nane other choys.
Nocht for our tong is in the selwyn scant
Bot for that I the fowth of language want
Quhar as the colour of his properte
To kepe the sentence tharto constrenyt me [...].
(Ibid., 11.115-22)
Conversely, he recognises the need to depart from Virgil's precise terms
in order to express his meaning in the language of early sixteenth-
century Scotland:
Sum tyme the text mon haue ane expositioun,
Sum tyme the collour will caus a litill additioun,
And sum tyme of a word I mon mak thre, [...]
Eik weill I wait syndry expositouris seir
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Makis on a text sentens diuers to heir,
As thame apperis, accordyng thair entent,
And for thar part schawis ressonys euident.
All this is ganand, I will weill it swa be,
Bot a sentens to follow may suffice me.
Sum tyme I follow the text als neir I may
Sum tyme I am constrenyt ane other way. [...]
For thar bene Latyn wordis mony ane
That in our leyd ganand translatioun has nane
Les than we mynys thar sentence and grauyte
And 3it scant weill exponyt.
(Ibid., 11.347-66)
The value which Douglas attaches to the letter ofVirgil's text is clear
from his exclusion of 'sentence diuers' from consideration in translation.
To introduce allegorical levels of meaning in translation, even though
such interpretations may be valid, is to depart from the one sentence,
embodied in the letter, which is Douglas' primary consideration. But
Douglas also recognises that the differences between languages and the
need for explanation of certain passages necessitate the modification of
the original text through addition and expansion. Furthermore, he states
that the limited resources of the vernacular in comparison to Latin, and
his own inferior wit when compared to Virgil, introduce another level of
necessary difference in producing an inferiority of style:
Quhy suld I than, with dull forhed and vaye,
With ruide engyne and barrand emptyve brayn,
With bad, harsk spech and lewit barbour tong
Presume to write quhar thy sueit bell is rung,
Or contyrfate sa precyus wordys deir? [...]
3it with thy leif, Virgile, to follow the,
I wald into my rurall wlgar gros
Wryte sum savoryng of thyne Eneados.
(Ibid., 11.19-44)
For Douglas, translation appears as an interplay of similitude and
difference, and of imitation and invention. It requires both an awareness
of the constraints which the form and meaning of the original text exert
on composition, and a creative power in modifying both the language
available to the translator and certain elements of the source text in
order to produce an intelligible vernacular version which captures as fully
as possible the essence of the Latin original. Douglas thus gives fuller
and more explicit expression to the view of translation suggested in
Henryson's 'Prologue' to the Fables. His conception of the translator's
role entails both the restrictions imposed on the scriptor and the
independent creativity associated with the auctor.
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Douglas' careful consideration of the task of the translator is
essentially motivated by an awareness of the irreducible importance of
the text's material form and structure as the product of the eloquence of
an individual writer. It is a perception of the artistry of the original poet
which requires that the translator display a similar artistry and
inventiveness in his use of the vernacular if his translation is to emulate
the achievement which is his auctor's text. It is a similar perception of
the individual resources of different languages, and of the distinctive
literary styles of himself and Virgil, which underlies his awareness of the
necessary differences which must obtain between their works. For
Douglas the act of translation entails not merely the transmission of a
signified meaning but also close attention to the signifier in both the
source text and the translation, necessitating a clear awareness of the
distinctive literary resources and talents of both auctor and translator.
In this he embodies what A.C. Spearing has described as the most
characteristic features of Renaissance thought: 'a new sense of the
historical distance and difference inherent in classical texts, [...] together
with a sense of the possibility of overcoming that distance and difference
by creative imitation.'28
Douglas' focus on the individuating qualities of literary texts, and
on auctores as models who invite creative imitation, is also evident in
attitudes towards poetry throughout the fifteenth century in Scotland.
One need only look at the reputations of Chaucer and the English
Chaucerians among fifteenth and early sixteenth-century Scottish writers
to see this. In The Kingis Quair, Chaucer and Gower are referred to as
'Superlative as poetis laureate, / In moralitee and eloquence ornate'29.
Similarly, in The Golden Targe, Dunbar writes enthusiastically of the
poetic styles of Chaucer, Gower and Lydgate, the following lines referring
specifically to the latter two30:
Your sugurit lippis and tongis aureate,
Bene to our eris cause of grete delyte;
Your angel mouthis most mellifluate
Our rude language has clere illumynate [...].
(11.263-66)
28. Spearing, Medieval to Renaissance, p. 13.
29. The Kingis Quair ofJames Stewart, ed. Matthew P. McDiarmid (London:
Heinemann, 1973), 200-1.
30. Dunbar, The Golden Targe, in The Poems ofWilliam Dunbar, ed. W. Mackay
Mackenzie (Edinburgh: Porpoise, 1932).
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Neither the author of The Kingis Quair nor Dunbar ignores sententia, the
former referring to 'moralitee' as well as 'eloquence' and the latter writing
of 'morall Gower', and drawing a distinction between the 'mater' of a text
and the language which expresses it (11.257-58). But the emphasis on
stylistic brilliance, powerfully evoked and imitated by Dunbar especially,
makes it clear that the letter of the text has an equally high, if not even
greater, value placed on it. Eugene Vance's observation regarding
Renaissance humanist culture, that 'richness of discourse was now
thought to reside not merely in the signified, or the sententia, but in the
very fabric of the signifier, in the verbum as a production ofmaterial
sound'31, applies equally to these comments by Scottish poets who were
near-contemporaries of Henryson.
The attitudes of these poets indicate a developing concept of the
relation between ancient and modern writers in literary composition
which is closer to the neo-classical concept of imitation as an active
literary exercise based on prior models than to the more typically
medieval concept where writing becomes the partial exposition of a prior
meaning ascribed to an ancient auctor. Where the latter authorises the
combination of often radical departures from the source text with the self-
effacing ascription of all responsibility for a work to that auctor, the
former demands both respect for one's source and a clear awareness of
where one departs from it. The emphasis on style in the praise which
Dunbar and the author of the Quair give to Chaucer and his English
literary heirs represents them as positive exemplars for later writers to
emulate in their own work, as is clear from the stylistic virtuosity with
which Dunbar, in particular, extols their virtues. Thus Dunbar and the
author of The Kingis Quair, like Douglas, present a pointed and explicit
statement of the attitudes towards authorship and the literary text
implied in Henryson's discussion of translation in the 'Prologue' to the
Fables.
In the Testament of Cresseid the innovative attitudes implicit in
the Fables are stated much more overtly. Henryson here expresses a
sense of the parity between ancient and modern writers, and of the
individuating qualities of authoritative works, and approves originality
as a legitimate feature of writing. In these respects, as Tim William
Machan has observed, the Testament expresses a conception of
31. Vance, p.321.
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authorship and literary authority which breaks from traditional medieval
attitudes32. In the Testament it is no longer the case that 'it is these prior
texts of classical poets and learned commentators which are typically
judged the only authoritative texts both in the sense of being original
creations and in the sense of having the unimpeachable "auctoritas" of an
"auctor.'"33 Henryson presents Chaucer as a modern vernacular auctor,
credited with having produced in his Troilus and Criseyde34 a distinctive
and valuable work: 'Writtin be worthie Chaucer glorious' (1.141). Chaucer
is further praised for his rhetorical skills, described as having written the
book 'In gudelie termis and in ioly veirs' (1.59). Henryson thus
emphasises Chaucer's active contribution to the Troilus, disregarding
Chaucer's frequent claims that he merely reports what his auctor Lollius
has written, having no responsibility for the meaning, style or verbal
form of the poem, as in the stanza prefacing the Canticus Troili:
And of his song naught only the sentence,
As writ myn auctor called Lollius,
But pleinly, save oure tonges difference,
I dar wel seyn, in al, that Troilus
Seyde in his song, loo, every word right thus
As I shall seyn [...].
(T&C, I, 393-98 [p.478])
It may, however, be more accurate to say that Henryson perceives the
subtler aspects of Chaucer's disclaimers, a subtlety evinced in the above
instance by the fact that Chaucer proceeds to open the Canticus Troili
with a translation of one of Petrarch's sonnets (11.400-420), thus
conjoining it with material drawn and freely adapted from Boccaccio's II
Filostrato. Chaucer may have his sources, but they are not what he
claims them to be and he is far from following them slavishly. His
exaggerated claim to be doing so to the letter only serves to highlight this
fact.
The idea that modern writers can have merits comparable to those
of ancient writers, and can thus be praised for their literary activity, is
also expressed by Henryson in the discussion of the provenance of the
'vther quair' (1.61) from which the narrative of Cresseid's fate is
supposedy derived:
Quha wait gif all that Chauceir wrait was trew?
32. Machan, 298.
33. Ibid., 281.
34. Troilus and Criseyde, in Riverside Chaucer, pp.473-585.
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Nor I wait nocht gif this narratioun
Be authoreist, or feindit of the new
Be sum poeit, throw his inventioun
Maid to report the lamentatioun
And wofull end of this lustie Cresseid [...].
(11.64-69)
The question ofwhether the 'vther quair' partakes of an established
auctoritas or is a wholly new invention is raised here only to be left
unexamined and unresolved. In the next stanza Henryson plunges into
the narrative of this mysterious book with the words 'Quhen Diomeid had
all his appetyte' (1.71). This suggests that the questions raised are felt to
be of little importance, and that the tale is worth recounting regardless of
whether it is history or fiction, ancient or modern: one may treat new and
established authors alike. Each has his own valid contribution to make.
Furthermore, the 'vther quair' is afforded the same status as the
work of the auctor Chaucer. Chaucer's poem is not taken as a definitive
work whose authority must always be deferred to, but is seen as one of a
number of possible constructions of the story of Troilus and Cresseid.
The historical accuracy of the Troilus is in doubt just as much as that of
Henryson's alleged source: 'Quha wait gif all that Chaucer wrait was
trew?' In thus emphasising the provisionality of both Chaucer's work and
the other text, Henryson recognises the value of both while allowing them
to co-exist with their differentiating qualities intact, and he leaves open
the possibility of other legitimate constructions of the story in which
other writers may introduce their own innovations. Hence, while the
Troilus and the Testament disagree in their accounts of the fates of
Troilus and Cresseid (in the former Troilus dies without seeing Cresseid
again after she goes to Diomeid, while in the latter they do in fact meet
again), both poems can nevertheless be seen as equally valid on their own
terms. The texts which Henryson cites are not arranged in a hierarchy of
auctoritas, despite the fact that earlier in the Middle Ages the anonymity
of the 'vther quair' would have severely limited its worth in comparison to
the work of an established auctor35. Nor are the differences between
them minimised in an attempt to stress their conformity with unified
truth. Rather both texts are seen as distinctive and co-equal literary
contributions within an open textual field. It seems that auctores need no
35. See Authorship, pp. 11-12.
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longer harmonise with each other in a univocal and undifferentiated
auctoritas, but are permitted their own idiosyncrasies and innovations.
This tendency to recognise, accept and even respect the
individuating features of a writer's work accords with the implications of
Henryson's emphasis on Chaucer's rhetorical prowess. This emphasis not
only foregrounds Chaucer's active contribution to the Troilus, but also
tends to represent his work as a model to be imitated rather than as a
definitive source of auctoritas. In this we see an attitude towards
Chaucer similar to that ofDunbar, where rather than inviting a self-
deprecating deference, Chaucer's work is instead seen as inspiring other
writers to actively emulate his achievements in their own literary
productions. Again, the emphasis is on original and distinctive literary
activity as a legitimate goal for the writer, and one authorised by the
example of established auctores.
The implications of Henryson's treatment of both Chaucer and the
author of the 'vther quair' are thus quite different from the attitude
generally prevalent earlier in the Middle Ages where, in the words of
Alistair Minnis, 'no "modern" writer could decently be called an auctor in
a period where men saw themselves as dwarfs standing on the shoulders
of giants, i.e. the ancients.' (.Authorship, p. 12). Instead Henryson
suggests that modern writers may have their own distinctive things to
say, and should be approached on that basis rather than denigrated in
comparison to ancient auctores.
The parallels with the attitudes of Douglas, and of Petrarch, are
clear. Yet for all its humanistic overtones, further analysis will show that
the attitudes underlying Henryson's conception of authorial role in the
Testament are thoroughly Scholastic. Those aspects of his work which
depart most radically from traditional medieval concepts of literary
authorship are in fact introduced as part of a critical and modificatory
engagement with the theoretical traditions he inherits, an engagement
comparable to his creative treatment of medieval rhetorical traditions as
described by Kindrick. The new concepts which appear in Henryson's
work will be shown to have been shaped within the framework of
Scholastic literary theory and to retain its fundamental concerns about
the nature of literary signification, so that those concepts receive a very




The differences between the innovations which appear in Henryson's
work and the similar attitudes found in Renaissance humanism can be
illustrated by comparing the presentation of auctores in the Testament
with Douglas' view ofVirgil in the Eneados. Douglas' attitudes are
superficially comparable to conventional Scholastic theory in that he
assigns Virgil an almost divine level of authority, emphasising the
richness of his sentence, the depth of his insight, and the perfection of his
style:
Quha may thy versis follow in all degre
In bewtie, sentence and in grauite? [...]
OfHelicon so drank thou dry the flude
That of thy copios fouth or plenitude
All mon purches drink at thi sugurit tun;
So lamp of day thou art, and schynand son [...].
Thou art Vesper, and the day stern at morow;
Thow Phebus lightnar of the planetis all -
I not quhat dewly I the clepe sail,
For thou art al and sum, quhat nedis more,
Of Latyn poetis that sens wes or befor.
(Bk I, Prol., 11.53-65)
The proliferation of terms of praise, culminating in the inexpressibility
topos of'I not quhat dewlie I the clepe sail', clearly stresses the
superlative and transcendent merit ofVirgil, while the association of him
with the heavenly bodies places him on a level approaching the divine.
Terms such as 'copiose', 'plenitud', 'al and sum', emphasise the fullness of
meaning ofVirgil's works which recalls the Scholastic assimilation of the
meaning of the works of auctores to the comprehensive vision embodied in
the divine Word.
Yet Douglas differs from the Scholastics in that this praise of his
auctor is accompanied by an emphasis on Virgil's individual creative
power, on the distinguishing features of his literary achievement, and on
his value as a model for new writers to emulate in their own works. This
is apparent from his view of translation as involving a respect for the
distinctive qualities of the source text, and as requiring the translator to
exercise his own poetic craft in order to emulate those qualities in his own
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historical and cultural context36. For Douglas, the positive emphasis on
Virgil's quasi-divine powers and insight is accompanied by an awareness
that his literary achievement is bounded by concrete circumstance, the
Aeneid being viewed as an individuated and distinctive work, produced
within a specific historical environment and employing particular
cultural resources. In his insistence on the need to be aware of and
respect these features ofVirgil's work, Douglas' attitude towards
authorship expresses a sense of the contiguity of the human and the
divine, the particular and the universal, wherein the individuating and
diversified elements of temporal reality retain an essential and
irreducible value.
This attitude is evident in the thought of other Renaissance
humanists. Erasmus, for instance, displays it in his rendition of the first
line of the Gospel of St John when producing his new Latin translation of
the Bible. What had previously been translated as 'In principio erat
verbum' becomes 'In principio erat sermo'. As Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle
has argued, in thus replacing 'verbum' with 'sermo' as a translation of the
Greek 'logos', Erasmus effects a dramatic change in emphasis from what
had gone previously37.
In the traditional medieval view, Verbum expresses the singularity
of the divine Word and is contrasted with the inherent plurality of human
words which necessarily depart from this ideal unity. Such multiplicity is
associated with the limits of human perspective: unable to grasp the
Word in its singularity, fallen humanity can only arrive at partial and
provisional versions thereof. This view is notably expressed by Henryson
in 'The Preaching of the Swallow', where he contrasts 'The profound wit
off God omnipotent' to whom all things are present 'Befoir the sicht of his
diuinite' (11.1622-28), with the weak understanding of humanity, for
whom it is difficult 'To knaw the thingis in nature manifest' (1.1642):
For God is in his power infinite,
36. The extent to which Douglas actually practises what he preaches has been a
matter of some debate. For an analysis of Douglas' literary practice as a translator
which sees him as essentially faithful to his ideals, see Priscilla Bawcutt, Gavin
Douglas: A Critical Study (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1976), pp.95-163.
A.E.C. Kanitz, however, sees Douglas as lacking any real historical sense in his
translation and as frequently, perhaps without realising it, medievalising Virgil. See his
'From Aeneid to Eneados: Theory and Practice of Gavin Douglas's Translation',
Medievalia et Humanistica, 17 (1991), 81-97 (esp. p.93).
37. On Erasmus' translation and the controversy it provoked, see Marjorie
O'Rourke Boyle, Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology (Toronto and Buffalo:
University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp.1-31.
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And mannis saull is febill and ouer small,
Off vnderstanding waik and unperfite
To comprehend him that contenis all.
(11.1643-49)
The representations produced by fallen humanity can only provide a
partial and uncertain vision. In order to approach the certitude of the
divine it is necessary to transcend such limits.
For Erasmus, however, the word 'sermo', especially when
considered as replacing 'verbum' in the first sentence of John's Gospel,
presents the diversified aspects of human language as already inscribed
within the 'logos'. Erasmus thus aims to affirm the positive connection
between human and divine language without compromising or reducing
the individuated qualities of the former. As Eugene Vance has noted,
where the contrast of Verbum and verba suggests the inadequacy of
human language which the soul must transcend in order to approach the
divine, for Erasmus the logos as sermo becomes a legitimising paradigm
for the proper exercise of eloquence:
Erasmus associated verbum with the inner activity of the soul
struggling to extricate itself from the world, while sermo signified a
notion of divine oratory as colloquial fraternalism in Christ,
expressed not only through the inner man but through the
institutions of national grammars as well.38
Hence the poet's creative activity is seen as mirroring the divine act of
creation, a view expressed by Sir Philip Sidney:
...] Give right honour to the heavenly Maker of that maker, who
raving made man to his own likeness set him beyond and over all
;he works of that second nature [i.e. physical nature]: which in
nothing he showeth so much as in poetry, when with the force of a
divine breath he bringeth things forth surpassing her doings [...].39
For Douglas, Erasmus and other Renaissance humanists, the positive
connection between human language and divine vision occurs in an
almost eucharistic form, whereby the two can meet with neither being
compromised. A sense of the plenitude of the auctor's meaning can be
maintained while giving the fullest regard to those creative and
individuating factors.
In this Erasmus and Douglas clearly differ from the Scholastics,
who tend to view such particularising factors as limitations of human
verba which distance meaning from the certitude of the divine Verbum.
This sense of distance underlies the interpretative freedom shown by
38. Vance, pp.319-20. See also Boyle, pp.28-31, 140-41.
39. Sir Philip Sidney, A Defence ofPoetry, ed. J. Van Dorsten (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1966), pp.24-5.
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medieval exegetes as they differentiate the comprehensive unity of the
transcendent intentio which underlies the text into particularised
formulations. A given reading which foregrounds specific teachings and
tenets of faith is not to be understood as the final word on the text. It is
to be viewed as having been defined with reference to a specific pedagogic
discipline and to the moral and educational requirements of the audience
being addressed. While this introduces a recognition and acceptance of
the interpretative activity of the exegete, who provides one particular
construction of a text's overall meaning, that activity is intrinsically
related to the limitations of human vision, which is incapable of grasping
the comprehensive intentio auctoris in its totality.
Furthermore, the threat that this negative sense of the contrast
between Word and words might result in an undermining of authority is
neutralised by having it operate in tandem with a sense of the positive
connection between the two. The sententia adduced by the exegete,
despite its inadequacy in the face of the unified body of meaning within
which the text resonates, derives a universal validity from its
participation therein. This participation provides meaning with a point
of origin which transcends the contingent constraints that shape the
exegete's interpretative decisions. Indeed, the exegete's activity is seen to
consist in the actualisation of truths which exist in potente within the
comprehensive intentio auctoris. The awareness of the contingent factors
which necessitate the differentiation of a unified body of truth into
diverse aspects is thus contained within a framework which affirms the
ideality of meaning, its ultimate transcendence of textuality. For the
Scholastics, then, when meaning is considered as having been influenced
by the interpretative activity of the exegete and shaped according to his
particular motivations and concerns, it is viewed as inadequate in the
face of the divine Word. When it is considered as having been already
implicit within the Word and as thus subsisting prior to the exegete's
interpretative activity, its authority is affirmed.
It is this Scholastic conception of the relation between meaning
and circumstance which underlies Henryson's attitudes towards
authorship in the Testament. For all that Henryson expresses a view in
which literary texts are seen as original and distinctive productions of an
individual auctor, inviting emulation and new creativity, his focus on
such features is accompanied not by a positive sense of the fullness of an
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auctor's meaning, but by an awareness of its limitations. It is precisely in
so far as Chaucer's text may not be true, instead being only a partial and
inadequate construction, that the active creation of new works modelled
on his own is authorised. Henryson's view of the literary text as
expressing the individual concerns and motivations of the auctor is
accompanied not by any sense of the quasi-divine nature of the auctor's
insight and creativity, but by a recognition of the partial and provisional
nature of his text's meaning. It is this recognition which legitimises the
production of different and original works. Individual creativity is thus,
for Henryson, a consequence of the limitations of human vision.
The legitimising of authorial creativity and originality which
appears in the Testament is thus founded on the same sense of distance
from the fullness of the divine Word as underlies the interpretative
freedom claimed by Scholastic exegetes. Where Henryson differs from his
Scholastic forebears is in his refusal to reabsorb this sense of distance
within an affirmation of the certitude which obtains from the authorising
connection to the Verbum. Henryson certainly presents the narrative of
the 'vther quair' as being worthy of consideration despite the doubts as to
its provenance and authority. But by framing it within these doubts he
encourages one to view the text with a critical eye, markedly qualifying
the assent which it commands. Whatever moral or spiritual import the
narrative may have remains intimately bound up with the circumstances
within which it was produced. Unlike the sententiae which Scholastic
exegetes adduce, the relation between the significance of the Testament
and universally applicable norms is an irreducibly oblique one.
IfHenryson's sensitivity to the ways in which texts are bounded
and individuated by the temporal constraints within which they are
produced associates his attitudes with those characteristic ofRenaissance
humanism, his depiction of such particularising factors as something
which compromises the ideal certitude which can be attached to a text's
significance marks his divergence from the perspectives of figures such as
Douglas and Erasmus. Henryson maintains the Scholastic and early-
medieval suspicion of those elements of literature which focus attention
on the ways in which meaning is produced. But rather than reducing
such elements to a merely instrumental function and defining a text's
significative structure as one of indicial reference, Henryson foregrounds
their influence in the construction ofmeaning and confronts all the
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inadequacies which acceptance of that influence entails. His view of
literary texts as distinctive products of authorial creativity which invite
emulation and the exercise of new creativity on the part of other writers
is underpinned by a destabilising sense of the contingent limitations
which characterise the significance of such particularised works. In this,
while departing from the traditional norms of academic Scholastic
literary theory, Henryson's depiction of authorship in the Testament
remains rooted in the attitudes towards literary representation which
that framework provides.
That the conceptual framework of medieval Scholasticism should
provide the materials from which Henryson's literary innovations are
produced demonstrates the extent to which his relation to tradition is a
creative and transformative one. Scholastic literary theory does not
govern Henryson's work as a normative set of protocols. Rather, it
provides him with a dynamic conceptual network which lends itself to
being opened in new and different ways, making possible the very aspects
ofHenryson's literary attitudes which bring him closest to the positions of
Renaissance humanism.
6
The different images of the auctor which appear in Henryson's works are
at the core of a complex nexus of attitudes towards literature. Henryson's
attitudes towards authorship raise broader issues concerning the nature
of literary signification and the process of reading. These attitudes are
thus connected to a more general reflection on the nature of literary
discourse in which the definitions and protocols of Scholastic literary
theory are rigorously interrogated. This interrogative approach to
Scholastic theory underlies and accounts for one of the most striking
features ofHenryson's constructions of authorial role: the fact that they
tend in such various directions. On the one hand, the depiction in the
Fables of the intentio auctoris as a transcendent and comprehensive body
ofmeaning which is assimilated to the divine Word, and which authorises
a wide diversity of legitimate interpretations, opens the text onto a body
of universal truth which extends its significance far beyond that
established within the frame of the text. In these terms any adduced
meaning is validated by its consonance with Christian doctrine and by its
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being fitted to the ethical requirements of the reader. Correct reading
consists in relating the text to a prior moral or spiritual truth and, in
recognition of its normative status, bringing one's own life into conformity
with the universal wisdom communicated therein.
On the other hand, the depiction of the auctor as an individual
with his own concerns and idiosyncrasies represents a text's significance
as being bounded by particularising contexts and thus much further
removed from any ideal extra-textual basis. Within this framework,
forces such as the author's individual motivations, the constraints of
temporal circumstances, and the rules of art all contribute to the shaping
of a determinate meaning which remains closely bound up with the
material signifier. Reading must thus involve a close attention to the
details of the text in order to discover the specific character of the intentio
which it embodies. If the first view of authorship invites one to
understand a text's significance as an array of universal norms the grasp
of which will enable one to raise the actual to the level of the ideal, this
second view emphasises the ways in which that significance is radically
circumscribed by the individuating and differentiating constraints of
actuality, which for Henryson drastically compromise the normativity
and ideality of meaning.
Henryson is wholly comfortable with neither of these alternatives.
His depiction of authorship in the Testament demonstrates a desire to see
literary meaning being as closely related to concrete circumstance as
possible, in line with the affective and ethical emphasis of Scholastic
literary theory. Equally, his awareness of the limitations which attend
such particularised significance in its departure from any transcendent
basis makes clear his continued indebtedness to the idealising tendency
of Scholasticism. Perhaps more than any other writer of the time,
Henryson is acutely sensitive to the tension which arises between these
two aspects of Scholastic literary theory in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries and the difficulty of reconciling them. The shifting views of
authorship which appear in his work articulate an uncertainty over how
to define the function of literature in the light of the growing sense of
disparity between the particular and the universal.
These different views of authorship, however, also testify to
Henryson's serious desire to find a response to this sense of disparity in
terms which can maintain both the key emphases of Scholastic theory.
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His work sees a variety of strategies being adopted and tested in order to
provide some sense of contiguity between the ideal and the actual. Thus,
as was argued in the previous chapter, 'The Cock and the Jasp1 and 'The
Trial of the Fox' both aim to reaffirm the value of heuristic interpretation,
with the text being seen as framed within a comprehensive intentio
auctoris which exists in potential to a broad range of valid
interpretations. But this reaffirmation is couched in such a way as to
underscore the need to accompany reading with penitential self-
examination, relating moral norms back to the particulars of one's own
life. A similar concern underlies the suggestion that modern auctores can
participate with the ancients in a transcendent and undifferentiated
auctoritas: Aesop's injunction to the narrator of 'The Lion and the Mouse',
'My fair child, / Perswaid the kirkmen ythandly to pray' (11.1615-16)
affirms that both writers commonly participate in and communicate a
unified body of universal wisdom, while at the same time underscoring
the fact that such wisdom remains directly relevant to the world
addressed by the modern auctor. If the Fables never settles on a single
satisfactory resolution of the difficulties which it addresses, it is because,
as 'The Two Mice' demonstrates, the problem is such that the
interpretation of temporal circumstance in the light of a priori moral
categories gives an inadequate and insensitive account of its complexities,
while at the same time remaining necessary if one is to arrive at any
meaningful understanding of the facts and processes of existence.
The discussion of authorship which prefaces the narrative of The
Testament ofCresseid is part ofwhat is perhaps Henryson's fullest
attempt to provide a comprehensive response to the problems
foregrounded in 'The Two Mice'. In stressing the text's firm grounding in
the constraints of temporal reality and its resultant provisional status,
Henryson emphasises the inadequacy of any attempt fully to embody
truth in literary representation. The Testament thus avoids any
totalising absorption of particular reality within simple moral categories
by signalling its own status as a necessarily partial textual construct. By
textualising the Testament in this way, Henryson seeks to preserve the
ethical focus of Scholastic literary theory in the face of the gulf between
the universal and the particular, aiming to present a moralising focus
more fully aware of the complexities of contingent existence which
prevent its easy assimilation to moral absolutes. How Henryson develops
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this aim within the narrative of the Testament, and how he balances it
with the need to preserve a sense of the ideal basis ofmeaning, form the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Five
Hard is thy Dome: Judgement
and Perspectivism in The
Testament ofCresseid
Jam vide quam stultum sit in tanta corpia verissimarum
sententiarum, quae de illis verbis erui possunt temere affirmare,
quam earum Moyses potissimum senserit; et perniciosis
contentionibus ipsam offendere charitatem, propter quam dixit
omnia, cujus dicta conamur exponere.
(Augustine, Conf., XII, xxv, col.840)
1
Modern critics of The Testament ofCresseid are strikingly divided into
two opposing camps: those who regard the poem as a confident
affirmation of faith in divine providence and justice, and those who view
its significance as entirely secular1. The former opinion is succinctly
expressed by E.M.W. Tillyard:
The consequences [of Cresseid's actions] are not the mere facts that
Cresseid was punished and died a leper, but that through the
working of God's will she was punished, brought to penitence, andended by taking the blame on herself: in fact the story of her
salvation according to the Christian scheme.2
Proponents of this Christianising perspective tend to view the Testament
as expounding an ascetic, other-worldly morality. John MacQueen
comments negatively on Cresseid's nostalgia for the physical comforts
which she has lost:
This lipper ludge tak for thy burelie hour,
And for thy bed tak now ane bunche of stro,
For waillit wyne and meitis thou had tho,
Tak mowlit breid, peirrie and ceder sour [...].
(11.438-41)
To MacQueen this demonstrates that 'Even now the appetitive reveals
itself, as once again Cresseid remembers the food she had eaten in her
"triumphand" past.' (Robert Henryson, p.87) Tillyard observes that
1. On the Christian/secular debate over the Testament, see Dolores L. Noll, 'The
Testament of Cresseid: Are Christian Interpretations Valid?', Studies in Scottish
Literature, 9 (1971), no.l, 16-25, and Lee W. Patterson 'Christian and Pagan in The
Testament ofCresseid', Studies in Philology, 52 (1973), 696-714.
2. E.M.W. Tillyard, Five Poems: 1470-1870 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1948),
P-17.
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Cresseid's bequeathing of her corpse 'With wormis and taidis to be rent'
(1.578) recalls the contemptus mundi topos and indicates the 'otherworldly
morality' of the poem3. Denton Fox describes Cresseid's moral progress
as one where she 'begins to repent and to spurn earthly love' and argues
that 'Christianity and the condemnation of earthly love are clearly
enough implicit in the end of the Testament.'4 He suggests, rather
indecisively, that Diana, to whom Cresseid leaves her spirit, is to be
equated with 'the Trinity or with the divine essence', or that at any rate
'Diana is a fairly obvious surrogate for God - or possibly for the Virgin
Mary, with whom she was sometimes compared.'5 Whichever of Fox's
alternatives one opts for, the message is that Cresseid has repudiated her
'excessive desire for earthly safety and comfort', and that the poem
concludes with a condemnation of such worldly concerns6. The
viewpoints of Tillyard, Fox, and MacQueen leave little room for any
positive appreciation of earthly pleasure or regret at its loss. Any
evaluation of the action based on such sentiments is seen as 'a
worldliness ofmoral judgement' based on 'false standards' which Cresseid
herself has rejected7.
This privileging of spiritual values at the expense ofmore
mundane concerns is also evident in Fox's account of the narrator's role
in the poem. Fox argues that the poem's compassionate depiction of the
earthly suffering and loss which Cresseid undergoes is significant only in
so far as it reveals the deluded narrator's inability to perceive her
culpability and the ultimate justice of her fate. The narrator's attitude is
'morally imbecilic', and 'stupidly and passionately involved'8. For Fox, the
narrator's sympathy is evoked only to be dismissed as erroneous, a result
of the sinfulness and folly which we all share with Cresseid:
Henryson makes him [the narrator], like Cresseid herself, a figure
who is both sympathetic and sinful, so that we must condemn him
3. Tillyard, pp.24-5.
4. The Testament ofCresseid, ed. Denton Fox (London: Nelson, 1968), pp.56, 57.
5. Ibid., p.57n.
6. Ibid., pp.56-7.
7. MacQueen, Robert Henryson, p.86.
8. Fox, ed., Testament, pp.56, 23. For a similar view of the narrator, see R.J.
Lyall, Narrative and Morality in Middle Scots Poetry (PhD thesis: University of
Glasgow, 1982), pp. 188-89. See also Larry M. Sklute, 'Phebus Descending: Rhetoric and
Moral Vision in Henryson's Testament of Cresseid', English Literary History, 44 (1977),
189-204 (pp. 191-2, 197-202). Sklute, unlike Fox and Lyall, does not see the poem as
exressing Christian optimism. He argues that the Testament expounds a dour, bleak,
and ultimately unforgiving morality, in which any hope of salvation is withheld.
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at the same time as we see him to be like us.
(p.55)
Construing an emotive response to human loss as evidence of
concupiscence, Fox privileges approval of her spiritual regeneration at
the expense of dismay at her physical decline and loss of temporal
happiness. For him, as for Tillyard and MacQueen, to focus on the tragic
worldly dimensions of the poem's action is to remain blind to the fact that
Cresseid's fate has a purificatory and redemptive function within a
benevolent providential order. Seen in terms of Cresseid's spiritual
progress, the poem depicts not loss but gain, and the narrated events
have been all for the good, making sorrow over them unnecessary and
foolish.
These critics undoubtedly highlight significant aspects of the poem
in terms of the providential implications of the narrative. But their
dismissal of the narrator's sympathy, and of the poem's tragic secular
dimensions, constitutes a serious neglect9. As Douglas Duncan has
pointed out, the Testament depicts Cresseid's leprosy in a graphic manner
which powerfully evokes horror and sympathy for her suffering. This
aspect of the poem demands that Cresseid's fate be understood with
reference to the human misery to which she finds herself exposed, and
invites an appreciation of the positive value of the secular happiness
which she has lost10. In diminishing the importance of the Testament's
secular emphasis, MacQueen, Fox, and Tillyard provide only a partial
understanding of the poem.
Those critics inclined to view the Testament in secular terms are
much more varied in their assessments of the poem than the
Christianising critics. But they do display a common tendency to deny
that it contains any metaphysical elements, insisting that its perspective
is wholly worldly. C.W. Jentoft argues that 'Cresseid's sin is courtly, not
Christian'. This view is shared by Dolores Noll, who affirms that the
positive value which the poem attaches to the love of Troilus and Cresseid
cannot be sustained within a Christian framework as it finds sexual
9. MacQueen does refer to 'the pathos of Henryson's realism1 in the recognition
scene between Troilus and Cresseid (Robert Henryson, p.91), but his reading of the poem
nowhere examines the positive significance of the poem's pathetic and realistic
elements.
10. See Douglas Duncan, 'Henryson's Testament ofCresseid', Essays in
Criticism, 11 (1961), 128-35 (esp. p.129).
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expression outwith marriage11. She argues that 'Henryson has created,
for the purposes of this poem, a love universe which is both self-contained
and eclectic. Its self-containment precludes a relationship to a larger,
Christian world' (p. 18). Neither Noll nor Jentoft pay much attention to
the poem's accent on human suffering, preferring to emphasise its
positive recommendation of the secular morality of courtly love. Other
critics, however, assign the more negative aspects of the poem's tragic
action a central role in defining its significance.
For A.C. Spearing, the significance of the Testament lies in the
bare facts of decay and loss which it reveals:
At the end of Troilus and Criseyde, Chaucer is able to make the
transition from earthly to heavenly love acceptable on at least an
emotional level, because the love of Troilus and Criseyde has been
presented as sharing the universal qualities of the love of God. But
m Henryson's poem, by the very nature of his story, earthly love
has no such qualities, and no positive alternative can be proposed.
There is simply the grim warning - 'Your roising reid to rotting
shall retour' (464) - and the casting off of illusion - 'Be war tharfoir,
approichis neir your hour' (468). The pattern disclosed by the
poem is in fact meaningless so far as any future action is
concerned. From it can be deduced only that 'Fortoun is fikkil
quhen scho beginnis and steiris'(469). [...] On such a view of
reality, however strong the will to moralize, Cresseid's treachery
and her death, once they have themselves been recounted, do leave
nothing more to say.12
In this view the poem recommends no positive system of values, whether
courtly or Christian: it simply displays 'the inescapable factuality of
physical and mental anguish' (ibid., p.184). For Spearing, it is the poem's
stress on the 'mere facts' of earthly misery which defines its significance,
and which is the proper object of critical attention.
E. Duncan Aswell argues that the poem does indeed affirm a
positive set of values, but he does not consider these to be based on any
transcendent criteria:
The narrator and Cresseid [...] both belong in a secular universe,
not one in which Fortune is seen as an aspect of or partial and
imperfect perspective upon divine providence, as Boethius or
Gower would have emphasised. Henryson's planet-gods are
immanent deities, natural forces, but their dominance is not shown
to be counteracted through a belief in God.13
11. C.W. Jentoft, 'Henryson as Authentic "Chaucerian": Narrator, Character
and Courtly Love in The Testament of Cresseid', Studies in Scottish Literature, 10 (1974),
94-102 (p.100). Noll, 22-23.
12. A.C. Spearing, Criticism and Medieval Poetry, 2nd edn (London: Edward
Arnold, 1972), pp. 188-89.
13. E. Duncan Aswell, 'The Role of Fortune in The Testament of Cresseid',
Philological Quarterly, 46 (1967), 471-87 (p.485).
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The poem reveals Cresseid's actions to be folly and error, and opposes to
them the steadfast love of Troilus who embodies a mode of behaviour
which provides greatest freedom from the destructive power of Fortune
(ibid., p.483). But the values attached to their actions derive solely from
their capacity to promote human happiness in the face of the negative
forces to which existence is naturally subject:
Since our life consists wholly of impermanence, of dependence upon
external conditions and internal states of mind that exist only to
change, and since man has so little control over them, each man
must strive to retain control over himself. In doing so, he at least
adapts himself to Fortune, instead of fighting against her, and this,
the poem demonstrates from beginning to end, is all that man can
do.
(Ibid., pp.486-7)
The judgements which the Testament presents are thus seen to be based
on utilitarian rather than a priori grounds. For Aswell, as with Spearing,
recognition of and sensitivity to the human suffering which results from
Cresseid's actions is the central factor which should shape our
assessment of them.
It is my contention that, while both the secular and Christianising
perspectives on the Testament elucidate aspects of the poem, neither one
of them gives a wholly adequate account. The Testament in fact defines
the meaning of the events which it depicts in both secular and
providential terms, authorising the perspectives of both sides of the
modern critical debate while at the same time exceeding the narrow
strictures of either. As will be argued below, the poem certainly invites
an idealising mode of judgement, encouraging one to understand
Cresseid's actions and fate in terms of the a priori moral law whereby
their significance is determined with reference to the metaphysical
opposition of voluptas and caritas. But at the same time the stress on the
stark factuality of human suffering invites a pragmatically-defined mode
of understanding, in which the worldly implications of human actions are
assigned a central role in determining the values attached to them.
Henryson seeks to reconcile an idealising mode ofjudgement with one in
which circumstantial criteria are paramount, aiming to overcome the
tension between these perspectives which appears in fables such as 'The
Two Mice1. The secular and Christianising critics, in proffering readings
which privilege one of these perspectives at the expense of the other, have
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seriously misrepresented a text whose structure is not exclusory but
comprehensive.
That the Testament contains multiple levels of significance has
already been suggested by Robert L. Kindrick, who observes that in the
Middle Ages, 'The integration of varieties of interpretation throughout
the narrative of an entire text was a generally accepted exegetical
principle.'14 Moreover, defining these levels ofmeaning according to the
fourfold Biblical exegetical schema, Kindrick proposes that one level
posits a localised significance and the other a universal one:
Henryson's Testament of Cresseid seems to be constructed basically
at the level of the sensus historicus and the sensus tropologicus. [...]
By modern aesthetic standards, the poem is hardly vulnerable to
criticism for working at both levels. In fact it might be praised for
its relative modernity.
(p.207)
The Testament, however, departs from the traditional medieval
conception of the multi-layered text in the nature of the relation which
Henryson establishes between the different levels of his poem. The
secular and metaphysical levels ofmeaning in the Testament are
organised in a pattern of ironic juxtaposition which leads to violent and
destabilising disjunctions between them. This sets Henryson apart from
his Scholastic forebears for whom the diverse sententiae which can be
ascribed to a text are all validated through their participation in the
divine Word. Departing from this affirmation of authority, Henryson
organises his poem in such a way as to accentuate the deficiencies of the
meanings which it posits. The different levels of significance call each
other into question, each highlighting what the other excludes while
remaining deficient in itself. It is this disjunctive structure which
underlies the lack of contact between the different modern critical
assessments of the Testament.
The rest of this chapter will examine the interaction of the
different levels of significance in the Testament. It will be demonstrated
that the poem is structured in a manner which aims to resolve the
tension between modes of judgement based on circumstantial and
absolute criteria. Henryson seeks to produce a mode of representation
adequate to fulfil both the affective and idealising imperatives of
Scholastic literary theory, permitting meaning to be adapted to take
14. Kindrick, Henryson and the Medieval Arts ofRhetoric, p.204.
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account of particular circumstances while retaining a sense of its
transcendent basis. The disjunctive organisation of the poem's secular
and providential levels of significance produces an ironic structure which
operates according to the pattern proposed by H.E. Tolliver in his 'From
Moralitas to Irony', being aimed to register and address the tensions
between these perspectives in order to embrace and comprehend them
(see above, Ch.3, p. 105). In attempting to resolve the interpretative
problems which he faces, Henryson develops a mode of signification
which remains heavily indebted to the assumptions and imperatives of
Scholastic literary theory while radically modifying that theory through a
flexible and creative deployment of its resources.
2
The first indications in the Testament that the events depicted therein
are to be understood in both secular and spiritual terms appear in the
narrator's opening comments on Cresseid:
0 fair Cresseid, the flour and A per se
Of Troy and Greece, how was thow fortunait
To change in filth all thy femininitie,
And be with fleschelie lust sa maculait,
And go amang the Greikis air and lait,
Sa gigotlike takand thy foull plesance!
1 have pietie thow suld fall sic mischance!
(11.78-84)
The narrator's use of terms such as 'filth' and 'maculait' implies a
recognition of Cresseid's debased condition. The reference to her
contamination with 'fleschelie lust' indicates that her actions are here
being seen as innately corrupt in the light of an absolute moral law. Yet
the narrator's awareness of Cresseid's sinfulness does not result in mere
condemnation. His consideration of her behaviour concludes with a
reaction of pity.
The narrator's pitying outlook is one which gives priority to
material considerations in evaluating human actions. Cresseid is
described at the outset of the narrative with a stress on the sorrowful
temporal consequences of her actions: 'wofull end' (1.69), 'quhat distres
scho thoillit' (1.70), 'destitute / Off all comfort and consolatioun' (11.92-3).
The stress here is on the fact that Cresseid's behaviour has resulted in
her isolation from human society and in temporal misery. The narrator's
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compassion is thus based on a sense of the value of what she has lost or
thrown away. This attention to the significance which Cresseid's actions
accrue in their worldly ramifications differs from and balances those
aspects of the narrator's comments which stress their intrinsic depravity.
As noted above, critics such as Denton Fox and R.J. Lyall have
argued that the narrator's pity is steeped in concupiscence and that his
prioritising of the concrete significance of Cresseid's actions is to be
rejected. The narrator's perspective is considered to entail a worldliness
of judgement which obstructs his perception of either Cresseid's initial
sin, or the positive implications of her subsequent fate, as both are viewed
with an eye to their corporeal rather than spiritual significance. The
narrator's sensual outlook leads him to deny Cresseid's responsibility for
her own actions by ascribing her debased condition to the workings of
Fortune and denying that she is to be blamed for them. This is a view
which appears to be supported by aspects of the narrator's
characterisation which establish a parallel between him and Cresseid. At
the outset of the poem the narrator is, like Cresseid, a devotee ofVenus
who seeks the perpetuation ofworldly pleasure:
For I traistit that Venus, lufis quene,
To quhome sum tyme I hecht obedience,
My faidit hart of lufe scho wald mak grene,
And therupon with humbill reuerence
I thocht to pray hir hie magnificence;
Bot for greit cald as then I lattit was
And in my chalmer to the fyre can pas.
(11.22-28)
The past tenses of'traistit' and 'thocht', and the phrase 'sum tyme'
suggest that at the time ofwriting the narrator's faith in Venus has been
shaken. In this he parallels Cresseid's outlook in her accusation against
the gods:
O fals Cupide, is nane to wyte bot thow
And thy mother, of lufe the blind goddes!
3e causit me alwayis vnderstand and trow
The seid of lufe was sawin in my face,
And ay grew grene throw Jour supplie and grace.
Bot now, allace, that seid with froist is slane,
And I fra luifferis left, and all forlane.
(11.136-42)
The imagery of verdure being slain by frost in this passage echoes the
narrator's desire that 'my faidit hart of lufe scho wald mak grene', and
the thwarting of this wish as he is driven from his oratory by the cold.
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The frost and cold symbolise the natural processes of decay to which all
sensual pleasure is prone, as is indicated by the wintry imagery employed
in the poem's depiction of Saturn, who is a conventional figure of time
(11.155-68). The permanence which both the narrator and Cresseid expect
from sensual pleasures is based on a failure to understand that such
pleasures are by their very nature ephemeral. Craig McDonald's
observation on Cresseid can thus be extended to include the narrator:
Cresseid, like Boethius (II, Prose 1), is being punished for
committing a fatal error of judgement, the failure to recognise her
own mortality. She has placea herself in the hands of a variable
goddess and has expected her fortune to remain stable.15
These parallels seem to confirm the view that the narrator shares
Cresseid's sensual outlook and is thus disposed to be lenient towards her,
minimising the seriousness of her sin and shifting responsibility for her
predicament onto Fortune16.
This argument, however, oversimplifies the narrator's attitude
towards Cresseid, in which a censorious recognition of her inherent moral
degradation is conjoined with a sense of pity, rather than displaced by it.
The narrator's recognition of the essential impurity of Cresseid's
condition, and his disapproval of her 'fleschelie lust', are irreconcilable
with the claim that he remains concupiscently ignorant of the precepts of
the universal moral law. The possibility remains, of course, that his
attitude is confused, being divided between two incompatible attitudes.
But it is not clearly established that his pity does in fact conflict with
those aspects of his remarks which betoken a recognition of Cresseid's
sinfulness. The suggestion that his sympathy leads him to deny
Cresseid's responsibility for her own actions and predicament, placing the
blame instead on Fortune, is not borne out by the text. As E. Duncan
Aswell points out, the narrator's opening comments on Cresseid's
situation express an ambivalent understanding of the nature of Fortune,
mixing passive and active verbs ('was [...] fortunait', 'change', 'be [...]
maculait', 'go', 'takand', 'fall') in a manner which suggests that '"Fortune"
may be a wholly external force predetermining human events arbitrarily,
or it may be the manifestation of an individual's own freely chosen
preferences and inclinations.' (Aswell, p.473) The narrator's hedging over
this issue may indeed suggest an unwillingness to take responsibility for
15. Craig McDonald, 'Venus and the Goddess Fortune in The Testament of
Cresseid', Scottish Literary Journal, 4 (1977), no.2, 14-24 (p.16).
16. See Fox, ed., Testament, pp.49-55; Lyall, Narrative and Morality, pp.187-89.
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moral failings of his own which he sees mirrored in Cresseid. But there is
nothing to indicate that his compassion is uniquely associated with either
of the views of Fortune which the stanza proposes.
Where the narrator does present Cresseid as a victim of Fortune, it
is not her actions which he is defending, but her posthumous reputation:
I sail excuse als far forth as I may
Thy womanheid, thy wisdome and fairnes,
The quhilk fortoun hes put to sic distres
As hir pleisit, and nathing throw the gilt
Of the - throw wickit langage to be spilt.17
(11.87-91)
The narrator does not wholly deny the appropriateness of Cresseid's
denunciation at the hands of posterity. He vindicates her reputation only
as far as he may, which again indicates his awareness that some degree
of blame is warranted. What he excuses from condemnation is not
Cresseid's infidelity, but her praiseworthy qualities which he insists
should not be overlooked in a sweeping denigration of her character. This
aspect of the narrator's sympathy thus reflects only on the justness of
Cresseid's wholesale loss of reputation. It has no bearing whatsoever on
the question of her responsibility for her actions, and involves no denial of
their disconsonance with the moral law. Again, pity co-exists with a due
recognition of sinfulness. While the parallels between the narrator and
Cresseid certainly suggest that his own conduct is dominated by merely
carnal concerns, there is no evidence that his pity for Cresseid is to be
identified as a product of those concerns, any more than is his censure of
her.
Other aspects of the poem assign the narrator's pity for Cresseid a
significance which severely problematises the view that it is merely an
index of his carnal outlook. The 'pietie' expressed by the narrator in 1.84
of the poem is a pun: the word designates both pity and piety. This point
is underscored by the fact that Troilus, whose constancy and gentility
provide a structural contrast to Cresseid's flawed nature, is himself
described as feeling 'knichtlie pietie' (1.519) when stirred to his generous
act of charity by the recollection of Cresseid which the sight of her
deformed visage provokes. This associates pity with the very virtues
which are opposed in the poem to the vices of both Cresseid and the
17. For a reading of these lines as blaming Fortune for Cresseid's actions and
subsequent plight, see Lyall, Narrative and Morality, p.187.
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narrator. The connection between the narrator's pity and the attitudes of
Troilus is further underscored when Cresseid tells us that in his general
regard for women, Troilus defended their reputation: 'helpit thair
opinioun' (1.557). Troilus' behaviour thus recalls the narrator's desire to
protect Cresseid from the defamation of posterity. Indeed, as Troilus' pity
and virtue are manifested in an act of charity, 'pietie', far from being a
product of sensuality, becomes thematically associated with the 'cheritie1,
or caritas, with which the narrator closes the poem (1.612). This suggests
that the narrator's sympathetic attitude towards Cresseid is much more
than merely a product of his flawed vision, to be displaced by a morally
sound understanding. The semantic and thematic connections which the
poem establishes indicate that his pity, for all its secular orientation, is
not only compatible with the higher ideal of caritas, but may in fact be an
essential aspect of it.
Those aspects of the poem's opening which draw a parallel between
the narrator's sensual preoccupations and Cresseid's outlook certainly
raise doubts about the underlying motivation for his pity. But while
these parallels may problematise the precise status of his compassion,
they are far from establishing that it is definitely to be construed as
concupiscence. Indeed, the punning implications of 'pietie' suggest that
an understanding of Cresseid's actions which preserves the dominance of
the absolute moral law may not be incompatible with one which attends
to contingent circumstance, but that they can and should co-exist
harmoniously. The narrator's attitude towards Cresseid thus highlights
the difficulty of reconciling worldly-orientated and spiritually-orientated
perspectives, and at the same time suggests the possibility of a mode of
judgement which can combine both perspectives.
In the opening sections of the Testament the terms in which
worldly-orientated and idealising levels of judgement might be deemed
compatible are left unclear. But their conjunction is decisively
established in the transformation in the narrator's outlook between the
beginning and end of the poem, and in the advice which he consequently
offers to his female audience in the final stanza. As noted above, the
opening depiction of the narrator as a devotee of Venus indicates that,
whatever may be said of his attitude towards Cresseid, his concerns in his
own life have been dominated by sensuality. At the close of the poem,
however, his position has changed significantly:
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Now, worthie wemen, in this ballet schort,
Maid for Jour worschip and instructioun,
Of cheritie, I monische and exhort,
Ming not Jour lufe with fals deceptioun [...].
(11.610-13)
The key word here is 'cheritie', which establishes a contrast between the
narrator's initial devotion to Venus and his final disposition. The
narrator's perspective has shifted from his original concern with voluptas
towards a mode of understanding founded in caritas.
The importance of the term 'cheritie' in the poem is underscored by
the syntactic ambiguity of this closing passage. 'Cheritie' may be viewed
as the theme of the poem ('this ballet schort [...] Of cheritie'), as an
attribute of the poet ('Maid [...] Of cheritie'), as an attribute of the
narrator ('Of cheritie, I monische'), or as a quality to be desired in the
female audience ('Of cheritie [...] ming not Jour lufe with fals
deceptioun').18 The emphasis placed on 'cheritie' in the Testament, and its
opposition to the narrator's initial concern with voluptas, is a strong
indicator that the poem exposes the limitations and dangers of a merely
carnal outlook on the world and aims to inculcate an understanding of
temporal reality in terms of transcendent spiritual values. Yet the
transformation in the narrator's outlook does not lead him to dismiss
earthly love. The narrator's closing counsel to his female audience in the
spirit of 'cheritie' is merely 'ming not Jour lufe with fals deceptioun'
(1.613). As R.J. Lyall points out, 'the final stanza counsels fidelity, not
celibacy' (Narrative and Morality, p.211). The narrator's recommendation
of fidelity in human love, in accordance with the courtly ethos, presents it
as a mode of behaviour which brings one's life into conformity with the
virtue of caritas.
Moreover, the closing exhortation permits the value of such
conduct to be understood in terms of both its universal resonances and its
actual implications. That the Testament proffers a metaphysically-
justified recommendation of fidelity, positing a relation of harmony
between courtly love and divine love, has already been suggested by
critics who adopt a Christianising view of the poem. Tillyard observes
that 'the code of Love could in its way co-operate with the code of the
Church, even preparing its devotees for a transfer of allegiance'. He cites
Malory's remark, on Guenever's having become a nun, that she 'was a
18. See Lyall, Narrative and Morality, pp.184-85.
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true lover, and therefore she had a good end'19. A similar point has been
made by John MacQueen, who affirms that Henryson
treats the courtly love relationship, and the religion of love, as
types or allegories of relationships which in themselves are seen
and judged in terms ofChristian morality.
(.Robert Henryson, p.63)
Dolores Noll argues against this view, claiming that, while the poem
establishes an ideal of human love represented by Troilus1 fidelity to
Cresseid, the illicitly sexual nature of the love between them makes this
incompatible with medieval Christian morality. This, however,
misrepresents both the Testament and the morality to which she refers.
The sexual nature of Troilus and Cresseid's relationship, evident in
Chaucer's Troilus, is not mentioned at all by Henryson. And, after all,
'Quha wait gif all that Chauceir wrait was trew'. Henryson's emphasis is
on Troilus' fidelity to Cresseid as the defining feature of his relationship
with her: he pays no heed to what physical expression their love might
take.
Moreover, even if one grants the illicitly sexual nature of Troilus
and Cresseid's relationship, this does not nullify the ideal value of the
love which can, and on Troilus' part does, accompany such a relationship.
Medieval Christian morality is not as inflexible as Noll suggests.
Aquinas, it should be remembered, defines evil as an imperfect
participation in good, and observes that since good and being are
convertible, all acts must have some degree of goodness20. This, combined
with Aquinas' subtle awareness of how acts can be categorised as good in
some respects and as evil in others, should provide a check to any
assumption that Christian moralists can only respond to sin with a
sweeping and absolute judgement21. While the sexual form of Troilus'
love for Cresseid may, in Aquinas' terms, compromise the goodness of his
relationship with her considered as a complete and particular act, leading
it to be classified as sinful, this neither erases all trace of goodness from
their relationship, nor makes it sinful in every facet. The positive value
of Troilus' fidelity as an informing force on their relationship (and this is
the aspect of the relationship on which Henryson chooses to focus),
whatever form it may take, retains an essential integrity.
19. See Tillyard, pp.13-15 (p.14).
20. See ST, I-II, xviii, 1, resp.
21. See above, Ch.3, p.137, n.35.
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Moreover, despite Noll's claim that 'Malory's comment about
Guenever seems insufficient to carry the point' (p.22), Henryson is in fact
drawing on well-established late-medieval tradition in presenting a
harmonious relationship between earthly and divine love. Dante's
Beatrice provides one obvious parallel:
For some years I sustained him with my looks;
Showing my youthful eyes to him,
I led him in the right direction.
(.Purg., Canto XXX, 11.121-3)
Beatrice presents Dante's human love for her as an ennobling force which
can lead to higher levels of love. While still limited and far from being an
end in itself, it nevertheless remains in harmony with divine love, and
retains its relative validity as a lower form operating in concert with it.
Similarly, in The Kingis Quair a dove appears to James I as a symbol of
both divine grace and of his lady's mercy, combining divine and secular
love in a single image22. The faithful love of Troilus for Cresseid, and
Cresseid's recognition of the value of that love, can thus quite
legitimately be interpreted as being consonant with divine love23.
This consonance is indicated in Cresseid's recognition of the value
of Troilus' love for her, which is accompanied by a new awareness of the
transience of the pleasures she sought and of her own guilt in giving
herself over to the whims of fortune. The poem's structure, whereby
adversity leads to Cresseid's perceiving the true nature of the pleasures
to which she has dedicated herself and her own culpability for having
'clam vpon the fickill quehill sa hie' (1.550) is recognisably Boethian. The
deleterious effects of fortune are shown to operate within a broader
providential scheme whereby they reveal the true nature of the temporal
things in which Cresseid has placed her faith and reveal the
erroneousness of that faith24. Yet Cresseid's perception of the
ephemerality of the pleasures she sought does not lead to a rejection of
earthly love as a thing of no value. Rather, it leads her to a deeper
appreciation of the faithful love which she had rejected:
'Thy lufe, thy lawtie, and thy gentilnes
I countit small in my prosperitie,
22. The Kingis Quair, 179-85.
23. See Erwin Panofsky's observations on ideas about love in the Middle Ages in
Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1939), pp.98-103.
24. See McDonald, 'Venus and Fortune', pp. 19-20.
192
Sa efflated I was in wantones,
And clam vpun the fickill quehill sa hie [...]'
(11.547-50)
That Troilus1 love should be thus valued at the very point where Cresseid
recognises the transience of sensual pleasures clearly suggests that it is
seen to be of a more permanent and enduring nature, less prone to the
vicissitudes of Fortune, than the lust to which she gives herself over.
Cresseid in fact expressly contrasts the sensual nature of her inclinations
which make her mind "'in fleschelie foull affectioun / [...] inclynit to lustis
lecherous1" (1.558-8) with the noble love of Troilus, implying that the
latter is more than merely sensual.
The contrast which Cresseid draws between her own dedication to
sensuality and the virtue of Troilus strongly indicates that her
recognition of the positive value of fidelity is morally congruent with the
narrator's final rejection of voluptas and recognition of the merit of
caritas. The fact that it is Troilus' own act of charity to the lepers which
leads to Cresseid's perception of the worth of his steadfast love
strengthens this thematic connection between her final position and that
of the narrator. Rather than presenting a stark opposition between
human love and divine love, the Testament distinguishes two forms of
human love: one which is merely concerned with the pursuit of sensual
pleasure, and another more spiritual form, the steadfast nature of which
shadows and participates in the eternal and unchanging nature of the
divine. The poem assigns faithful human love its own relative validity
defined within an evaluative framework whose approbatory reference,
while metaphysically-grounded, nevertheless encompasses both secular
and spiritual undertakings.
The validity which secular love receives through its shadowing of
divine love, however, still prioritises transcendent reference as the
governor of signification: the value of human love, while displayed on the
level of particular existence, is seen to derive from an essential nature
which remains wholly external to and independent of actual context.
Similarly, the destruction of temporal happiness depicted in the poem
appears in these terms as a consequence of the distance from the stability
of the divine which results from sin. The worldly-orientated aspects of
the Testament, however, invite one to view the worldly suffering which
Cresseid undergoes as much more than an index of the iniquity of her
actions. The poem's stark evocation of human misery invites value-
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judgements which, rather than being dominated by metaphysical
considerations, involve a pragmatic cognisance of the material
implications of the different conducts of Troilus and Cresseid.
Hence, the narrator's closing remarks, while signalling the
metaphysically-grounded value which fidelity derives from its
participation in caritas, also invite the female audience to view its value
in worldly terms. His urging them to 'Beir in 3our mynd this sore
conclusion / Of fair Cresseid' (11.614-15) invokes the desire to avoid
temporal misery such as hers as a major motivation for embracing
fidelity. That the poem should conclude on such a note, inviting
consideration of Cresseid's 'sore conclusion', makes nonsense of those
interpretations which suggest that Cresseid's spiritual growth should
lead one to transcend concern over her material loss, and that the poem
should be seen as wholly positive in its depiction of her fate. The
impression ofmisery which the Testament creates is in fact of irreducible
importance to the poem's moral structure. The powerful and sympathetic
rendering of the factuality of human misery in the Testament demands
that the tragic consequences which ensue from Cresseid's actions should
in themselves be taken as a key factor in evaluating those actions. The
poem recommends virtuous love in terms which balance an awareness of
its shadowing of divine love with a sense of its pragmatic value in
promoting secular happiness. Henryson analyses the morality of human
actions both in terms of their relation to the universal moral law and in
terms of their particular ramifications on a human level, affirming a
harmonious relation between the two.
The pragmatic dimension of the value placed on courtly love in the
Testament is evident in Cresseid's warning to lovers that they should be
wary of fickleness such as hers. Cresseid condemns such fickleness not
only as a concupiscent priveleging of the temporal over the eternal, or of
the appetitive over the rational, but also as a mode of behaviour which
destroys the worldly ideal of true mutual love and the terrestrial
happiness which it brings. Hence she warns lovers not of the general
instability of earthly love, but of the difficulty of finding steadfast love
reciprocated: 'I lat 3ou wit, thair is richt few thairout / Quhome 3e may
traist to haue trew lufe agane' (11.563-4). From this perspective, it is in
terms of the destruction of the temporal happiness provided by faithful
love that actions such as Cresseid's are to be condemned, and it is in
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fostering such happiness that the value of faithful love is established.
Cresseid's final recognition that in her betrayal of Troilus, and of the
values which he embodies, she has thrown away the possibility of
temporal happiness works in concert with the poem's stark and humane
depiction of the earthly suffering and loss which she consequently
endures. The Testament invites a positive evaluation of faithful human
love which prioritises its secular implications and complements the
idealising focus on its transcendently-defined significance: the text's
metaphysical dimensions provide an absolute basis for the poem's value-
judgements, while its worldly focus grounds those judgements in the
concrete reality of human life.
The multi-layered significance of the Testament is thus designed to
make room for a sensitive concretising understanding of human actions
without losing sight of the absolute basis ofmoral judgement,
harmonising the two within a framework where the totality of an action's
significance is defined with reference both to its universal and its
particular resonances. The poem constructs a system of contrasts and
relations between merely sensual lust, faithful human love, and the
divine love of caritas, within which the implications of an action with
regard to worldly happiness reflect that action's consonance or
disconsonance with the moral law. This structure permits a perspectival
flexibility whereby actions may be evaluated in terms which foreground
either their secular or their spiritual significance. The alternative
emphases proffer distinct but complementary perspectives on a mode of
conduct that brings one's life into conformity with the moral law, and
their differing criteria ofjudgement unite in commonly encouraging one
to embrace such conduct. The Testament thus endorses Troilus' fidelity
and discommends Cresseid's licentiousness in terms which permit their
conduct to be understood both in idealising terms and according to the
significance which it acquires through its worldly ramifications.
This structure has a number of implications with regard to
Henryson's deployment of the resources of Scholastic literary theory. His
continuing commitment to the protocols and imperatives of Scholasticism
is evident in the distinction in the Testament's final stanza of discrete
levels of significance which inculcate the moral value of fidelity in terms
appropriate to different types of reader. The elderly narrator arrives at
an understanding of the poem's action which, as his closing exhortation
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makes clear, is couched in terms of the metaphysical opposition of
uoluptas and caritas. The 'worthie wemen' whom he addresses are
encouraged towards an understanding based on concrete sensible
grounds. The poem caters to both modes of understanding, with each
level of significance recommending in a different way a mode of behaviour
which brings one's life into harmony with the universal order. In this
respect Henryson's poem permits its audience to approach a simple virtue
in different ways, according to what is appropriate for their
circumstances and level of understanding25. Simple universally valid
moral standards are received according to different modes of
understanding which are determined by the particular contexts in which
these values are being applied. In thus catering for different readerly
perspectives, Henryson continues the ethical imperative of Scholastic
theory. Alistair Minnis1 observation that in medieval literary thought, 'A
single text can have different kinds of meaning, depending on the kind of
reader, or the kind of reading in which the reader is engaged at a given
time.' {Authorship, p.xvi) is as applicable to Henryson's Testament as it is
to the exegetical practices of academic Scholasticism.
It must also be noted, however, that Henryson's relation to the
ideas of his Scholastic forebears here is again a modificatory one. While
Henryson provides his text with multiple levels of significance in order to
cater to the different conditions of his readership, his use of this structure
has very different implications from what had been traditionally the case
in academic Scholasticism. These implications can be demonstrated by
comparing the structure of the Testament with Auerbach's brief definition
of the term figura towards the end ofMimesis:
In this conception, an occurrence on earth signifies not only itself
but at the same time another, which it predicts or confirms,
without prejudice to the power of its concrete reality here and
now.26
Auerbach rightly adds that this generally leads in the Middle Ages to a
view wherein the temporal significance of occurrences, whereby they are
understood according to their place within a chronological or causal
25. It is on this level that a reading of the poem as anti-feminist would have to
proceed. The parallels between the initial conditions of the narrator and Cresseid
undermine any simple identification ofwomen with sensuality and fickleness as opposed
to male rationality and stability (see Noll, p.24). The final stanza, however, does
reproduce a traditionally gendered distiction between sensible and intelligible modes of
understanding.
26. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation ofReality in Western
Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p.555.
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scheme, 'is of secondary importance, and often their interpretation can
dispense with any knowledge of it.'27 The framework which Auerbach
describes, however, involves the distinction of discrete levels of
significance so that an occurrence signifies both on the level of its
concrete reality and according to its resonance within the divine plan. It
is certainly true, as Auerbach states, that medieval Christian thinkers
perceived 'an antagonism between sensory appearance and meaning', and
that figural exegesis permitted them to view an event's meaning as
primarily defined within a transcendent and atemporal framework
(pp.48-9). But the distinction of discrete levels of reference which such
exegesis involves also provides the potential for a mode of understanding
which can conjoin this idealising perspective with attention to an event's
significance in terms of its sensible reality28.
It is precisely this potential which is developed in the Testament of
Cresseid. Henryson moves beyond the widespread medieval sense of an
'antagonism between sensory appearance and meaning', and in doing so
he departs from the tendency in Scholastic exegesis to privilege universal
norms per simplice as the proper object of readerly attention. The
Testament is orientated towards the actual as much as towards the ideal:
it aims to give the fullest sense that Cresseid's actions are reprehensible
not merely in metaphysical terms, in so far as they are out of harmony
with the moral law, but also in tragic terms, in that they result in human
misery. In this respect, Henryson's poem departs from Averroes'
conception of literary signification as being dominated by the universal
overtones of human actions and beliefs which make them honest,
praiseworthy, and beatifying, and as primarily directing the gaze towards
those aspects of human existence which render it 'important, normative,
definitional, connected with the eternal fitness of things.' (Ethical Poetic,
p.30) The secular focus of the Testament certainly works in concert with
this universalising emphasis, recommending a mode of conduct whose
ultimate justification lies in its consonance with the moral law. But the
poem's stress on the human suffering and loss to which Cresseid's actions
lead gives the actions of both her and Troilus a pragmatic significance
which, while not separate from that which inheres in them absolutely, is
27. Ibid. See also pp.73-6.
28. Dante's Commedia is the clearest literary example of such uses of figura.
See Singleton, 'The Irreducible Dove1, and 'Dante's Allegory' (esp. pp.95-6).
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certainly distinct from it. The Testament delineates the worldly
consequences of human actions as more than merely instrumental aids to
an understanding of the universal overtones of those actions. It presents
them as a legitimate focus of attention in their own right, permitting
simple moral norms to be evaluated not merely in terms of their intrinsic
Tightness, their fittedness with the eternal order of things, but also in
terms of the material consequences which ensue from their application in
actual circumstances.
Henryson's literary innovations in the Testament are aimed at
addressing and resolving the tension between the idealising and affective
emphases of Scholastic literary theory. They facilitate a mode of
representation capable of sensitively taking account of the concrete
circumstances which circumscribe an action without compromising the
certitude which derives from reference to a priori moral norms. As in
'The Two Mice', Henryson responds to the affective imperative of
Scholastic theory by developing a mode of representation in which the
significance of incidents and characters can be defined within a
framework of contingent relations, thus enabling a mode ofmoral
judgement which is capable of taking account of the concrete
circumstances which circumscribe human actions. Furthermore, in
harmonising this mode of signification with one based on reference to
moral absolutes, Henryson offsets the radical undermining of authority
which, in 'The Two Mice', was seen to result from a circumstantially-
orientated mode of representation. The Testament's alternative levels of
significance can be reconciled when understood as perspectives on an
action's total significance in which both are encompassed and validated.
The Testament thus illustrates the extent to which Henryson's
innovative literary strategies are motivated by his commitment to the
conflicting imperatives of Scholastic literary theory and his desire to see
them reconciled. Furthermore, the protocols provided by Scholastic
theory, in providing for the organisation of disparate levels of textual
significance within a comprehensive framework, are what make possible
the resolution of this conflict which the poem's balancing of realist and
idealising modes of signification proposes. Henryson produces significant
innovations and departures from medieval norms through his creative
engagement with traditional materials and concerns. As Robert L.
Kindrick affirms, Henryson is a 'transitional figure' who 'incorporates
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medieval ideas in ways not likely envisioned by the originators of the
traditions on which he draws.'29
3
So far, this chapter has concentrated on Henryson's attempt to affirm a
positive mode of ethical judgement in the Testament: a moral vision
capable of resolving the uncertainties which result from the tension
between the affective and idealising imperatives which he inherits from
Scholastic thought on literature. Yet the complementary relation
between the different levels of significance distinguished in the
Testament, whereby the validity of each is affirmed, is only clearly
established towards the close of the poem. The poem's harmonising of its
different perspectives is reached only after a bewildering juxtaposition of
worldly and transcendent modes ofjudgement in which each destabilises
the authority of the other and reflects critically on the criteria according
to which it is established. The Testament's disjunctive organisation thus
delineates the inadequacies as well as the virtues of its secular and
metaphysical emphases.
Henryson's diffraction of a comprehensive vision into distinct
partial perspectives is not only a means of catering for different readerly
requirements, or of simply reconciling the tension between the affective
and idealising axes of Scholastic theory. It is also a means of registering
and addressing the fact that a sense of this tension still exists as a
considerable problem in late-medieval thought, always producing the
temptation to resolve it by privileging an absolutist perspective over one
orientated towards temporal contingencies, or vice-versa. The proposed
resolution of this tension in the Testament does not lead Henryson to
overlook the fact that it remains a powerful tendency in his intellectual
environment, or to think that he can readily dismiss or minimise the
danger of the temptation which it presents. His literary strategy in the
Testament can be thought of as a pre-emptive action against such
temptation: the poem distinguishes a secular and a metaphysical
perspective, setting these against each other in order to expose the
limitations of both and show that each requires the complementary
balance of the other.
29. Henryson and the Medieval Arts ofRhetoric, p.273.
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The tendency of the Testament's two levels of significance to
displace each other rather than harmonise is manifest in the poem's
narrative structure. The narrative sequence delineates Cresseid's
gradual and enforced detachment from the world. Initially depicting her
as 'destitute / Of all comfort and consolatioun', passing from the town
'Richt priuelie, but fellowschip or refute' (11.93-4), the poem proceeds to
show her loss of the consolation found in her father's house as she finds
herself exiled to a marginalised existence among the lepers. Her
alienation from the world is completed in her death. That this narrative
sequence permits both spiritual and secular perspectives on its
significance is neatly emblematised in the final words of Cresseid's
'Testament', where she announces that 'My spreit I leif to Diane, quhair
scho dwellis, / To walk with hir in waist woddis and wellis.' (1.587-88)
The term 'waist' can mean 'familiar'. This reading authorises the
Christianising interpretation of the poem. When understood in spiritual
terms, situating Cresseid's fate within the a priori opposition of
uoluptas/caritas, the narrative sequence delineates a process ofmoral
regeneration. Cresseid, when in her father's home, remains distanced in
her sensual outlook from a correct understanding of the metaphysical
order of the universe and her own place within it. Her 'Complaint'
(11.407-69) shows that when exiled among the lepers she arrives at a
partial illumination in her perception of the necessarily ephemeral nature
ofmerely sensual pleasures, though still remaining evasive as to her own
responsibility for her fate in having actively embraced the impermanence
ofwhich she complains30. At the poem's close she finally grasps her own
moral culpability and spiritual deficiency in having rejected Troilus and
given herself over to sensuality. This arrival at a mode of understanding
in tune with the moral law, and with the metaphysical ordering of reality
in which that law is based, is immediately followed by her departure from
secular life. To construe 'waist' as 'familiar' is to view the narrative as
depicting an optimistic movement towards a spiritual homecoming which
ends the spiritual exile in which Cresseid's initial moral disposition had
placed her.
The word 'waist', however, can also mean 'desolate'. The latter
reading highlights the negative direction of the poem's action, focusing on
30. On Cresseid's moral evasiveness at this point, see C. David Benson, 'Troilus
and Cresseid in Henryson's Testament', Chaucer Review 13 (1978-79), 263-71 (p.268).
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Cresseid's progressive dislocation from the world of human comforts. It
implies a grief over this alienation which is far from any simple
contemptus mundi attitude. This reading responds positively to the
sympathy with which Cresseid's plight is depicted and to the graphic
emphasis on her physical decay, both of which invite one to respond to
the narrative in literalistic, worldly terms, considering it as a portrayal of
degradation and human loss. The movement of the poem's narrative,
then, can be seen equally in terms of'a worldliness of moral judgement'
which views it in tragic terms, or of an 'otherworldly morality' which
views it optimistically as a spiritual regeneration. The narrative invites
and sustains both readings.
These two perspectives on the narrative, however, sit
uncomfortably together. Their relationship is one of contrapuntal tension
rather than harmonious concordance, as the narrative sequence
simultaneously delineates spiritual progress and temporal decay. The
oppositional character of the different modes of judgement, whereby the
narrative movement presumed on one level is reversed on the other,
problematises their reconciliation, suggesting that either can only be
sustained by supplanting the other. The contrapuntal organisation of the
narrative thus produces a disjunctive interaction between the poem's
secular and Christianising levels of significance, as the narrative
authorises two distinct structurations which appear to be incompatible.
The structural tension which Henryson thus establishes between
the Testament's idealising and mundane levels of significance is
augmented by other aspects of the poem, wherein the two modes of
judgement destabilise each other in more precisely defined terms,
heightening the interpretative difficulty by exposing each other's
limitations so that neither can be taken as providing an adequate
sententia on which the text can be closed. This is evident in Cresseid's
first speech of any length in the poem, in which she accuses the planetary
gods of having brought about the loss ofworldly happiness which has left
her 'forlane' (11.126-40):
'3e causit me alwayis vnderstand and trow
The seid of lufe was sawin in my face,
And ay grew grene throe dour suppile and grace [...].'
(11.136-38)
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Cresseid's expectation of permanent pleasure from necessarily transient
things immediately invites one to view her sin as a mistaken and
idolatrous privileging of the temporal over the divine. The Boethian
overtones of this depiction of Cresseid construct her fault in terms of the
a priori hierarchical oppositions of reason and the senses, the spirit and
the flesh. At this point in the poem Troilus has not appeared and there is
no indication of the later definition of the courtly ideal of fidelity as a
mode of conduct which is good in both temporal and spiritual terms.
Cresseid's attack on the gods, in associating her concern over the loss of
temporal good with a sensual outlook which loses sight of the spiritual
priorities necessary to true happiness, thus encourages the view that her
distress over the loss ofworldly pleasure is inherently erroneous, and
that the poem is, as Tillyard suggests, expounding an 'otherworldly
morality', in accordance with the contemptus mundi tradition31.
The Boethian overtones of this passage are continued throughout
the narrative in the depiction of the progress of Cresseid's moral
understanding. Her development in fact directly parallels that of
Boethius in the De Consolatione Philosophiae, as he is similarly led from
a merely sensual perspective, through a recognition of the necessary
ephemerality of temporal pleasures, to arrive at an understanding of the
true good. Viewed from this perspective, the Testament's contrapuntal
narrative movement appears to be making the same point as is made by
Philosophy in Boethius' De Consolatione, when she argues that bad
fortune is the best kind as it demonstrates the ephemeral nature of
temporal goods and directs one's gaze towards the true good which is God:
Etenim plus hominibus reor aduersam quam prosperam prodesse
fortunam. Ilia enim semper specie felicitatis cum uidetur blanda,
mentitur; haec semper uera est, cum se instabilim mutatione
demonstrat. [...] Postremo felix a uero bona deuios blanditis trahit,
aduersa plerumque ad uera bona reduces unco retrahit.
{De Cons., Bk II, Prose viii)
Cresseid's temporal misfortune thus appears as a blessing when
considered in terms of its resonance within a framework of absolute
moral essences, leading her to espouse a set of ethical values which are
attuned to the metaphysical order of reality. Her enforced detachment
from the things of this world is positively evaluated as a necessary stage
31. Tillyard, pp.24-5.
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in a progressive movement towards spiritual enlightenment and
penitence.
These aspects of the poem reflect critically on its secular
dimensions. While a worldly-orientated understanding of the Testament
certainly produces a negative judgement on Cresseid's outlook and
behaviour, that judgement is founded on a sense of the value of the
earthly happiness which she has thrown away, and on a wish that things
could have been otherwise. The poem's poignant and sympathetic
depiction of human loss thus entails a sense of the positive worth of
secular pleasure and an attitude of regret and protest at its passing. In
this it appears to mirror Cresseid's discontent at the ordained order of
things, along with her failure to view the passing of temporal good with
the equanimity which its ephemeral nature and its subordination to the
divine good seems to require. Similarly, in leading one to view the
narrative as reaching a negative conclusion, such a focus on the pathos of
Cresseid's tragedy seems unaware of the larger positive implications of
the action, remaining inattentive to its spiritual dimensions whereby it is
seen as the action of a benevolent providence. The poem's secular level of
significance thus appears to remain steeped in the merely carnal outlook
whose limits the poem's transcendent significance exposes.
Moreover, the Testament's idealising perspective, in establishing
an absolute basis for meaning, provides a certitude which is not
forthcoming from a circumstantially-based mode of judgement. While the
transcendent and worldly dimensions of the poem tend to displace each
other, the sympathetic focus on the disastrous consequences of Cresseid's
actions provides a secular affirmation of the value of faithful love which
agrees with the metaphysical validation of the courtly ideal. But the
poem's bleak depiction of temporal vicissitude undermines that
affirmation, exposing the inadequacies of the terms on which it is
founded. On a merely secular level, the poem's courtly morality can only
be validated in terms of the pragmatism which E. Duncan Aswell sees in
the poem. Henryson's emphasis on the facts of human pain and
mutability in the Testament provides the key worldly justification for
courtly love as an ethos which can provide some stability in life and
shield one against the depredations of Fortune. But this accent also
means that instead of presenting a confident statement of the positive
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value of courtly love, the poem conveys an impression of the fragility of
the happiness which it can provide32.
This aspect of the poem is indicated in the negative character of
the narrator's closing exhortation which points back to the narrative of
Cresseid's fate so as to urge women to 'Ming not dour lufe with fals
deceptioun' (1.613). Rather than emphasising the aesthetic and moral
appeal of the decorous courtly ethos in itself, the poem weighs it against
the vivid depiction of the chaos which ensues from its abandonment. The
recommendation of positive secular values is thus haunted by an
underlying negativity which is foregrounded in the analyses of Spearing
and Aswell: fidelity in human love appears less as a vital and cohesive
system of values than as an accommodation to harrowing circumstances,
making virtue of necessity. The lingering sense of horror and pity which
the Testament arouses combines with this negative imperative to ensure
that the courtly love ethos appears in the poem not as a confident
affirmation of positive values, but as an exigent adaptation to harsh
circumstance, raised in the face of a universe dominated by forces
inimical to happiness, and within which humanity remains frail and
impotent. The sense of existential horror aroused by the Testament's
exposure of the fragility and hollowness of secularly-defined human
values in the face of a hostile and indifferent universe reveals their
deficiency, and invites one to find it supplied in the certitude and positive
resolution of the poem's providential significance.
It must be noted, though, that while the spiritualising aspects of
the poem contrast with and reflect negatively on its worldly emphasis,
the process is not merely one-way. The sympathy for Cresseid's plight
which is expressed by the narrator and evoked by the graphic depiction of
her physical suffering makes the poem's spiritual significance appear as
harsh and unfeeling. Its Boethian diffidence in the face of human misery
seems insensitive to the anxieties and exigencies of temporal suffering,
and neglectful of the virtues of concern over such matters. The priority of
the metaphysical over the secular dimensions of the Testament is called
32. This accounts for Noll and Jentoft's neglect of Henryson's accent on 'the
inescapable factuality' of suffering (see above, p. 181). Both attribute to Henryson's
'courtly-love universe' a self-sufficiency and internal coherence which gives its moral
precepts an unquestioned legitimacy and normative force (see Noll, pp.18, 24; Jentoft,
p.101). This emphasis is undermined by the negativity inherent in the poem's depiction
of courtly love as a defence against the destructive forces which constantly threaten
human happiness.
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into question in precisely these terms in the depiction of the tribunal of
the planetary gods. The nature and extent of the gods' jurisdiction are
clearly defined in the poem. They have
power of all thing generabill,
To reull and steir be thair greit influence
Wedder and wind, and coursis variabill [...].
(11.148-50)
The gods are representations of immanent influences which define the
natural condition of the sublunary sphere, the world of impermanence
and change. As such, their subjection of Cresseid to their judgement is a
reaffirmation of the mutability which she denied in her complaint against
Venus and Cupid. The judgement of the planet-gods on Cresseid, as E.
Duncan Aswell argues, enacts the necessary consequence of Cresseid's
misunderstanding of the natural order of secular life33: having failed to
grasp its inevitable mutability and adjust her conduct and attitudes
accordingly, she leaves herself entirely at the mercy of the deleterious
effects of Fortune. That her fate is to be seen as a natural outcome of her
actions is underscored by the fact that in the Middle Ages leprosy was
commonly viewed as a venereal disease, thus appearing as corollary to
her promiscuous actions rather than as an imposition from above34.
This structure obviously lends itself to the Testament's secular
focus, which bases its negative assessment of Cresseid's actions on the
negative consequences which necessarily ensue from them. The temporal
processes over which the planetary gods hold sway, however, are not
devoid ofmetaphysical significance. Leprosy, it must be noted, was not
only viewed as a venereal disease. It was also seen as a divine judgement
on sinners, as well as being a form of earthly purgatory which brought its
sufferers closer to God35. Furthermore, the symbolic connections between
Cresseid's leprosy, which leaves her 'ouirspred with spottis blak' (1.339),
and her already 'maculait' spiritual condition, implies that the judgement
on her is related to an immanent moral law, leprosy being the outward
sign of her inward state. This introduces another level of reference to the
tribunal of the gods, as the temporal punishment which she undergoes is
incorporated within the providential scheme which brings her to
penitence and moral regeneration. The gods represent not only the
33. Aswell, 486-87.
34. See Fox, ed., Testament, pp.27-30.
35. Ibid., pp.34-7.
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natural laws which govern the order of things. Their temporal influence
also enacts the moral law as they function as the agents through which
the divine will is manifested, a role indicated in Cupid's comment that '3e
ar all seuin deificait, / Participant of deuyne sapience' (11.288-89)36. In
this respect the tribunal of the gods is an embodiment of providential
justice, embodying natural processes whose effects on Cresseid serve not
only to reinforce the moral law and punish her transgression of it, but
also to initiate a positive spiritual movement which leads her to insight
and repentance.
Yet if the depiction of the court of the gods thus invites one to
understand their judgement on Cresseid as part of the narrative's
upward providential movement, Henryson appears to have done
everything possible to prevent one from easily viewing it in a positive
light. The description of the gods is organised in such a way as to give an
impression of balance and neutrality, alternating between planets who
are astrologically malevolent and benevolent. But their judgement is
made to seem highly inequitable by the fact that they are pronouncing on
an offence against themselves. This impression is strengthened when
Mercury selects Saturn and Cynthia to consider Cresseid's case and
pronounce judgement on her. As Saturn is a malevolent planet, while the
moon takes on the attributes of the planet with which it is in conjunction,
Mercury has effectively ensured that any judgement on and punishment
of Cresseid will be as harsh as possible. Mercury himself, a supposedly
benevolent planet, has doubt cast upon him when he is described as
'Honest and gude, and not ane word culd lie.' (1.252) This last assertion
introduces to the poem the very possibility that it denies, and Mercury's
depiction as a rhetor, given the dubious reputation of that art with regard
to lying, tends to reinforce these doubts.
Moreover, far from being benevolent in their disposition, the
emphasis of the gods is entirely on exacting temporal vengeance on
Cresseid by bringing her pain. Thus Cupid recommends that 'with pane
we suld mak recompence [...], Thairfoir ga help to reuenge, I 3ow pray!'
(11.291-94) The justice of the gods' judgement on Cresseid, whereby her
leprosy appears as a natural consequence of her promiscuity and as an
external manifestation of her spiritual condition, is also called into
36. On the gods as enacting the divinely-ordained moral law see ibid., pp.34-5;
MacQueen, Robert Henryson, pp.69-70; Tillyard, pp.19-22.
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question by the fact that her fate is so horrifying as to seem grossly in
excess of her original fault. Indeed, as Gotz Schmitz has pointed out,
Cresseid's upbraiding of the gods is conventional, having precedents in
Ovidian and Petrarchan love poetry, as well as in Chaucer's Troilus. Yet
in none of these precedents does the complaint, or the attitude underlying
it, have the strongly negative moral implications or horrifying results
that appear in the Testament37. These aspects of the poem mean that
rather than being presented as just, impartial, and ultimately benevolent,
the gods'judgement appears as directed by malice, hostility, and
destructiveness.
The vindictiveness of the gods invites one to view their actions with
dissatisfaction and distress, focusing sympathetic attention on the
negative secular movement of the narrative. In foregrounding the
aspects of the representation of the gods which evoke this response,
indeed making vengefulness and malevolence the most evident
characteristics of the planetary tribunal, Henryson accentuates the
temporal significance of their judgement so as to interfere with the view
that it represents the just and benevolent action of providence. To
privilege the poem's providential dimensions, construing sympathy for
Cresseid, in the light of the poem's upward spiritual movement, as the
product of misplaced priorities thus appears as an inadequate response.
It is a view which ignores the positive value attached to such sympathy
and concern for Cresseid's secular well-being, which appears in a virtuous
light through its opposition to the malevolent disposition of the gods. In
this, the poem's spiritual significance necessarily appears as harsh and
unfeeling. As H.E. Tolliver argues, while the poem is organised so that
both reader and poet are ironically distanced from the narrator's
engagement with the action, rendering both him and the sympathy he
expresses 'subject to moral judgement', this does not lead to the outright
repudiation of his accent on the pathos of Cresseid's decline: 'only by
seeing Cresseid through his eyes can we judge her properly.'38
As was argued above, the Testament ultimately resolves and
harmonises these perspectives. But this resolution is reached only
through a juxtaposition of the worldly and otherworldly moralities in
37. See Gotz Schmitz, 'Cresseid's Trial: A Revision: Fame and Defamation in
Henryson's "Testament of Cresseid'", Essays and Studies (1979), 44-56 (pp.52-3).
38. Tolliver, 306.
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which neither is finally privileged, and each undermines the other's
authority. The poem's disjunctive and contrapuntal organisation thus
delineates the limitations and the virtues of both modes of judgement,
indicating that each requires the complementary balance of the other,
and forcefully underlining the inadequacies which result from their
separation. The Testament thus aims to take full account of the tension
between universal essences and particular things. The distinction of
discrete levels of secular and spiritual significance, and the mutual
destabilisation which the relation between these levels effects, warns
against the temptation to resolve the tension between them by favouring
one and repudiating the other, and affirms the need for a comprehensive
vision which can embrace both.
4
The literary strategies outlined above have a number of significant
implications with regard to the relation between Henryson's work and
Scholastic literary theory. The importance of the Scholastic background
in this context is evident from the character of the disjunctive
perspectives which Henryson distinguishes in the Testament. The poem's
metaphysical dimension, where judgement operates by situating
Cresseid's initial error and subsequent fate within the frame of the a
priori opposition of voluptas and caritas, confers an ideal certitude on the
meaning it attaches to human actions. But in its indifference to and
neglect of the pathos of Cresseid's tragedy, it appears incapable of taking
adequate account of the immediate implications which such actions may
have within their sensible context. Conversely, the poem's secular level
is clearly sensitive to the sensible resonances of the poem's action. But in
assigning meaning on the basis of these resonances, it risks losing sight
of any absolute basis for judgement. Even the value which is conferred
on the courtly virtue of mutual fidelity in love as a defence against the
entropic forces which govern secular life and which threaten human
happiness is shown to be inadequate as an affirmative vision. The
Testament's, disjunctive structure can thus be seen to address the tension
between the affective and idealising axes of Scholastic literary theory,
exposing the dangers of privileging either one of the at the expense of the
other. In this it urges the need for an inclusive perspective which
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embraces both elements, so that meaning defined with reference to an
absolute moral law can legitimise and be combined with a mode of
understanding which appeals to problems and aspirations associated with
an action's secular implications. This once again underscores the extent
to which Henryson's literary strategy in the Testament is shaped
according to criteria inherited from Scholastic literary theory.
Moreover, Henryson's response to the problems which he inherits
from Scholasticism modifies the protocols of Scholastic exegesis, drawing
on them in ways which once again demonstrate the creative character of
his engagement with tradition. The parallel between the allegorists'
distinguishing multiple levels of significance in a text, all of which
harmonise within a comprehensive frame ofmeaning, and the
Testament's balancing of discrete levels of significance has already been
noted, as has the fact that Henryson's deployment of the multi-layered
text departs from established practice in that Henryson uses it to
comprehend and direct attention towards an action's concrete
significance, to which he affords a priority not previously evident. This
modification is of a piece with Henryson's insistence on the need not only
to relate particular actions and events to absolute moral norms, but also
to apprehend such abstract norms in terms of their concrete worldly
implications.
But Henryson's creative deployment of the allegorical tradition
goes further than this. The dramatic juxtapositioning of the different
levels of significance in the Testament produces a disjunctive patterning
very different from what is traditionally found in allegoresis. The
different levels of significance which Scholastic exegetes distinguish in a
text exist in a relationship which, while involving a degree ofmutual
destabilisation, does not ultimately call the certitude of any of them into
question. The diversity of equally valid readings which are available
certainly prevents any one of them from receiving final privilege as the
correct one and insists that the accentuation of one at the expense of the
others is justified on merely provisional heuristic grounds. But this
mutual destabilisation only highlights the inadequacy of a given reading
in relation to the comprehensive intentio which underlies a text. It is
countered by an awareness of the validity which an adduced sententia
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derives from its positive connection to that intentio, and which permits it
to be assigned an absolute auctoritas when considered in itself39.
Henryson's procedure is very different. In the Testament, the
mutual destabilisation produced through the interference of the text's
discrete levels of significance is much more radical. The different
perspectives impinge forcefully on one another's ground, each calling into
question not only the hermeneutic priority of the other, but also its
adequacy as a mode ofjudging human actions. Taking the traditional
conception ofmeaning as being both distanced from and connected to the
Word, Henryson stresses the distance, refusing to permit the interference
between different levels of significance to be easily contained within an
affirmation of their shared authority. He ensures that the limitations
which associate a given perspective with the uncertainty and partiality of
human interpretation, rather than with the absolute authority of divine
truth, are fully grasped.
The implications of this aspect of the Testament with regard to
Henryson's attitudes towards literary signification can be illuminated by
Paul de Man's theory of allegory. De Man's view of allegory extends the
term's reference beyond what is normally understood by it: indeed he sees
it less as a literary mode than as an essential component of all linguistic
signification, which, for de Man, always suspends the possibility of
arriving at a stable interpretation40. De Man's understanding of allegory
is apposite to the specific literary mode of the Testament, and allows for a
clear description of its similarities and dissimilarities to conventional
Scholastic views of literary signification.
De Man describes allegory as a 'structural interference' between
two sign systems operating in the same text, one governed by a prior
system of values, the other by narrative syntax, with this interference
leading to what he terms 'unreadability'41. I take 'unreadability' to mean
that the text simultaneously posits meaning and undermines it, refusing
to allow interpretation any stable resting-point. This pattern neatly
summarises the structure of the Testament, with its delineation of an
absolute level of significance wherein Cresseid's actions are understood
39. See above, Ch.2, pp.74-8.
40. See, for instance, Allegories ofReading: Figural Language in Rousseau,
Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979),
pp.16-19.
41. See Allegories ofReading, p.206.
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with reference to an a priori system of values (caritas/voluptas,
reason/sensuality), and a contingent level which defines the significance
of those actions in relation to their tragic temporal consequences as
delineated on the level of plot. The 'structural interference' between
these modes of judgement indeed leads to a certain 'unreadability', as the
text destabilises any attempt to privilege one over the other, showing that
to do so is to impose a narrow closure on a text whose significative
structure exceeds the limits of either perspective.
Henryson's destabilisation of reading is, of course, less radical than
that which appears in De Man's work: Henryson ultimately affirms that
these partial readings are perspectives on an overall significance which
harmoniously comprehends both of them. But there is a connection in De
Man's thought between his view of allegory and his understanding of
literary discourse, which reflects significantly on the relation between the
structure of the Testament and the medieval sense of the dangers of
poetic language. Just as De Man sees the allegorical dimension of texts
as leading to the destabilisation of the meanings which they affirm, so too
he considers the specifically literary qualities of texts to consist in their
self-cancelling and de-mystifying nature: the fact that in foregrounding
their rhetoricity, they undermine their referential function and their
truth-claims, presenting their meaning as a textual construct:
The self-reflecting mirror-effect by means ofwhich a work of fiction
asserts, by its very existence, its separation from empirical reality,
its divergence, as a sign, from a meaning that depends for its
existence on the constitutive activity of this sign, characterises the
work of literature in its essence.42
This definition of literature, or literariness, recalls the early-
medieval concern over how literary discourse subverts claims to authority
and truth by undermining a referential view of language. A large part of
the project of Scholastic literary theory was to contain those aspects of
the literary text which draw attention to its constitutive role in the
production of meaning, reducing their function in the significative process
by assigning them an instrumental affective role in the communication of
prior truths.
As the parallel between de Man's definitions of allegory and
literature make clear, the disjunctive relation between the Testament's
different levels of significance draws attention to those aspects of literary
42. Paul de Man, 'Criticism and Crisis', in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the
Rhetoric ofContemporary Criticism (London: Routledge, 1983), pp.3-19 (p.17).
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discourse which Scholastic literary theory aims to contain. In
foregrounding the limitations of the poem's concretising and idealising
perspectives, Henryson draws attention to the fact that the meanings
arrived at on these different levels are produced through human
interpretative activity. He thus stresses the fact that a text's significance
is constituted within the constraints of particular priorities and concerns,
obstructing any attempt to identify meaning with prior truths.
Unlike his Scholastic predecessors, then, Henryson develops a
model of signification in the Testament in which the uncertainties and
limitations ofmeaning are fully recognised. In this, Henryson's
modification of the allegorical tradition is related in its effects to his
treatment of authorship and authority. As was argued in the previous
chapter, the narrator's comments on the poem's authorship and
provenance, while certainly asserting its value, also refuse any final
privilege to the narrative which is presented, attesting to its
provisionality as the fictional creation of an individual author. The
disjunctive and contrapuntal organisation which characterises the
narrative of Cresseid's fate thus co-operates with the discussion of
authorship and textual authority which frames that narrative, both
highlighting the ways in which meaning is produced rather than given.
The latter, in questioning the Testament's historical veracity, invites one
to consider the narrative as itself constituted through the exercise of
authorial creativity. The former, in having different levels of significance
call each other into question, indicates that the moral sententiae which
attach to that narrative are produced only in accordance with specific
models of signification, the limited interpretative priorities ofwhich are
clearly delineated. In both instances the signified meaning's
transcendence of the linguistic realm is called into question, as its
association with an interpretative activity inherent in the process of
signification is underscored.
The narrator's pity for Cresseid's loss of reputation also works in
concert with these aspects of the Testament, as becomes clear in the
stanza which deals with her detractors. Having cast doubt on the
historical veracity of the narrative, with that doubt being reinforced by
the hearsay status assigned to the assertion that Cresseid, on being
abandoned by Diomeid, 'walkit vp and doun, / And sum men sayis, into
the court commoun' (11.76-77, my italics), the narrator proceeds to take
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the narrative's suggestion of her promiscuity seriously, treating it as
though it were a reliable account:
0 fair Cresseid, the flour and A per se
Of Troy and Grece, how was thow fortunait
To change in filth all thy femininitie,
And be with fleschelie lust sa maculait [...]!
1 have pietie thow suld fall sic mischance!
(11.78-84))
The questioning tone of this passage may suggest a continuing
incredulity towards the tale of Cresseid's behaviour, but the final line,
with its expression of pity, clearly has the narrator engaging with the
provisional account on its own terms. Yet even given his engagement, the
narrator rejects any totalising vision of Cresseid:
3it nevertheless, quhat euer men deme or say
In scornefull langage of thy brukkilnes,
I sail excuse als far furth as I may
Thy womanheid, thy wisdome and fairnes,
The quhilk fortoun hes put to sic distres
As hir plesit, and nathing throw the gilt
Of the - throw wickit langage to be spilt!
(11.85-91)
As noted above, while the qualification 'als far furth as I may' suggests an
awareness that some degree of moral condemnation is warranted, this is
accompanied by a refusal to see Cresseid's sins as consuming her whole
being (p. 186). The statement that Cresseid's loss of reputation was
'nathing throw the gilt / Of the' suggests that regardless ofwhatever real
guilt might attach to her, the sweeping denigration of her character
which has ensued is unwarranted. In this, the narrator's pity at
Cresseid's loss of reputation conjoins with the pity and horror at her
actual fate which is stressed throughout the poem, and which constantly
demands that we view Cresseid not merely in terms ofwhat she now is,
but that we also consider what she once was: 'sweit, gentill and amorous'
(1.326). The narrator's insistence that, despite Cresseid's 'brukkilnes', her
more noble features should not be forgotten, implies that the generalising
condemnations to which he openly objects give a reductive view of a
complex and multi-faceted existence, in the light of which negative
judgements on her can only have a relative validity.
The narrator's pity is, then, connected to a recognition of the
exclusions through which the judgemental representation of Cresseid is
constructed. The word 'langage' appears twice in this stanza, thus
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associating the adverse account of Cresseid with the linguistic realm.
Combined with the narrator's reiteration of those qualities in Cresseid
which such merely negative representations of her exclude (her
'womanheid', 'wisdome and fairnes'), this association foregrounds the gap
between sign and referent. The error of Cresseid's detractors is that they
provide a picture of her which is a textual construct, constituted by those
exclusions which the narrator seeks to counter, and then identify their
reading of her with Cresseid herself, disregarding its limitations. Such
closure is strongly resisted by the narrator, and it is this which allows his
reaction to be tempered with pity rather than taking the shape of a
blanket condemnation. For him, the complexity of Cresseid's existence
cannot be encompassed by any simple moral categorisation.
The way in which the Testament layers these various qualifications
demonstrates the extent to which their common emphasis on the
interpretative textual character ofmeaning is an essential feature of the
poem. The discussion of the text's authorship and provenance which
frames the narrative undermines its claims to historical veracity and
stresses the authorial activity which produces it. Following this, the
attack on Cresseid's detractors indicates that even when seriously
engaging with the poem's account of Cresseid, the partial and reductive
nature of its account of Cresseid's fate must be borne in mind, as it selects
and foregrounds certain aspects of her being while excluding others: any
sententia based on such a partial account provides not a summation of her
moral condition, but merely a perspective on it. The disjunctive
organisation of the different levels of significance attached to the
narrative qualifies yet further the relative validity afforded to such
partial evaluations. The mutual destabilisation effected by the
interference between the secular and idealising interpretations on
Cresseid's fate indicates that each is to be seen as limited not only in
relation to the totality of Cresseid's existence, but also in relation to this
portion of it. Each level ofmeaning proffers an evaluation which is
shown to have been produced in accordance with a limited interpretative
perspective, prioritising a model of signification which falls short of
encompassing the totality of the narrative's resonances. The inability of
either of these perspectives to provide a competent and satisfactory mode
of judging human actions is thus underscored.
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The conclusion of the poem, in which the narrator remains
pointedly silent on Cresseid's fate after her death, further reinforces this
accent on the textual limitations of the Testament. Critics have varied in
their opinion on the significance of Henryson's silence here, some
assuming that Cresseid's salvation is obvious, and others taking it to
confirm that the poem holds out no redemptive hope43. The issue cannot
be settled by pointing to the pagan setting of the poem as evidence of
Cresseid's exclusion from Christian salvation. In an article on Piers
Plowman, T.P. Dunning has demonstrated that in the later Middle Ages
a variety of paths to salvation were open to heathens, so that Cresseid's
fate is not determinable on the basis of her paganism44. The narrator's
pointed refusal to speak of Cresseid's fate after death is in fact
comparable to Chaucer's prevarications as to the spiritual fate of his
pagan characters45. Henryson's refusal to pronounce on the question of
Cresseid's salvation leaves matters in doubt, and is a tacit recognition
that such a determination can lie only with God, before whose
comprehensive vision all human interpretations must humbly recognise
their own inadequacies. The Testament's silence as to this question once
more underscores the deficiencies of its representations, and their
incapacity to provide any final and decisive evaluation of Cresseid's
existence.
In stressing the constitutive and interpretative nature of
signification in the Testament, Henryson underlines the gap between sign
and referent. Language is shown not merely to mediate between a
receiver and a prior subsistent meaning. Rather, meaning is seen to be
actively formulated through processes of invention, differentiation, and
categorisation, which distance it from any substantial origin, and firmly
place it under the aegis of textuality. The Testament thus systematically
invokes the very forces whose disruption of certitude and authority
Scholastic literary theory sought to contain.
Yet, for all its destabilising self-reflexive features, the Testament's
emphasis is not merely negative. The narrator's opening observations on
authorship and authority, while casting doubt on the reliability of the
43. For two such conflicting assessments, see Fox (ed.), Testament, p.57, and
Spearing, Criticism, p. 189.
44. T.P. Dunning, 'Langland and the Salvation of the Heathen', Medium Aevum,
12 (1943), 45-54. See also Ymaginatifs comments in Piers Plowman: A Complete Edition
of the B-Text, ed. A.V.C. Schmidt (London: Dent, 1978), XII, 278-295.
45. See for instance, The Knight's Tale, CT, I, 2809-16.
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narrative, do not prevent him immediately proceeding to recount it and to
engage with it on its own terms. The narrative is seen as worthy of
consideration, regardless of its limitations. Similarly, the inadequacies of
the secular and spiritual levels of significance which are distinguished in
the poem are defined in relation to a holistic perspective which
encompasses both of them, and affords them a relative validity as partial
perspectives thereon. This relative degree of affirmative value is also
indicated in the narrator's closing remarks which maintain the
distinction of these discrete levels of significance even while affirming
their consonance within a unifying comprehensive vision. The
implication is that while one must always recall that either perspective
remains inadequate in itself, their distinction can be justified by its
rhetorical and ethical utility: it permits one to arrive at the same moral
values by different paths, thus facilitating the text's capacity to convey its
meaning in a manner adapted to the understanding and sensibilities of
different audiences. These aspects of the Testament indicate that, while
it is a poem wherein one is encouraged to be aware of the inadequacies of
the judgements which the text posits, its accent on the provisional and
interpretative character ofmeaning is not to be taken as entirely
eliminating the possibility of construing valid and useful moral
sententiae.
Henryson's stress on the textual character of the Testament and
the concomitant limitations of the poem's meaning is in fact designed to
contain and overcome the judgemental uncertainty produced by the
disproportionate relation between transcendent norms and the
significances acquired by human actions in their actual resonances. The
Testament ultimately affirms a positive relationship between the two
which can provide a clear and viable basis for moral understanding. The
poem delineates the inadequacy of the moral judgements which it
presents so as to clear the ground in order to define more precisely the
terms in which those judgements can be deemed valid.
5
To understand how Henryson's destabilising literary strategies in the
Testament serve to affirm a positive mode of moral vision, it is necessary
to examine their implications with regard to the tension between the
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affective and idealising imperatives of Scholastic literary theory. While
the former of these imperatives urges that moral values be addressed as
closely as possible to worldly circumstances, the latter insists that they be
assigned a universality which transcends any temporal contexts. In the
light of the debate and epistemological uncertainty engendered by the
late-medieval awareness that particular reality cannot be assimilated
within universal categories without an extreme reductivness, it becomes
difficult to find a mode of judgement which satisfies both of the Scholastic
prerequisites46. The tension between them inhibits the process of moral
judgement and reform, as the satisfactory application to human actions of
a coherent and normative set ofmoral values is hindered by an
awareness that such values, in failing to address the qualities which
actions accrue in their temporal contexts, provide an understanding of
existence which neglects significant dimensions of its reality. The process
of establishing clear guidelines for ethical judgement and action is thus
problematised.
It is clear that these are issues which Henryson cannot afford to
dismiss. To fail to engage with them would be to neglect a major and
problematic tendency in late-medieval thought which threatens to
compromise the moral efficacy of his own work and challenges its
capacity to address moral judgements to the lives of its audience. It has
already been noted in this chapter that the disjunctive interaction of the
Testament's secular and metaphysical levels of significance registers the
lack of congruence between universal essences and particular realities in
late-medieval thought: simple moralisations are shown to provide an
image of reality which appears insensitive to the qualities which human
actions take on in their temporal dimension, while judgements founded
on the latter seem unsatisfactory in their contingency and lack of any
positive authority. In foregrounding the limits of these different
perspectives in a manner whereby each provides what the other lacks,
Henryson urges the need for the comprehensive vision which is provided
towards the poem's close, within which the relationship of these
perspectives becomes complementary rather than antagonistic. At the
same time, the disjunctive organisation of the poem's different levels of
significance serves a valid function in exposing the problems presented by
any privileging of one perspective over the other. The late-medieval
46. See above, Ch.2, pp.84-93.
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sense of the tension between universal values and particular realities
makes such privileging an immanent danger. By thus guarding against
it, Henryson aims to ensure that literature's capacity to mediate
effectively between ideal moral norms and individual human actions can
be sustained in the post-Nominalist context in which he writes.
The Testament's mode of signification is thus both critique and
continuation of the priorities of Scholastic literary theory. In developing
a mode of judgement which is orientated toward the actual as much as
the ideal, and which critiques a merely transcendently-orientated mode of
judgement, Henryson suggests that, in view of the gulf between
universals and particulars, the abstractive Scholastic model of literary
signification model is no longer tenable. But the terms in which this
critique is couched indicate a continuing commitment to such theory. The
concretising emphasis of the Testament, which demands that the moral
values which it recommends be understood in terms of their worldly
implications as well as of their universal resonances, is entirely in
keeping with the affective emphasis of Scholastic literary theory.
Henryson criticises the model of signification traditionally presumed in
Scholastic exegesis in terms which are themselves derived from
Scholasticism. His aim is not to displace the Scholastic conception of
literature. Rather, the Testament evolves a significative mode designed
to maintain literature's conformity to the imperatives laid down by
Scholastic literary theory, and which does so in being adapted to a post-
Nominalist context in which the established Scholastic definitions and
interpretative protocols are no longer adequate to achieve this end.
Henryson's invocation of the destabilising forces of textuality is in
this respect a strategy of containment. The inadequacy of the
Testament's different judgemental modes is foregrounded in order to
reinforce the poem's recommendation of a perspective which transcends
their limits, and which in attending to practical secular value as well as
to inherent worthiness, enables a viable and authoritative moral
understanding of human actions. Henryson's foregrounding of the
Testament's textuality thus preserves the Scholastic concern over
maintaining a sense of the ideal truth-value of literary meaning, while
ensuring that such meaning can be adequately related to actual
circumstances in accordance with the affective requirement of Scholastic
theory.
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Other aspects of the Testament's textualising stress on the
interpretative character of the moral judgements which it presents
similarly serve to maintain a sense of the positive relation between
simple moral values and concrete situations. The narrator's 'pietie1, and
his refusal of any generalising condemnation of Cresseid, stress that the
signs of the text produce only a partial image of a complex and multi-
faceted being, and that any moral evaluation based on the narrative
presented is necessarily a reductive account of Cresseid's existence.
Hence, while depicting Cresseid as an exemplum of concupiscence,
defined in terms both of its secular and metaphysical implications, the
Testament also signals that this representation is necessarily built upon
exclusions. Henryson thus indicates that particular existents cannot in
their entirety be assimilated within any simple categorisation. The poem
invites one to reach a moral judgement, but also undermines the validity
of that judgement in relation to the complexities of particular reality.
Once again, this aspect of the Testament is relevant to the late-
medieval perception that particular existents cannot be adequately
defined in terms of simple values. And as before, this perception results
in a sense that sentential moralisations have small bearing on actual life.
The equivocal and complex nature of existents resists summatory
categorisation. The resultant impeding ofjudgement, however, differs
slightly from that which obtains from the lack of congruence between the
ideal and actual dimensions of reality. While Henryson is able, in the
Testament at least, to bypass the latter impediment by harmonising both
dimensions of the poem's action within a comprehensive appraisal of its
significance, the disruptive effects of the former problem are much less
readily reducible. Henryson's foregrounding of the multi-faceted nature
of Cresseid's being casts doubt not merely on the relation between ideal
values and actual existence, but on the validity of any sentential
evaluation of reality.
The inadequacy of the depiction of Cresseid as an admonitory
exemplum of cupiditas, however, pertains only when one considers that
the Testament provides merely a partial representation of the totality of
her existence. The poem's warning against concupiscence, seems entirely
valid within the limited frame of the narrative, and clearly apposite to
the events depicted therein. Nothing in the Testament disputes the
affirmation that this exemplative treatment of Cresseid, in negatively
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interpreting her promiscuity and sensual outlook as error and folly in
both spiritual and worldly terms, provides a wholly pertinent and
adequate reading of the specific actions depicted in the poem. Henryson
thus emphasises that the knowledge provided by simple categorisations is
partial and imperfect in its exclusion of significant aspects of Cresseid's
existence when considered in its totality, while at the same time
affirming the applicability and authority of such knowledge with regard
to the specific portion of her life on which judgement is being brought to
bear.
The Testament thus presents a mode ofjudgement which again
affirms the connection between simple values and human life. At the
same time, by assigning the significance established on these terms only
a relative perspectival validity, Henryson maintains an awareness of
those aspects of the multiform nature of an individual life which exceed
the compass of such exemplative judgement. The poem's restriction of
the evaluative scope of its summatory categorisations is thus directed
towards clarifying moral vision. Henryson highlights the oblique relation
between simple values and actual reality in order to define more clearly
the area of positive relation between them. The images of reality
provided by sentential and universalising determinations of significance
retain an evaluative legitimacy, even as their inadequacies are
recognised. The actual pertinence and applicability of simple values,
while restricted in its compass, is more powerfully affirmed for being
precisely defined.
The final way in which Henrsyon's qualifications of the Testament's
narrative tend to affirm the validity of its meaning lies in their
reinforcing of the poem's affective power. The poem's questioning of its
own historical veracity, its drawing attention to the fictionality of its
account of Cresseid's life, combines with other aspects of the poem to
stress the distance between Cresseid herself and the textual image of her
presented here. Henryson thus signals that the primary value of the
Testament does not lie in what it can tell us about Cresseid. The accent
on the creative interpretative aspects of the poem invites one to consider
the Testament as an authorial construct, shaped according to motivations
which direct its significance outwards towards the audience, or
audiences, for whose instruction it has been constructed: 'Maid for 3our
worschip and instructioun' (1.611).
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In this, the stress on the Testament's status as a provisional fiction
is designed to underscore Cresseid's injunction, 'in 3our mynd ane
mirrour mak of me' (1.457). Herbert Grabes has pointed out that mirror
imagery in medieval texts, especially those which present images of
mutability as is the case with the Testament, indicated that the fates of
literary characters were to be regarded as 'unmasking mirrors in which
everyone may catch a glimpse of his ineluctable fate. They move the
beholder to incorporate this knowledge into his everyday affairs and his
moral attitudes.'47 Henryson's stress on the interpretative and creative
aspects of the Testament invite precisely this conception of the text,
encouraging the poem's readers to understand its sententia as directed
towards their own moral life.
The features of the Testament outlined above re-emphasise the
extent ofHenryson's debt to Scholastic literary theory, along with the
analytical rigour and independence of mind which characterise his
engagement with it. This debt is evident in the audience-orientated
nature of the poem, which continues the affective emphasis of Scholastic
literary theory. It is equally apparent in Henryson's concern to maintain
literature's capacity to mediate between ideal values and actual life,
defining its function in terms which preserve both its transcendent
reference and ethical utility, and thus satisfy the two key imperatives of
Scholastic literary thought. Similarly, the perspectival structure by
which Henryson achieves this clearly owes much to the model of
signification presumed in the tradition of allegorical exegesis.
At the same time, Henryson's engagement with Scholastic theory is
critical and modificatory. In his sensitivity to the material significance of
human actions, and his awareness of the inadequacy of a mode of
judgement which neglects this level of their significance, Henryson
departs from the traditional universalising emphasis of academic
Scholasticism. But this critique and dissent from Scholastic norms is
itself motivated by a commitment to the Scholastic requirement that
literary meaning be directed towards a practical ethical end, and
constitutes an attempt to fulfil that requirement in terms adapted to his
own post-Nominalist epoch. Henryson also abandons the medieval and
47. Herbert Grabes, The Mutable Glass: Mirror Imagery in Titles and Texts of
the Middle Ages and the English Renaissance, trans. G. Collier (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), p.93.
221
Scholastic tendency to define literary meaning as being wholly
independent of the confabulatory processes through which the text is
constructed. For Henryson, a text does not passively convey its
significance to the mind of an audience. The Testament's perspectival
organisation permits him to present meaning as having been contructed
through an interpretative and discriminatory processing of reality, while
at the same time retaining a sense of validating reference to a strictly
delimited aspect of the substantial nature of that reality. Henryson
draws on exegetical protocols furnished by Scholastic theory in order to
reconcile the idealising and affective emphases of that theory by
establishing a positive relation between simple norms and actual reality.
But the mode of signification which he develops in order to achieve this
entails a recognition of the figmentary character of even universalised
sententiae which departs radically from the emphasis found in the
Scholastic traditions which provide the motivation and the means for the
Testament's singular construction.
Here, as throughout the Testament, Henryson utilises the
resources of Scholastic literary theory with considerable flexibility and
freedom. At the same time, the innovatory literary strategies which he
develops are aimed at preserving the Scholastic conception of literary
signification in a context where that conception has become highly
problematic, with the traditional biases of Scholasticism being no longer
adequate to establish a relation between the literary text, universal
values, and human life. The Testament thus demonstrates both
Henryson's commitment to the Scholastic theoretical tradition, and the
critical and productive character of his engagement with it.
Whatever the internal coherence of the Testament, however,
doubts remain over how satisfactory its proposed reconciliation of
idealising and concretising modes of judgement really is. Comparison
with 'The Two Mice' shows that the Testament fails to address a
significant aspect of this tension. The Testament presents a situation
where the temporal implications and universal overtones of Cresseid's
actions agree in inviting one to view her behaviour in negative terms, as
either spiritual corruption or secular folly. In 'The Two Mice', however,
these modes of judgement do not invite compatible conclusions. There,
Henryson presents a situation where actions which are to be condemned
according to an a priori set ofmoral values appear quite justifiable when
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considered in their secular context48. As in the Testament, each mode of
judgement acquires an irreducibly textual character: the evaluations of
both are seen to be constituted through a process of differentiation and
exclusion, whereby certain of an action's apparently significant
dimensions are prioritised and others excluded. But in 'The Two Mice',
the incompatibiity of these perspectives leaves judgement suspended,
proffering neither a reconciliation of the differing modes ofjudgemental,
nor any means of deciding which should receive priority.
'The Two Mice', then, agrees with the Testament in acknowledging
the necessarily figmentary character which the disproportionate relation
between universals and particulars imposes on moral judgement.
Humanity's apprehension of reality is necessarily mediated through signs
which depart from the reality they purport to describe. But the fable
provides a much darker understanding of this situation. In the
Testament, the influence of such fictive representations on the human
faculties is positively figured in Troilus' recollection of Cresseid's image:
The idole of ane thing in cace may be
Sa deip imprentit in the fantasy
That it deludis the wittis outwardly,
And sa appeiris in forme and lyke estait
Within the mynd as it was figurait.
(11.507-11)
Even as Troilus fails to recognise the real Cresseid in her debased
condition, his senses are further beguiled by a purely mental impression
which nevertheless determines his reaction to her. His act of charity
towards Cresseid is motivated by 'knichtlie pietie and memoriall / Of fair
Cresseid' (11.519-20), sentiments which have been aroused by the
conjuring of her image. Troilus' perception is clearly deluded here by a
fictive ideal49. But his delusion is ultimately a beneficial one, resulting in
Cresseid's own self-knowledge50. This is quite in accordance with the
Testament's perspectival structure which indicates that true moral
insight can only be effected by representations whose departure from
reality assigns them a necessarily figmentary, textual quality.
48. See above, Ch.3, pp.127-42.
49. Benson argues that Troilus is here being criticised for his delusion, pp.265-
66.
50. See Anne M. McKim, 'Henryson's "Memoriall of Fair Cresseid'", in OfLion
and of Unicorn: Essays on Anglo-Scottish Literary Relations in Honour ofProfessor John
MacQueen, ed. R.D.S. Jack and K. McGinley (Edinburgh: Quadriga, 1993), pp. 1-15
(p.10).
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But in 'The Two Mice', the separation of signs from things
thoroughly debilitates the human understanding. The disjunction
between universals and particulars results in actions taking on a diverse
range of possible significances, each ofwhich displaces the other, with no
means of deciding which, if any, provides a true understanding. As
Henryson puts it in 'The Preaching of the Swallow', 'Sa is our saull with
fantasie opprest, / To knaw the thingis in nature manifest.' (11.1641-42).
Set against this congenital uncertainty in the Fables is the impending
threat of divine judgement and damnation. Henryson thus presents a
situation in which the moral faculties ofhumanity are condemned to an
unavoidable uncertainty and vacillation, while no margin is provided for
the errors which must inevitably result from this. While Henryson's
treatment of the relation between the ideal and the actual is more honest
and thorough in the Fables than in the Testament, his vision is also much
bleaker and more pessimistic therein. The Fables provides no resolution
of the crisis of representation which has resulted from the tensions and
contradictions of Scholastic literary theory. But, as will be argued in the
next chapter, the collection does offer a rigorous analysis of the nature of
that crisis and of its implications for the possibility of establishing moral






Et grammatice (quam in Latinum transferentes litteraturum
vocaverunt) fines suos norit, praesertim tantum ab hac
appelationis suae paupertate, intra quam primi illi constitere,
provecta.
(Quintilian, Institutio, II, i, 4)1
1
In the Fables, Henryson gives considerable attention to problems of social
as well as individual morality. Fables such as 'The Sheep and the Dog',
'The Lion and the Mouse', 'The Wolf and the Wether', and 'The Wolf and
the Lamb' place a powerful emphasis on the connection between moral
and social disorder, focusing on both the oppression of the poor and on the
danger of rebellion against the social hierarchy. Concern is also
expressed over the abuse of the legal system which leads to a failure in
the proper administration of justice. These aspects of the Fables are not
separate from the problems of representation which Henryson addresses
therein. Henryson's questioning of the nature and function of literary
representation poses semiotic problems which are a root cause of the
social corruption and disorder to which he objects. The fables display a
fractured mode of signification which both emblematises a more general
disorder in the world and embodies the disruption ofmoral vision from
which it results.
Many of the representations of language and signs in the Fables
highlight their disruptive potential. The deceptive power of language is
foregrounded repeatedly, with the attachment of false names to things
appearing as a pervasive strategy for misleading oneself and others. In
'The Trial of the Fox', the special dispensation which the mare claims
excuses her from the lion's summons turns out to be a blow from her hoof
(11.1008-24). In 'The Fox, the Wolf and the Cadger', the dubious
1. Cited in Murphy, p.24n.
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significance of the 'nekherring' with which the Cadger threatens
Lowrence is exploited fully by the fox, to the wolfs detriment:
'It is ane syde of salmond, as it wair,
And callour, pypand lyke ane pertrik ee:
It is worth all the hering 3e haue thair -
3e, and we had it swa, is it worth sic thre.'
(11.2126-29)
In 'The Fox, the Wolf, and the Husbandsman', the farmer's
metaphorically intended imprecation against his oxen, "'The volff [...] mot
haue 3ou all at anis!"' (1.2244), is held against him in a literal, legalistic
interpretation by the Wolf, who exploits the potential for confusion
generated by the co-existence in one sentence of discrete levels of
grammatical and rhetorical significance. In the same fable, Lowrence's
beguiling of the wolfwith a fictional cheese which he identifies with the
moon's reflection in a well (11.2392-98), extends the moralitas' execration
of covetousness as 'all hot fraud and fantasie' (1.2451) to encompass the
duplicitous significations which result from language's intervention
between things and our perception of them.
Like the Testament of Cresseid, then, the Fables displays an
awareness of how the distance between sign and referent compromises
knowledge, instituting a breach between the significances we attach to
reality and the things ofwhich they are predicated. In the Testament, the
separation of signs from things is accounted for within a perspectival
structure which maintains an oblique reference whereby meaning retains
a relative validity. In the Fables, however, no such resolution of the
problem is forthcoming. As 'The Two Mice' illustrates, the ideal and
actual dimensions ofmoral actions exist in a much more violently
disjunctive and exclusive relation than in the Testament, refusing to be
reconciled within any comprehensive structure. The way in which the
disproportion between the universal and the particular exacerbates the
uncertainties to which moral representation and judgement are subject is
neatly summated in 'The Cock and the Fox'.
In this fable, the hens present a series of vying representations of
Chantecleir and his fate (11.495-543). Chantecleir is depicted as a dutiful
model of courtly virtue comparable to Troilus in the Testament (11.495-
508), as impotent, jealous, and abusive (11.516-19), and as sinful in his
pride, faithlessness and lechery (11.530-43). His fate is either a tragic
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loss, a good riddance, or divine retribution. Gregory Kratzmann
describes the effects of this passage of the fable admirably:
The four mock-epitaphs spoken by the three wives (Pertok provides
a startling corrective to her initial lament in response to Sprutok's
persuasion) construct Chantecleir's nature in opposing ways; each
block of dramatic rhetoric offers a point ofview which answers to
the speaker's own sense of self, and the truth of Chauntecleir's
'gentillesse' is finally indeterminate. As each invents her own
reality, the poetry highlights the power of language both to
persuade and to delude.2
Reality itself slips away, as the understanding grasps it indirectly
through signs whose divergence from things, and capacity to be evoked in
the absence of their proper referent, undermines any certainty as to the
truth of their constructions.
The gap between sign and referent and the resultant obscuring of
the nature of things is connected in this same passage with the
disproportionate relation of the ideal and the actual. Coppok's moralising
pronouncements introduce to the fable an awareness of the imminence of
divine judgement on evildoers:
'Bot rychteous God, haldand the balandis euin,
Smytis rycht sair, thocht he be patient,
Adulterairis that list thame not repent.'
(11.535-37)
In the light of this, the need to be able to understand how one's actions
appear in the eyes of God becomes of paramount importance. Coppok's
outlook here is a compelling one. In evoking, however prematurely in
this instance, the inevitable judgement which awaits all those who have
'comptit not for Goddis fauour or feid' (1.539), it combines with the
gradually darkening tone of the fables3, and with the stress in many of
the moralitates on the everlasting horror of damnation4, to affirm the
2. Gregory Kratzmann, 'The Poetics of the "Fenyeit Fabill": Chaucer and the
Middle Scots Poets', in OfLion and of Unicorn, pp.16-38 (pp.27-8).
3. I take the order of the Fables as presented in Fox's edition to be authoritative.
The symmetries and patterns revealed in the analysis by George D. Gopen in his 'The
Essential Seriousness of Robert Henryson's Moral Fables: A Study in Structure', Studies
in Philology 82 (1985), 42-53, are too precise and pervasise to be accidental. See also
H.FI. Roerecke, The Integrity and Symmetry ofRobert Henryson's Moral Fables (PhD
thesis: Pennsylvania State University, 1969). On the darkening tone of the Fables, see
Fox's observations in his introduction to Poems, pp.lxxix-lxxxi.
4. See, for instance, 'The Cock and the Fox', 595-99; 'The Preaching of the
Swallow', 1930-36; 'The Fox, the Wolf and the Husbandsman', 2450-54; 'The Wolf and
the Lamb', 2720, 2765-69.
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urgency of moral reform and the dire consequences of failing to consider
the absolute resonances of human actions.
But whatever the persuasiveness of Coppok's moralising
considered per se, it is not clear that it is appropriate in these
circumstances. While the fable can undoubtedly serve as a warning of
the practical dangers of a vain susceptibility to flattery, its events have
little obvious bearing on the question of Chantecleir's alleged adultery.
Moreover, Chantecleir's eventual escape from the fox casts doubt on
Coppok's reading of the fable's action as not merely revealing
Chantecleir's foolishness, but as an expression of divine displeasure, and
a vindication of God's justice. The weight of reprobatory significance that
she ascribes to an incident which, whatever its disastrous potential,
finally comes to nothing, suggests that her will to moralise may be
excessive. This suspicion is heightened by the narratorial prelude to her
observations: 'Than Coppok lyke ane curate spak full crous' (1.530). As in
'The Cock and the Jasp', the word 'crous' is ambivalent. It might be taken
here to mean 'bold', implying a readiness to speak out against sin.
Equally, it might be taken to mean 'boastful', in which case it would
suggest that Coppok's willingness to cast Chantecleir's misfortune in the
most condemnatory light possible derives from a complacent conceit and
sense of moral superiority, which lead her to ascribe her own prejudices
to the divinity.
The disparity between the apparent significance of the events
described in the fable and that which Coppok ascribes to them is neatly
emblematised in the summatory couplet which concludes her discourse:
'Thairfoir it is the verray hand off God
That causit him be werryit with the tod.'
(11.542-3)
The rhyming juxtaposition of the words 'God' and 'tod' underscores the
bathetic effect of the couplet, which points up the absurdity of thus seeing
the divine will revealed in a commonplace farmyard incident, and the
incongruity of finding momentous eschatological significance in things
which are apparently mundane and unspectacular. Coppok's sermonising
certainly stresses the urgency of arriving at a true understanding of the
essential moral nature of human actions given the prospect of divine
judgement, and fosters a sobering awareness of the fact that, as the
moralitas to 'The Wolf and the Lamb' affirms, 'God in his diuinite / The
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wrang, the richt, of all thy werkis wait.' (11.2722-23) But the uncertain
applicability of her remarks to Chantecleir's circumstances suggests that
the obliquity with which absolute values apply to the complexities of
particular realities must raise doubts over whether the significance
established by such categorising is anything more than an arbitrary
imposition. Coppok's moral perspective thus joins with the passage as a
whole to indicate the problems involved in trying to arrive at a sure
understanding of the real nature of things. The difficulty of
distinguishing fiction from truth which results from the lack of necessary
relation between sign and referent is exacerbated by the disproportionate
relation of the universal and the particular, which introduces a diversity
of possible and incompatible significances to things. The evidently
differential and exclusory nature of such disjunct meanings leaves the
understanding unable to extricate itself from the duplicitous realm of
signs.
Henryson has no doubt that ultimately humanity will be subject to
absolute judgement. This is implicit in the emphasis on the horrors of
eternal damnation which frequently occurs in the moralitates, a prospect
before which there is little room for moral relativism. But the obliquity
with which simple moral categories come to bear on temporal reality,
their narrow strictures being exceeded or challenged by the possible
significances introduced by that reality's complex contingent resonances,
means that the understanding is deprived of any clear criteria of
judgement and can never be free from vacillation and the risk of error.
The crisis of representation which the Fables presents is one in which the
Scholastic conception of literature breaks down. Poetry no longer appears
as an affectively useful adjunct to moral understanding and action,
facilitating an audience's reception of ideal truths in a manner which
establishes a positive relation between normative values and human life.
Rather, in being characterised by an interference between particularising
and universalising modes ofjudgement, it testifies only to the inadequacy
of its own significations, displaying its own failure to provide any certain
knowledge of the nature of reality.
But Henryson's interrogation of poetry and of the controlling
definitions of Scholastic literary theory addresses problems whose
implications extend far beyond the restricted domain of literature, even if
they are most clearly exemplified therein. Henryson conceives moral
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rectitude and social order as consisting in temporal reality's being
brought under the aegis of the ideal precepts of the moral law. The
problematic relation between universals and particulars thus not only
disrupts the significative structure of literature but also impedes the
establishment ofmoral order and social justice. Henryson frequently
provides representations in the Fables of the failure of persuasive
discourse to produce reform and of the moral and social disorder which
results from this failure. Analysis of these representations will show that
the problems of poetic signification which complicate the relation of
meaning to truth are a result of its participation in a general crisis of
moral perception which casts doubt on the possibility of ever bringing
earthly life into conformity with the order of the moral law.
2
In the final stanza of the moralitas of 'The Wolf and the Lamb' Henryson
states his ideal of social justice in terms which reflect significantly on the
problems of literary representation which he addresses. The stanza
exhorts that social abuses be righted through the proper government of
the king:
God keip the lamb, quhilk is the innocent,
From wolfis byit and men extortioneris;
God grant that wrangous men of fals intent
Be manifest, and punischit as effeiris;
And God, as thow all rychteous prayer heiris,
Mot saif our king, and gif him hart and hand
All sic wolfis to banes of the land.
(11.2770-6)
Divine justice still operates on an eschatological level: 'God in his
diuinite, / The wrang, the richt, of all thy werkis wait' (11.2723-4). But
there is a clear disparity between this affirmation of a transcendent
justice and the negative depiction of the injustice which actually appears
on earth. The stanza demands that right be established and the wicked
punished temporally as well as spiritually. The repeated appeals that
God bring the world into conformity with His will, concluding with the
prayer that the king should act in accordance with his divinely-appointed
role as admistrator of God's justice on earth, thus provide a
comprehensive moral vision. Conformity to the edicts of the divinely-
ordained moral law, Henryson suggests, provides the only means of
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securing humanity's secular well-being. The stanza's ethical imperative
maintains a clear reference to absolute standards of justice, vouchsafed
by divine authority, as a touchstone of moral judgement. But these ideal
imperatives are equally to be understood in their temporal implications,
bringing human actions into direct conformity with the divine law and
thus allowing temporal life to participate in the harmony and stability of
the divine ordo.
These aspects of 'The Wolf and the Lamb' establish a connection
between the semiotic problems posed in Henryson's treatment of
literature and his social attitudes. Just as the poetic text is required to
open onto ideal meanings and facilitate their application in actual life, so
too does justice consist in a mediation of the moral law which should
bring humanity into conformity with the divine will as manifested
through that law. This connection between the mediative functions of
justice and poetry is expressed by Aquinas in his comments on the nature
of law and justice. For Aquinas, justice involves a proper relation of
mutuality between diverse beings5, although it can also be considered
metaphorically as designating the correct ordering of the interior
disposition, as in the subordination of the senses to reason6. In both
instances, justness entails conformity to the order of right reason:
In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse aliquid iustum ex eo quod est
rectum secundum regulam rationis. [...] Unde omnis lex
humanitas posita intantum habet de rectione legis, inquantum a
lege naturae derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali discordet,
iam non erit lex, sed legis corruptio.
(ST, I-II, xcv, 2, resp.)
Justice, then, requires a consonance between human actions, whether
interior or exterior, and the moral imperatives of the natural law. In
order to achieve this, ideal values must be mediated onto actual
circumstances, both by the exercise of individual reason and by the rule of
law:
Ex praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam principiis
communibus et indemonstrahilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana
precedat ad aliqua magis particulariter disponende.
(ST, I-II, cxi, 3, resp.)
In the Fables, however, it seems doubtful whether temporal
existence can in fact be harmoniously brought into conformity with the
5. See ST, II-II, lvii, 1.
6. Ibid., I-II, cxiii, 1, resp.
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moral law. In 'The Wolf and the Lamb' the debate which takes place in
the narrative component of the fable shows the attempt to establish the
rule of reason failing in the face of brute force: '"Ha", quod the volff, "thou
wald intruse ressoun / Quhair wrang and reif suld duell in propertie.'"
(11.2694-94) The lamb's eloquence in asserting the justice of his own
position provides no defence against such intransigent corruption and
superior power. The wolf in fact reduces him to inarticulacy: 'The selie
lamb culd do na thing hot bleit' (1.2700). 'The Wolf and the Lamb'
conforms to the dominant pattern of the Fables, where there is a marked
and sustained disparity between the imperatives of the moralitates and
the world of the tales where those imperatives visibly fail to be applied,
and it shows in a particularly graphic manner the deleterious
consequences of this failure:
Sone wes he hedit; the volff wald do na grace;
Syne drank his blude and off his flesche can eit
Quhill he wes full [...].
(11.2701-3)
That the exercise of persuasive discourse can really effect the enactment
of the precepts of the moral law in a manner which permits secular life to
participate in the stability of the divine ordo, with human beings
conforming to the principles of their proper action as decreed by the will
of God, thus appears highly questionable.
'The Wolf and the Lamb' depicts a world in which the social
institutions which should enact the divine will and serve as guarantors of
order are twisted away from their proper function. The moralitas opens
with an attack on the judicial system, construing the wolf as an example
of'fals peruerteris of the lawis', 'Smoirand the richt, garrand the wrang
proceid' (1.2719). The wolf is also taken to represent 'mychtie men' whose
greed leads them to oppress and exploit the poor, giving the specific
example of those who use their greater economic power to oust tenants
from their land (11.2728-41). Finally, Henryson attacks landlords who
exploit their tenants in order to gain extra rent and labour from them
(11.2742-62). Here, the social structure of feudalism, which should draw
the different estates together in a relation of interdependence based on
mutual obligation and responsibility, is shown to be corrupted. The
relation between the different levels of society should be regulated by
principles of justice and equity which, as the final stanza of the moralitas
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indicates, ensure order and stability in society and accord with the divine
will. Instead, the relations of power which the social hierarchy institutes
are abused, being diverted from their proper function in promoting the
common good. The social order thus fails as an institution of temporal
justice, as it departs from the principles of right decreed in the moral law
according to the rule of reason.
Henryson's concern over social abuses, particularly as carried out
through the maladministration of the law, pervades the Fables. The fox's
eagerness to take bribes in his role as arbitrator in 'The Fox, the Wolf,
and the Husbandman' (11.2315-35), and the sheep's trial by a court
composed of predators and scavengers in 'The Sheep and the Dog',
provide further instances of the corruption ofwhich Henryson complains.
Fables such as these show the judicial process being perverted so that, as
the sheep remarks, those who administer it "'thoill the richt go doun'"
(1.1306) in order to serve their own interests7. The social institutions
which should operate under the aegis of the moral law are diverted from
their proper end by those responsible for their administration. The social
disorder which the Fables depicts is thus presented as a consequence of
humanity's lack of obedience to the divine will.
As noted above, 'The Wolf and the Lamb', along with the other
socially-orientated fables in the collection, expresses a concern over the
temporal as well as spiritual implications of injustice. The innocent
lamb's fate is no disaster for him in eschatological terms, but Henryson's
condemnation of the wolf focuses on both the innate corruption of his
actions and on the evil of the suffering to which they subject their victim.
The stark horror of the lamb's death combines with the specificity of the
abuses which Henryson attacks in the moralitas to define injustice in
secular as well as spiritual terms, and to demand a conformity to the
divinely-ordained law which will result in social as well as moral order.
This suggests that the disorder of which Henryson complains is seen as
being, in principle at least, remediable. In fables such as 'The Sheep and
the Dog' and 'The Wolf and the Lamb', the values of the moralitas appear
clearly relevant to the action of the tale. Even if little hope is held out
7. On the representation of law in these fables, see Robert Pope, 'Henryson's
The Sheep and the Dog', Essays in Criticism, 30, no.2 (1980), 205-14; Craig McDonald,
'The Perversion of Law in Robert Henryson's Fable of The Fox, The Wolf, and the
Husbandsman', Medium Aevum, 49 (1980), 244-53.
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that these values will be put into practice, there is no doubt that they
provide sound criteria for assessing the moral significance of the abuses
depicted in the narrative. The ideal precepts of the moral law are only
prevented from being applied in actual reality by an entrenchment in
sensuality which leaves humanity impervious to the dictates of reason.
This suggests that ideal moral norms are capable of being applied to
actual circumstances in a manner which brings order to existence, even if
in practice they fail to be enacted.
This aspect of the Fables reflects positively on the capacity of
poetry to express a coherent vision of reality, as is indicated in the
representation of the lamb's eloquence. The failure of the lamb's
persuasions makes a point similar to that made by Aesop in the prologue
to 'The Lion and the Mouse', in which he initially resists the narrator's
request that he recount a fable:
'Now in this warld me think richt few or nane
To Goddis word that hes deuotioun;
The eir is deif, the hart is hard as stane;
Now oppin sin without correctioun,
The e inclynand to the eirth ay doun.
Sa roustit is the warld with canker blak
That now my taillis may lytill succour mak.'
(11.1391-97)
Pessimism with regard to the capacity of poetry to produce reform derives
here from a sense of humanity's habituation to sin, an issue which
Henryson also addresses in the 'Prologue' to the collection as a whole8:
Na meruell is, ane man be lyke ane heist,
Quihilk lufis ay carnall and foull delyte,
That schame can not him ren3e nor arreist,
But takis all the lust and appetyte,
Quhilk throw custom and the daylie ryte
Syne in the mynd sa fast is radicate
That he in brutal beist is transformate.
(11.50-56)
The inability of poetry to repair the breach between human life and the
moral law which the disparity between the world of the tales and the
ideals of the moralitates represents is here attributed to the hard-hearted
carnality of sinners. This leaves them unreceptive to the moral truths
which poetry conveys, and unable to properly moderate the relation
between reason and passion within themselves, or in their relation to
8. See also 'The Fox and the Wolf, 786-88.
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others. From this perspective poetry and other forms of persuasive
discourse are indeed capable of providing an understanding of human
actions which relates them cogently to essential moral values. The
failure of rhetorical discourse, including poetry, to provide effective moral
persuasion is thus attributable to its reception rather than to any
congenital defect in its signings.
In this respect, the Fables' concern over its own moral inefficacy is
a conventional one, being a recognisable characteristic of the genre9. This
might be thought to confirm that the doubts which Henryson expresses
are not incompatible with a sense of the genuine utility of fable, being
harmoniously contained within the genre as one of its traditional
constituents. Robert L. Kindrick in fact suggests that Henryson's
depictions of the failures of persuasive representations are aimed at
increasing the moral efficacy of the fables. Referring to 'The Preaching of
the Swallow', he argues that the birds' refusal to heed the swallow's
exhortations is designed to encourage in the fable's audience a positive
response to the message about the importance of prudence10. Henryson's
concern over the failures of rhetorical discourse is thus incorporated
within a strategy which affirms its value as a persuasive force for moral
order.
Other aspects of the Fables, however, suggest that the
disconsonance between temporal reality and the moral law is a far more
intractable problem than this, and that the factors which produce it are
such as to radically undermine the capacity of poetic signification to
provide any positive knowledge of reality. Poetry is in fact frequently
used to emblematise an obscuring ofmoral vision which leads to the very
abuses which Henryson attacks. The fables construct the inability to
relate sensible reality to intelligible values not only as sensuality, but
also as textuality. The common designation of fable and fox as 'fen3eit'
has already been noted (above, Ch.3, p. 117). The moralitas of 'The Wolf
and the Lamb' refers to 'fals peruertiris of the lawis, / Quhilk vnder poleit
termis falset mingis' (11.2715-16). This recalls the reference in the
9. On the doubt expressed in the Fables over its capacity to produce reform, see
Fox (ed.), Poems, pp.lxxviii-lxxxi. On the relation of this doubt to Aesopic tradition,
particularly with reference to the widely-known Life ofAesop, see Annabel Patterson,
Fables ofPower: Aesopian Writing and Political History (Durham and London: Duke
University Press, 1991), pp.26-31.
10. Kindrick, Henryson and the Medieval Arts ofRhetoric, pp.247-48.
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'Prologue' to the 'polite termis of sweit rhetore' (1.3) and directly connects
the perversion of human law, which turns it away from the law of nature,
with the workings of poetic language. Features such as these suggest
that poetry in its very constitution entails a disruption of knowledge
which leaves it unfitted to the task of producing moral reform.
The Fables' pessimism as to the capacity of literature to produce
moral reform, then, does not merely result from a sense of humanity's
habituation to sin. A major and even more intractable distortion of
perception results from the problems of representation discussed above.
Poetic discourse is presented as exemplary, the failure of its signings
typifying a general crisis of epistemology which leads not merely to a
disruption of literary signification, but to moral and social disorder as
well.
3
Many of Henryson's depictions of persuasive discourse in the Fables
suggest that its failure is a necessary result of the disproportionate
relation between the universal and the particular, which problematises
the determination of the moral significance of particular actions and calls
into question the capacity of absolute precepts to bring order to worldly
life. In 'The Preaching of the Swallow', the exhortations of the swallow
are no more effective than the arguments of the lamb in 'The Wolf and
the Lamb'. The moralitas of'The Preaching' constructs the
unreceptiveness of the birds as a result of habituation to sin,
emblematised in their allowing the seed to grow:
Proceding furth be vse and consuetude,
The sin rypis, and schame is set on syde [...].
(11.1909-10)
The tale, however, ascribes the birds' rejection of the swallow's advice not
to the wilfulness of sin, but to the weakness of their vision.
The fable opens with a contrast between 'The hie prudence and
wirking meruelous, / The profound wit off God omnipotent' (11.1622-23),
and 'mannis saull', which 'is febill and ouer small, / off vnderstanding
waik and vnperfite / To comprehend him that contenis all' (11.1644-46).
The narrator proceeds to counter this sense of distance between human
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and divine vision with an affirmation of the via positiva whereby God can
be known through his works:
The firmament payntit with sternis cleir
From eist to west rolland in cirkill round,
And euerilk planet in his proper spheir,
In mouing makand harmonie and sound;
The fyre, the watter, and the ground -
Till vnderstand it is aneuch, I wis,
That God in all his werkis wittie is.
(11.1657-63)
This is combined with an extensive description of the progress of the
seasons from summer to spring, in which the narrator states that
humanity should be able to find 'ilk sesoun / Concorddand till our
opportunitie, / As daylie be experience we may see' (11.1676-77). This
description implies a beneficent divine order which operates not only on a
spiritual level, but is also perceptible in the material world.
Certain aspects of the seasonal description, however, raise doubts
as to the authority of this evocation of a divine order manifested in
creation. Winter is afforded greater emphasis than the other seasons,
having two stanzas devoted to it, while the others have only one. In
anticipating the wintry setting of final tragic action of the fable, this
suggests on the narrator's part an awareness that the ideal vision of the
world as manifesting a divine order is compromised by the negative
elements of experience in which that order fails to be realised, as
illustrated in the narrative's chilling conclusion.
The fate of the birds is recounted with sympathy and horror:
Allace, it wes grit hart sair for to se
That bludie bowcheour beit thay birdis doun,
And for till heir, quhen thay wist weill to de,
Thair cairfull sang and lamentatioun.
(11.1874-77)
The narrator's pity for the birds is enhanced by an emphasis on their
weakness and helplessness: 'Thir small birdis, for hunger famischit neir'
(11.1867). This recalls the characterisation of the human soul in the
opening section of the fable. The fable thus reinscribes a sense that the
weakness of corporeal perception hampers the birds' capacity to grasp the
true significance of their own actions, and prevents them from adopting a
mode of conduct which will see the divine order directly manifested in
temporal life. This undermines the narrator's assertion that 'we may haif
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knawlegeing / Off God almichtie be his creatouris' (11.1650-51), which
appears as rather too pat a dismissal of the problem.
The narrative confirms that the birds' failure to bring their lives
into conformity with the divine order is a result of an uncertainty which
makes it well nigh impossible to arrive at a sure determination of an
action's true nature. John Burrow has pointed out the fable's concern
with the theme of prudence, a virtue which is concerned to apply
universals to particulars, determining the essential nature of present
moral actions by relating them to past actions and to their future
implications, and thus shadowing the atemporal vision of God11. The
fable, however, is as much a problematisation of prudence as a
recommendation of it. Burrow points to the lark's deployment in 11.1764-
68 of 'a string of anti-prudential proverbs' (p.33) as evidence that the
birds reject the swallow's advice through folly. Yet the fable also
indicates that the birds' refusal to heed the swallow is itself motivated by
prudential considerations. Certainly, they have 'bot lytill thocht / Off
perrell that mycht fall be auenture' (11.1818-19). But this is because they
aim to provide against hunger and want which, as the fable itself
illustrates, will come inevitably, and not merely 'be auenture':
'3one lint heirefter will do gude,
For linget is to lytill birdis fude.
'We think, quhen that 3one lint bollis ar ryip,
To mak vs feist and fill vs odd the seid,
Magre 3one churll, and on it sing and pyip.'
(11.1809-6)
Burrow comments thus:
Such optimism is a form of self-delusion, what Henryson earlier
calls 'fantasy', because the future generally brings change for the
worse. The joy and prosperity of spring and summer are followed
by the misery and deprivation ofwinter, While there is still time,
the prudent man will 'be ware' and 'provide before'. In this way he
may avert, or at least reduce, the dangers facing him in the future.
(pp.33-34)
But it is precisely in providing defence against future deprivations that
the birds refuse to eat the flax immediately, so that it may serve as a
source of food later. In the light of the certain onset of the hardships of
winter, this seems a rational decision. Indeed, the swallow's arguments
11. See John Burrow, 'Henryson's "Preaching of the Swallow'", Essays in
Criticism, 25, no.l (1975), 25-37 (pp.30-35).
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against deferring gratification appears in these terms to recommend a
course of action which is the very opposite of prudence, having no thought
for the future.
The problem, then, is not the birds' lack of prudence. Rather, it is
the fact that the nature of a particular action is obscured by its having a
range of possible implications which point in different directions and
complicate judgement. Conduct which is wise in some contexts, is foolish
in others. Any determination of the value of a particular course of action
is thus necessarily caught up in a difficult interpretative process in which
the relationship between things and the significances attached to them is
uncertain, so that the understanding is mired in perplexity and
constantly exposed to the risk of error. The distinction between truth and
lies, fact and fiction, is blurred, and the understanding, its capacity for
discernment thus hampered, is left open to manipulation by mendacious
representations.
The difficulty of transcending the complex particular resonances of
actions to grasp their intelligible nature is imaged not just in the fable's
narrative action, but also in the relation between tale and moralitas,
which is characterised by a tension between sympathy and judgement.
The moralitas has nothing of the narrator's piteous response to the birds'
predicament. Instead it condemns them in straightforward terms,
constructing their failure to heed the swallow's advice as worldliness
which leads to damnation (11.1902-1908, 1930-36). The narrative
similarly recognises that the birds' existence is disconsonant with the
divine order, as indicated by the disparity between the positive movement
of the seasons from summer to spring in the opening passages and the
negative movement from spring to winter in the story. But the pity with
which the narrator views their fate involves an awareness of the
constraints of physical need and weak understanding which underlie
their actions. The narrator's sensitivity to such factors questions the
appropriateness of the moralitas with its emphasis on wickedness and sin
which concentrates merely on the fact of their error, and its neglect of the
circumstances which explain and mitigate that error.
In this, the fable itself partakes of the same disordered perception
which the birds display in the tale and which hinders their capacity for
right judgement, the main difference being that no resolution of the
interpretative difficulties raised by the tale/moralitas relation is
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proffered. Unlike the situation in the tale, the rights and wrongs of the
competing perspectives are never established. Even as the fable's action
affirms the urgent need to bring human life into consonance with the
moral order, the tension between the response of the narrator and the
perspective of the moralitas testifies to the difficulty of grasping how
moral norms apply to circumstances whose complexity problematises the
question of how they are to be understood. God may know 'the wrang, the
richt' of all our works, but such things are not so evident to humanity. In
its depiction of the Swallow's failure to persuade and the consequences
thereof, the fable affirms the need for a moral certitude which it itself is
unable to provide.
A similar situation occurs in 'The Fox and the Wolf, which draws
with particular clarity the relation between the 'fendeit fox' and the
'fen3eit termis textuall' of poetry. Here the problem is not, as in the
'Preaching', the failure of true representations to effect moral persuasion
through their veracity being obscured. Rather it is the power of false
images to affect one's actions by being substituted for truth. Lowrence's
rebaptism of the kid as a salmon in an attempt to avoid the penance of
abstention from meat set in his imperfect confession (11.747-53), provides
a comic depiction of language's capacity to misrepresent the nature of
things, and of the delusions attendant on the understanding's being
governed solely by signs. The fox, remarking on the fact that he has been
shot immediately after his jesting remark, 'Vpon this wame set wer ane
bolt full meit' (1.760), observes that one cannot make a joke nowadays
without someone taking it seriously (11.769-70). This itself is a joke which
has serious import. The real nature of things may be obscured by the
deceptive power of words, but that nature remains intransigent.
Lowrence may call the kid a salmon, but it is still a kid. He may consider
that the scenario of retributory justice can be jokingly evoked, having no
actual bearing on his life, but its imminence is all too real. The fable
reminds one indeed that 'God in his diuinitie / The wrang, the richt, of all
thy werkis wait', and urges the need to transcend the arbitrary and
illusory significances which language obtrudes between the true nature
and consequences of those works and the human understanding of them.
The fable inscribes these issues and imperatives in its own
significative structure. The fox is depicted throughout as an engaging
character. Even his murder of the kid is passed over lightly, made the
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object of a joke, and depicted with none of the grimness which
characterises the slaughter of the birds in 'The Preaching of the Swallow',
the murder of the lamb in 'The Wolf and the Lamb', or the stark
disembowelling which concludes 'The Paddock and the Mouse'. The
game, energetic qualities which Lowrence displays, jesting even in death,
give him a roguish appeal which jars with the moralitas' wholly
unsympathetic account of him as a hardened sinner, unable to repent.
This form of disjunction is a consistent feature of the Reynardian fables,
where the fox's colourful character is construed in the moralitas
variously, but with a consistently censorious emphasis, as emblematising
worldly good, the temptation ofworldly pleasures, and the devil himself12.
Even in 'The Trial of the Fox', where the fables' bipartite structure is
disrupted by the intrusion of a moralising voice into the tale, this only
serves to highlight the lack of congruence between the impression given
by the cheerful disrespect with which the fox treats his father's corpse
and the moralising execration of his covetousness, lack of filial piety, and
worldliness (11.810-37).
The disjunction between these sympathetic and judgemental
perspectives reflects negatively on both. On the one hand, the moralitas
indicates that the tale's depiction of the fox remains rooted in sensibilia,
losing sight of the intelligible moral essences which should serve as a
guide to understanding. The moralitas also comments on the morality of
reading, warning against the deceptiveness of the tale's 'fei3nit termis
textuall' which give a delusive impression of the fox, just as Lowrence
himselfmanipulates language to create a false image of his own actions.
The poetic text provides a perspective shaped merely by signs whose
meaning remains divorced from the true nature of things.
It is not, however, clear that the tension between these
perspectives can be so easily resolved in favour of the moralitas. As
critics such as H.E. Tolliver, Daniel M. Murtaugh, and George Clark,
have argued, albeit with different emphases, the sympathy of the tales
comments on the harshness of the moralitates, rather than, or as well as,
vice versa13. In 'The Preaching of the Swallow', the narrator's sympathy
is not merely based on a neglect of the wisdom of the moralitas, but is
12. See 'The Fox, the Wolf, and the Cadger', 11.2210-20; 'The Trial of the Fox',
11.1132-38; 'The Fox, the Wolf, and the Flusbandman', 11.2431-33, respectively.
13. See above, Ch.3, pp.105-6.
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much more carefully considered. It is based on an awareness of the
constraints of vision and circumstance which affect the birds' actions: the
uncertainty of future contingencies which leads them not only to reject
the swallow's advice but to provide for the future in a different way from
what he suggests, and the hunger which compels them to scrape among
the chaff which the fowler lays for them as a trap. These considerations
complicate the birds' actions, introducing dimensions not considered in
the moralitas so that, erroneous as those actions may be in terms of their
worldly implications, it is not clear that they are morally condemnable in
absolute terms.
A similar consideration of circumstance characterises the
representation of Lowrence in 'The Fox and the Wolf. The depiction of
the wolf as a friar, 'Freir VolffWaitskaith' (1.667), introduces a strong
element of anti-clerical satire into the fable. The fox outlines the pastoral
role which the clergy are expected to perform in society:
'3e ar the lanterne and the sicker way
Suld gyde sic sempill folk as ne to grace [...].'
(11.677-78)
The distance between the ideal and the reality is evident in the absurdity
of having a wolf in a pastoral role, but is also illustrated in the confession
of Lowrence. The lupine friar absolves the fox of his sins, announcing
that 'heir I reik the full remissioun' (1.725), despite the fact that the
confession had been imperfect, with the fox lacking contrition and
refusing to resolve to avoid sin in future.
Henryson's depiction of the clergy here brings to mind the point
which Sir David Lindsay makes in Ane Satyre of the Thrie Esaitis when
Wantonnes counsels the king thus:
Beleive ye, Sir, that lecherie be sin?
Na, trow nocht that! This is my ressoun quhy:
First at the Romane [court] will ye begin,
Quhilk is the lemand lamp of lecher [...].
(11. 235-38)
The clergy's tolerance or even active espousal of sin, given that it is to
them that one looks for moral guidance and example, makes moral evils
appear acceptable to the laity and misleads them as to the true
significance of their own actions. Reading 'The Fox and the Wolf with an
eye to these matters, and recognising that Lowrence's inability to reform
is exacerbated by such conditions, strengthens the sympathy with which
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the text invites one to view his behaviour and makes his error appear
understandable, suggesting that simple condemnation is not an
appropriate response.
The moralitas, however, takes no account of the circumstantial
constraints on moral understanding and activity which the narrative
highlights. Its judgement of the fox remains implacably based on absolute
principles, defining his imperfect confession as an instance ofwilful
depravity:
For mony gois now to confessioun
Can not repent, nor for their sinnis greit,
Because thay think thair lustie lyfe sa sweit.
(11.779-81)
Assigning Lowrence's inability to repent or promise to forego further sin
to 'consuetude and ryte' (1.782), the moralitas wholly disregards the tale's
attention to the failure of the clergy to provide moral guidance, ignoring
the fact that the wolf has encouraged Lowrence to believe that the
attitudes with which he approaches confession are acceptable and that he
has been granted absolution. The narrative's foregrounding of the
external factors which deceive Lowrence's understanding questions the
authority of the essentialising judgement of the moralitas, making its
straightforward condemnation appear insensitive to the temporal
complexities by which actions are necessarily circumscribed.
The narrative's consideration of circumstance, however, appears to
have equally dubious implications. In 'The Preaching', the birds are
shown to have been misled by circumstantial considerations parallel to
those which lead the narrator to adopt a view that jars with the
moralitas. This raises doubts over the wisdom of the narrator's
perspective, suggesting that his failure to respect the absolute decrees of
the moral law perpetuates an outlook which leads to confusion and error
in this life, and damnation in the next. Similarly, in 'The Fox and the
Wolf, the suggestion in the narrative that Lowrence's imperfect
confession need not be met with moral condemnation parallels the wolfs
rather liberal failure to condemn Lowrence and make clear to him the
conditions he must meet if he desires absolution and salvation.
Moreover, in questioning the moralitas' insistence that the proper
reception of the sacrament is an essential and non-negotiable criterion for
salvation (this being the orthodox position of the Catholic church, then as
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now14), and suggesting that its necessity for the remission of sin can be
countermanded by the exigencies of circumstance, the narrative repeats
the obfuscation of absolute laws which is responsible for leading the fox
into error in the first place. These aspects of the fables lend urgency to
the moralitates' negative reflection on the tales' attention to the
mitigations of local circumstance. They reinforce the suggestion that
such attention is a source ofmoral confusion which obscures the relation
between ideal values and actual reality and leads to the delusive
perceptions of the fox, the friar/wolf, and the birds in 'The Preaching'.
Indeed, 'The Fox and the Wolf establishes an analogy between the
sympathetic outlook of the narrative and the wolfs perversion of the
sacrament of penance. According to Aquinas, 'sacramenta necessaria
sunt ad humanam salutem inquantum sunt quaedam sensibilia signa
invisibilium rerum quibus homo sanctificatur.' (ST, III, q.61, art.3, resp.)
He observes that the condition of human nature
est ut per corporalia et sensibilia in spiritualia et intelligibilia
deducatur. [...] Nam si spirituali nuda ei proponerentur, eius
animus applicari non posset, corporalibus deditus.
(Ibid., art.l, resp.)
The confession which Lowrence makes is one in which the corporeal signs
of the ritual, stripped of any spiritual significance by the wolf, mislead
him as to the true significance of his actions. The narrative's
foregrounding of contingent, contextual considerations similarly assigns
Lowrence's actions a significance in which their disconsonance with
absolute laws is marginalised as a judgemental criterion. This suggests
that, as with the wolfs imperfect administration of the sacrament of
confession, the tale's focus on temporal, causal relations embroils the
understanding in signs which are devoid of any underlying substance,
and which obstruct the proper grasp of the ideal moral norms which
should govern our understanding of reality.
The different perspectives presented in the fable, then, are
juxtaposed in a mutually destabilising manner, each reflecting critically
on the other. Henryson offers no means of either reconciling or choosing
between them. The fable leaves judgement suspended, its narrative
refusing to yield up any positive sententia. This impasse ofjudgement,
14. On the necessity of penance to salvation, see Aquinas, ST, III, q. 65, art.4,
resp.
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which leaves the understanding unable to distinguish between true and
false signs, reinforces the delusory power of Lowrence's false
representations, obstructing the right understanding of the moral
implications of actions when seen in the light of the moral law.
The tension between secularly and transcendently orientated
modes of judgement has dramatic social ramifications in 'The Wolf and
the Wether'. The moralitas to this fable constructs the wether's folly as
figuring the presumptuousness of those who seek to rise above their
station:
Thairfoir I counsell men of euerilk stait
To knaw thame self, and quhome thay suld forbeir,
And fall not with thair better in debait [...].
(11.2609-11)
Such actions are condemned as a disruption of social order, blurring the
proper hierarchical relation between different ranks in society as 'pure
men' 'counterfute ane lord in all degre' (2598), and 'lychtlie lordis in thair
deidis' (1.2604).
But the significance attached to the wether's actions in the tale do
not entirely support this reading, and in fact reflect critically on the
moralitas' conception of the social order. While the wether certainly
descends into folly with the announcement that 'It is not the lamb, hot
the, that I desyre' (1.2535), his initial enterprise appears commendable15.
Henryson stresses the helplessness of the shepherd upon the death of his
dog and his distress at the threat that he will lose his livelihood with
nothing to protect his flock from predators (2469-75), and foregrounds the
diligence of the wether in carrying out his new guard duty and the initial
success of his enterprise (11.2497-510). The moralitas, however, proffers a
wholesale condemnation of the wether's disregard of the social order
which neither recognises the virtuous aspects of his conduct nor considers
the consequences which would otherwise have ensued from the dog's
death. These evident exclusions mean that the moralitas offers no
rebuttal of the initial positive impression of the wether. It simply ignores
the considerations which give that impression.
In the relation between the tale and the moralitas of'The Wolf and
the Wether' Henryson again presents a disjunction between worldly-
15. See I.W.A. Jamieson, 'Henryson's Taill of the Wolf and the Wedder', Studies
in Scottish Literature, 6, no.4 (1969), 248-57 (pp.249-54); Newlyn, 'Affective Style', 49-50.
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orientated and idealising modes ofjudgement. The moralitas counsels
respect for the established social hierarchy as an absolute precept, to be
heeded regardless of context. This hierarchy is presented as naturally
ordained, inherent in the order of things. The moralitas assumes a
difference between 'pure men' and 'ane lord' (11.2596, 2598), and between
those of lowly estate and 'thair better' (1.2600), which is as clearly
established as the biological difference between the wether and the wolf
in the tale. The wether, had he taken the moralitas' advice, would be
commended for bringing himself into conformity with an ideal and
natural order, and with acting in accordance with justice by observing his
own status and his proper relation to others. But it is equally clear that
such conformity to an ideal would lead in actual terms to injustice,
denying the flock any protection from predators who would be left free to
rob and kill as they pleased. Paradoxically, then, it is through a breach of
the absolute precepts of the moral law that justice is actually established,
and an equitable relation between different groups preserved.
Conversely, conformity to an ideal principle of justice leads to actual
injustice and promotes social disorder and exploitation. In these
circumstances at least, the discontinuity between the particular and
universal resonances of things appears to be such as to deny absolute
precepts any value whatsoever as a principle of temporal order.
Henryson certainly attempts to deal with this problem in a manner
which can preserve a sense of the worldly value of transcendent moral
norms. Throughout the Fables he urges the powerful to cease their
exploitation and to accept the ethical responsibilities of their position. In
appealing to the authority of the king in 'The Wolf and the Lamb' he
seeks a legitimate means of enforcement which can be applied to 'mychtie
men' and which can compensate for the disempowerment of the poor, as
the king can protect their interests and take action against nobles and
other powerful figures without being seen to disrupt the social order. But
while in these respects the Fables looks forward to a reconciliation
between ideal precepts and human life it provides no resolution of the
interpretative problems presented in 'The Wolf and the Wether'. In the
situation which the tale depicts, the wether's conformity to his prescribed
role within the hierarchical ordering of things would result in a temporal
disorder which his disruption of the hierarchy serves to prevent. The
question of whether his presumptuousness in taking on the role of the
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dog is to be wholly condemned as an offence against the dictates of the
moral law, or whether the circumstances permit him to be viewed as
praiseworthy, in his initial conduct at least, is left unresolved. Again, the
fable yields no clear moral sentetitia, but rather testifies to the
uncertainty which attaches to particular actions as a consequence of the
problematic application of ideal norms in actual circumstances.
'The Wolf and the Wether' presents an analogy between disorder in
poetic signification and social disorder. The moralitas construes the
presumptuousness which it condemns as a privileging of appearance over
substance, whereby 'riches of array' (1.2595) leads people to 'counterfute'
their betters (1.2598). The true nature of things is obscured by false
signs. This aspect of the moralitas reflects on the temporally-orientated
understanding of the narrative. As preoccupation with 'riches of array'
constitutes a fixation on appearances which undermines the proper
perception of one's true status and leads to the disruption of the social
order, so too concern over the sensible dimensions of the wether's actions
obscures a proper grasp of their real nature defined in relation to the
absolute moral law. As the former threatens social stabililty, so the latter
threatens the stability ofmeaning as the text produces a significance
which denies moral precepts any universal validity and whose
judgements are determined solely according to localised considerations.
Both social and poetic disorder are attributed to a concern with veneers
which obscures a proper sense of the realities which underlie the signs.
Yet the fable also shows that conformity to ideal ethical principles,
far from realising the stability of the divine ordo on earth, can in given
situations actually exacerbate worldly disorder and lead to greater
suffering on the part of the innocent. The tale's conclusion shows not
only the reassertion of the order which the wether had disrupted, but also
of the tyranny of the wolf, against which there is now no protection (and
it is perhaps significant that this fable is immediately followed by 'The
Wolf and the Lamb'). The worldly-orientated mode of signification which
undermines the stability of both meaning and society, also appears to be
the only one capable of adapting to circumstances so as to produce value-
judgements that provide for some degree of actual order in society. This
facilitates greater particular reference and actual utility, and reflects
negatively on the moralitas' idealising mode ofjudgement. The
abstractive sententiae of the moralitas are shown to fail to address the
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exigencies of temporal existence, their inadequate applicability to
circumstances undermining the ethical applicability to circumstances
which is necessary if they are to have any positive material effect in the
world.
But the fable also indicates that this applicability can only be
achieved by compromising universal reference and depriving both
meaning and the social order of any legitimising ideal basis. 'The Wolf
and the Wether' thus presents an image of a social disorder whose
irreducible nature is figured in the poem's disjunctive significative
structure, which testifies to the fable's failure to provide any satisfactory
criteria for establishing moral and social order.
All of the fables discussed above express an inability to establish a
perspective in which a focus on the significance which human actions
accrue in their temporal dimensions can be harmoniously conjoined with
attention to that which derives from their ideal resonances. The former
emphasis provides a mode of vision which, in adapting meaning according
to the exigencies of circumstance, becomes dissociated from any absolute
values. The latter emphasis results in an abstractive perspective which,
while maintaining reference to regulatory moral norms, provides no
guidance as to how they are to be brought to bear in various particular
contexts. In order to sustain their pre-eminence in moral judgement it is
forced to dismiss from consideration any worldly aspects of human
actions which contest the authority of such absolute determinations. The
result, as displayed in the tension between sympathy and judgement
which so often characterises the ta\e/moralitas relation in the Fables, is
to cast doubt on the validity of both modes of judgement. The
significances adduced in each are shown to provide only partial
representations of reality. The knowledge they produce is arrived at only
through an interpretative process of discrimination and exclusion. They
provide sententiae whose incapacity to encompass within their referential
scope the universal and particular resonances of reality leaves the human
understanding always open to doubt and error in being unable to
transcend the uncertainties of signs.
These fables, in their juxtaposition of sympathy and judgement,
embody the tension between the idealising and affective emphases of
Scholastic literary theory. The obscurity of vision which plagues the
characters in the fables, impeding their capacity to determine the truth
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or falsehood of different representations of their actions, reflects
outwardly on the disjunction between narrative and moralitas, which
inscribes that same uncertainty in the structure of the fables themselves.
For Henryson, the power of poetry to communicate truth is disabled by a
general disruption ofmoral perception. The interference between modes
of judgement based on circumstantial and absolute considerations results
from the ontological and epistemological privilege afforded to the
individual in the later Middle Ages, which prevents a thing's nature from
being reducible within universal categories. That Henryson's
commitment to both the key imperatives of Scholastic theory should
undermine literature's capacity to convey truth, leading to a sense of
meaning's being breached from reality, testifies to the extent to which the
Scholastic conception of literature has become unsustainable.
4
Henryson's concern over the disruption ofmeaning which occurs in poetry
is qualitatively different from that expressed by early-medieval thinkers.
The earlier attitude towards imaginative writing distinguished such
discourse as a special linguistic case in which the proper relation between
sign and meaning that operated in ordinary discursive language was
distorted. For Henryson, however, poetic signification is undermined by
its participation in a larger ontological and epistemological crisis which
affects moral judgement in general. Furthermore, early-medieval
concerns were largely founded on a concern over literature's
foregrounding of the contingent basis ofmeaning. Henryson certainly
retains this suspicion towards the suggestion that meaning is merely
materially-grounded. But his work equally expresses reservations about
universalised sententiae which themselves take on a figmentary quality.
The disruption of signification which literature presents derives from the
interference between the material and transcendent significances, and
involves a recognition of the relative inadequacies and virtues of both.
Again, this suggests that the problem is not one proper to poetry, but
derives from the general sense of the disproportion between universals
and particulars which developed in late-medieval philosophy. Indeed, the
fables' depictions of the failures and abuses of rhetoric, legal argument,
preaching, and even the sacraments, show that the problem is one which
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poetry expresses rather than produces. Yet Henryson retains an aspect
of the early-medieval view which would seem to run counter to this
emphasis. He constructs poetry as embodying a sensual outlook which
distorts moral perception, and he assigns it an exemplary status which
makes it not merely one among a number of discourses which have
become problematic but places it at the very core of the problems of
representation which he addresses.
Henryson's view of poetry as an exemplar of deficient moral
judgement is imaged in the final fable: 'The Paddock and the Mouse'. The
moralitas in this fable urges that one should beware of being misled by
false appearances and delusory signs:
Ane fals intent vnder ane fair pretence
Hes causit mony innocent for to de;
Grit folie is to gif ouer sone credence
To all that speiks fairlie vnto the;
Ane silkin toung, ane hart of crueltie,
Smytis more soir than ony schot of arrow;
Brother, gif thow be wyse, I reid the fie
To matche the with ane thrawart fen3eit marrow.
(11.2918-21)
The tale, however, suggests that this is easier said than done. The mouse
is in fact suspicious of the toad, reading her appearance as a sign of
deceitfulness: '"Giff I can ony skill of phisnomy, / Thow hes sumpart off
falset and inuy.'" (11.2824-25)16 Yet, as Robert Pope has shown, even if
one accepts the validity of physiognomic analysis, it can still be
misleading. Pope points out that the section on physiognomy in the
Secreta Secretorum is prefaced by a cautionary tale in which the disciples
ofHippocrates become outraged when a physiognomist declares a picture
of their master to be lecherous and a deceiver. When they report this to
Hippocrates himself, he replies that it is true, but that he had exercised
himself to overcome his evil disposition. 'It was clearly possible', Pope
observes, 'to belie one's physical appearance by an effort of the Spirit.'17
The mouse, then, has no certain means of discerning whether the
impression of the toad which she forms from outward appearances is
accurate or not.
16. That the mouse here accurately applies physiognomical tradition is
demonstrated by Robert Pope in 'A Sly Toad, Physiognomy, and the Problem of Deceit:
Henryson's The Paddock and the Mous', Neophilologus, 63 (1979), 461-68 (pp.463-64).
17. Ibid., 466-67 (p.467).
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Moreover, in affirming his trustworthiness, the toad expresses
contempt for all forms of deception in tones which echo the warning of the
moralitas in insisting that one should not judge by merely superficial
criteria:
'Off sum the face may be full flurischand,
Off silkin toung and cheir rycht amorous,
With mynd inconstant, fals, and wariand,
Full of desait and menis cautelous.1
(11.2847-50)
That the toad should employ the very advice propounded in the moralitas
problematises the task of proper discernment yet further: the counsels of
virtue can themselves be employed to mislead. The moralitas1 simple
imperative that one should beware of falsehood provides no indication as
to how one is to distinguish truth from mendacity when the
understanding must negotiate among conflicting signs whose relation to
substances is not evident. And yet the fable's brutal conclusion stresses
the urgency of arriving at correct judgement, showing the dreadful
consequences of failing to do so.
The moralitas sets the problem of right discernment within the
opposition of the soul and the body, the former striving to embrace
spiritual things, the latter drawing it towards the false good of carnality
(11.2934-2961). 'The Paddock and the Mouse' connects this opposition
directly to the interpretative difficulties which beset the Fables, evoking
the traditional construction of the flesh as the signs of the text and the
spirit its inward sententia. The mouse's desire to reach the far bank is
explained in the tale in terms which echo the imagery with which the
'Prologue' describes fable:
'Seis thow', quod scho, 'Off corne 3one iolie flat,
Off ryip aitis, off barlie, peis and queheit?
I am hungrie, and fane wald be thair at,
But I am stoppit be this watter greit;
And on this syde I get na thing till eit
Bot hard nuttis, quhilkis with my teith I bore:
Wer I be3ond. my feist wer fer the more.
(11.2791-97)
The abundance of the far fields recalls the comparison of the sententia of
fable to corn 'Hailsum and gude to mannis sustenance' (11.10-12), and the
'doctrine wyse aneuch / And full of frute' which is concealed beneath the
'nuttis schell', 'hard and teuch' (11.15-18). In the moralitas the far bank
represents heaven and spiritual reward:
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The saull rycht fane wald be brocht ouer, I wis,
Out of this warld into the heuinnis blis.
(11.2960-61)
The relation between the narrative, the moralitas, and the 'Prologue'
establishes a chain of associations wherein the obscurity of vision which
leads the mouse to be deceived by the toad is linked to the subjection of
the soul to sensuality, and to the difficulty of deriving an authoritative
sententia from the fables. This conjoins with other references in the
Fables, to the 'fen3eit' text, and to the 'poleit termis' of the perverters of
the law, to associate a general obscuring ofmoral perception with poetic
signification. The uncertainty which attaches to ethical determinations
and the consequent exposure of the understanding to the immanent risk
of error is consistently referred back to the obfuscatory and deceptive
character of poetry. This aspect of the Fables does not simply depict
poetry as participating in a general disruption of moral judgement.
Henryson's emphasis also suggests that this disruption can be viewed as
a general extension of poetic signification which makes it the defining
model of a fractured moral perception.
This construction of poetic signification as the paradigm for the
problems of representation which lead to moral and social disorder also
appears in 'The Lion and the Mouse'. This is the only one of the fables in
which the ideals of the moralitas are seen to operate in the world of the
tale, and where rational persuasion is seen to be successful. The lion's
ability to think and act 'according to ressoun' (1.1504) in accordance with
the prompting of the mouse ensures a harmonious relation between king
and subjects which is conducive to the maintenance of the social order,
resulting in a positive outcome to the fable. Like the Testament of
Cresseid, 'The Lion and the Mouse' constructs a model of signification in
which the text recommends a set of values whose virtue is defined both in
absolute terms with reference to the a priori moral law, and in terms of
their pragmatic secular worth. The moralitas' explication of the fable
encompasses both of these dimensions. The underlying cause of the lion's
initial lack of vigilance, and of the general failure of rulers 'to reule and
steir the land, and justice keip', is defined as sensuality: the moralitas
associates such behaviour with 'lustis', 'the warld and his prosperitie',
'fals plesance' (11.1580-86). Equally, considerable emphasis is placed on
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the fact that such behaviour has negative temporal consequences,
resulting in disorder and rebellion in the realm:
Thir lytill myis ar hot the commountie,
Wantoun, vnwyse, without correctioun;
Thair lordis and princis quhen that thay se
Of iustice mak nane executioun,
Thay dreid na thing to mak rebellioun
And disobey, for quhy thay stand nane aw,
That garris thame thair soueranis misknaw.
(11.1587-1600)
The value of wise and proper administration ofjustice on the part of
rulers thus consists in its bringing them into conformity with their
divinely-appointed role and hence with the divine will, and in the social
stability which is shown to result from this conformity. The moralitas'
emphasis on fortune, and on the power of the values which it
recommends to protect against its vicissitudes (11.1601-7), suggests an
organic relation between these two levels of significance, much as was
seen in the Testament. Temporal instability is seen as a consequence of a
moral disorder which places one out of harmony with the divine will as
expressed through the moral law. Conformity to that law results in a
participation in the divine will which sees something of its order and
stability established on earth.
The mode of signification proposed in 'Lion and the Mouse' thus
retains reference to ideal norms per simplice, and affirms that diverse
particular actions can be assimilated within them. The moralitas
expressly indicates that the sententia which it propounds has a normative
value which extends its reference across a range of specific contexts. The
lion 'May signifie ane prince or emperiour, / Ane potestate, or Jit ane king
with croun' (11.1574-75). Aesop's moralisation concludes with a gesture
which leaves further particularisations of the general precepts of the
moralitas to the audience:
Mair till expound, as now, I lett allane,
Bot king and lord may weill wit quhat I mene:
Figure heirof oftymis hes bene sene.
(11.1612-14)
The interpretative approach which these lines invite is admirably
displayed in the various modern allegorical readings of the fable, in which
a range of precise historical reference to events in the reign of James III
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have been proposed18. The fable is designed to communicate values
whose normative status makes them applicable in diverse contexts,
without having their authority restricted to or solely defined within any
one set of circumstances. In this, 'The Lion and the Mouse' proposes a
means of understanding the relation between general norms and diverse
particulars which conforms to that described by Aquinas:
Dicendum quod quia infinitas singularium non potest ratione
humana comprehendi, inde est quod sunt 'incertae providentae
nostrae', ut dicitur Sap.ix [Wis. 9:14], Tamen per experientiam
singularia infinita reducuntur ad aliqua finita quae ut in pluribus
accidunt, quorum cognitio sufflcit ad prudentiam humanam.
(ST, II-II, q.xlvii, art.3, ad.2)
The narrative of 'The Lion and the Mouse' provides an image of the
general rule according to which the values it propounds apply across
various circumstances. Further and more highly particularised
determinations are left to the readers, who are encouraged to relate those
values to whatever situations are closest to their own experience.
'The Lion and the Mouse' thus posits an unproblematic relation
between particular situations and universal precepts in which the former,
being readily intelligible in the light of the latter, are open to an
assimilation thereto which allows actual reality to participate in the
stability of ideal principles of order. The fable communicates simple
absolute values while still being able to address and resolve the
uncertainties ofworldly life. This faith in the capacity of the actual to be
raised to the level of the ideal, and of the ideal to be actually manifested,
is also evident from the fact that the fable continues the heuristic
emphasis seen in 'The Cock and the Jasp'. Aesop begins the moralitas
with the words 'As I suppois' (1.1573), emphasising the provisionality of
the interpretation he offers and leaving the fable open to other possible
readings, according to the varying ethical priorities of different readers.
18. On the historical reference of'The Lion and the Mouse', see Marshall W.
Stearns, Robert Henryson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp.16-18;
Robert L. Kindrick, 'Lion or Cat?: Henryson's Characterization of James III', Studies in
Scottish Literature, 14 (1979), 123-35 (pp. 128-31); John MacQueen, Robert Henryson,
pp.170-73); Ranald Nicholson, Scotland: The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1974), pp.508-9. For reservations about such precise political
allegorisation, with specific reference to 'The Lion and the Mouse', see R.J. Lyall,
'Politics and Poetry in Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Scotland' Scottish Literary
Journal, 3 (1976), no.2, 5-29 (pp.7-10); Steven R. McKenna, 'Legends of James III and
the Problem of Henryson's Topicality', Scottish Literary Journal, 17 (1990), no.l, 5-19
(pp.11-12).
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Henryson extends the text's significance so as to encompass readings
which break the organic relation between tale and moralitas whereby the
practical resonances of ideal values are displayed. In doing so he
expresses a conviction as to his audience's ability to construct sententiae
in view of their own moral requirements. The audience is seen as being
readily capable of assimilating ideal values, arriving at a material grasp
of their virtue, and perceiving their pertinence to their own lives.
'The Lion and the Mouse' has nothing of the Testament's sensitivity
to the tensions between idealising and concretising modes ofjudgement.
The fable expresses a sure faith in the possibility of discerning the ideal
resonances of concrete actions, and of assimilating contingent reality
within the frame of absolute norms in a manner which provides a clear
means of addressing and resolving the uncertainties ofworldly life. Ideal
values are seen as being clearly realisable, raising human existence to
the highest level of its nature, and bringing to it the stability which
results from conformity with the divine Will as exercised through the
moral law. As in Scholastic literary theory, there is no sense that the
communication ofmoral norms, expressed in simple form, in any way
conflicts with the imperative that they be practically applied. The
moralitas' invitation to the audience to provide further particularisation
of its sententia, and even to construct sententia of their own, indicates a
faith in the human capacity to relate universals to particulars which
suggests that the idealising and ethical imperatives of Scholastic theory
are once again harmonised. Henryson is certainly more attentive to the
practical as well as intrinsic value of moral imperatives than his
Scholastic forebears. But he nevertheless expresses in this fable a
conception of the relation between the universal and the particular which
is free of the complications which develop as the later Middle Ages
progresses, and which sees the Scholastic vision of literature reaffirmed.
Other aspects of'The Lion and the Mouse', however, qualify its
optimistic vision of literary representation and of social justice. The fable
is unique in the collection in being set within the framing device of a
dream. This suggests that the congruence between normative precepts
and actual circumstances which it posits remains conjectural, its
realisation seeming a distant and ephemeral prospect. Indeed, 'The Lion
and the Mouse' in fact evokes an ideal of poetry in the face ofwhich the
rest of the Fables stands condemned. As Ian Jamieson has pointed out,
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the moralitas' reading of the lion sleeping under a tree as an emblem of
rulers who neglect their duties in pursuing worldly pleasures reflects also
on the narrator, who himself falls asleep under a tree in the prologue.
Similarly, the moralitas' description of the forest, which symbolises 'the
warld and his prosperitie' (1.1582), applies the moral to the narrator's
world as much as to the world ofAesop's narrative. In the tale, we are
only told that the lion 'lay in the fair forest' (1.1408). The moralitas'
reference to 'foulis sang and flouris ferlie sweit' (1.1581) supplies details
which are drawn from the description of the forest in which the narrator
walks and falls asleep in the prologue (11.1321-41)19. In this respect, 'The
Lion and the Mouse' accuses the narrator/poet himself of a worldliness of
vision, and implicates the other fables in the collection in that
worldliness.
'The Lion and the Mouse' thus directly associates the moral chaos
which ensues from the failure to attain a relation of congruence between
normative moral values and actual situations with the problems of poetic
signification with which Henryson wrestles in fables such as 'The Two
Mice'. The prudential function of poetry as defined in Scholastic literary
theory, whereby it facilitates the relation of universals to particulars in
moral understanding and action, is one which the Fables strives towards,
but fails to achieve. Various literary strategies are proffered in an
attempt to establish a mode of representation capable of establishing
reference to universal norms and relating these cogently to particular
circumstances. But invariably, each suggested mode is undermined by
other aspects of the Fables. The collection constitutes a nexus of
proposals, critiques, and counter-proposals which ultimately leaves
judgement suspended and appears pessimistic as to the possibility of
settling the questions which it addresses. Nor does 'The Lion and the
Mouse' provide any satisfactory resolution of the difficulties. The fable,
like the Testament, assumes a neat congruence between ideal virtues and
the particular consequences of actions conducted in conformity with those
virtues, but it fails to consider situations such as that depicted in 'The
Two Mice', where concretising and idealising determinations of an
action's significance conflict with one another. 'The Lion and the Mouse'
provides no answers to the problems of representation which Henryson
19. See I.W.A. Jamieson, 'Some Attitudes to Poetry in Late Fifteenth-Century
Scotland1, Studies in Scottish Literature, 15 (1977-78), 28-42 (p.35).
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faces. Rather, it presents a challenge, establishing the ideal of poetry
which the fables must realise if they are to maintain any persuasive
moral force. The actual literary difficulties which Henryson confronts in
trying to achieve this mean that poetry appears as part of the problem,
not as part of the solution.
One further significant aspect of 'The Lion and the Mouse' appears
in the interplay between the differing claims as to its authorship, its
being ascribed overtly to Aesop and covertly to the narrator. This
suggests that Henryson considers the deficiencies of poetry which he
depicts to be a product of his own age. In attributing the poem to Aesop
Henryson associates his ideal of persuasive moral representation with the
auctoritas of the ancients, presenting this auctoritas as something to
which the modern writer should aspire. But in setting it within a dream,
and having it comment adversely on the problematic status of the other
fables in the collection, he suggests that such auctoritas is not easily
emulated in his own day. It demands a capacity on the part of both poet
and audience to grasp the relation between particular actions and the
moral law which, as Aesop's own animadversions against the corruption
of the narrator's epoch indicate, has been lost in the decadence of the
modern age:
'Now in this warld me think richt few or nane
To goddis word that hes deuotioun [...].
Sa roustit is the warld with canker blak
That now my taillis may lytill succour mak.'
(11.1391-97)
This suggests that at one time fables would indeed have had a positive
effect, but that the capacity to respond positively to them has been lost.
Indeed, even the capacity of modern writers to construct fables which can
present a coherent moral vision in a manner capable of addressing the
problems of the times is in doubt. ('The Lion and the Mouse' itself, of
course, in its assumption of the unproblematic application ofmoral norms
in actual circumstances, is ill-adapted to the Weltanschauung of
Henryson's age.)
'The Lion and the Mouse' again illustrates the intimate connection
between literary, moral, and social questions in Henryson's work. The
problems resulting from the lack of contiguity between universals and
particulars, the ideal and the actual, which disable poetic signification
and undermine the moral efficacy of literature are the same as those
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which impede ethical judgement in general and lead to moral and social
disorder. But the way in which Henryson consistently refers such
disorder, and the fractured moral perception which produces it, back to
problems of poetic signification makes it clear that questions regarding
the epistemological status of literature are central to his ethical and
social thought.
It is the textuality of poetry, the prominence of the signifier in its
constitution, which leads Henryson to attribute to it the negative
paradigmatic quality which it takes on in the Fables. The problems that
the lack of proportion between universals and particulars produces, and
which Henryson addresses and analyses so rigorously in terms of their
literary, moral, and social implications, result in both abstractive and
concretising modes of ethical judgement assuming a figmentary textual
complexion. Both appear as partial, exclusory perspectives, generating
significances which are distanced from the realities they purport to
evaluate, being constituted through textualising processes of
differentiation and prioritisation. Meaning takes on a fictive, constructed
quality, which associates it with the artifice of a poetic language whose
signings are once more felt to actively obstruct the mind's grasp of truth,
rather than serving as instruments which facilitate it.
In the Fables, poetry has regained its early-medieval associations
with a disruptive textuality which undermines meaning even as it is
posited. But the destabilisation ofmeaning which Henryson associates
with poetry appears in a form which is particular to Henryson's post-
Nominalist milieu. The text presents an interference between sententiae
derived from structurations which privilege either its syntagmatic or
paradigmatic axes. This produces a tension between discrete levels of
meaning, established on the level of narrative syntax and through prior
reference, which causes both to appear as a relative construct, each
foregrounding the other's exclusions and limitations. This differs from
the early-medieval perception of the literary text as distracting from a
proper consideration of the relation of meaning to ideal truth through its
ornate language and fictionality. Henryson insists that the teachings and
tenets which a text presents must be attuned to both the absolute and the
contingent dimensions of the actions ofwhich they are predicated. The
difficulty involved in combining these results in a destabilisation of poetic
meaning which is much more radical and far-reaching than in the early-
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medieval conception. Being symptomatic of a disorder which is endemic
in moral judgement in general, it leaves little possibility of stepping
outside the realm of textuality to arrive at a clear perception of the true
nature of reality.
But for all that the breach between sign and referent which the
Fables depicts and embodies is of general application and has a
distinctive late-medieval configuration, Henryson's commitment to
Scholastic theory leads him to construe that breach as being first and
foremost a property of literary signification, and its more widespread
effects as an extension of a disruptive potential inherent in literature. As
has already been pointed out with regard to 'The Cock and the Jasp' and
'The Trial of the Fox', Henryson is well aware of the inherently disruptive
effects of poetic language and of the dangers of its exceeding the limits of
the instrumental role defined for it in Scholastic literary theory (above,
Ch.3, pp. 124-25). Fables such as these show that the value he places on
the idealising heuristic tendency of Scholasticism is founded on a clear
recognition of the dangers of privileging the particular formulations of the
text as the prime determinant of its significance. To read in such a
manner is to undermine the authority of whatever meaning is posited,
presenting it as defined merely by accidents of context and perspective,
and lacking in any relation to the substantial nature of the actions and
incidents depicted. It is this sense of a disruptive potential intrinsic to
poetic discourse which induces Henryson to construct poetry as the
paradigm of a general destabilisation ofmoral perception. The collapse of
the Scholastic model of literature and the development of the sense of the
disproportionate relation between the ideal and the actual, are
constructed as a general eruption of forces which had always been an
implicit threat within literary discourse, so that a previously restricted
poetic textuality now extends to encompass ethical judgement in general.
The breakdown of the Scholastic conception of literature sees the return
of the forces which the Scholastics sought to contain. The disruptive
power of literature which aroused early-medieval suspicion thus
reappears in Henryson's work in a greatly heightened form.
That the disintegration of the Scholastic model of literature should
be imaged in terms derived from that same model testifies to Henryson's
vast debt to Scholastic literary theory. The Fables shows Henryson's
engagement with that theory to be profound, intensely clear-sighted, and
259
significant in ways which extend far beyond any narrow conception of
literary concerns. His rigorous anatomising of the tensions which have
by his time developed between the affective and idealising imperatives of
Scholastic theory testifies to the critical character of his engagement with
that theory, as he subjects the conventional Scholastic protocols to an
interrogation which ruthlessly exposes their incapacity to fulfil the
ethical function assigned to them. Henryson's creative deployment of the
resources of Scholastic theory, which he adapts and modifies, tapping
their transformative potential in an attempt to develop new modes of
signification, further testifies to the creativity and independence ofmind
with which he uses traditional materials.
At the same time, Henryson remains deeply committed to the
Scholastic vision of literature. His creativity is motivated by the desire to
reconcile the two conflicting axes of Scholastic theory in order to maintain
the key aspects of its definition of literature in an environment where
their combination has become highly problematic. The tensions between
the different modes of signification which prevent Henryson's writings
from ever settling into any stable synthesis are structured by a desire to
see both the affective and idealising prerequisites of Scholasticism
fulfilled. This unstinting desire persists even when the incompatibility of
these imperatives impedes Henryson's capacity to provide any cogent
form of moral representation. These aspects of his work demonstrate the
strength of his commitment to the imperatives of Scholastic theory, which
provide the underlying motivation for even the most innovatory features
of his work. What Henryson derives from the Scholastics is not a set of
normative literary protocols. Rather it is a set of problems and resources
which ensure that he approaches Scholastic theory as a dynamic system.
His Scholastic inheritance motivates and facilitates the development of a
diverse range of literary strategies, prompting and enabling an
experimental approach which generates literary attitudes and modes of
representation that often depart radically from established medieval
conventions.
Henryson's analysis of problems of moral representation also
indicates his awareness that the problems posed for him by Scholastic
literary theory raise issues which are more than merely aesthetic, but
which reflect more broadly on problems of ethical judgement and of social
justice. The semiotic difficulties raised in Henryson's work not only
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disrupt the coherence of poetic representation. They also forestall the
possibility of establishing order and equity in society and impede moral
judgement in a manner which has deleterious consequences in both
spiritual and material terms. The collapse of Scholastic literary theory
brings to light semiotic quandaries which are at the root ofmore general
moral and social problems. These quandaries ultimately revolve around
the epistemological status of literature, whose textuality embodies for
Henryson, to an even greater degree than for early-medieval thinkers, a
destabilisation ofmeaning which undermines all established principles of
order, even those according to which its own representations are
constructed.
This is not, however, to say that Henryson's work should be
deemed a failure. Certainly, Henryson appears deeply frustrated over
the difficulty of arriving at any coherent form of moral representation, in
literature or elsewhere. The Fables maintains a persistent emphasis on
the imminence of a divine judgement for which humanity's fractured
moral understanding leaves it ill-prepared. This paints a pessimistic
picture, and one which clearly views the failures of poetry in a negative
light. But considered as an anatomy of the factors which produce the
dissolution of Scholastic literary theory and result in the collapse and
abandonment of established medieval modes of signification, Henryson's
work is massively impressive in its acuity and insight. Faced with a
crisis of representation which not only undermines the conceptual
categories which shape his understanding of literature, but also
threatens his whole conception of moral and social order, Henryson
squarely confronts and works through the problems, attempting to
resolve them while refusing any retreat into evasiveness or
oversimplification. That no coherent vision emerges from his work is not
a flaw. It is testimony to the rigour of Henryson's interrogation of the
Scholastic conception of literature, and to the clarity with which he
perceives and articulates the implications of the semiotic issues at stake
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